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SUMMARY 
1. The point of departure is what many regard as 
the normal situation: a security is listed on a 
stock exchange and is traded on that exchange 
exclusively. However, from this appealing and orderly 
situation there are deviations, varying in extent 
from country to country. Thus the question arises 
why some securities are traded on several exchanges 
or even both on and off exchanges while others 
are not traded on an exchange at all. 
2. These deviations must be measured against a well 
founded criterion if their advantages and disad-
vantages are to be established convincingly. 
Procedural efficiency is such a criterion. It is 
developed in Part 1 on the basis of the interests 
of investors and issuers. An increase in procedural 
efficiency will reduce the difference between the 
effective yield of the investor and cost of capital 
of the issuer. Procedural efficiency includes 
criteria such as market depth, market breadth, low 
commissions, competition and investor protection. 
3. Part 2 describes how securities are traded on the 
secondary markets of the member countries of the 
European Communities, in Japan and in the United 
States. The detailed analysis shows that con-
centration of dealings on one stock exchange is 
the exception, rather than the rule. Even where a 
high degree of concentration is achieved, the 
securities are not traded according to a single 
procedure, but trading of active and inactive - XVIII -
securities is organized differently (vertical 
segmentation). In addition, dealings in a 
security are often spread over several markets 
(horizontal segmentation)• Segmentation results 
from the efforts of security-dealing firms to 
reduce the cost of producing transaction services, 
and to adjust the quality of transaction services 
to investor needs. 
Vertical segmentation enhances the procedural 
efficiency of the secondary market. Where a large 
number of securities are traded, ranging from 
exceptionally active securities to issues usually 
not dealt in at all, four vertical segments are 
useful. In the upper two segments, the auction 
principle will normally determine trading proce-
dures, in the third segment trading is founded on 
the market-maker principle, while for securities 
rarely dealt in, plain brokerage techniques 
suffice. In order to ensure that technical progress 
and changes in investors' preferences are promptly 
translated into improved transaction services and 
advanced trading procedures, there should be 
competing market organizers for individual vertical 
segments or parts thereof, even if certain 
facilities have to be duplicated. For the lower 
segments, it is of no consequence whether the 
market organizer is a stock exchange or not. 
Horizontal segmentation is characterized by two 
types of trading: trading off the principal market 
at that market's prices, e. g. in-house crossing, 
and trading on sub-markets on which prices are 
established autonomicly, e. g. parallel markets. - XIX -
In the first case the positive effects on proce-
dural efficiency generally dominate. On balance, 
there are more disadvantages than advantages 
to the second type of trading. In particular, 
this applies to intra-country parallel markets 
if competition with other markets is restrained. 
A securities market policy of the European 
Communities should not seek to influence directly 
the structures of the national secondary markets, 
but should lay the foundations for the competition 
of market organizers, so as to indirectly achieve 
markets properly segmented and adapted to the 
conditions prevailing in each country. These 
foundations would also help to eliminate distortions 
in intra-Community competition, which will tend 
to become keener as economic and monetary integration 
progresses. - XXI -
PREFACE 
Towards the end of 19 74 I was asked to produce a 
study by the end of 1975 for the staff of the 
Commission of the European Communities on the 
structure of the securities markets in the member 
countries and to consider whether, in the interests 
of the proper functioning of the Common Market, 
similar organization forms are needed for the 
secondary markets in the various countries of the 
Community. I accepted this task for three reasons: 
in the first place, the study would be of value to 
the division planning the securities market policy 
of the Commission; secondly, securities market 
organization lies at the heart of my research 
activity; thirdly, when a scholar is asked to comment 
on questions of public interest, he should do so. 
This report was submitted in two parts. The original 
request concerned only the secondary markets in the 
countries of the Community. The study report was 
filed in December 19 75. A second agreement brought 
Japan and the United States into the scope of the 
study as well. In November 19 76 I completed the 
second report. The work now presented is a consolidation 
of the two reports. In some cases the earlier reports 
have been updated. 
Without the invaluable support from many sides I 
would surely not have been able to submit this 
report. Many stock exchanges, bankers, brokers and 
supervisory authorities have kindly provided me 
with information and sent me their publications. - XXII -
Many experts have made themselves available and 
have patiently answered my questions (see pages 
442 - 444) . I am particularly grateful to them. 
Mr. Pierre Welter, Principal Administrator in the 
division XV/A/3 of the Commission, made valuable 
suggestions after reading the first part of the 
report as to which problems required analysis 
in depth from the point of view of his department. 
I thank Dr. Hans-Jiirgen Lwowski for the useful 
contacts he arranged for me. I am indebted to my 
assistants, Mr. Hermann Reuter and Mr. Eckart Milden-
stein, who consulted experts in Italy and France, 
collected material there and collated it for me; 
to Mrs. Ursula Liiders and Mrs. Lieselotte Bode for 
typing various versions of the report; to Mr. Michael 
Doberenz, who helped me in preparing the manuscript; 
and to Mrs. Irene Otto and Mr. Joachim Daduna, 
who relieved me of proofreading and of much of the 
library work. 
Hamburg, March 1, 19 77. H.S, - 1 -
INTRODUCTION 
Most observers of the stock exchange scene will at some 
time have asked themselves one of the following 
questions: 
Is it a good idea to have several stock exchanges 
existing side by side? 
Why are different prices quoted on different 
stock exchanges at the same time for one and 
the same security? 
Why do not all stock exchanges use the same 
trading procedures? 
Why do not all securities enjoy the benefit of 
orderly and "transparent" stock exchange dealing? 
Is there a trend towards a central stocx exchange? 
Isolated questions like these can be subsumed into the 
main question of the advantages and disadvantages of an 
integrated as opposed to a fragmented secondary stock 
market. There are several such advantages and disad-
vantages. To set them out would seem at first glance 
a simple matter. One can list the tasks of a stock market 
and examine the contribution of one or other types of 
market structure to the fulfilling of these tasks. _ •) 
The tasks of a stock market are basically: 
- to enable investors to buy or sell securities 
regularly or even instantly; 
to determine and publish prices of a certain 
quality; 
to improve the liquidity and marketability of 
securities and to improve the depth of the market; 
to protect investors and to put all users of the 
market on equal footing; 
to keep the cost of security-transaction services 
as low as possible; 
to reduce the difference between the cost of 
capital to issuers or borrowers and the yield 
to investors. 
Obviously this method would produce a more or less 
systematic enumeration of the advantages and disad-
vantages. But what is required is not merely a listing 
of pros and cons but an appraisal of various possible 
market structures. In order to arrive at least at a 
starting-point for an appraisal, we must link the 
above-mentioned criteria and merge them into a single 
overall criterion. Part 1 of the study is devoted to 
this aim. Part 2 gives a detailed description of the 
secondary stock markets of the countries of the European 
Community, Japan and the United States to provide a 
vivid understanding of existing and developing market 
structures. Finally in Part 3 typical elements of these 
market structures are evaluated. - 3 -
In order to arrive at a single, multi-dimensional 
criterion we use as our starting-point the most 
comprehensive of the criteria already mentioned, that 
of the margin between borrowers' cost of capital and 
investors' yields; it includes all other criteria 
stated above. The emphasis of the examination thus 
falls on the cost of the financial services provided 
by the security-dealing firms, whether they be banks 
or specialist undertakings such as broker firms. 
This approach is not unusual; it focusses on the 
efficiency of the stock markets. It is only new insofar 
as it takes into account defective investor protection 
in concrete terms as expected losses to the investor 
rather than as a deviation from abstract ideals of 
justice. 
This approach has implications with which not all 
readers will agree. In a basic way the problems connected 
with including investor protection in considerations of 
efficiency can be illustrated by the following thesis: 
if certain expected losses to the investor amounting 
to a million marks a year can be prevented only by 
measures costing more than a million marks a year, the 
efficiency of the securities market is not increased by 
such measures. Only if measures can be devised which will 
cost less than a million does it make economic sense to 
improve investor protection. We are well aware that it 
could be said that investors only notice in the most 
exceptional cases that they have been cheated and by how 
much; that this approach would therefore result in ex-
cessive investor protection and that efforts should be 
confined to refurbishing the image of stock and share 
dealing from time to time, after glaring malpractices 
had come to light, by introducing apparent or actual 
reforms. We are well aware, too, that all the securities 
markets examined, all the major stock exchanges, form - 4-
part of democratic and constitutional social systems 
which are especially pledged to protect their 
citizens from unjust attacks on their property. One 
could therefore demand a perfect degree of investor 
protection even if it cost far more than the amount 
by which it reduced the expected losses. The reader, 
in reading the critical passages, is free to choose 
where he stands between the attitude of "Fiat iustitia 
et pereat mundus" on the one hand and complete neglect 
of investor protection on the other, and to modify our 
findings in the light of his preferences. All the same 
it remains sensible, for the purposes of an efficiency 
analysis, to measure defective investor protection in 
terms of the losses that investors can expect to sustain 
or, rather more accurately, as is done in Part 1, in 
terms of the cost of (self-)insurance against trans-
action and custody risks. 
For many readers the analytical "unbundling" of financial 
services will seem an approach just as unusual as does 
the "integrating" concept for developing a criterion 
for assessing market structures. It is often assumed, 
in studies of stock markets, that investors merely 
"buy and sell" certain securities. This sometimes gives 
the false impression that firms dealing in securities 
offer only a standardized, homogeneous transaction 
service to the investor in the manner of single-product 
firms and that there is no point in bothering with the 
composition of this transaction service. In reality, 
however, the service which security-dealing firms offer 
to investors varies widely. When it comes to examining 
the question why transactions in a security are sometimes 
effected through a stock exchange and sometimes outside 
the stock exchange, sometimes on one market and some-
times on several, it is very important to realize this. One would never gain an adequate understanding of 
the hotel trade or the motor industry if one pro-
ceeded from the assumption that they offered the 
customer only a single homogeneous product, say a 
standardized bed-unit or a standardized four-wheel 
motorized vehicle with a minimum of passenger 
comfort and safety components. Investors are no more 
likely than hotel guests or motorists to be satisfied 
with a standard design of the product they seek. 
Investors are not merely interested in being able to 
buy and sell securities; they want a more complex 
service. It is true that the central element in this 
sercice is very often a homogeneous transaction, but 
this transaction is supplemented as occasion demands 
with other complementary financial services in many 
different ways. For that reason security-dealing 
firms are not treated as single-product undertakings 
in this study but as actual or potential suppliers 
of a whole range of primary and complementary financial 
services. On the basis of this range, service packages 
tailored to the needs of certain groups of investors 
are offered; sometimes the client is able to undo such 
packages easily, sometimes he cannot do so at all. 
The securities markets, whatever their structure, have 
substantial achievements to their credit. Their contribution 
to the financing of industry is most obvious. The costs 
arising on security transactions bear comparison with 
the cost of transactions in any other asset. The cost 
is often less than 1% of the value of the transaction. 
Any improvement in the market structure could not, 
consequently, reduce these costs by whole percentage 
points but only by fractions of a point. They would 
involve only tenths of a per cent of the value of a 
transaction - which seems microscopically small. - 6-
Admittedly, the annual purchases and sales on the 
markets in question amount to many thousands of 
millions, even measured in pounds sterling. But one 
or two thousandths of this figure do not on their 
own produce a high enough sum to give the question of 
the improvement of the market structure any great 
importance or urgency. 
In fact, in the countries with well developed financial 
markets, all that can be expected from any effort to 
improve the efficiency of secondary stock markets is 
a minor reduction in the cost of capital and a modest 
increase in the yields from securities. At first it 
may seem as though the possible effect does not justify 
such an effort. It is well known, however, that even 
small relative changes in the yields of various in-
vestment media can trigger off substantial switching 
of investments. Moreover, a reduction in the cost of 
capital will tend to lead to a higher rate of growth 
of productive assets. Its effect may be barely 
noticeable after two or three years but it will be 
very clear after a generation, particularly if other 
countries, which are being adduced as a comparison, 
neglect their capital markets. There are some countries 
which devote more care and attention to their security 
markets than the security dealers in those countries 
would like. Every country in the European Community 
should seek to avoid being one of the countries merely 
referred to for purposes of unfavourable comparison. - 7-
P a r t 
CRITERIA FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF DIFFERENT 
STRUCTURES OF STOCK MARKETS 
A. CRITERIA FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF STOCK MARKETS 
I. USING THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MARKET AS THE 
STARTING-POINT 
The question as to the advantages and disadvantages 
of fragmented stock markets versus integrated markets, 
with special reference to securities markets in the 
Member States of the European Communities can be 
answered unequivocally only if criteria are available 
against which a given market structure can be measured 
and if these criteria enable consistent findings to be 
arrived at. Such criteria cannot simply be stated 
without further analysis. They will therefore be 
developed below. 
Stock markets do not exist for their own sake. Rather, 
just like any other market, they are intended to serve 
buyers and sellers and those who organize the market 
and bring the two sides together. These groups, who 
for our present purposes will be investors, issuers 
and stock market financial service organizations 
(dealing firms, stock exchanges and other organizations 
which facilitate dealing in securities), place different 
demands on a stock market as a result of their special 
interests. It may for that reason seem inappropriate to try to build up the desired criteria from the 
interest of these groups. But if we do proceed from 
these conflicting group interests, we do so in the 
knowledge that any other approach entails the risk 
of awarding the best marks to those hypothetical or 
real market structures that are shunned by investors, 
dealing firms or issuers and that are little more than 
an end in themselves. From this it is already clear 
that any intervention by the authorities under a 
policy for the furthering of stock markets must go no 
further than the safeguarding and reconciliation of 
the interests of those involved in security dealings, 
provided such interests are deserving of protection. 
Convincing as the chosen approach may be, it never-
theless has certain disadvantages. Firstly, it does 
not allow us immediately to concentrate exclusively 
on the secondary stock market, which is the object of 
this study; before this can be done, some aspects of 
the stock market as a whole, i.e. including the new 
issues or primary market, must be considered. Secondly, 
this procedure does not take into account whether or 
not statistics are available or can readily be compiled 
on the values which will prove to be crucial or 
particularly important for judging the markets, with 
the result that for this reason it will be very 
difficult, within the time allowed for producing this 
study, to make recommendations that are backed up by 
quantitative analyses. Thirdly, we will have to focus 
on the common and longer-term interests of a small 
number of participant groups only if our presentation 
is to remain simple and clear. Therefore in the first, 
and general, part of the study we will in principle 
not deal with the parties with special interests - 9 -
who are everywhere in evidence and who frequently 
oppose any alteration of the market structure, as 
is only to be expected in such a traditional and 
tradition-conscious activity as security dealing. The 
task given us compels us to accept this third dis-
advantage. The two other disadvantages also seem 
unavoidable if this study is to be constructed on a 
broad and firm foundation. We shall therefore use the 
common interests of the groups participating in the 
market as our point of departure. 
In order to develop criteria for the assessment of stock 
markets in this way, we shall start from the interests 
of the investor and the issuer when a bond is issued. 
Our observations will make use of the basic model of 
security valuation that has been employed by investment 
analysts for decades, particularly for bonds, and that 
has been accepted in a many other branches of economics. 
Tax aspects will be left out of account. As our in-
vestigations progress, we will cease to confine our 
attention to bonds alone. Stock market financial service 
organizations will then be brought into the study. 
Finally, it will be shown what criteria still remain 
relevant if one disregards new issues - i.e. transactions 
in which securities are sold to investors for the first 
time - and concentrates on dealings in issues that are 
already in circulation, that is to say on the secondary 
stock market. The statements on the next few pages are 
supplemented by Annex 1 at the end of the study to help 
the reader gain a thorough understanding of this rather 
complicated matter. 10 
II. CRITERIA FROM THE POINT OF VIEW 
OF INVESTORS AND ISSUERS 
If an issuer wishes to issue a bond himself or wishes 
to arrange to have a bond issued, there will be three 
groups of investors who are potential buyers: 
1. Investors who are absolutely certain that they will 
hold the bond until maturity. Such investors will 
discount the promised interest and redemption 
payments, less the cost of custody of the bond, at 
the minimum rate of interest they wish to obtain 
from an investment in bonds of this type and quality, 
in order to ascertain whether the bond is attractive 
to them at the intended issue price. If the bond is 
offered for sale by tender, the investor can calculate 
in this way how much he should offer for it. 
2. Investors who must expect to have to sell the bond 
before maturity because they may need cash. In order 
to reach a decision as to whether or not to buy the 
bond, these investors will in principle proceed in 
the same way as the first group of investors except 
that in their calculations the expected net sales 
proceeds of the bond will take the place of the 
redemption payments. 
3. Investors who if they buy the bond will hold it only 
until such time as in their opinion a favourable 
situation for switching their investment has arisen. 
This third group also uses the net sales proceeds 
instead of the redemption amount in making the 
necessary calculations. In contrast to the second - 11 -
and also the first group, these investors are at all 
times interested in information about the business 
situation of the issuer, since this information will 
help to determine when they should sell the bond. 
Investors of the third group therefore have to deduct 
from the interest they will receive not only the 
cost of custody of the bond but also the cost of 
continuous information in order to be able to calculate 
whether or at what price they should accept the issuer's 
offer. 
When an issue is placed, parts of it will normally be 
taken up by all three groups of investors. The objectives 
of the groups of investors and their relative strengths 
determine the price at which the bond can be sold. The 
investors' decisions will be influenced by the following 
six factors: 
the type of bond it is (especially the terms of issue 
and the maturity date); 
the minimum rate of interest which investors require 
from bonds of this type; 
the financial standing of the issuer; 
the net sales proceeds expected by investors; 
- the cost of custody of the bond; and 
the cost of obtaining continuous information. 
The objective of the issuer is easier to ascertain than 
that of the investors: his aim is the lowest possible -12-
cost of capital. The cost of capital to the issuer, 
or to be more precise, the cost of the capital raised 
by means of the bond issue, is initially determined 
by the issue price of the bond and by the amount of the 
interest and redemption payments. However, the cost of 
selling the issue (including the costs of publicity) 
must be deducted from the issue price and the cost of 
servicing the bond (including periodical publicity 
costs) must be added to the interest. It can therefore 
be said that the cost of capital is determined by the 
six factors influencing the issue price, by the issue 
costs and by the costs of servicing the bond. 
The cost of capital is thus partly determined by the 
structure of the stock markets. On the one hand, the 
methods used by and the competition prevailing on the 
primary markets have a strong influence on the flotation 
costs which the issuer has to bear. On the other hand, 
the way the secondary markets are organized affects the 
investor by influencing net sales proceeds, custody 
costs and the cost of obtaining continuous information 
and affects the issuer by influencing the cost of 
servicing a security. 
The influence of stock markets on the cost of capital can 
be demonstrated even more clearly by an example. Let us 
assume that a bond is issued at 100 and is also repaid 
at 100. We must further assume that the market rate of 
interest for bonds of this quality and with its (remaining) 
time to maturity is always the same as the coupon rate 
of interest on the bond. Under these conditions the 
market price will always be 100. Since net sales proceeds 
are defined as market price minus transaction costs, they 
can easily be split up into the components "secondary -13-
market transaction costs" and "sales proceeds" where 
the market price is constant. In contrast to the net 
sales proceeds, the transaction costs are determined 
entirely by the state of organization of the stock 
market in the wider sense of the term, as are flotation 
costs, custody costs, continuous information costs and 
the cost of servicing a security. 
If these five market-organization-determined cost 
categories were all zero, the investor would have to 
consider only the interest and the redemption moneys -
or instead of the latter the net sales proceeds, which 
would be the same as the redemption moneys - and similarly 
the issuer would also have to consider only the interest 
and redemption payments. The cost of capital would then 
always be the same, as far as this bond was concerned, 
as the actual amount of interest that the various 
investors obtained from the bond. To put it another way, 
the losses caused by friction due to the way the market 
was organized would have disappeared. This situation would 
fully meet the objective of the issuer: if investors 
demanded a certain minimum rate of interest from an issue, 
the cost of the capital would be only as high as that 
interest and no higher. The investment programmes of a 
potential issuer with a given capacity for meeting 
certain interest and redemption payments would stand the 
best possible chance of being implemented. This situation 
would also be very much in the investor's interest: in 
no other circumstances would it be easier for the investor 
to obtain satisfaction of his yield demands on the issuer. 
So the sum of these five cost categories, which are 
determined by the organization of the market, constitutes 
a good criterion for assessing stock markets from the 
point of view of investors and issuers. -14-
This result was reached using, for the sake of 
simplicity, two assumptions which can now be dropped. 
We will first abandon the assumption that the coupon 
rate of interest is always the same as the market 
rate of interest of the bond in question. Net sales 
proceeds are then no longer determined by transaction 
costs alone but, more realistically, by changes in 
the earning power of the issuer and changes in market 
rates of interest as well. In a world in which the 
services of issuing, dealing, keeping custody of 
securities, providing information and servicing 
securities were free, the average yield received by 
all the investors who together had held a certain 
proportion of the bond issue from the time of placing 
until the time of redemption would equal the cost of 
the capital to the issuer. Differences between the 
yields to individual investors and the cost of capital 
would reflect changes of the issuer's earning power 
and fluctuations in the market rate of interest, factors 
which are not governed by the structure of stock markets 
but by the general economic situation, by the sector 
in which the issuer operates and by investors' ability 
to form an opinion with the help of a given amount of 
publicity. If we further drop the assumption that only 
bonds are involved and bring shares, dividend-right 
certificates, warrants - in short, securities of 
every kind - into the analysis, the foregoing two 
sentences still apply, with the sole modification that 
instead of a clearly stipulated term of life there is 
usually an unlimited period of existence. In this more 
real world the sum of the five market-organization-
determined cost categories still remains the criterion 
for judging stock markets. The procedural efficiency 
of a stock market can be measured by the sum of 
these five costs. 15 
This criterion is applicable to issuers and investors 
in their totality, not to individuals. An individual 
issuer may for example obtain special advantages 
for himself by using exaggerated reporting to paint 
his earnings position rosier than it really is. The 
same can be said of investors who spread rumours. 
All issuers of similar securities will eventually be 
penalized by such action because their capital will 
become more expensive, owing to the fact that the more 
unreliable the published financial data prove to be, 
the lower and less certain will be the distributions 
and net sales proceeds expected by investors. 
Although the subject matter of this study is the 
structure of the secondary markets, our considerations 
so far have also included new issue transactions. But 
the method we have chosen can equally well be applied 
exclusively to secondary markets. In place of the 
issuer proper we have the seller of securities already 
in circulation, in place of the issue price we have 
the market price and in place of the flotation costs 
we must consider the transaction costs of the seller 
and buyer. The seller is interested in obtaining the 
highest possible net proceeds. But the buyer will only 
pay him a price that gives him - the buyer - a chance 
of obtaining his minimum yield, taking into account 
the expected dividends or interest, the transaction 
costs in connexion with the purchase and in connexion 
with a possible future sale, the costs of being provided 
with information on a continuous basis, and the cost of 
custody of the securities. For the seller this price 
is reduced by his transaction costs. Given the buyer's 
minimum yield and the anticipated amount of the 
interest or dividends payments, the seller will be 16 
more pleased the lower the present and future trans-
action costs, custody costs and continuous information 
costs are. His ideal is a secondary market on which 
the sum of these three costs and the cost of servicing 
securities are, and will remain, zero. 
For the buyer procedural efficiency of this kind 
would seem at first sight to be irrelevant, since he 
can adapt his yield requirement not only to the type 
and quality of the stock on offer but also to the 
amount and the degree of uncertainty of the procedure-
influenced costs. But, as explained above, whether and 
to what extent an issue is successful depends on these 
costs. The lower the costs, the greater the choice 
open to the buyer on the secondary market. Moreover, 
every buyer is a potential seller. So even from the 
point of view of the investors who participate in 
dealings on the secondary market procedural efficiency 
is a suitable criterion for assessing the quality of 
the market. In contrast to the general case, the 
procedural efficiency of the secondary market is 
measured by the total of four, not five, cost categories, 
since flotation costs no longer need to be taken into 
account. -17-
III. CRITERIA OF MARKET QUALITY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW 
OF THE PROVIDERS OF RELEVANT FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Up to this point it has repeatedly been assumed that the 
costs that depend on the organization of the market can 
be reduced to zero, without the services in question 
being waived. Of course, this is unrealistic. On stock 
markets, just as anywhere else, it is hardly possible 
to provide services free of charge. Investors and 
issuers will therefore regard as efficient those stock 
markets on which the appropriate financial services are 
provided in the most rational way and on which 
competition is strong enough for the benefits of 
efficient production to be reflected in prices. 
It is well known that in many countries security-dealing 
firms reject price competition. Commission cartels in 
security dealing are among the oldest and most success-
ful price-fixing arrangements in business history. As 
the long and intensive debate about the dissolution 
of the commission cartels of the members o
/: the 
principal stock exchanges in the United States has 
shown, there are no valid reasons why such cartels 
should be allowed to continue in existence. If the 
principle of competition among providers of financial 
services on stock markets was accepted, their interests 
would then lie in the same direction as the interests 
of investors and issuers. They would, like firms on 
other markets, try to offer services which in quality 
and price were attractive to certain investors and 
issuers and to this end they would use the most 
efficient production procedure. The criteria of market 
quality for them would then be freedom to choose 18 -
their products and range of products, freedom of 
pricing, and freedom in the choice of production 
techniques. 
Given these three freedoms a broker, for example, 
will be able to execute a client's order as 
inexpensively as possible: he can offer the client 
the plain transaction service, he is free to conclude 
the contract in the manner that is cheapest for him 
and he can in every case charge a fair market commission, 
But stock exchange members are not always allowed to 
accomodate investors in this way. In many cases they 
have to pass an order through the stock exchange even 
when the price and the other party to the transaction 
have already been established and must charge a higher 
commission than competitive conditions warrant; they 
therefore offer the client, in addition to the 
desired dealing service, "free" consultancy and 
custody services although the client would possibly 
be better off if he were able to buy these services 
from specialized firms with the portion of the 
commission he had saved. 
It would be a mistake to suppose, however, that the 
mechanism of competition can immediately and unaided 
bring about an alignment of the interests of investors 
and of financial service organizations and thereby 
automatically introduce a maximum level of procedural 
efficiency, even though for some financial services 
that result can certainly be expected. Four categories 
of stock market financial services must be distinguished 
in this context. 
The first group of financial services is characterized - 19 
by the fact that even an individual firm can provide 
and sell such services with a prospect of being 
able to withstand the competition. Included in this 
category are advisory or counselling services, the 
publication and distribution of information from 
issuers to investors, the acceptance and transmission 
of orders, and the maintenance of clients' accounts. 
In this area there can be competition among individual 
firms. There are many firms that have been successfully 
offering such services for many years - and, naturally, 
examples of failure are also to be found. 
Financial services of this first type must be strictly 
distinguished from those services which, although also 
sold for a consideration, can be provided so cheaply 
where there is co-operation between the largest 
possible number of firms that a lone operator has no 
chance of being able to survive the competition if his 
services are provided by others on a joint or centralized 
basis. Among services of this type may be mentioned the 
provision of information on current buying and selling 
prices, the clearance of securities transactions and 
basically also the finding of the counterparty to a 
transaction. Although single firms can compete in this 
field as far as the fees they charge are concerned, 
individually they have no influence in ensuring that 
the most economical method is used to provide the 
service at any given time. Members of a stock exchange 
find counterparties for their clients with the help 
of the normal trading procedures and use the clearing 
facilities of their stock exchanges irrespective of 
whether these procedures are economically efficient or 
are still very much susceptible to improvement. As a 
rule the individual firm cannot overcome the rationalizing -20-
effect of clearing-houses and the time-saving in 
finding counterparties through centralization of 
data about potential contracting parties. It must 
be ascertained whether competition between 
associations of dealers or investors offering 
different dealing systems can help the most rational 
system to become established where competition 
between individual firms is unable to ensure 
procedural efficiency, or whether such competition, 
on account of its fragmenting effect, ought to be 
regarded as a step backwards and progress in 
procedural efficiency ought to be sought in a 
different way. 
Financial services of the third type are those 
provided by individual organizations because they 
are obliged to do so under the terms of agreements 
or by official provisions or regulations and for 
which such organizations do not charge a fee. The 
principal services of this kind are the production 
of periodical reports and the provision of other 
services in connexion with the servicing of securities 
by issuers. Other examples are the safeguarding of 
dealer firms against insolvency by means of official 
requirements as to the amount of capital they must 
have, to the extent that such requirements go beyond 
what a prudent businessman would regard as necessary, 
and the protection of investors through regulations 
that stipulate that certain clients should only be 
offered securities with a prescribed maximum risk 
content. The self-interest of those compelled to 
provide services of this kind will ensure that the 
cost will be kept as low as is possible within the 
scope of the regulations. However, in the first - 21 -
place, it is the responsibility of the regulators 
that their regulations aim for a high degree of 
procedural efficiency. 
The fourth and last category of financial services 
cannot be sold for a consideration and cannot be 
provided by individual firms. Into this category fall 
many services protecting the investor which are not 
part of the services assigned to the second category. 
Although for example the dealing systems of the various 
national stock markets give the investor more or less 
intensive protection against price manipulation, 
there is usually scope for additional protective 
measures. The question arises as to how the investor's 
possible interest in these services can best be met 
and whether the procedural efficiency of the secondary 
market is increased if such services are offered. 
As in the case of financial services of the third 
type, this question can only be answered on the basis 
of each case arising. 
IV. ELEMENTS OF PROCEDURAL EFFICIENCY 
The foregoing section of this study demonstrated that 
even the providers of financial services on stock 
markets would be interested in procedural efficiency 
if they had to operate under conditions of competition; 
accordingly procedural efficiency can be said to be 
the principal criterion for judging the quality of 
stock markets. Since an attempt will be made in the 
course of this study to evaluate various forms of 
organization, the elements of this procedural 
efficiency and the relation of the elements to each 22-
other must be described. The emphasis in this 
analysis will be placed unequivocally on the sector 
of execution of orders for the purchase or sale of 
securities, as demanded by the subject matter of the 
study, the fragmentation or segmentation of secondary 
stock markets, which is principally evident in this 
sphere. In order to be able to give at least a 
complete overall view of all the main elements of 
procedural efficiency and the way these elements 
relate to each other, we shall also touch on questions 
of the provision of information about securities and 
delivery and settlement. 
The procedural efficiency of secondary markets is 
measured by the total of four cost categories that are 
determined by the state of organization of the market: 
the cost of servicing securities; the cost of providing 
information on a continuing basis; transaction costs; 
and custody costs. The most important costs are the 
transaction costs, particularly since up to this point 
in the study we have used this term to cover a whole 
range of different components in order to simplify 
presentation. We defined the transaction costs 
arising on a sale of securities as the difference 
between the market price and the expected net sales 
proceeds and the transaction costs arising on a 
purchase of securities as the difference between the 
expected gross acquisition price and the market price. 
These differences have four components: 
1. The cost to the investor, in connexion with the 
transaction, of obtaining information and taking 
a decision. - 23 -
2. The cost of accepting the order, finding the most 
advantageous contracting party for the client, 
making the bargain, and of clearing and settlement. 
Remuneration for the services related to these 
cost components is usually obtained by charging 
a commission. 
3. The cost of securing an instant bargain (cost of 
immediacy). This cost is generally covered in the 
case of purchases by an addition to the market 
price and in the case of sales by a deduction 
from the market price. 
4. The cost of protection against transaction risks. 
The last two components need explaining in detail. 
Costs do not arise for securing instant bargains if 
matching orders are immediately available on the 
market. Nor are they normally incurred when the client 
is prepared to wait until a suitable counter-offer 
turns up. Waiting, however, gives rise to additional 
costs of the second category in every case and of the 
first category in some cases. By agreeing to bear a 
discount (or premium) for an immediate bargain, the 
seller (or buyer) may avoid these costs. In addition 
he obtains forward cover in return for the discount 
(premium), and is freed from the risk that the price 
will change while he is waiting. In this connexion 
we also come across "market depth" or premiums and 
discounts for large orders - the additional cost of 
immediacy for a large quantity. Since counter-orders 
are not usually available to meet large orders, the 
discounts or premiums here are naturally very high. 
Only a fairly long period of waiting would enable - 21 
the large order to be executed, with a greater risk 
of the price changing. But the costs involved in 
securing an instant bargain do not arise only in 
connexion with large transactions. They represent 
the consideration for a particular transaction service 
which is in demand even from small investors. Anyone 
offering this financial service regularly to buyers 
and sellers of one or more titles is usually called 
a market maker (see Annex 3). 
The "transaction risks" are a reflection of the lack 
of perfection in investor protection. Before discussing 
the costs of safeguarding against transaction risks, 
we must first give a brief outline of the two groups 
of transaction risks, "information risks" and 
"realization risks". Investors can place only limited 
reliance on the correctness of information which 
appears to shed light, for example, on the earnings 
position of an issuer, whether this information comes 
from the issuer himself, from professional advisers 
or elsewhere and whether it reaches potential buyers 
and sellers in the form of reports, analyses, 
recommendations or price changes. There is always a 
risk that for a whole variety of reasons they will be 
poorly or falsely informed (in this study we call 
risks of receiving poor or false information 
"information risks" for short). Investors must take 
account of the fact that owing to inadequate or untrue 
information they will have to be prepared to buy stock 
at higher prices or to sell stock at lower prices than 
would have been the case if they had had correct 
information and in particular will have to be prepared 
to accept that those on the other side of the 
transaction will be better informed than they. - 25 -
The extent of such price differences will determine 
the amount of loss suffered by the investor. 
Secondly, an investor can never be sure that when 
his decision to buy or sell stock is translated into 
reality he will obtain the price that he would have 
obtained on a market on which his transaction was 
dealt with absolutely correctly and fairly. Instead, 
he must be prepared for "realization risks". The 
best-known and probably the most widespread risk of 
this kind is the risk of "fellow-travelling" or 
"shadowing". If a client gives an order to buy that 
is so large that its execution will very probably 
cause the price to rise, the dealer who has received 
the order and others who have got to know of it can 
cash in on the expected price rise by buying in stock 
for their own account before executing the client's 
order. The client then loses an amount per share 
equal to the difference between the higher price he 
is charged with and the lower price at which he could 
have obtained the stock if there had been no "fellow-
travelling". If the order is an order to sell, dealers 
with "inside" knowledge can profit at the expense of 
the client by selling or shorting the stock ahead of 
the client and repurchasing it while his order is 
executed or immediately thereafter. 
A second kind of "realization risk" is the risk of 
counter-action ("reaching across the market", 
"fishing around"). If, for example, the limit buying 
order or the buying bid of an investor becomes known 
to a market participant who wishes to sell, the latter 
will try to trade at this limit even if he would have 
sold at a lower price if he had not had this knowledge. - 26 -
In this case, too, there may be a price difference 
to the disadvantage of the investor; the value 
expected of this difference is an indication of the 
cost of guarding against this special realization 
risk. 
There is a number of similar realization risks which 
also give rise to differences between the price that 
could have been obtained if the transaction had been 
properly handled and the price actually obtained. 
Among such risks should be mentioned those of price 
frauds of every kind, arbitrary or fortuitous failure 
to execute an order, closing at rigged or arbitrary 
prices, closing under circumstances in which dealings 
ought to have been suspended, negligent execution of 
an order on the market and, finally, delays in 
delivering documents if this prevents timely resale. 
In the case of other realization risks the possible 
costs to the investor cannot be computed on the 
basis of the expected price differences; examples are: 
delay in crediting him with the net sales proceeds, 
the share certificates of the seller lack the 
qualifications to good delivery, insolvency of the 
stockbroker or other firm that is acting for the client. 
But, as in all other cases, an investor can estimate 
his conceivable losses, weight them according to 
probability of occurrence and thus arrive at expected 
values and hence at the approximate cost of safe-
guarding himself. 
To a certain extent the investor can and will provide 
his own protection, for example by subscribing to 
various information services, by passing larger orders 
through several carefully chosen security-dealing firms, by stipulating realistic and staggered 
limits and by having the deal handled at different 
stages by a third party, even though this will 
give rise to additional expense. Thus for instance 
during the financial crisis of the New York brokers 
in 1970 many private investors withdrew the 
securities they had deposited with their brokers 
and transferred them to their banks even though this 
meant paying the usual charges for custodial accounts 
(e.g. 0.1% of market value, with a minimum charge of 
$ 50) whereas the brokers charged no fees at all for 
the custody. 
The willingness of investors to bear additional costs 
of this kind demonstrates that they are aware of the 
existence of transaction risks and seek to transform 
the costs of guarding against transaction risks which 
are uncertain as to amount and occurence into certain 
transaction costs wherever possible. If the problem 
of determining the amount of the loss and knowing 
when transaction risks did occur could be solved, an 
insurance policy against transaction risks could 
take care of this task. However, since no insurance 
of this comprehensive type is available, one must 
assume that investors, in areas where they cannot 
protect themselves otherwise, will apply a kind of 
notional selfinsurance premium to any transaction in 
securities which they are planning and will regard it 
as the imputed cost of safeguarding themselves 
against transaction risks, to be considered alongside 
the other components of the cost of the transaction. 
So the costs of guarding against transaction risks 
may be composed partly of costs that are actually - 28 -
incurred and partly of imputed costs. The imputed 
costs of guarding against transaction risks should 
correspond to the expected losses arising from those 
transaction risks that are relevant to the planned 
transactions and against which the investor is not 
protected in any other way. Only an investor who 
regularly takes into account even these elements of 
transaction costs will be able to attain his investment 
targets in the long run. As the majority of investors 
are averse to risk, it is to be feared, however, that 
they will apply higher costs in guarding against 
risks than the expected value of those risks. Higher 
imputed costs are also likely to be applied, because 
the investor has to be prepared for above-average 
losses and wishes to guard against faulty diagnosis, 
and because he often has only a small number of deals 
to transact. 
The above account gives sufficient detail as to how 
the various costs are composed, the sum of which should 
in the interests of the procedural efficiency of 
secondary stock markets be as low as possible. One 
might suppose that procedural efficiency could be 
increased by simply reducing the individual costs. 
The important point, however, is not the individual 
costs, but their total. Since in some instances 
certain individual costs or cost components increase 
as others decrease, it is always the total that 
must be considered as the target value where inter-
related costs are involved. 
The total of all market-organization-dependent costs 
can be divided up into three sub-totals that are 
largely independent of each other and are therefore 29-
useful targets when it comes to improving procedural 
efficiency. These sub-totals relate to the information 
and decision-taking sphere, the execution sphere and 
the settlement and custody sphere. The first of these 
three sub-totals comprises the cost to the investor 
of keeping himself continually informed and the cost 
of information and decision-taking connected with 
specific transactions, the cost of guarding against 
"information risks" and the cost to the issuer of his 
periodical publicity, which is part of the cost of 
servicing the securities. Every step in the direction 
of clear and up-to-date disclosure will reduce the 
above-mentioned costs of the investor but the better 
this disclosure and the more thoroughly it is checked 
by stock exchange and other authorities the more 
expensive it will be. Now the smaller the number of 
investors interested, the sooner will a point be 
reached at which further improvements in publicity 
will give rise to additional costs which are greater 
than the resultant reduction in costs to investors; 
in other words, the total costs of the information 
and decision-taking sphere would no longer be reduced 
by such a measure but would be increased; procedural 
efficiency would be diminished. It is not a simple 
matter to determine where this point lies. As it does 
exist, however, it would appear reasonable to base the 
publicity requirements placed on an issuer on the 
type of investor affected, e.g. bond-holder, share-
holder, and on how many of such investors there are. 
A rule like that laid down by the Securities Exchange 
Act in the United States may be considered appropriate: 
under this rule the full Federal periodical disclosure 
requirements apply in general only to those companies 
with net assets of more than one million dollars - 30 -
and which have at least 500 ordinary or preference 
share-holders. This is in any case more appropriate 
than those solutions which place the same obligations 
on all issuers in a given industry or which leave 
it to the discretion of the issuer whether to spend 
more money in order to reduce the total costs of 
the information and decision-taking sphere. 
Next to the information and decision-taking sphere 
follows the sphere that extends from the giving of 
the order to buy or sell to the receipt of the 
confirmation notice by the client and at the centre 
of which stands the making of the bargain (the 
execution sphere). The market-organization-dependent 
costs, the total of which has to be kept to a minimum 
in this second sphere if procedural efficiency is 
to be achieved, are the costs of accepting and passing 
on the order, of securing the best available price 
for the customer, (i.e. seeking the most favourable 
counter-offer), of consummating the trade and of 
confirmation. To these must be added the costs of 
guarding against the "realization risks" that can occur 
in the execution sphere and finally the costs of 
immediacy, which in individual cases and like some 
other items may not arise at all. It would seem an 
obvious idea to try to perfect investor protection 
in this sphere in order to reduce to zero the costs of 
guarding against realization risks here and at the 
same time to try to reduce the other costs. But 
investor protection measures not only give rise to 
non-recurring and recurring costs which are ultimately 
passed on to the investor, they also, more importantly, 
tend to have repercussions of various kinds on other 
costs. Restrictions on own-account dealing by stock 
exchange traders holding orders from clients will - 31 -
usually have the effect of raising the cost of 
immediacy. And if investors are protected from 
counter-action and rigged prices by confining all 
or a rather large number of dealers to dealing only 
one stock at the time (call system), the individual 
dealer will be able to execute less orders in a day 
than under a procedure which allows the individual 
dealer to trade in any stock he likes at any time; 
a measure of this kind will therefore raise the cost 
of executing an order. Many more examples could be 
given besides the two just quoted. But the point is 
already clear: complete investor protection in the 
execution sphere may conflict with procedural 
efficiency if the adverse cost effects of investor 
protection measures outweigh the reduction in the costs 
of guarding against realization risks. Since it is 
difficult to measure these positive and negative cost 
effects in specific cases, it will only be possible 
within limits to state in economic terms the degree 
of investor protection called for by procedural 
efficiency. Within these limits policy considerations 
may be meaningful. What is needed are trading 
procedures that right from their design exclude as 
many realization risks as possible or which can have 
safeguards built into them in a straightforward way 
so that the costs of market supervision can be kept 
down. 
The third sphere in which measures to improve 
procedural efficiency can be applied is the settlement 
sphere. Here the problem is the correct recording of 
the details of the bargain and the dependable transfer 
of the stock or cash to the parties entitled within 
a given period. A settlement system that fully meets - 32 
these needs will at the same time remove the 
"realization risks" of this sphere, with the exception 
of the risk of insolvency which, independently of the 
settlement system, can be reduced by solvency 
safeguards and also if necessary by means of insurance. 
Finally, and closely connected with the settlement 
sphere, comes the custody sphere. Here we must take 
account not only of the cost of custody to the investor 
but also of such costs of servicing securities as paying 
agents' costs, cost of inviting share-holders to 
annual meetings, costs of notices about the drawing of 
bonds, and costs of guarding against insolvency, fraud 
or negligence on the part of the custodian. Since any 
change in the techniques related to settlement, for 
example a change from registered to bearer securities or 
from actual delivery of securities to document-less 
delivery, will in all likelihood have repercussions 
on procedures and costs in the custody sphere, the 
costs of both spheres can appropriately be combined 
to form the third sub-total of market-organization-
dependent costs. 
V. THE CRITERION OF PROCEDURAL EFFICIENCY AND OTHER 
CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING THE QUALITY OF SECONDARY 
STOCK MARKETS 
So far, proceeding from the interests of the market 
participants, we have established procedural efficiency 
as the main criterion for assessing the quality of 
stock markets. Besides this, we have shown what cost - 33 -
elements in the three functional spheres of the 
secondary stock market - cost elements influenceable 
by the way the stock market is organized - prevent 
the cost of capital to an issuer being equal to the 
aggregate yields enjoyed by the investors who hold 
his issue over a period of time. From this discussion 
it emerged, firstly, that the sub-total of the costs 
influenceable in the individual market spheres could 
serve as a sub-criterion for judging procedural 
efficiency and we saw, secondly, what might be the 
crucial points for an improvement in the quality of 
the secondary stock market and what problems arose in 
that connexion. Before proceeding to examine secondary 
stock markets in the countries of the European 
Communities in the light of these findings, it would 
seem a good idea to show the relationship between 
the yardsticks we have developed in this study and 
other criteria for assessing the quality of a stock 
market which are commonly to be found in the relevant 
literature. 
In the more recent American literature the criterion 
of internal or operational efficiency is often used. 
This criterion is basically the same as that of 
procedural efficiency except that it mainly includes 
sub-aspects of the efficiency of the execution sphere 
and does not, for example - unlike "procedural 
efficiency" - include the set of problems relating to 
investor protection because of its narrower definition 
of transaction costs. Internal or operational efficiency 
is contrasted with external or "allocational" efficiency, 
although operational efficiency is regarded as a 
prerequisite for allocational efficiency; in other 
words, if market-organization-determined costs were zero, -34-
funds would be routed via the stock markets 
("allocated") to the optimal uses. It would be a 
prerequisite for this that the relevant information 
was available and that a fairly large number, at 
least, of mutually independent market participants 
evaluated it correctly and promptly. Stock prices 
would then at all times be the best possible 
reflection of the distribution and amounts of future 
payments by issuers. But the higher the market-
organization-determined costs - and in particular the 
higher and more unpredictable the transaction costs 
that have to be borne - the wider the deviations from 
such optimum allocational prices that can arise and 
persist, since it would not pay market participants 
who spotted these deviations to induce a change in 
prices by making appropriate transactions (for 
example, where the deviations are not greater than the 
expected transaction costs of the switching transactions 
that appear - at a first glance - profitable because of 
these deviations). 
From the point of view of optimum allocation, it is 
particularly unfortunate if comparable stocks have 
to bear market-organization-determined costs of varying 
amounts, whether because of differing capital resources 
among market makers in these stocks, because they 
cannot be dealt in on the same market and therefore 
attract different rates of commission, or because 
minor and major issuers have to bear the same amount 
of fixed ctsts for servicing securities. Irrespective 
of whether the market-organization-determined costs 
vary with the number of transactions or not or are 
dependent on the volume of the issue or not, the less 
and the more uniformly they burden a transaction unit -35-
or an issue unit, the more accurately will the share 
price be able to indicate the earning power of the 
issuer. Accordingly, procedural efficiency in the 
stock market and in connexion with the individual issue 
is in fact essential if allocational efficiency is to 
be achieved. Procedural efficiency also prepares the 
ground for allocational efficiency by demanding 
rational methods of prompt communication of business 
and company announcements. Where a large number of alert 
investment analysts and investors stand ready to 
receive and interpret such announcements, one can count 
on share prices that properly perform their function of 
guiding funds to the optimum uses. 
Procedural efficiency, expanded into allocational 
efficiency, includes nearly all the criteria normally 
used for assessing the quality of stock markets even 
if not always to the full extent (see diagram). It is 
worth briefly examining a few of these criteria and 
requirements. Diagram 1  Allocational efficiency of secondary 
stock markets 
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The greater the choice of securities, the more 
attractive is a market to investors. Therefore the 
breadth of a market, measured by the type and number 
of issues traded on it, is rightly regarded as an 
important criterion. On a procedurally efficient 
market the costs of capital are as low as they can 
be given the yield requirements of the investors. 
Such a market is attractive to potential issuers and 
will have breadth even where there is competition from 
an efficient banking system. If procedural efficiency 
is improved, this will, ceteris paribus, give scope 
for reductions in the cost of capital and/or increases 
in yields to investors. As a result, the market becomes 
more attractive to both investors and issuers. 
Another requirement if there is to be allocational 
efficiency is that all issues should receive equal 
tax treatment and that contracts and transfers should 
not be taxed. Taxes on stock exchange purchases and 
for sales and on the transfer of securities must be 
judged in the same way as transaction costs. Ideally, 
both should be zero; in the case of transaction costs 
this cannot be achieved, but it can with the taxes 
named. 
What has been said about allocational efficiency and 
in Section III above has already shown clearly that 
competition is a significant determining factor in 
procedural and allocational efficiency; thus, there is 
no need to treat it as an additional criterion. 
Procedural efficiency also includes the protection 
of investors. As explained in the previous section, 
the costs of guarding against transaction risks and -38-
custody risks are determining factors, in the form 
of transaction or custody costs, of procedural 
efficiency. The investor protection measures that 
contribute to procedural efficiency are those that 
reduce these costs or, more precisely, that reduce 
the total of all market-organization-determined costs 
(cf. page 3). Investors may have no interest in 
obtaining perfectionist protection measures that go 
further than this as such measures are not economically 
justified. Demands for investor protection that are 
based on purely ethical or legal considerations may 
therefore sometimes go further than those covered by 
the economic criterion of procedural efficiency. The 
dividing line between economically justified investor 
protection measures and other investor protection 
measures is often obscure, particularly since the 
imputed costs of guarding against transaction risks 
are difficult to calculate and vary with the passing 
of time. Some measures clearly fall into the second 
group, however. In Germany, for example, a security 
dealer who has accepted an order is allowed to 
charge his commission even if he is taking or 
supplying his client's securities for his own account. 
As he has not taken the order to the market, it seems 
unjust that he should charge a commission. For that 
reason members of the Stock Exchange in the United 
Kingdom, for example, are not allowed to charge a 
commission in such cases. Moreover, in both cases 
the price at which the dealer trades may not be less 
favourable than the price obtainable on the stock 
exchange. Let us suppose a client wishes to buy shares. 
Assume that the commission is 2, that the share can 
be sold on the market at 198 and bought at 200, the 
latest price quoted was 199 and the dealer acting -39-
is prepared to let the client have shares at 199. 
In Germany the client must pay a gross 201, but in 
Britain - under the ethically more acceptable rule -
he must pay 202, since his broker is better off 
if he himself sells on the market for 198, buys for 
the client at 200 and can charge 2 for commission; 
on a sale to the client the broker would have 
obtained only 19 9 (as opposed to 200 on executing 
the order on the market and selling his own shares 
in a separate transaction). Both the dealer and the 
client come off better under the rules that are alleged 
to be against the best interests of the investor. 
Two further criteria which should be mentioned in this 
connexion are confidence in the reliability of the 
security-dealing firms and confidence in the markets. 
The less reliable the security dealers, the greater -
without any doubt - the cost of market supervision 
and the imputed cost of guarding against transaction 
risks. This criterion is therefore covered by the 
criterion of procedural efficiency. Confidence in the 
markets is also determined by procedural efficiency, 
but it may in cases of doubt be adduced as an additional 
criterion, for example when it is a matter of deciding 
who shall have the deal where there has been 
simultaneous acceptance of an offer by more than one 
dealer: from the point of view of investor protection 
it would be good enough to decide by throwing a coin, 
but to give priority to investors would create more 
confidence. 
Marketability of securities, market depth or fluidity 
or liquidity of the market are all terms used to 
denote a criterion, that is very frequently mentioned. - 40 
This is another criterion that is subsumed within 
the criterion of procedural efficiency. What is 
meant is the possibility of obtaining an instant 
bargain, whether large or small in volume, at 
acceptable immediacy costs (see Annex 3). Market depth 
makes it easier to plan investment, to execute orders 
and to adjust prices promptly in response to new 
information. Yet not all investors are interested in 
market depth, particularly if it means that the cost 
of immediacy is going to be arbitrarily high, as will 
become increasingly plain as we go on. Nor must it 
necessarily be market makers who offer the opportunity 
for instant trading. As will emerge when the individual 
markets are analysed, market makers improve procedural 
efficiency mainly in securities with a medium volume 
of turnover. 
Often the liquidity of securities is mentioned as a 
criterion. It is measured by the ratio of the lowest 
expected net sales proceeds to the value which the 
investor regards as representative for his planning 
period. The smaller the difference between the two 
values - i. e. the smaller the possible loss on 
liquidation of the holding in question - the more 
liquid is the security regarded as being. In the very 
short run this loss is determined primarily by the 
four component elements of transaction costs and by 
comparable taxes; the liquidity criterion thus covers, 
inter alia, the costs of immediacy and hence the 
market-depth criterion. In the longer run, however, 
liquidity of securities may be influenced by changes 
in all other market-organization-determined costs and 
thus embraces the whole of the procedural efficiency 
criterion. Nevertheless, we shall not make use of - 41 -
the criterion of liquidity of securities here, since 
liquidity is in the longer run dependent also on 
changes in market rates of interest, in the business 
and financial situation of the issuer and in certain 
circumstances on changes in taxation; in other words 
it is also influenced by non-market-organization-
determined factors. In principle, such factors are 
no help in explaining or evaluating integrated or 
fragmented stock markets. Therefore procedural 
efficiency, not the liquidity of securities is the 
more appropriate criterion for this study. 
INTEGRATED AND FRAGMENTED (SEGMENTED) 
SECONDARY STOCK MARKETS 
There can be different interpretations of what 
constitutes an integrated secondary stock market and 
what - in contrast - constitutes a fragmented one. 
Generally speaking, an integrated secondary market 
would be one that was a single uniform entity covering 
all dealings in certain securities already in 
circulation. Admittedly, even in this straightforward 
case one could distinguish between functional sectors -
such as the information and decision-taking sphere, 
the execution sphere and the settlement and custody 
sphere - but procedures within these sectors would 
follow a single pattern: the chain of events from the 
decision to purchase through to payment would in 
principle have the same kind and number of links in 
every case. In a less straightforward but more 
realistic case the. links may differ. It then no 
longer matters whether the investor receives advice -42-
and if so from whom, whether an order is executed 
by a bank or a specialized security-dealing firm or 
both together, whether one or several trading 
techniques are available to execute orders, or 
whether more than one method of clearing the transaction 
is used; the important point is whether all the existing 
elements are brought together to form an orderly whole, 
to form a security-market system. 
In the straightforward case the "fragmented" secondary 
market can be clearly defined as the opposite of the 
integrated market. Under this definition, all existing 
markets would of course be more or less fragmented. 
Even taking only the execution sphere, different methods 
for trading the same or different stocks can be 
observed in every country. If we use the second, more 
realistic, definition, this difficulty disappears. 
There are certainly some secondary markets which can 
be described as integrated under this definition. But 
then the question arises, fristly, whether, where there 
is a high degree of division, a certain lack of 
uniformity, we should not speak of fragmented markets. 
And secondly, we have to state what criteria shall be 
used to decide whether the elements observed can in 
fact be regarded as forming part of a whole or not. 
The following questions demonstrate how many aspects 
may play a part here: 
1. Are unofficial dealings by members of a stock 
exchange before the exchange has opened or after 
it has closed, even if carried on under somewhat 
modified rules, a rational complement to dealing 
on the floor of the exchange and therefore part 
of a system? -43-
2. Should a security-market system provide opportunities 
for the purchase and sale of every security, even 
for those not admitted to a stock exchange quotation, 
and do markets for these securities together with 
the stock exchanges constitute an orderly whole? 
3. Are stock markets at different places, on which the 
same securities are traded under more or less the 
same rules, parts of a whole? How near to each other 
do they have to be located and how different may their 
rules be? 
4. Is it of any consequence for designating various 
parts of a secondary market as "integrated" or 
"fragmented" whether, despite different trading 
techniques, they serve the same sort of investor, 
whether the same security-dealing firms, more or 
less, are active on them, whether there are the 
same regulations for the admission of securities to 
a quotation and/or whether the same clearing 
techniques are used or not? 
Some aspects always suggest that a market segment belongs 
to a certain system of security-dealing, while others 
suggest the opposite. For this reason it is not possible 
in general to draw a sharp dividing line between 
integrated and fragmented stock markets. The same 
result is obtained if instead of using the significance 
of the word "integrated" as the starting-point one uses 
the term "fragmented" as the basis from which to 
approach the problem. Fragmented or split markets are 
well-known in foreign exchange business; these are 
markets for the same currency between which arbitrage 
is not legally possible. But that is of no use for our 
present purposes. -44-
The fragmented elements of the secondary stock market 
did not come into being through action by the 
authorities but historically grew up in response to 
the special needs of investors; these markets usually 
welcome any arbitrage transactions. In stock exchange 
terminology the term "fragmented" rather than "split" 
is preferred, and to use more neutral terminology one 
should speak of "segmented" markets. But even this 
terminological clarification is no help in finding a 
dividing line. Segmented markets are nothing but 
non-integrated or less integrated markets. 
Obviously, the title of the study fails to set forth 
clearly the market structures to be analysed. As the 
advantages and disadvantages of integrated versus 
fragmented markets are to be brought out, an alternative 
way to obtain a clue what the study should focus on is 
looking at its intention. This study was commissioned 
to investigate whether in a given Member State there 
is an integrated secondary stock market - which may be 
concentrated in a single stock exchange or spread 
over several - or whether the stock market in that 
country is split, that is to say whether alongside the 
official bourse or bourses there is at least one other 
market (examples: "geregelter Freiverkehr", over-the-
counter market, Ariel; see Annex 4). This means, first 
of all, that the study should focus on the execution 
sphere. The markets named as examples always reveal 
different procedures in that sphere; this does not 
generally hold for the related other functional spheres. 
In addition, the following questions are asked: 
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of not 
including certain groups of circulating securities - IS 
in stock exchange dealing but trading them outside 
the exchanges? 
2. What are the resultant advantages and disadvantages 
if securities, trading in which on the stock exchanges 
is permitted, are dealt in not on the exchanges 
but by traditional methods or by automated methods 
outside the exchanges? 
3. What advantages or disadvantages accrue if a 
security is traded simultaneously on several stock 
exchanges with the same or different dealing 
techniques? 
In order to prepare answers to these questions, we shall 
first, in the second part of the study, examine the 
secondary stock markets of the Member States to see 
what solutions are found there in the execution sphere, 
in other words what stock-exchange and non-stock-
exchange market-segments exist there. A complete 
description and analysis of the markets in the Member 
States in this connexion is neither necessary nor 
intended. It is more important to get an idea of the 
effects that different methods have on the cost of 
processing an order, particularly on the cost of 
securing the best price available, the cost of guarding 
against realization risks in the execution sphere and 
the cost of immediacy. Finally, in Part 3, we shall 
set out the reasons why secondary stock markets are 
segmented in different degrees and what advantages and 
disadvantages flow from these different degrees of 
segmentation. -46-
P a r t 
SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET IN THE MEMBER STATES 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, IN JAPAN AND IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 
I. PARTICIPANTS AND ISSUES TRADED 
On March 25, 1973, the stock exchanges in the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland were merged into 
a single organization called "The Stock Exchange". 
In August 1975 the Stock Exchange had admitted 4084 
members who - according to choice - had joined one of 
the seven regional subdivisions which are known as 
"Administrative Units". With the exception of the 
Provincial Brokers Administrative Unit these subdivisions 
maintain trading floors and other facilities for trading 
and settlement. Table A-1 lists the Units, the location 
of their trading floors, and the number of their 
members. Members in the same firm may join different 
Units. At present the Units operate seven trading floors. 
There were 24 floors in the British Isles before the 
Scottish exchanges amalgamated in 1964. Data on the 
turnover of individual Units are not available. Thus, 
this information is missing from Table A-1. However, 
specific information on the importance of the Units 
outside London was published in the Exchange's report 
of the One-Day Transaction Study of 7 August 19 74. - 47-
This study was repeated for the first time on 
8 October 1975. From these studies it can be seen 
that stockbroking firms outside London handled only 
2.9% (3.8%) of all purchases and sales at market 
value, but that judged on the number of transactions 
handled they had a 25% (29%) share of all business. 
If government and public authority securities are 
left out of account and only stocks and shares of 
private-sector firms are considered, the proportions 
are 9.7% (11.5%) and 26% (30%) respectively. The figures 
in brackets are those for the date of the second 
study. 
Table A  1 
The Administrative Units of the Stock Exchange in 
August 19 75 
Name 
London AU 
Northern AU 
Midlands and 
Western AU 
Scottish AU 
Provincial 
Brokers AU 
Irish AU 
Belfast AU 
Location of 
trading floor 
London 
Manchester 
Liverpool 
Birmingham 
Glasgow 
Dublin 
Belfast 
Number 
of members 
3 240 
299 
174 
156 
143 
49 
23 
'."umber of 
member firms 
represented 
134 
47 
24 
23 
40 
25 
4 - 48-
Although the Administrative Units are governed by 
the same rules as to the admission of new members 
and the listing of securities, the structure of the 
Units and their methods of dealing and settlement 
continue to show certain differences. 
Judged on the basis of the volume at market value, 
stock exchange transactions are dominated by the 
institutional investors; by the Stock Exchange's 
definition, these comprise banks (particularly 
clearing banks, merchant banks, discount houses and 
overseas banks), insurance companies, pension funds, 
investment and unit trusts, co-operative societies 
and public authorities. According to the information 
obtained in the "Transaction Studies", these 
investors account for just under 90% of total volume 
in fixed-interest securities. They also account for 
approximately half of the turnover in equities, 
while nearly 30% of equity turnover is attributable 
to domestic private investors and the remainder to 
foreign investors and members of the stock exchange -
excluding dealings by jobbers. These proportions of 
turnover attributable to institutional investors 
are somewhat higher than comparable estimates by the 
Bank of England for earlier years would have led one 
to expect. One will have to wait and see therefore 
whether future studies by the Stock Exchange and the 
Bank of England confirm the findings of the two 
"Transaction Studies". 
Judged on the basis of the number of transactions, 
private investors are the largest participators 
in stock exchange business. They are responsible 
for 75% of all transactions. More than half of their - 49 
orders are obtained not directly by the broking 
firms themselves but indirectly through the agency 
of clearing banks and others. For this service the 
banks receive 25% of the commission. Branches of 
banks usually work with two or three local firms 
of stockbrokers with whom they have had good 
experience. In addition to dependable handling of 
orders, banks' branches expect to receive demand 
deposits from their brokers. 
In a financial centre as prominent as London secondary 
market transactions are naturally not confined to 
members of the Stock Exchange and their clients, even 
if one disregards the discount houses, the institutions 
specializing in money market transactions. Many 
foreign security-dealing firms, particularly American 
and Canadian, have branches in London and not only 
constitute a link with overseas markets but also deal 
in Euro-securities in London. There is also to a 
certain extent a market in domestic securities outside 
the Stock Exchange. Here the place of the Stock 
Exchange is taken by merchant banks or security-dealing 
firms licensed by the Board of Trade under the 
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958. Recently 
one such firm, Automated Real-Time Investments 
Exchange Ltd. (Ariel), has attained a certain degree 
of importance. A description of the dealing methods of 
this firm will be given below. 
Basically, anyone who carries on the business of 
dealing in securities is subject to the supervision 
of the Board of Trade. However, the Prevention of 
Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958, provides for exemptions 
from the obligation to obtain a license and from the -50-
associated requirements and provisions. The Bank 
of England, public corporations and certain groups 
of co-operative societies are statutorily exempt 
from the obligation to be licensed. Summary 
exemptions - via recognition as stock exchange 
association of dealers or as authorised unit trust 
scheme - are currently granted by the Board of Trade 
to, for example, the members of the Stock Exchange, 
the members of an American and a Canadian association 
of security-dealing firms in London, the members of 
the London Discount Market Association and recognized 
unit trusts. In addition, a great many firms, 
particularly banks and insurance companies, have 
obtained individual exemptions. It is a prerequisite 
for obtaining an individual exemption that the 
security-dealing business in question should either be 
an activity in the new issue market or that it should 
be an incidental activity within which dealings with 
private investors play a subordinate role, apart from 
the passing on of orders to domestic licensed or 
exempted firms or to members of foreign stock exchanges. 
But anyone who carries on secondary market business as 
his principal activity or who otherwise principally 
deals on behalf of private clients without regularly 
using the services of other firms, must hold a license 
unless he is covered by a statutory or summary exemption. 
The Board of Trade has appointed four full-time 
officials to grant and monitor licenses and exemptions 
and to investigate complaints. 
At March 31 19 75 909 8 securities with a market value 
of h 210 000 million had been listed by the Stock 
Exchange; they may be broken down as follows: - 51 -
Table A 
Number and value of Stock Exchange listed 
securities on March 31, 19 75 
Type of security 
Fixed-interest securities 
1. Public sector 
a) United Kingdom 
b) Republic of Ireland 
c) foreign 
2. Private sector 
a) United Kingdom 
b) Republic of Ireland 
c) foreign 
Shares 
a) United Kingdom 
b) Republic of Ireland 
c) foreign 
Total 
Number 
of issues 
922 
69 
500 
2 440 
30 
42 
4 456 
171 
468 
9 09 8 
Market value 
of securities 
outstanding 
in h millions 
24 278 
553 
2 061 
4 010 
42 
186 
31 539 
331 
147 268 
210 268 
% of 
total 
market 
value 
11,5 
0,3 
1,0 
1,9 
0 
0,1 
15,0 
0,2 
70,0 
100 
The private-sector securities were issued by 3716 
companies (3165 British, 154 Irish and 397 foreign). 
Since these figures give much less weight to foreign 
securities than the market-value figures do, it appears 
advisable to consult the turnover statistics to obtain 
a picture of the importance of dealings in foreign 
issues. However, the London Stock Exchange's periodical -52-
Table A - 3 
Stock Exchange volume 
(in h thousand millions) 
Volume 
2)  Fixed-interest securities 
Shares 
Total 
(number of transactions, 
in millions) 
1973 
38,7 
17,1 
55,8 
(6,0) 
1974 
44,2 
12,6 
56,8 
(5,0) 
1975 
76,4 
17,6 
94,0 
(6,0) 
1) Purchases and sales by jobbers. In most other countries 
"stock exchange volume" means the total of all sales; 
for the purpose of international comparison, the volume 
figures in the above table must therefore be halved. 
On the other hand, dealings by members for their own 
account on other stock exchanges are included in full 
in the volume figures. 
2) These figures include a small amount of turnover in 
preference shares. 53-
turnover statistics do not distinguish turnover in 
foreign shares from that in domestic issues, and one 
is therefore compelled to refer to the One-Day 
Transaction Study of 1974 (1975). According to the 
study's findings, total turnover breaks down as 
follows; domestic fixed-interest 84% (88%), foreign 
fixed-interest 0.4% (0.2%), domestic shares 12.1% 
(10.4%), foreign shares 3.4% (1.4%). The overwhelming 
predominance of fixed-interest turnover is due hot 
least to the fact that government stock is placed via 
the Stock Exchange. 
Besides listed securities, other issues may be traded 
on the Stock Exchange; these comprise principally 
British money market bills, securities listed on 
foreign stock exchanges and all stock traded over the 
counter in Canada and the United States. A member may 
also deal in any other security provided he obtains 
the approval of the Stock Exchange authorities for each 
individual transaction. Whilst the issuers of all 
listed securities are obliged by the listing agreement 
to provide information to investors on a continuous 
basis over and above the statutory requirements, the 
issuers of unlisted stock are not affected by the 
Stock Exchange disclosure regulations. -54-
II. STOCK EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET IN 
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 
This liberal attitude on the part of the Stock Exchange 
towards dealings in unlisted securities is an important 
reason why there is only a very modest volume of "over-
the-counter" trading in the United Kingdom and the 
Republic of Ireland. Another contributory factor is the 
willingness of the Stock Exchange to list even issues 
with a low market value. Although two or three times the 
official minimum market value of h 200.000 laid down 
in the admission regulations is probably required today, 
this is still well below the minimum requirements 
imposed by other major stock exchanges. Other reasons 
for the small extent of off-exchange business are the 
long trading sessions and the fact that dealing does 
not have to take place physically on the floor of the 
exchanges. Members are allowed to deal by telephone. 
In London the Exchange is open from 9.30 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. 
After that time trading takes place exclusively by 
telephone. These official telephone transactions end 
at 5.30 p.m.; dealing later than this is basically 
only prevented by the fact that jobbers cannot be 
contacted after that time. 
In principle, it is mandatory for every deal to be 
transacted with a jobber. That is why the "jobbing 
system" is spoken of. With one exception the jobbing 
system has also become established on the provincial 
exchanges since the merger of 1973. Members of the 
Stock Exchange are either jobbers, who have no private 
clients and are "spread guided", i.e. they profit by 
realizing spreads or turns, or are brokers, who 
chiefly are "commission guided", i.e. they earn their -55-
money through the commission they charge to clients. 
Jobbers and brokers may not combine together in a 
single firm; jobbers must work only with other jobbers 
and brokers with other brokers. Brokers normally 
execute orders from investors on an individual basis 
by immediately making a deal with a jobber. Since the 
broker does not need to hold any securities to do 
this - and ideally does not hold any - and since, 
further, he has no knowledge of the counterparty to 
the transaction because of the intermediary function 
of the jobber, he can be a completely impartial adviser 
and agent to his client, apart of course from the 
fact that he has an interest in getting his commission. 
1. The jobbing system 
a) The normal dealing procedure 
In the normal procedure the jobbers act as market makers 
- they are in fact the archetypal market makers -
that is to say they are willing at any time during 
business hours to buy or sell certain securities 
immediately for the account of their firm and on the 
basis of a spread (the jobber's "turn") which they 
themselves determine. At the end of March 19 75 there 
were 21 jobbing firms with 569 representatives 
registered with the Exchange. Most jobbers make markets 
in at least a few dozen securities. Ten years ago 
there existed, in London alone, 60 firms of jobbers 
with 750 dealers. Although no statistics are 
available, information provided by the Stock Exchange 
indicates that for all the more important stocks there 
are at least two jobbers on the market and three - 56 -
jobbers for specially active issues. However, the 
number of jobbers dealing in a given issue is not 
necessarily an indication of the degree of 
competition for transactions, since many jobbers combine 
their market-making positions and "make a joint book", 
i.e. they act for joint account. 
The jobbers can usually be found on their firm's pitch 
on the floor of the exchange, where, either in person 
or by telephone, they quote the prices at which they 
are prepared to deal and they enter into deals. But 
they can also, exactly like the market makers on the 
American over-the-counter market, take care of all 
enquiries and business by telephone from their offices. 
When a broker receives an order, he will first ask 
the appropriate jobber or jobbers on the floor of his 
local stock exchange for their quotations without 
revealing whether he wishes to buy or to sell; he will 
then telephone the jobbers at other exchanges or 
outside the Stock Exchange to find out their prices. 
Only then will he consummate the trade with the jobber 
offering the price most favourable to his client. 
It is only necessary in certain cases for the price 
to be published. Basically, members are free to choose 
whether or not to report the prices at which they have 
dealt. So only every third or fourth price is published. 
The volume of individual deals is never reported. 
Disclosure of the price and volume of each individual 
transaction is resisted, especially by the jobbers. 
They rightly fear that complete information on prices 
and turnover would enable their competitors or brokers 
to draw conclusions as to the state of their market-
making position and make it harder for them to liquidate such positions without a loss. 
The same applies to the provision of information 
about current quotes. It is not easy even for a 
broker to get a complete picture of the situation. 
A broker can discharge his duty to secure the best 
price for his client only by having someone ask the 
jobbers or by asking them himself. Some help is 
provided by the middle prices chalked up by the 
jobbers on their pitches but these prices, lying 
mid-way between bid and ask, are often out of date. 
More reliable information on middle prices is 
supplied by the Stock Exchange's electronic Market 
Price Display System (MPDS). It shows on a display 
screen the movements in the middle prices of the more 
active shares, starting with the closing middle price 
of the previous day and continuing with the London 
jobbers' middle prices, which are ascertained from the 
jobbers continuously by price collectors and fed 
into the system. 
MPDS is a valuable aid for advising clients and for 
members in offices and at the provincial stock exchanges 
but it does not tell a broker - unlike Nasdaq, for 
example (see K III 1a and K IV 2b infra) - which jobber 
is offering the highest bid or the lowest ask. This 
information would speed up the search for the best 
counterparty and could sharpen competition, particularly 
between jobbers at different stock exchanges. Quite 
apart from the fact that with 10 000 to 30 000 bargains 
per working day the 4 000 brokers are not very heavily 
burdened, even if not all of them are actively engaged 
in stock exchange dealing, failure to provide complete 
information on quotes is less serious with only two -58-
or three jobbers per issue than it would be if market-
makers were more numerous. From the point of view 
of the stock exchanges a certain lack of transparency 
may even be desirable, because the more reliable the 
information about current quotes on the exchange, 
the more likely it is that orders will be executed 
outside the exchange with consequent loss of business 
to jobbers and other members. 
A special feature of the transaction service offered 
by members of the British Stock Exchange to their 
clients is that bargains are in principle concluded 
immediately, since it is mandatory to deal through 
jobbers and the jobber constitutes an immediately 
available counter-party for the deal desired by the 
investor. As already stated on page 24, this special 
service has its price, the immediacy premium or discount, 
Both together go to form the dealer's spread, if one 
disregards costs other than those of immediacy. It is 
now said in various quarters in the City that spreads 
have widened in recent years and differ less from 
share to share than was once the case. Since a jobber 
does not usually buy and sell at the same time - indeed 
it is precisely his task to bridge the time gaps 
between the receipt of orders to buy and orders to sell -
his spread or turn is not a very reliable indicator 
of how much the instant bargain costs the individual 
investor or all investors in aggregate. The aggregate 
actual earnings of all jobbers from dealing - that is 
to say their earnings after they have bought in stock 
at a certain time and sold it at another time, whether 
at a profit or a loss - would be a better indicator, 
particularly if one compared these earnings with total 
purchases and sales in order to ascertain the cost - 59-
of the jobbers' services to investors per unit 
transacted. But as will be shown below, jobbing 
firms are not single-product undertakings and this 
is one of the reasons why this method produces a 
figure for the cost of immediacy to investors per 
unit transacted that is rather too low. 
By making calculations of this kind the Stock 
Exchange tries to counter accusations that jobbers' 
turns are too wide. It arrives at a figure of 
realized spreads per unit of sales only for a large 
jobbing firm with business mainly in bonds ranging 
between 0.05% for 19 73 and 0.11% for 19 75. In the case 
of another large firm, whose main business is in 
equities, the corresponding figures are 0.09% for 
1975 and 0.19% for 1971. Unfortunately these 
calculations were based not on gross earnings from 
dealing but on net earnings after full or partial 
deduction of various expense items such as salaries 
and rents. It was not possible to ascertain the 
amount of these expense items. Without doubt reliable 
statistics on the cost of the jobber service per 
unit of turnover would be very useful for judging 
the procedural efficiency of the jobbing system. 
Such statistics would also reveal what earnings a 
jobber needed in order to cover the cost of handling 
his business from the technical point of view and to 
cover the cost of his capital which corresponds to 
the risk of holding market-making positions. In 
addition, a jobber, when building up a "bull" or 
"bear" position, must also include an element of 
forward cover discount or premium (see page 2 3) 
in his bid or ask respectively. Viewed as a whole, 60-
however, the unrealized profits initially gained 
by the forward cover discount or premium will, 
under ideal conditions of intensive competition 
between market makers, completely disappear in the 
liquidating transactions the jobbers effect. This 
forward cover discount or premium is not therefore 
borne by investors in their aggregate, but for an 
individual investor it may, in conjunction with the 
other costs of the market-making service, be so 
substantial that he would prefer - if he had the 
choice - to forgo his instant bargain and instead 
wait for a suitable counter-order to turn up in due 
course. We shall have cause to return to that problem 
time and again. 
The cost of immediacy is greatly influenced by the 
conditions under which the market makers must 
operate. The Stock Exchange has created favourable 
conditions for jobbers in three ways: 
1. All securities - with the important exception of 
British, Irish and Commonwealth government 
stock and the loans of some international 
organizations - are traded forward (the "account 
system"), with the result that the costs of 
procuring funds and securities for market making 
are kept low in comparison with the cost of cash or 
regular way transactions. In the case of government 
and public authority stocks there are special 
facilities that help to keep these costs down. 
2. The jobbers are kept continually up to date on 
important economic and political developments 
by a news ticker on the floor of the exchange. 61 -
Without this information they would run the risk 
of misinterpreting the orders of investors. If they 
did not have access to continuous information they 
would have to protect themselves against this 
risk by applying on the average higher forward 
cover discounts or premiums. In other words, the 
news ticker reduces the jobbers' information risks. 
3. The rule that business must go through jobbers 
exposes the jobbers to the full flow of orders. 
A jobber can thus clear his position more quickly 
than would be possible under any other trading 
procedure. Hence his risk of having to suffer 
losses is smaller than it would be in a situation 
where it was not mandatory to trade with jobbers. 
The jobbing system will therefore tend to keep 
forward cover discounts or premiums down. 
Unlike the market makers on the New York Stock Exchange 
(see K II 1a infra), the British jobber, however, has 
no idea of how his position is protected by the market, 
because he has no knowledge of the orders awaiting 
execution. His book is only a book of his actual 
positions, it is not an order book; orders, as such, 
are not in principle passed to him. If a jobber who, 
for instance, had to buy a fairly large block of shares, 
knew that a substantial volume of orders to buy up to 
a limit a little below the present price had been 
received, so that if the price were to fall his 
position would be protected, this knowledge would not 
be without influence on the size of his forward cover 
discount. Lack of knowledge about orders received and 
awaiting execution has a twofold effect: on the one 
hand it makes it harder for the jobber to estimate the -62-
price risk he runs, and on the other hand it protects 
the investor from counter-action and from being 
wilfully denied priority, and there is no need for 
special regulations in this connexion. For related 
reasons a jobber is not allowed to have investor clients 
of his own. 
b) Modifications for block transactions and in other 
circumstances where spreads are wide 
In principle, a jobber buys or sells any amount of stock 
at his bid or, respectively, at his offer. There are 
limits to this, however. An order may be so large that 
the jobbing firm cannot assume the risk of the position 
arising from an immediate execution of the order; since 
jobbers themselves have no direct contacts with 
investors, their opportunities for rapidly running down 
large positions are limited. Even if the jobber is 
willing to take up the position, his quotation will 
necessarily vary according to the size of the transaction 
and the point will eventually be reached at which the 
broker holding the order will ask himself whether, in the 
interests of his client, he should forgo the immediate 
bargain and try to discover, by asking other potential 
buyers, whether they are interested in doing a deal 
and, if so, at what price. A broker, however, who feels 
that the price offered by a jobber is not good enough, 
must 
1. find out from the jobber the prices he is quoting 
for the transaction or for parts of the transaction, 
2. allow the jobber to take on at least part of the - 63-
transaction at the eventual dealing price provided 
this does not prevent the execution of the order, 
and, 
3. if he (the broker) has obtained matching orders, 
he must allow the jobber to offset these orders 
against the original order or the remaining portion 
of the original order ("put-through"). 
For this the jobber receives a smaller spread, which 
has nothing to do with the cost of immediacy but 
rather should be seen as a "price consultancy 
commission" or a "fair price commission". A small 
portion of this spread should - as in every other 
case - be interpreted as a "commission for guaranteeing 
settlement", as the jobber would himself be liable 
to the buyer or seller if the broker and the parties 
he represented failed to honour their commitments. 
This spread normally ranges from 0.1 to 0.4% of the 
value of the transactions. 
The put-through procedure has grown greatly in importance 
with the increasing "institutionalization" of share-
dealing, because institutional investors often come to 
the market with orders so large that they cannot be 
dealt with by the normal methods of the jobbing system. 
The procedure is to be used for all stocks listed on a 
domestic or foreign stock exchange. But a broker is free 
to deal in Eurobonds unaided by a jobber and may also 
do so for his own account, or he may, also without the 
assistance of a jobber, execute an order abroad if it 
is to his client's advantage. The proportion of put-
through transactions to total stock exchange turnover 64 
is now about 10%. Recently, there seems to have been 
a growing trend towards put-throughs even for 
transactions of normal size. Some brokers, it seems, 
are assembling offsettable orders so as to exclude, 
if not the jobber, then at least his forward cover 
service. Complaints have been heard, moreover, that 
jobbers are being completely circumvented by brokers 
executing orders in leading British shares not in the 
United Kingdom or Ireland but on stock exchanges or 
over-the-counter markets abroad. 
The broker who effects a put-through deal can generally 
speaking charge his clients on both sides of the trans-
action the usual commission. If, however, he himself 
and at least two jobbers - where there is more than 
one - come to the conclusion that the deal is too large 
or leaves no room for a spread, the jobbers may decline 
to put through the business as described under 3 above. 
However, the broker then does the offsetting himself 
and may charge a provision only to one party to the 
transaction, so he does worse than he would have done 
if a jobber had been involved. 
Besides the put-through, a technique which where 
large orders are involved resembles over-the-counter 
block-assembling (see K II 1a infra), there are other 
methods for dealing with block orders. A broker will 
not always be able to create matching orders from his 
clientele to meet the part of a large order which the 
jobber of iiis choice cannot execute at an acceptable 
price. In this case he will first do a deal with the 
jobber for the amount that he can obtain under 
acceptable conditions. He will then usually put a 
price limit on the remainder of the order and leave -65-
it with the jobber. The jobber may then try to 
provide the right conditions for the execution of 
the order by making suitable quotes, or he may, 
with the broker's consent, enquire of other jobbers 
whether they are interested in doing a deal. Or the 
jobber might make an offer to another broker which 
that broker would put to one or more of his clients 
so that a counterparty may be found in this way. 
Some large firms of stockbrokers specialize in putting 
proposals of this kind to dozens of institutional 
investors within the space of a few minutes. Finally, 
it is open to the jobber, as it is to the broker, 
to resort to international arbitrage. 
Even with transactions of normal size it may happen 
that a broker finds the jobber's margin unsatisfactory 
or that the jobber registered for the issue does not 
quote two prices at all but only makes a one-way 
market. In that case the broker may proceed exactly 
as described above. Alternatively, he may challenge 
the jobber and make a counter-offer for the client on 
his own account, in which case the jobber has the 
right to trade on the terms offered. But if a bargain 
is transacted for the broker's own account, he may 
not charge even a single commission as described 
above in the case where he carries a transaction 
through between two clients, but may charge none at all. 
This circumstance has already been explained with the 
aid of an example, on page 39. There it was stated 
that it seemed reasonable on the face of it that a 
broker should not claim a commission as agent for 
transactions in which he did not act as agent but dealt 
on his own account. However, our analysis there made 
it clear that the rule which prevents the broker from -66-
charging commission in this instance is not an 
economically valid rule designed to protect the 
investor. At this point we may add that the rule is 
a means of protecting the jobber from competition. 
The price at which a broker sells direct to his 
client must be higher than the jobber's bid by the 
amount of one commission; the price at which the 
broker buys for his own account from a client to 
challenge a jobber must be lower than the jobber's 
ask by the amount of one commission. So long as a 
jobber does not pitch his spread wider than the amount 
of one commission, he is safe from competition from 
brokers. A broker cannot profit from challenging 
a jobber then. 
c) The jobber as broker 
In the case of securities which are seldom traded, it 
will often happen that the jobber immediately executes 
only part of a normal-sized order, taking on the 
remainder of the order as agent. He then tries to find 
a party on the other side. For his broking services 
he receives a reduced spread. He may alternatively 
accept the entire order in the capacity of agent. 
2. Trading without jobbers 
As stated .bove under 1b), any broker is free to 
execute orders on foreign markets or on the Eurobond 
market if this is of advantage to his client. Apart 
from these instances, there is in general no way of 
bypassing the jobbers. This principle does not apply -67-
to certain Irish stocks, however, particularly 
Irish government stock, even though there are jobbers 
who trade in such securities. Also of course, all 
securities for which no jobbers exist may be dealt 
in broker to broker. 
a) The "callover" system 
The Irish Administrative Unit in Dublin has no jobbers 
but instead publishes a price list covering 277 titles. 
Just under a third of these securities are regarded 
as active. These market leaders are "called over" each 
day in a specific order by a stock exchange official. 
After the name of a stock is called out, the represent-
atives of the 19 firms trading on Dublin's stock 
exchange may bid and trade in that stock. Then the next 
issue is called over. The individual prices produced 
by this method of dealing are then published in the 
Irish Administrative Unit's official price list. 
Some of the securities dealt in in Dublin have a 
jobber in London. Before a broker trades in such a 
security on the floor of the Dublin exchange he must, 
for the best advantage of his client, find out the 
current quotation in London in order to ensure that the 
client's order is executed at the best available price. 
If a broker wishes to deal in one of the close to 
200 shares that are not regularly called out, he may 
request that the share should be called over and then 
try to find the other side to his order. 68 -
b) Other methods of trading without jobbers 
A decisive factor determining the method of trading 
to be used is whether 
1. the transaction involves listed securities or 
those unlisted securities that may be dealt in 
without a Stock Exchange listing, or whether 
2. securities other than those mentioned in 1. 
are involved. 
Even for issues in the first category there is not 
always a jobber, so an interested broker will have to 
make enquiries on the floor of the house or by telephone 
around the offices and among his clients to find a 
buyer or seller. 
A broker may trade in securities of the second category 
only if each individual transaction has been permitted 
by the Council of the Stock Exchange. Transactions of 
this kind mostly involve the shares of small domestic 
companies. It depends on the market-knowledge and 
resourcefulness of the broker whether he finds a counter-
party himself or through third parties. It is also 
possible that he should act for his own account. 
Usually two broking firms are involved in transactions 
of this kind. - 69 
III. OFF-EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 
1. Automated Real-Time Investments 
Exchange Limited (Ariel) 
From the legal point of view Ariel is just a "licenced 
dealer in securities" and accordingly Ariel 
calls itself merely a new City broking firm using a 
special modern dealing technique. But if by "stock 
exchange" one means an organization that helps certain 
security-dealing firms to make their bargains more 
cheaply by providing them with standardized forms of 
contract and standardized dealing procedures, supplies 
them with information about the market price of 
securities and makes it easier for them to find counter-
parties of good standing, then Ariel is not just a 
broker but, as its name implies, a stock exchange. 
Compared with stock exchanges in the usual sense of 
the word, however, Ariel is different in five respects. 
Firstly, dealing is not concentrated physically in an 
exchange building. In London this first difference is 
of little moment: as explained above, stock exchange 
business in the United Kingdom and the Republic of 
Ireland is not concentrated solely on meetings 
between dealers but is carried on to a large extent 
over the telephone. Secondly, dealing takes place 
entirely anonymously and without any personal contact, 
not even voice contact over the telephone. Thirdly, 
Ariel, unlike the Stock Exchange, does not have any 
listing requirements of its own with regard to the 
stock dealt in, not even for shares of domestic issuers. -70-
Fourthly, the members of Ariel are the investors 
themselves; they are major institutional investors, 
interested mainly in block transactions. Fifthly, 
only a few of the members are also shareholders of 
Ariel. Some of these differences are merely differences 
of degree, others have precedents in stock exchange 
history, but together they go to make up a new type of 
exchange which has developed in the past decade in the 
United States out of the so-called third and fourth 
markets. Ariel is based on the American "Instinet" 
system, with which it continues to cooperate. 
Ariel was founded in 19 72, trading commenced in 
February 1974, and by September 1975 Ariel had 66 
members, comprising 17 accepting houses, which created 
the new system and which own it, 8 banks, 7 trusts, 
13 pension funds and 21 insurance companies. To become 
a member, a firm must have securities to the value of 
at least h 40 million under management. Even before, 
19 74 these institutional investors were handling an 
unknown but substantial volume of business between 
themselves without using members of the Stock Exchange 
as intermediaries and this business was in both bonds 
and equities. At the request of the Bank of England, 
government stock is not dealt in through the Ariel 
system, with the result that trading is concentrated 
mainly on equities. Ariel restricts itself to titles 
that are listed on the Stock Exchange and brings them 
gradually into its dealings as and when members so 
desire; the system covers some 1500 stocks and bonds. 
Ariel's turnover has been around h 160 million a year, 
which is 2% of the comparable volume of the Stock 
Exchange. - 71 -
Each member has at least one keyboard terminal with 
visual display unit and printer. With this equipment 
a dealer can interrogate the system to find out the 
four latest prices and volumes of transactions in 
a security as well as price range and turnover data 
for the two previous months. At the same time he can 
read the "book", i.e. information on open orders in 
this issue which were entered into the system. In 
addition, he will see on the bottom area of the 
screen a collection of orders of other members in 
various securities specifying limits and amounts 
ordered although such amounts do not have to indicate 
the full extent of the desired transaction; these 
"broadcast" orders often are good for only a few minutes, 
as can be seen from the time of entry and the expiration 
time of the order both stated on the screen. Since 
every broadcast order qualifies for a credit of h 2 
which goes to reduce the sender's membership fee, 
there is an incentive to make use of the system by 
broadcasting orders so that they are visible to all 
subscribers instead of entering orders "discreetly" in 
the book, in which event they are accessible only to 
those interested in the particular issue. 
If a member wishes to accept a bid or offer filed with 
the system, he enters the order number and the relevant 
data and accepts. His dealer can also call upon the 
other side to negotiate through the system by drawing 
the sender's attention to a counter offer or to a 
counter bid simultaneously entered by means of an 
acoustic signal. When a bargain is struck, a detailed 
record of the bargain will appear on the display 
screens of both parties and at the same time a contract 
note will be printed out for each of them. -72-
All entries, even erroneous ones, and all answers 
from the system are printed out in the control room 
at the head office in chronological order so that 
every action is recorded and can be checked. If the 
system should go down, an experienced dealer is on 
hand at head office who can carry on negotiations or 
consummate trades by speaking to the parties over 
the telephone. 
Ariel is attractive to its members for two main 
reasons. Firstly, its commissions are considerably 
lower than those charged by the Stock Exchange members, 
and secondly there are no jobbers' costs. Ariel does 
not offer the immediacy service provided by the jobber. 
But if a matching order is at hand, there is no need 
for this financial service. As the orders of Ariel 
members are large orders, the cost of immediacy could 
be expected to be high. Reference should be made in 
this connexion to what was said on page 23. The savings 
in commissions by members on their transactions through 
Ariel was sufficient to cover the h 400 000 development 
costs and start-up expenses of the system in the first 
year of operation. Secondly, the Stock Exchange reduced 
the commission on large orders in 19 73 in an attempt 
to make membership of Ariel or at least the use of 
Ariel less attractive to institutional investors. 
This, too, has produced substantial indirect commission 
savings. 
At present there are no market makers participating 
in Ariel. If market makers for block transactions 
could be found, they could operate within the existing 
framework. But they would have to enter their quotes 
into the system discreetly, because if the quotes were -73-
broadcast a confusing multiplicity of bids would 
be displayed on the screens. Unlike jobbers on the 
Stock Exchange, market makers in the Ariel system 
would have to tolerate other participants feeding 
into the system orders limited at prices inside their 
quotations. Although Ariel could be a very useful 
instrument for all jobbers or brokers assembling the 
other side to a block.order (see II 1b supra), it 
is not used for this purpose. The Stock Exchange does 
not allow its members to make use of the "new stock 
exchange". 
2. Other off-exchange segments 
Owing to the difficulty of separating stock-exchange 
trading from off-exchange transactions in the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland - witness the 
existence of stock-exchange telephone trading - we 
shall use the term "stock-exchange trading" to refer 
to all transactions that pass through a member of the 
Stock Exchange and the term "off-exchange transactions" 
to designate all stock market dealings that do not 
involve a member of the Exchange. It is generally 
believed that only a portion of inter-institutional 
business goes through Ariel. In government stock 
especially, in which Ariel is not involved at all, 
there are likely to be substantial dealings off the 
Exchange. In addition, there are the market makers in 
Eurobonds who operate in London. 
There are well over a thousand companies in Britain 
which are large enough to be listed on the Stock 
Exchange but whose shares are not sufficiently -74-
distributed among investors to be eligible for 
listing. Occasional dealings in such shares are 
normally effected by Stock Exchange members on the 
basis of a permission for each transaction by the 
Stock Exchange Council (see II 2b supra). If dealings 
develop with any regularity, the Stock Exchange 
Council will try to persuade the company to apply for 
listing. If the company fails to do so, further dealings 
by members will not be permitted. Unlisted domestic 
companies will therefore usually have to decide sooner 
or later whether to comply with Stock Exchange 
requirements, i.e. to ensure that at least 35% of the 
shares are publicly held, and to pay the substantial 
listing fees or, on the other hand, to do without the 
support of the exchange community. To put it another 
way, without a listing it will basically not be possible 
for a secondary market in the company's shares to 
develop. 
There are a few exceptions to this rule. Some merchant 
banks are willing to act as agents from time to time 
in selling small or large holdings on behalf of share-
holders; they will also in some cases, where they 
are convinced that the company has good prospects, 
act as market makers. Another solution has been provided 
for some years by the firm M.J.H. Nightingale & Co, 
a "licenced dealer in securities". This firm offers 
promising small and medium-sized companies a whole 
range of interesting financial services including a 
complete secondary market service, mainly for shares 
but in some cases for bonds as well. A closely held 
company usually contacts the firm because the present 
shareholders wish to sell - for tax reasons, for 
instance - a fairly large portion of the shares but - 75-
initially less than 35% of the total either 
immediately or over the course of a few years. The 
shareholders are therefore interested in a reliable 
secondary market in order to be able to sell at 
prices as high as possible. 
If, for this reason, a company decides to seek the 
market-organizing services of Nightingale, the latter 
will first carry out a comprehensive analysis of the 
company. If the company meets the standards required 
by Nightingale, a kind of listing agreement will be 
framed in which the company undertakes to keep 
Nightingale continuously informed of its state of 
affairs. Nightingale will then approach institutional 
investors with its analysis of the company, with a 
view to placing the shares. After these initial 
transactions, Nightingale is willing at any time to 
facilitate further deals, acting as agent not as 
market maker. It has a daily insert in "The Times" 
showing the share prices, price-earnings ratios and 
current yields of its client companies. In addition, 
it supplies regular information to the public 
shareholders, endeavours to keep the risk of take-
over bids to a minimum by its choice of buyers for 
the shares, and advises the companies. In short, 
Nightingale offers issuers and investors a comprehensive 
and integrated secondary market service which clearly 
has quality characteristics different from the 
corresponding service provided by the Stock Exchange 
and its members. -76-
B. THE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET IN DENMARK 
I. PARTICIPANTS AND ISSUES TRADED 
The only stock exchange in Denmark is the K0penhavns 
Fondsb^rs. It has two sections, the "Main" Exchange 
(Hovedb^rsen) and the "After" Exchange (Efterb^rsen). 
At present there are 33 stock exchange members, spread 
over 24 member firms. They are appointed as the need 
arises by the Economics Minister and, like the stock 
exchange itself, come under a special Ministry 
supervisory authority which, however, has no officials 
engaged full-time on this supervisory task. Neverthe-
less the supervisory authority makes its presence felt. 
The supervisory regulations have been tightened up 
in recent years, not least in response to three cases 
of insolvency of members in the past decade. The 
regulations lay down minimum capital requirements 
for members and require protection of clients against 
insolvency by insurance or similar means. The authority 
carries out regular audits of members' activities. 
Moreover, it recently instituted an investigation into 
the affairs of a member of the board of directors of a 
corporation on the grounds of alleged insider trading, 
even though there is no regulation specifically 
prohibiting such trading. The initial outcome of the 
authority's action was the resignation of the director 
in question. 
Although stock exchange members and the stock exchange 
itself are regulated by the government, their accounts 
are not available to the public. For information 
about member firms, in particular , one has to rely -li-
on estimates by experts. According to the latter, 
there are six large member firms, 12 - 14 medium-
sized ones and four to six small firms. Only some 10% 
of the orders they execute are received direct from 
their own investor clients. They are both commission 
guided and spread guided, since in principle they 
are allowed to deal for their own account, although 
only in securities for which on a given day they 
receive, or have received, no executable orders. As 
a result of this provision of the Stock Exchange Act 
of 7 June 19 72, stock exchange members are not 
allowed to cross clients' orders against bids or offers 
for their own account, although in general they are 
permitted to cross orders outside the exchange provided 
the client has not expressly asked for the order to be 
executed on the stock exchange. 
Some 90% of all investors' orders received by stock 
exchange members come to them indirectly, principally 
through the commercial banks but also via the savings 
banks and to a very small extent also from a dozen so-
called "outsiders" who are licenced to act as dealers 
and brokers in securities and finance but are not 
authorized to deal on the stock exchange. The finders 
of business (i.e. the banks, savings banks and 
outsiders) may cross orders like stock exchange 
members without being subjected to the same investor-
protection regulations. The banks are heavily involved 
in securities trading, to a fair extent even for their 
own account, and they frequently bypass the exchange 
members. 
Securities business in Denmark is dominated by the 
long-term bonds of the mortgage credit associations -78-
which at the end of 19 73 accounted for almost 90% 
(1972 88%, 1974 91%) of the bonds outstanding, 
calculated on the basis of nominal value. Apart from 
these, government and local authority bonds have a 
certain importance, while the bonds of industrial 
companies play an almost negligible role. At the end 
of 1973 1395 bonds were listed, which compares with 
341 shares issued by a total of about 250 corporations 
(see Table B - 1). 
Table B - 1 
Value and number of bonds and shares listed 
on the stock exchange in Denmark 
Year-
end 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Bonds 
Total 
outstanding 
in Dkr 
'OOO millions 
at face value 
83,1 
96,6 
112,9 
136,1 
162,7 
Number 
of 
issues 
(of which 
B list) 
1140 (185) 
1251 (192) 
1322 (194) 
1345 (230) 
1405 (262) 
Shares 
Total outstanding 
in Dkr 'OOO millions, 
at: 
par value 
(of which 
Efterb^rs) 
5,1 (0,9) 
5,5 (0,9) 
6,0 (1,0) 
8,1 (1,4) 
8,6 (1,4) 
market value 
(of which 
Efterb^rs) 
• 
10,2 (2,9) 
20,0 (5,4) 
25,9 (9,2) 
19,3 (6,0) 
Number 
of 
issues 
(of which 
EfterbgSrs) 
328 (193) 
309 (168) 
341 (197) 
341 (193) 
319 (177) 
1) Excluding some 50 - 60 bonds traded on the Efterb^rs -79-
Apart from six foreign issues these are all Danish 
securities. They include all issues that are 
regularly traded in Denmark. There is no regular 
trade in any bonds or shares other than those listed 
on the exchange, even though many companies' shares 
are not listed. Almost all such unlisted companies 
have less than ten shareholders. 
The stock exchange rules of 16 November 19 72 oblige 
listed companies to provide information going beyond 
the minimum statutory requirements and to do so on 
a continuous basis. But the different sections of 
the exchange do not have different disclosure 
requirements. A prospectus must normally be produced 
when a company desires to be listed, and this applies 
to shares and to all bonds except those of credit 
institutions under public supervision. However, it is 
precisely these institutions that are the largest 
issuers. 
II. EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY 
MARKET IN DENMARK 
1. Hovedb^rsen 
The securities subject to the trading procedures of the 
Main Exchange are the major shares and almost all 
bonds. Today bonds may be admitted to the Hovedb^rs as 
soon as paper amounting to a face value of Dkr 500 000 
has been placed, although this admission is based on 
the assumption that further bonds in the same issue 
or series will subsequently be floated on the stock 
exchange; the average issue volume of a listed bond - 80 
is Dkr 100 million. For a share to be listed, there 
must be a par value of at least Dkr 5 million outstanding. 
In addition, it is stipulated that 15% of the share 
capital, but with a minimum of Dkr 2.5 million, must 
be publicly held. Usually a share is first listed on 
the Efterb^rs. If regular trading develops in that 
market, the share may, on application from the issuer, 
be admitted after three months to the HovedbgSrs. 
a) Dealings in "A List" shares and bonds 
Dealings in bonds and shares are catered for by the 
provision of a hall for each, in which sit the stock 
exchange members or their authorized clerks. Opposite 
them and next to the chairman sit the stock exchange 
secretary, a stenographer and the representatives of 
the national bank and several commercial banks and 
savings banks. Dealing commences at 10.30 a. m. and 
takes place at individual prices according to a 
procedure clearly based on auction principles (see Annex 2) 
The chairman calls out the names of the securities in 
the order they appear on the official list, repeats 
the highest bids and the lowest offers cried out by 
members and notes bargains if bid and offer happen to 
coincide. The unit of trading or round lot is normally 
Dkr 4 000 par value for shares and Dkr 20 000 face 
value for bonds. If some dealers then indicate by 
hand signals that they have further bids or offers, the 
chairman maiKS additional bargains at the price that 
has just been established by calling out "igen" (again). 
However, usually a bargain cannot be made at once. But 
if the bid and offer are close to one another, the 
chairman will call out a gradually increasing bid and - 81 -
a gradually decreasing offer until these modified bids and 
offers either coincide or are withdrawn. During the course 
of dealing the banks' representatives - who are not 
authorized to deal - may continue to signal orders 
to stock exchange members which they were unable to 
communicate before dealings commenced. The prices of 
and turnover in each security are published in the 
official price list. This also applies to bids and 
offers provided that the spread is not more than five 
points in the case of shares and two points in the 
case of bonds. 
b) Dealings in "B List" bonds 
As can be seen from Table B - 1, there are over 260 
bonds on the B List; they account for some 1% of 
turnover in bonds. Up till 1972 the B List also included 
18 equities, but these were subsequently transferred 
to the Efterb^rs. Bonds may be placed on the B List if 
the value in circulation is less than Dkr "!0 million 
and if the series has been closed for more than two 
years, in other words if the placing of the security 
through the stock exchange can be regarded as at an end 
and little further turnover can be expected. As is well 
known, the majority of Danish bonds are introduced on the 
stock exchange not by the issuers but by their borrowers; 
the borrowers of the mortgage credit associations, 
instead of receiving cash, are given bonds to the amount 
of their loan, which they may then sell, either on or 
off the exchange, at what they consider to be the most 
opportune moment. This circumstance shows, incidentally, 
that a substantial part of the turnover in A List bonds 
must be regarded as coming under the new issue market 
rather than the secondary market. -82-
Table B - 2 
Sales of the Hovedb^rs at par value and as 
a percentage of the total amount outstanding 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Bond sales 
Face value, 
in Dkr millions 
2 418 
2 607 
2 796 
3 123 
4 625 
4 458 
6 253 
6 909 
7 419 
10 595 
As % of 
total 
outstanding 
6,1 
5,8 
5,4 
5,1 
6,3 
5,4 
6,5 
6,1 
5,4 
6,5 
Stock sales 
Par value. 
in Dkr millions 
72 
86 
89 
72 
97 
95 
89 
215 
394 
217 
As % of 
total 
outstanding 
2,9 
3,1 
3,0 
2,2 
2,6 
2,3 
2,0 
4,3 
5,8 
3,0 
Trading procedures for these securities are basically 
the same as for bonds on the A List. However, the 
B List issues are called out regularly for dealing 
purposes only on Wednesdays after the A List titles have 
been called. On other business days B List titles are 
dealt in and quoted only if application for calling has 
been made to the stock exchange secretary before ten 
o'clock on the day in question. -83-
2. EfterbgSrsen 
The shares admitted to the Efterb^rs are those which 
have not (or not yet) qualified for admission to 
the Hovedb^rs. A stock may be traded here provided 
that the related share capital of the issuing company 
amounts to Dkr 1 million at par value. The majority 
of stocks (177 at the end of 19 74) are quoted on the 
Efterb^rs. In addition, some 50 very small bond issues 
are traded on the After Exchange, but they are quoted 
only if application has been made to the stock 
exchange secretary beforehand. 
The securities to be quoted are divided into four 
groups. A board is provided for each group. The names 
of the issues are displayed on these boards and trading 
takes place in front of them. In the presence of a 
fairly large number of stock exchange members and bank 
representatives - the latter are not authorized to deal 
on the Efterb^rs either - these groups of shares are 
called out in sequence every business day after the 
end of share trading on the Main Exchange. The members 
first cry out their bids and offers for stocks in the 
first group in any order they like. The chairman's two 
assistants write these bids and offers down on the first 
board and replace them with higher bids or lower asks 
as and when these are called out. They also note 
bargain prices and turnovers on the board. When activity 
begins to tail off, the chairman announces that dealing 
is coming to an end and switches on a wall-clock which, 
after 60 seconds - during which time trading again becomes 
brisk - rings to signal the end of the session. The 
other groups then go through the same procedure. Each 
group's dealings normally last between 5 and 10 minutes. - 84-
The participants have to spend about 10 seconds of 
their time on each issue; such a short average 
trading period per stock cannot be achieved in 
dealings on the Main Exchange. 
Turnover on the After Exchange is very modest, if 
one disregards newly listed securities and certain 
stocks which should be allocated to the Main Exchange. 
However, what is interesting for the purposes of our 
study is not the absolute amount of this turnover but 
the difference in turnover between securities that 
are representative of the two methods of stock exchange 
trading. A typical stock on the Hovedb^rs will have 
about ten transactions per week, its equivalent on the 
Efterb^rs less than one bargain. Even in the most 
active shares the relationship of the respective turn-
overs is about 10 : 1; in the leading shares on the 
Hovedb^rs 10 - 20 round lots are traded per day and 
average daily sales at market value amount to 
Dkr 60 000 - 100 000. 
III. OFF-EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY 
MARKET IN DENMARK 
The greater part of secondary stock market transactions 
in Denmark take place off the stock exchange. The chief 
participants in this market are the major banks in 
Copenhagen. Since no office collects data on off-exchange 
dealings systematically, we cannot say with certainty 
whether banks in other parts of the country play an 
active role in this market. Nor is it known whether, and 
if so to what extent, institutional investors act 
without the agency of banks. Even the turnover of this -85-
segment of the market can only be stated approximately. 
Off-Exchange (or "over-the-counter") sales in shares 
is estimated at between one and two times that of the 
corresponding stock exchange figure, over-the-counter 
sales in bonds at between one and seven times. In the 
case of bonds - if one includes new-issue dealings, 
which form a substantial part of stock exchange business 
three times stock exchange sales is more likely to be 
too low than too high an estimate. 
Off-exchange transactions are almost without exception 
based on the stock exchange prices for the relevant day. 
The transactions in question consist partly of inter-
bank dealings, partly of in-house crossing transactions, 
but also of business in Danish Eurobonds, for which the 
large banks act as market makers, and, finally, of 
business in small orders and block transactions. We 
must give, briefly, more detail of the last two 
categories. 
1. Execution of small orders 
By "small orders" we mean orders for less than the 
designated unit of trading or such parts of orders in 
excess of one or more round lots, in other words, 
orders for odd lots. In theory, even odd-lot orders may 
be executed on the Hovedb^rs; if application is made to 
this effect half an hour before the commencement of 
trading, the small orders may be called out following 
regular dealings in the security in question. This 
procedure is cumbersome; thus, it is not used. As a rule, 
banks are prepared to buy or sell odd lots for their own 
account at prevailing stock exchange prices. If several -86-
prices could be applied to the transaction, the bank 
chooses the price it considers reasonable for the 
deal. Since the prices from which the choice may be 
made have arisen at virtually the same moment there 
is little difference between them unless the effect of 
a large order has made itself felt. In addition, a 
premium or discount for dealing in a small quantity 
(odd-lot differential) is added to or subtracted from 
the price. The client is charged the usual commission. 
2.. Block transactions 
In listed bonds, in particular, block transactions 
are very common. Such dealings usually involve sales 
to insurance companies and pension funds; less often 
they take the form of transactions between banks. All 
transactions are normally based on reported stock 
exchange prices. Even where deals of several million 
kroner are involved, the ask is said to be quoted not 
higher than 25 - 50 base points above the bid, if they 
differ at all from the reported prices. For such 
business the banks charge the normal commission. Persons 
or organizations other than banks are not granted 
special terms, apart from stock exchange members, who 
pay half commission. 
Besides dealings for cash, a certain amount of business 
takes place for future settlement, which mostly entails 
the client buying bonds for delivery at a later date 
(up to one or two months after trading date) when the 
necessary funds are available. A premium over the current 
stock exchange price is often charged in forward trading 
of this kind. The banks either deliver the bonds from their 
own holdings or purchase them for cash on the market. - 87-
THE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
IN THE NETHERLANDS 
I. PARTICIPANTS AND ISSUES TRADED 
Since 1974 there has been one stock exchange only in 
the Netherlands, the Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs (AEB); 
the exchanges in Rotterdam and The Hague had to close 
for lack of business. The members of the AEB form the 
Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel. The Vereniging is 
a private association. It owns the exchange building 
and its board of directors and committees lay down 
the necessary regulations and fulfill all functions of 
management and supervision. The members of the 
Vereniging were granted a monopoly as agents for 
securities trading in 1947 by a Ministerial Decree. 
This does not mean that it is mandatory to deal through 
the stock exchange, however, as the members may at any 
time trade off the exchange, either as agents or for 
their own account. If a transaction in securities is 
to be effected without the participation of a member of 
the stock exchange, it must be approved by the Minister 
of Finance. 
In principle, all members of the AEB may deal for their 
own account and they are therefore spread guided to 
some extent. However, their main earnings come not from 
realized spreads but from commissions charged to 
investors or other members. Among the primarily investor-
commission guided members are the banks, which have 
brought securities business into their range of services, 
and the stock brokers, who devote themselves almost 
exclusively to securities business. The so-called "hoeklieden", on the other hand, are chiefly guided 
by member or floor commissions. They specialize in 
certain securities and accept orders from the 
investor-commission minded members in these securities 
for execution. The hoeklieden themselves have no 
direct contact with private clients or institutional 
investors. For his services the hoekman receives a 
member commission, which is one tenth of the investor 
commission. At the end of 19 75 55 of the 178 member 
firms of the AEB were firms of hoeklieden, 84 were 
brokers and 39 were banks. 
The Stock Exchange Act of 1914 placed the responsibility 
for supervising the stock exchanges with the Finance 
Minister. The Minister is not actively using the powers 
granted him in this regard but has devolved his functions 
to the Vereniging. The Minister must take a.decision on 
every application for listing of a security; he has always 
accepted the recommendation of the AEB. The Finance 
Ministry has no officials engaged full-time in security-
dealing matters. To the extent that the member firms 
are subject to the supervision of the central bank, they 
must comply with the latter's solvency regulations. 
At the end of 1974 675 stocks and 1459 bonds were 
admitted to a quotation. The 29 7 Dutch stocks (excluding 
investment trusts) had a market value of just under 
Dfl. 29 000 million, while the nominal value of domestic 
bonds amounted to Dfl. 41 000 million. The stocks of the 
50 largest public corporations represent 90% of the 
market value of all listed shares. -89-
Table C - 1 
Number of securities listed on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange, by type of security 
Year-
end 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Bonds 
domestic 
958 
1 025 
1 030 
1 073 
1 116 
1 167 
1 229 
1 251 
1 272 
1 289 
foreign 
258 
261 
264 
261 
252 
240 
253 
191 
187 
170 
Stocks 
domestic 
586 
566 
545 
503 
455 
412 
390 
328 
309 
297 
foreign 
319 
313 
314 
310 
303 
304 
298 
289 
292 
303 
Investment 
trust shares 
77 
74 
79 
85 
87 
85 
84 
81 
75 
75 
Total 
2 198 
2 239 
2 232 
2 232 
2 213 
2 208 
2 140 
2 140 
2 135 
2 134 
In 19 74 stock exchange turnover in domestic shares 
amounted to 30% (19 73: 39%) of the total outstanding; 
the corresponding figure for domestic bonds was 14%. 
The significance of domestic and foreign securities 
for stock exchange trading is shown by Table C - 2. -90-
Table C - 2 
Stock exchange volume of sales in 1973 and 19 74 
by type of security, in Dfl. thousand millions 
Type of security 
Bonds 
Domestic 
Foreign 
Shares 
Domestic 
Foreign 
Total 
Sales 
1973 
6,3 
0,3 
18,0 
1,1 
25,7 
1974 
5,7 
0,2 
10,0 
0,5 
16,4 
Percentage of total 
sales 
1973 
25% 
1% 
70% 
4% 
100% 
1974 
35% 
1% 
61% 
3% 
100% 
II. EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY 
MARKET IN THE NETHERLANDS 
In most countries investors' orders are brought to the 
stock exchange by the members' clerks or are passed to 
the floor by telephone or telex. In the Netherlands this 
is still common practice. However, one large bank, one 
of the most important stock exchange firms, now has an 
automated order-switching system. Orders are received 
by the bank's branches and passed on by telephone in 
coded form to two input points in the system. The system 
than prints out the orders in the bank's stock exchange 
booth at the AEB. This procedure, which exists in similar 
form in other countries, has two interesting aspects which 
will be examined here by way of example. - 91 -
In the first place, the bank obtains certain cost 
benefits. The system checks the orders for completeness 
and consistency so that any errors can be corrected 
during the telephone contact with the relevant branch. 
In addition, the computer prints the number of the 
appropriate stock exchange dealer on the order and this 
speeds up work in the bank's floor office. Further, the 
preparation of confirmations and the preparation of 
accounts are facilitated, since individual prices have 
to be assigned only to the unique order number allocated 
by the system, whereas a collective price is simply 
allotted to all orders in a given stock which had to be 
executed at that price and which were executable within 
the limit instructions. 
In the second place, the system improves the protection 
of investors against what we have called "realization 
risks". The relevant risk in this connexion is the risk 
of a refined form of intertemporal price fraud. In the 
normal case of intertemporal price fraud the client 
receives a confirmation based on a less favourable 
earlier or later price than that at which his order was 
actually executed. Here an audit can in certain circum-
stances establish that the firm did not trade at all at 
the confirmed price. In the refined form of the fraud, 
on the other hand, a security transaction corresponding 
to the clients's order is actually effected first but 
this is then followed by two further transactions of the 
same volume. Assume that the client wanted to buy shares 
and that after the execution of a buying order corre-
sponding to his instructions the price had risen. The 
position arising from the first deal will then be closed 
by means of a second transaction; this transaction and 
the first transaction are taken on by a clerk for his - 92 
own account or for a third party. The third transaction 
is another purchase, this time - and for the last time, 
it is hoped - for the client. This form of inter-
temporal price fraud is difficult to prevent under the 
traditional procedure. But with the automatic order-
switching system the only orders that can be passed to 
the exchange are those which have been firmly assigned 
to a specific investor. In this way it becomes 
impossible for members of the staff in the branches of a 
bank or a broker to operate in this refined way. 
1. Gesloten hoeken 
"Hoek" is the Dutch term for the positions on the floor 
of the exchange at which dealings in certain securities 
are concentrated. An imaginary grid delineates 82 squares 
and these are occupied by the markets or "hoeken". It 
is mandatory to deal through a "hoekman" on the "gesloten 
hoeken". This is where most securities are traded. The 
"hoeklieden" - there are two for almost every security -
collect all orders and at around 12.15 p.m. for the first 
time and if necessary around 1.15 p.m. for a second time 
they jointly establish a collective price (see Annex 2) 
at which it will be possible to achieve the highest 
turnover, in other words a price at which the market will 
be completely cleared or at least cleared to a larger 
extent than at any other price. All the orders received 
are executed at this price provided that their limit 
instructions allow it. The hoekman has the right, but is 
not obliged, to satisfy or take up surplus orders at 
this price for his own account. Between the two collective 
prices it is permissible for individual bargains to be 
made through a hoekman at the first price. - 93 
If bargains cannot be made, bid or offer prices or 
spreads may be quoted. If, on the other hand, 
bargains can be made but one side of the market is 
in excess of the other, for example if demand at 
the collective price exceeds supply, and if it is not 
covered by the hoekman, the shares must be distributed 
to the prospective buyers proportionately; each buyer 
must receive at least one share. This regulation 
reduces the risk of chance or arbitrary failure to 
secure a bargain for a client. Each gesloten hoek may, 
with the permission of the quotation commissioner, 
temporarily become an "open hoek", provided that the 
inflow of orders is sufficiently brisk, in order to 
cater for direct dealing between members ("opengaan van 
gesloten hoeken"). 
2. Open hoeken 
The "open hoeken" are the markets in active securities 
and trading may take place on them at any time during 
the stock exchange business hours of 11.30 a.m. to 
1.15 p.m. At opening time the appropriate hoekman 
determines a collective price, the opening price, in the 
same way as on the gesloten hoeken. Trading at individual 
prices then follows. Each stock exchange member may 
make and accept offers and bids. It is not mandatory to 
deal through a hoekman here; the members may deal with 
each other direct, without the intervention of a hoekman 
and individual bargains may be done at prices differing 
from the opening price. The hoekman may also participate 
in this trade for his own account, but basically only 
if he has no more orders. All prices are published in 
the official list. -94-
III. OFF-EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY 
MARKET IN THE NETHERLANDS 
As already stated in the first section, the members 
of the Vereniging have a monopoly of securities trading. 
It is, as they put it in the Netherlands, mandatory to 
deal through a securities agent; it would be more 
appropriate to say that it is mandatory to deal through 
a member of the stock exchange, in order to make it 
clear that exchange and off-exchange business are in 
the hands of the same people. So the segmentation of 
the market in the Netherlands is not a matter of 
competition but of expediency. 
1. Off-exchange dealings in listed securities 
Unless the client instructs otherwise, orders in listed 
securities are executed on the stock exchange. In 
principle, members of the exchange are not allowed to 
cross such orders; they have to pay the hoekman only 
half the floor commission for offsettable orders. 
Although crossing thus plays no part in off-exchange 
trading, this does not mean that there is no off-floor 
trading in listed securities. First of all there is 
after-hours trading in foreign and international issues; 
this is particularly important and derives from the 
fact that the AED closes as early as 1.15 p.m. whereas 
the London Stock Exchange for example remains open 
until 3.30 and New York does not open until 3 o'clock 
Central European Time in summer. There is also naturally 
some before-hours and after-hours trading in purely 
domestic issues as well. Secondly, we must mention block 
transactions, which are usually prepared and executed -95-
outside the exchange. New regulations are currently 
being drafted to protect orders on the floor from 
non-execution when block business is being transacted. 
Thirdly, premium and option deals in quoted titles 
are effected outside the exchange. (The AEB is at 
present planning to introduce option dealings on the 
exchange on the American model.) 
2. Off-exchange dealings in non-listed securities 
The Vereniging obviously considers it inappropriate that 
an issue should be the subject of stock exchange dealings 
by means of collective bargains at collective prices if 
the market value of the shares in circulation in the 
Netherlands is lower than Dfl. 500 000. Nevertheless there 
is some trading in such securities. A great many securities 
could be admitted to a stock exchange listing but their 
issuers have hitherto refrained from applying for 
listing. These securities play a major role in telephone 
dealings in domestic issues. There are probably some 
one thousand unlisted stocks and bonds. 
The bulk of business in domestic unlisted ("incourant") 
securities is handled by the offices of two member firms. 
Normally these two "incourante kantoren" admit stocks 
to their dealing service only if the issuer applies to 
them, submits his annual reports and accounts and makes 
a certain proportion of his share capital available to 
the market. Although all business with the two firms 
must be settled through a bank or through a broker, 
the firms also accept orders direct from investors and 
negotiate with these investors direct in line with their 
efforts to establish direct contacts with as many 96-
potential buyers and sellers of unlisted securities 
as possible and to keep a record of such prospective 
clients. When an order comes in, there is usually 
neither a matching order available nor can be 
expected. Therefore the dealing departments of these 
firms normally telephone various potential contracting 
parties until a bargain is made. Dealing takes place 
not only during stock exchange hours but also during 
normal office hours. 
With regard to unlisted securities the stock exchange 
members are not bound by the Vereniging's commission 
rules and charge a higher commission because dealing 
work in connexion with "incourant" securities is more 
costly than for "courant" items. The two specialized 
firms publish their turnover in their own price lists 
which appear once a week in the financial press. 
In closing we must mention the market segment constituted 
by Euro-securities. There are several market makers for 
these issues in Amsterdam, particularly for Eurobonds 
denominated in guilders. The main operators in this 
field are the large Dutch commercial banks. -97-
THE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
I. PARTICIPANTS AND ISSUES TRADED 
In Germany there are at present eight stock exchanges. 
Frankfurt and Düsseldorf are the most important, 
followed by Munich and Hamburg, while Berlin, Stuttgart, 
Bremen and Hanover are of minor importance. This can 
be seen from Table D - 1, which shows the number of 
member firms at the end of 19 73. 
Table D - 1 
Member firms of German stock exchanges 
Type 
of firm 
Banks 
Unof-
ficial 
brokers 
(Frei-
makler) 
Official 
brokers 
(Kurs-
makler) 
Berlin 
32 
11 
8 
Bremen 
17 
-
1 
Diissel-
dorf 
69 
16 
17 
Frank-
furt 
103 
21 
21 
Hamburg 
85 
6 
17 
Hanover 
19 
-
3 
Munich 
44 
3 
8 
Stutt-
gart 
33 
-
4 
Table D - 1 does not adequately reflect the overwhelming 
importance of the banks as stock exchange members. 
Admittedly, and unlike the other firms, a fairly large -98-
number of banks which are admitted to several exchanges 
are recorded several times. However, the banks have on 
average about five members each whereas the "broker" 
firms have but one in most cases. The member banks are 
also especially significant because - with some 
exceptions - they are the only investor-commission 
minded members whereas the brokers are member-commission 
minded. All members may also deal for their own account, 
but official brokers only if orders cannot otherwise be 
executed. 
Since there is no monopoly in security dealing in 
Germany - apart from the special tasks of the official 
brokers and a few unofficial brokers in connexion with 
establishing prices - any person not a stock exchange 
member may deal in securities at any time. The primary 
operators among non-members are the banks, over 6000 of 
them, most of which have some importance if only as 
bringers of orders. About 300 banks are particularly 
active in securities business and a few operate as 
market makers outside the stock exchanges. Apart from 
the banks a few other undertakings carry on securities 
business, particularly the sale of foreign issues. 
These sales agents, unlike the banks, are not subject 
to federal banking supervision, which applies to everyone 
who trades securities in his own name and to an extent 
that requires a businesslike operation. 
The stock exchanges are subject to supervision at state 
(Land) level. The finance or economics ministers of the 
states in which stock exchanges are located have in 
six cases appointed commissioners to be responsible 
for exchange supervision. But in most instances the 
state commissioner has only an advisory and reporting - 99-
role. Only in Munich has he the right to impose 
disciplinary sanctions upon official brokers - who 
are in general appointed and supervised by the 
relevant minister. But no use has yet been made of 
this provision. 
Since 19 72 the stock exchanges have had investigatory 
committees which are intended, for the benefit of 
those interested in security dealing, to strengthen 
self-regulation and to investigate infringements of 
the recommendations on insider trading. We must point out 
in this connexion that the German concept of insider 
dealing is wider than that of other countries: a violation 
of the recommendations on insider trading is deemed 
to have been committed not only where non-public 
information about the business situation of an issuer 
has been exploited but also where the effects of false 
information on prices are exploited, for example by 
the publisher of an advisory service letter, or where 
information about orders is abused by the dealer of 
a member firm, for example through "fellow-travelling". 
So far there have been very few proceedings before the 
investigatory committees in which no infringement 
has been proved. 
About 5 million of the 21 million private households 
own stocks or bonds. They hold some 20% of the bonds 
and shares of domestic issuers. In the case of bonds 
the banks, with a good 40% of the bonds outstanding, 
occupy a special position, while a similar proportion 
of shares is probably held as a long-term investment 
by public and private shareholders and cannot therefore 
be said to be "circulating" (see Table D - 2, last 
column). The significance of institutional investors - 100 -
has grown in recent years, but they have not acquired 
a dominating position. The most important participants 
in the secondary market after the banks are the 
insurance companies in the case of bonds and the 
mutual funds (Investmentfonds) in the case of shares; 
the proportion of share turnover attributable to the 
investment funds is estimated at 15%. 
Table D - 2 
Percentage shares of various groups of investors in 
securities outstanding at the end of 19 70, 19 72 and 19 74 
Group 
of investors 
Domestic individuals 
Banks 
Mutual funds 
Insurance companies 
Other undertakings 
Social insurance 
Other public entities 
Other domestic 
legal entities 
Foreign investors 
Non-specified 
Shares in the outstanding amount 
at face or par value 
Bonds 
1970 
19,8 
47,3 
2,1 
10,1 
4,3 
4,6 
1,9 
2,1 
2,5 
5,3 
of domestic 
issuers 
1972 
20,8 
42,1 
2,8 
10,1 
3,9 
4,4 
1,3 
2,0 
6,2 
6,4 
1974 
21,5 
41,3 
2,8 
10,9 
3,5 
3,1 
1,0 
2,1 
7,5 
6.3 
Stock 
1970 
22,0 
• 
1,8 
2,2 
13,6 
0 
7,4 
1,3 
5,1 
• 
s of domestic 
issuers 
1972 
18,2 
8,0 
2,4 
2,2 
13,0 
0 
7,2 
1,1 
6,1 
41,8 
1974 
17,2 
7,9 
2,8 
2,2 
14,4 
0 
6,7 
1,2 
5,3 
42,3 
At present a total of about 530 domestic and 130 foreign 
stocks are traded on the German exchanges. Table D - 3 - 101 -
shows the distribution over the individual stock 
exchanges at the end of 19 73; it should be borne in 
mind that there are many cases of multiple listing. 
Table D - 3 
Number of stocks traded on the various market 
segments of German stock exchanges at the end 
of 1973 
1. German stocks 
(total) 
admitted to: 
a) official con-
tinuous trading 
b) official 
non-continuous 
trading 
c) unofficial 
exchange trading 
2. Foreign stocks 
(total) 
admitted to: 
a) official con-
tinuous trading 
b) official 
non-continuous 
trading 
c) unofficial 
exchange trading 
Total number of stocks 
Ber-
lin 
241 
85 
128 
28 
7 
6 
1 
-
248 
Bre-
men 
53 
39 
-
14 
-
-
-
-
53 
Dussel-
dorf 
210 
78 
103 
29 
48 
39 
9 
-
258 
Frank-
furt 
267 
85 
118 
64 
124 
82 
14 
28 
391 
Ham-
burg 
168 
140 
-
28 
23 
23 
-
-
191 
Han-
over 
84 
54 
-
30 
-
-
-
-
84 
Mu-
nich 
182 
58 
101 
23 
14 
14 
-
-
196 
Stutt-
gart 
104 
32 
48 
24 
-
-
_ 
-
104 102 -
Of the domestic stocks 2 3 are traded continuously on 
all exchanges and their market value is 4 3% of the 
market value of all quoted shares (end of 1973: 
DM 120 000 million). By contrast the 118 securities 
that are traded in unofficial exchange dealings 
exclusively formed less than 10% of total shares out-
standing at market prices. 
The market value of all domestic and foreign shares 
in the Federal Republic was DM 24 7 000 million at the 
end of 1973 and the face value of domestic and foreign 
bonds in circulation was the same amount. On the 
Frankfurt exchange 32 75 domestic and 286 foreign bonds 
were listed in 19 73; in Diisseldorf the figures were 
1965 domestic bonds with a face value of DM 125 000 
million and 187 foreign bonds (market value DM 20 000 
million). The contribution of stocks and bonds to the 
volume of sales on the German exchanges is shown 
by Table D - 4. 
Table D - 4 
Sales on the German stock exchanges in 197 3 at market 
value in DM thousand millions (and as percent of total 
turnover) 
Exchange 
All exchanges 
except Berlin 
Frankfurt 
Diisseldorf 
5 exchanges 
Total 
38,2 
(lOO) 
16,7 
(44) 
13,2 
(35) 
7,8 
(21) 
Stocks 
Domestic 
19,0 
(lOO) 
6,8 
(36) 
6,8 
(36) 
5,4 
(28) 
Foreign 
1,2 
(lOO) 
0,8 
'(67) 
0,2 
(25) 
0,1 
(8) 
Bonds 
Domestic 
13,5 
(100) 
5,5 
(41) 
5,5 
(41) 
2,5 
(18) 
Foreign 
4,5 
(loo) 
3,6 
(80) 
0,6 
(13) 
0,3 
(7) - 103-
II. EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
On the German exchanges a distinction must be drawn 
between official and unofficial trading. This 
distinction is confusing, especially for a foreign 
observer, because in both cases dealings take place on 
the floor of the stock exchanges, the participants 
being almost identical and even - if one takes the 
German stock exchanges together - the traded issues 
are the same to a large extent. Although prices 
naturally arise in unofficial dealings, they are not 
reported but are merely quotations on which no claim 
to execution can be based. In the case of official 
dealings, on the other hand, any transaction prices 
or bids or offers are reported, and an investor may 
claim execution of his order on the basis of these 
prices, even if they are only bids or offers. These 
official prices, which may be established only for 
securities that have been listed, have a special legal 
significance which no other exchange or market price 
has: they are the basis for the securities agent's 
right to deal, on his principal's behalf, with himself 
("Selbsteintrittsrecht"). The German banks, in their 
capacity of securities agents, regularly make use of 
this right under their terms of business, executing 
orders from customers from their own holdings at 
official prices and still charging the usual commissions 
and expenses. The "Selbsteintrittsrecht" leaves them 
free to decide whether or not to engage in a covering 
transaction and the manner in which to do so, and 
limits their duty to provide information to the 
customer as to the details of the execution. In the 
case of share dealing this limitation now constitutes 
the only practical significance of the "Selbsteintrittsrecht", - 104 -
as the banks undertook in 1968 to pass all orders in 
respect of listed shares through the stock exchange, 
unless the customer had expressly instructed otherwise 
("freiwilliger Borsenzwang", i.e. voluntary agreement 
to accept the obligation to deal through a bourse). 
1. Official trading 
a) Continuous trading 
This market segment is also designated as "dealings at 
variable quotations" or, more briefly, "variable-price 
dealings" ("variabler Verkehr"). A price is only 
established if a certain minimum number of shares are 
bought and sold, usually 50. The securities dealt in 
in this segment on the north German exchanges of 
Hamburg, Bremen and Hanover are all listed stocks. 
However, the executive committees of the five other 
German bourses in principle only assign shares to 
variable-price trading - apart from foreign securities -
in which it can be proven that there is a need for 
continuous dealing, in other words in which major orders 
are regularly forthcoming during stock exchange hours. 
The distribution and par value of capital of domestic 
listed stocks traded on several German exchanges are 
shown in Diagram 2; stocks traded continuously on at 
least one of the five exchanges indicated above were 
assigned to the first category ("continuously traded 
stocks"), the remaining stocks to the second. 
In the normal course of events the stock exchange's 
executive committee will require a member bank to make 
an application for the admission of such stock to - 105-
continuous dealing. The bank will then be expected 
to facilitate the execution of incoming orders in 
the security, in other words to act to some extent 
as market maker. The number of shares admitted to 
continuous trading is shown in Table D - 3. 
Diagram 2 
Distribution and par value of capital of 
domestic listed stocks traded on several 
German exchanges 
Percentage 
of capital 
publicly 
held 100 . 
500 10O0 
Issuer's capital, in DM millions 
C Continuously traded stocks 
(regression line) 
N Stocks with non-continuous trading only 
(regression line) 
Continuous trading breaks up into collective negotiation 
at the beginning of the stock exchange session and a - 106-
collective price - known as the first price or the 
opening price - is established; the subsequent 
individual bargains are made at individual prices. 
Each official broker ("Kursmakler") is allocated 
certain securities in respect of which he takes 
orders from the member banks. He matches up the 
buying and selling orders, provided they are for round 
lots or multiples of round lots, and calculates the 
price at which supply and demand will balance. He 
notifies this price to interested dealers who have 
assembled at his post and accepts more orders from them; 
the official broker may also decide to cover an excess 
of demand or supply for his own account (this is known 
as taking over a "Spitze"). The equilibrium price 
which then arises is quoted as the opening price. 
Although the most active shares are dealt in in 
this segment of the market, it often happens that 
only a bid price is quoted as the opening price. 
There are a number of different variants of continuous 
dealings. Members may give their orders to the official 
broker or an unofficial broker ("Freimakler") who will 
hold the order at the market ready to deal with a party 
appearing on the other side. Unofficial brokers, in 
particular, may also put themselves forward as counter-
parties. Alternatively, the official broker may cross 
matching orders of a member and quote the crossing 
price. Finally, the members often trade amongst themselves 
without the intervention of the official broker. In that 
case, however, they have no right to have their prices 
quoted and reported, except that in Hamburg official 
brokers must quote even these prices if a member so 
requests and if the price in question is in line with 
the market. It is this variant of continuous trading - 107 -
that lends exchange dealing in Germany its characteristic 
appearance and colour . The aggregate sales in a typical 
security in this segment of the market on the four 
leading boursed average about one million marks per 
working day. 
b) Non-continuous trading 
Two groups of orders are executed in this segment of 
the market: firstly, all orders in respect of securities 
which although listed are not admitted to continuous 
dealing, and secondly, all small orders in respect of 
shares admitted to continuous dealing. Thus all listed 
securities are traded here. Trading takes place once 
a day. Only issues with a nominal value of at least 
DM 500 000 outstanding may be traded in this segment of 
the market. Orders are passed to the appropriate official 
broker who then, in the same way as in the calculation 
of the opening price in the continuous-trading segment, 
determines a collective price. This price is called the 
uniform price ("Einheitskurs"). It frequently happens 
that no interested dealers are to be found at the 
official broker's post. In that case only the orders 
already received and in certain circumstances the bid 
for surplus supply or demand by the official broker 
dictate the price. But often one or more bank represen-
tatives participate in the price-making process. 
However, it is very rare for so many dealers to be 
actively involved in determining the price that one can 
speak of competition for surpluses. Moreover, this 
would hardly be possible since the uniform prices for 
hundreds of bonds and stocks are arrived at within half 
an hour. Normally a price is influenced by the - 108 -
representative of the price-stabilizing bank and 
this is particularly so in the cases of intervention 
by the central bank's representative in regard of 
the prices of federal government and related bonds. 
If substantial variations from the previous day's price 
for a given security are imminent, an attempt is 
always made to involve a fair number of dealers in 
making the price. If an official dealer, on the basis 
of the orders he has already received, expects a price 
change of the order of 5 to 10%, he must draw the 
attention of the stock exchange dealers to the special 
situation by writing up a plus or minus sign (if the 
expected change is more than 10%, a double plus or 
double minus). In the case of bonds the corresponding 
rates are 1 and 2%. In all situations of this kind a 
supervisory member of the stock exchange's executive 
committee participates in making the price. It is his 
responsibility to decide whether and if so at what price 
bargains should be made or whether to suspend trading 
in the security in question. This procedure is also 
used in continuous trading when there are substantial 
price fluctuations. At some bourses there are special 
regulations for securities with prices of up to DM 5. 
Although the collective prices are still calculated by 
writing in the brokers' books at the German exchanges, 
the subsequent operations have been largely automated. 
Data relating to deals that have been entered into are 
fed into a data processing system by the brokers or 
their clerks through terminals right at their posts. 
The system prints out contract notes and uses the input 
data inter alia to prepare and implement clearing and 
settlement. The printing of the official price lists - 109 -
is automated too, on the basis of the input data 
provided by the brokers. The possibility of having the 
order data fed into the system not by the official 
brokers but at an earlier stage - directly from the 
members' branches - is currently being worked on. 
The data processing systems now operated jointly by 
several exchanges and connected with each other are 
also used for continuous trading of course. In order to 
apply the systems to off-floor trading as well and to 
make contract notes and other information available in 
offices outside the exchanges, terminals are increasingly 
being installed at outside locations. In addition, 
efforts are currently being made to enable transactions 
involving more than one financial centre to be handled 
by the automated settlement systems of the individual 
exchanges. 
2. Unofficial exchange trading 
a) Trading in unlisted securities 
Although regulated unofficial trading ("geregelter 
Freiverkehr") or more specific, trading of unlisted 
issues ("unlisted trading") takes place on the floor of 
the exchanges and is regarded as a segment of the 
exchange market for the purposes of this study, it is 
not subject to supervision by the stock exchanges nor 
are the governing bodies of the stock exchanges 
responsible for this segment. Control of dealings in this 
segment is in the hands of a "Committee for transactions 
in unlisted securities" at every stock exchange (referred 
to in this study as "unlisted trading committees") which 
also takes the decision as to which securities should - 110 — 
be "included in" (not "admitted to" or "listed") 
regulated unofficial dealings. Three groups of 
securities dealt in for cash are involved here. 
Firstly, securities that have been listed on one 
or more other German bourses and for which there is a 
need for local trading. Secondly, there are those 
securities which would qualify for a stock exchange 
listing but whose issuers have not applied on account 
of the higher fees and other expenses of listing in 
comparison with "inclusion" in regulated unofficial 
dealings. Finally, the third group covers securities 
which do not qualify for a stock exchange listing 
either because there are doubts about the issuer's 
standing or because the capital outstanding is too low 
or because of too short a time to maturity in the case 
of fixed-interest securities. Of the 331 fixed-interest 
titles included in unlisted trading on the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange at the end of 1973, 165 were medium-term 
notes ("Kassenobligationen"). Normally the unlisted 
trading committees "include" a security in response 
to an application from the issuer; sometimes, however, 
they will include a security on their own initiative 
without the issuer's agreement, if turnover is 
sufficient to warrant it, and in that case inclusion 
fees are not charged. 
Unofficial exchange trading takes place mainly at 
individual prices, sometimes continuously, as in Hamburg, 
sometimes on the basis of one or more unofficial brokers ■ 
official brokers are restricted to official dealings 
on the exchange - calling over the relevant securities. 
Contrary to official trading transaction prices are 
not reported. Whether or not individual bargains are 
made, the unofficial broker will try to come up with - Ill -
quotations which reflect the market situation and will 
report these quotations. They are published in the 
official list or in an appendix to it. They may be 
firm quotes, as is the case when the broker has orders 
awaiting execution or when he states bid and offer 
for his own account, or they may merely state the limits 
within which the individual prices have actually lain 
or probably lay. Thus, no investor is entitled to 
execution of his order, not even of market orders to buy 
or to sell at the offer or bid. 
b) Option trading 
Since 1 July 19 70 puts and calls with three different 
contract periods have been traded in Germany. The only 
persons entitled to trade are stock exchange members 
recognized by the local options clearing association, 
the "Lombardkasse" or the "Liquidationskasse". Transactions 
are restricted to 45 German and Dutch stocks with heavy 
trading; they are largely the same as the shares for 
which the four largest German exchanges publish a daily 
list indicating the share volume of sales. The Federal 
Finance Minister and the executive committees of the 
stock exchanges decide which securities are to be the 
subject of option dealings in conjunction with the 
issuers. 
Supervision of option dealings is the responsibility 
of the executive committee of the stock exchange in 
question, which also lays down the conditions under which 
these dealings shall take place. So here the executive 
committee takes the place of the unlisted trading 
committee. Thus, in contrast to unlisted trading, not - 112-
only the admission of participants but also the 
admission of securities have to be officially 
authorized. In addition, supervision is exclusively 
in the hands of an official body of the stock exchange. 
However, as in unlisted trading, option prices are 
not official prices. Consequently, option dealings are 
usually regarded as constituting a segment lying 
between official dealings and unlisted trading. 
Option securities are normally called over during the 
second half of the trading session by an unofficial 
broker. As in the case of unlisted trading, quotations 
(or even merely bid or offer prices) are then determined 
if possible on the basis of individual prices - but they 
do not give rise to the right to execution. As with the 
cash segment of the unofficial market, deals may be 
made not only during calling but throughout the trading 
session. The round lots are the same as for continuous 
trading. The small volume of sales on the option market 
is concentrated on Frankfurt and Dusseldorf; at these 
centres in 1973 18 738 and 5 664 option deals 
respectively were concluded, that is 2 - 3 bargains per 
security per working day. - 113 — 
III. OFF-EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY 
MARKET IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
As already mentioned, there has been a limited, self-
imposed obligation to deal through the stock exchange 
in Germany since 19 6 8; the banks have undertaken, in 
their conditions of business, in principle to pass 
their customers' orders in respect of listed stocks 
through the stock exchange. This has meant that 
in-house crossing of orders in these shares, which was 
normal before 1968, has almost entirely disappeared, 
while crossing still continues to occur occasionally 
in bonds as before. Other off-floor secondary market 
transactions were not affected by this obligation to 
deal through the stock exchange. Off-exchange trading 
can be divided into off-floor dealings in listed 
securities or in securities included in regulated 
unofficial dealings on the one hand and dealings in 
all other securities on the other. 
In the category of off-floor trading in stock exchange 
securities the most significant business is that in 
bonds. It is said to amount to ten times the fixed-
interest sales on the exchanges. Some 20 banks have 
established themselves as market makers in domestic 
and foreign bonds. Other houses confine themselves to 
broking and occasional business for their own account. 
Particularly in evidence is business between banks and 
with institutional investors. Competition on the off-
floor bond market is fierce and it is not usually 
possible to charge immediacy premiums or discounts. 
Block business in equities, too - not very large in 
volume - takes place mainly outside the exchanges. 
Besides crossings and the just mentioned off-floor - 114-
transactions in bonds and block transactions in 
shares, before-hours and after-hours trading in the 
shares of the exchange segments also have a certain 
importance. The chief participants are banks, but 
unofficial brokers, official brokers and occasionally 
investors themselves also take part. These out-of-hours 
dealings are carried on over the telephone and in 
accordance with stock exchange practice. The main 
business is the covering of positions left open when 
the exchanges closed. In addition, a part is played by 
purchases and sales of minor stocks and transactions 
triggered off by the receipt of unexpected information. 
Lastly, out-of-hours dealing to some extent accomodates 
arbitrage with foreign financial centres. 
Trade in securities that are neither listed nor included 
in regulated unofficial dealing, particularly when it 
involves German and foreign shares and "when issued" 
trading, is commonly known as unregulated unofficial 
dealing ("ungeregelter Freiverkehr") or - even less 
appropriately - telephone dealing. Some of these non-
exchange quoted securities, chiefly units in mutual funds 
and foreign securities, can be bought and sold every 
day over the telephone. At times deals in "telephone 
issues" are tolerated even on the floor of an exchange. 
Some banks have made a name for themselves as brokers 
and dealers in inactive German shares; they distribute 
daily lists showing buying and selling interest in 
their special securities. Sometimes they include 
securities of dormant corporations or defaulted issuers 
in these lists. At a few market centres associations 
of dealers in "telephone stocks" have been formed; they 
publish daily lists with quotations in these securities. 
In some centres unregulated unofficial trading displays - 115 — 
elements of co-operative market organization in that 
the local unlisted trading committee (see p. 109) 
decides what securities may be dealt in. Finally, 
mention should be made of the segment of the secondary 
stock market in which usually no banks operate and 
in which individual investors and promoters of foreign 
firms solicit the sale of securities through newspaper 
advertisements and lists of addresses. - 116-
THE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET IN BELGIUM 
I. PARTICIPANTS AND ISSUES TRADED 
There are four stock exchanges in Belgium - in Brussels, 
Antwerp, Liege and Ghent. Each exchange keeps a list 
of "agents de change" and "agents de change correspondants" 
admitted to it. According to these lists, the Brussels 
Bourse has some 350 members, that in Antwerp 150, and the 
Liege and Ghent exchanges 40 each. The "agents de change" 
may handle securities and foreign exchange business only. 
They are primarily investor-commission minded, but are 
also permitted to do business for their own account. But 
in order to obviate conflicts of interest they may not 
cross orders for own account. Only the "agents de change" 
and their representatives may deal on the exchange. Some 
"agents" have combined together in partnerships, others 
operate as sole proprietors. There are about 250 stock 
exchange firms in Brussels. About 10 of them are 
relatively large, the biggest firm employs 180 persons -
and carry on the full range of securities business. There 
are 50 medium-sized firms with about 10 employees each. 
The remaining firms are small and one-man firms are not 
uncommon. 
The "agents de change" must be distinguished from the 
"agents de change correspondants". The latter's place of 
business must be situated outside a radius of 25 kilo-
metres from the stock exchange location. Their main 
activity is to obtain orders for the members authorized 
to deal and they are usually remunerated by being given 
half of the investor commission. However, it is possible 
to be admitted to a stock exchange as an "agent de - 117 
change" and at the same time to be admitted to one 
or more other exchanges as an "agent de change 
correspondant". 
Besides their monopoly of trading on a stock exchange, 
the Belgian "agents de change" also have a monopoly 
of accepting orders for securities business, although 
they have to share this monopoly not only with their 
correspondents but also with the banks. Since stock 
exchange orders may neither be crossed against other 
orders by the "agent" nor be crossed for own account, 
they are all passed through the stock exchange. Since 
the banks are not allowed to deal on the exchange, they 
must pass their orders on to an "agent de change" for 
execution and for this service the "agent" receives two 
thirds of the commission. In addition, the "agents", 
their correspondents and the banks have a monopoly in 
off-floor secondary stock market business, except for 
take-over bids, occasional transactions between investors, 
and deals in securities for amounts of Bfrs. 10 million 
and over. 
Each of the four Belgian bourses has a "commission de 
la bourse". This is in the first place a representative 
organization for the "agents de change" and "agents 
de change correspondants". Both types of "agent" are, 
secondly, admitted and supervised by the "commission". 
But the "commission de la bourse" is also the stock 
exchange's governing body; it manages the exchange and 
the "commission's" members discharge important self-
regulatory functions. The four "commissions" are subject 
to the supervision of a State commissioner appointed by 
the Finance Minister; the State commissioner may take 
part in all meetings of the stock exchange committees 
in an advisory capacity. - 118 -
In contrast to the other Belgian exchanges, the 
Brussels Bourse publishes very detailed statistics on 
monthly sales in the more active securities. In the 
case of forward trading it even publishes each day's 
bargains in the official list. Despite this, it is not 
easy to get an overall view of the number of issues 
in the various categories and of their importance in 
terms of sales and amounts outstanding. At the end of 
1973 816 titles had been admitted to dealings on the 
Brussels Bourse, of which 352 were bonds (32 7 domestic 
and 25 foreign) and 464 were stocks (324 domestic and 
140 foreign). At the end of 1975 there were 782 titles, 
346 of them bonds, 287 Belgian stocks and 149 foreign 
stocks. Quite a number of the securities quoted on the 
Antwerp exchange were traded in Brussels except for 
twenty or thirty local securities. The same applies to 
the two other exchanges, though on a much smaller scale. 
Only the Brussels exchange publishes its sales and it 
is therefore impossible to say with any accuracy just 
how insignificant the three other bourses are. - 119 -
Table E - 1 
Volume of sales and amounts outstanding of securities 
traded on the Brussels Bourse (in Bfrs. thousand millions) 
Sales at face value 
of domestic govern-
mental bonds 
(of all bonds) 
Sales of domestic 
and foreign 
securities of 
private issuers 
(of all stocks) 
Total of listed 
Belgian stocks out-
standing at year-
end 
(number of issuers) 
Total of listed 
Belgian bonds out-
standing at year-
end 
at nominal value 
1970 
25 
(.) 
28 
(.) 
302 
(.) 
1972 
19 
(.) 
49 
(.) 
415 
(332) 
1973 
30 
(32) 
67 
(66) 
424 
(321) 
708 
1974 
43 
(44) 
46 
(45) 
306 
(.) 
779 
1975 
50 
(51) 
51 
(50) 
364 
(.) 
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II. EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
IN BELGIUM 
A characteristic feature of the Brussels and Antwerp 
exchanges is the calling out of calculated collective 
prices in order to give all stock exchange members an 
opportunity to correct these preliminary prices by 
making additional bids. The more dealers there are 
taking part in this process, the more satisfactory -
from the market-organization point of view - are the 
prices. For that reason the collective prices of the 
various markets are established consecutively, starting -
in the case of Brussels - with the forward market 
securities at 12.30 p.m., proceeding to the "corbeille" 
market at 12.50, and the "parquet" market at 1.10. 
Time is provided from 1.30 for daily dealings in unlisted 
items; auctions in such securities take place once a 
fortnight in the afternoon. On the other two exchanges, 
Ghent and Liege, bargains are in general made at the 
Brussels quotation which is ascertained by telephone or 
with the help of a stock exchange information service. 
In Brussels there are two categories of security from 
the dealing point of view: securities dealt in purely 
for cash and securities dealt in partly on a cash basis 
and partly on the forward market. Turnover in securities 
dealt in purely for cash is normally small; all orders 
are concentrated to provide a sufficiently broad basis 
for determining prices regularly. In the case of other 
securities activity is sufficient for small orders 
to be separated from round-lot orders as is done 
elsewhere. The exchanges attempt to widen the market 
on which the round-lot orders are executed by organizing 
it as a forward market. Even investors not intrinsically - 121 -
interested in forward trading tend to use the forward 
market, provided their orders are large enough, 
because of the lower rates of commission charged for 
future-settlement orders. In addition to these orders 
there are the orders of those investors specifically 
interested in forward trading. Some idea of the 
importance of such orders may be gained when one knows 
that some 35% of forward transactions are prolonged. 
1. The forward market 
Forward transactions in Belgium are for the middle or 
end of a month, i.e. there are 24 settlement dates in 
a year. On account of the larger-than-average size of 
forward transactions, of the possibility of a substantial 
build-up of liabilities until settlement day and because 
of the specific risk of price changes affecting forward 
positions, particularly onerous requirements must be 
imposed on those participating in forward trading. Thus 
not all "agents de change" in Belgium are authorized 
to forward dealings but only "agents" with more than 
three years' experience as a member of the stock exchange 
and with sufficient capital resources; only they may 
become members of the clearing co-operative and hence 
authorized to deal on the forward market. At present the 
co-operative has 175 members. 
In principle, the "agents" transmit their future-
settlement orders to the stock exchange quotation service 
before the exchange opens for dealing. For every issue 
involved, the buying and selling orders are fed into a 
computer; the computer lists them according to their 
limit prices and indicates the previous day's price - 122 -
and the price at which the market can be cleared. 
After 12.15 p.m. the computer prints out this 
information on a sheet for each security and these 
sheets serve as the basis for trading. Alternatively 
the "agents" may hold on to their orders and, if 
they wish, make bargains among themselves at the 
opening price, which is not at that stage known. 
The opening price is fixed in collective negotiation 
under the direction of a quotation commissioner 
("commissaire aux criees"). The governing body of the 
stock exchange has appointed about 40 "agents de change" 
as quotation commissioners, some of whom are themselves 
members of that body. A commissioner receives neither 
a share of commission nor any other remuneration for 
his services. Each of the quotation commissioners calls 
his securities out consecutively. For every security 
he first accepts further orders from the assembled 
dealers. Often no more orders are forthcoming and in 
that case he can use the calculated price printed out 
by the computer. He then declares whether the opening 
price will be higher or lower than the previous day's 
close. From that moment on he accepts only selling 
orders if he expects a higher price and only buying 
orders if he expects a lower price. When no more orders 
are called out to him he determines the price at which 
supply and demand balance or nearly balance; in the 
second case the orders to be executed on the larger side 
are selected according to a random sequence established 
in advance for each working day by the governing body. 
After a collective price for each security has been 
established as a result of these collective opening 
negotiations, the "agents" may put forward further 
orders. In any case there are usually still some buying - 123 -
and selling orders with limits lower or higher, 
respectively, than the opening price, which it has 
therefore not been possible to execute. Orders with 
limits near to the opening price are written up -
with details of the limit and the quantity - underneath 
the opening price on large boards above the quotation 
commissioners' posts, so that the next most favourable 
trading opportunities are clearly visible to everyone. 
Newly-received orders are added. This special feature 
facilitates arbitrage and other immediate sales below 
the opening price and immediate purchases above the 
opening price. This procedure makes it plain that large 
amounts of limited orders on both sides can take the 
place of a market maker. If individual bargains are now 
made, the executed orders are crossed out and the 
individual prices written up and quoted in the official 
list in chronological sequence. Individual bargains 
in premium trading also occur on the forward market and 
these are also quoted; the number of such trades on 
any day, if indeed there are any, is small. 
The round lot on the forward market is fixed individually 
for each security at a round figure of units with a 
total market value of approximately Bfrs. 50.000. 
The average daily volume of sales in the 90 forward-
traded securities is about three times as high in the 
forward market as in the cash market. As already mentioned, 
orders for quantities of these securities smaller than 
a round lot are assigned to spot trading on the "corbeille" 
market. Over half the forward-traded titles are foreign 
stocks; they account for about half of forward sales. 
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2. The cash market 
Dealings on the cash or spot market, too, are under 
the direction of a number of quotation commissioners, 
who establish a collective price for each security 
through collective negotiation. Here again a form 
prepared by the computer is used by the commissioner, 
but in this case it does not show buying and selling 
orders but only the last quoted price and the price at 
which the orders in hand balance. The following 
sections focus on the special forms of collective 
negotiation found on the cash market of the Brussels 
Bourse. 
a) Le marche des corbeilles 
(the "corbeille" market) 
Following the allocation of about 180 new items to the 
"corbeille" market by the Commission de la Bourse in 
Brussels in 1976, about 300 titles are now traded on 
that market, principally foreign stocks but also some 
70 Belgian stocks and a number of convertible bonds. 
Orders here are not passed to the quotation service but 
to a so-called "specialiste". A fairly large number of 
"agents'" act as "specialistes". They are not chosen or 
appointed to this function but simply take it up on 
their own initiative. Their activities, like those of 
the quotation commissioners, bring them in no extra 
commission but give them insight into the state of the 
market and an obligation - in the normal course of events 
to cover excesses of supply or demand for their own 
account. One firm is a "specialiste" in about 120 titles. 
The "specialiste" notes on the computer form the 125 
equilibrium price that he has calculated and passes 
it to the appropriate commissioner who then calls out 
that price. If further orders are forthcoming at that 
price, the "specialiste" may cover the excess in turn 
or may propose a different price and so on until an 
opening price has been established. In exceptional 
cases selling or buying orders may be scaled down. 
Subsequently, individual prices may be quoted during 
the whole time the exchange is open. Certain minimum 
quantities are prescribed if there is to be a quotation: 
two units of trading in the case of the opening price 
and one unit for every individual bargain. If these 
minimum quantities are not reached, the quotation 
committee ("comite de cotation") may nevertheless allow 
a quotation if there is good cause. These minimum lots 
are half the round lots prescribed for the forward 
market. Individual bargains generally involve a 
"specialiste"; they are much less common than on the 
forward market. Whereas on the latter market individual 
prices arise in more than half of the issues, on the 
"corbeille" market they are to be found in barely one 
tenth of the securities traded. 
The maximum price change of a security compared with the 
previous day's price is 10% on the "corbeille" market. 
But this restriction applies only to securities traded 
on the cash market exclusively. If the equilibrium 
price lies outside this margin, only a bid or an offer 
will be quoted. The "specialiste" must undertake to 
take or supply, respectively, two units of trading at 
this price ("cours modifie argent - CMA"; "cours 
modifie papier - CMP") until noon on the following day. 
The next day's permitted price change will then be - 126-
determined on the basis of the "CMA" or the "CMP", 
Although such a quotation is equivalent to a 
suspension of trading, off-floor transactions are 
permitted. 
b) The market in domestic governmental bonds 
Almost three hundred issues are traded in this segment 
of the market. Trading procedures here are laid down 
not by the stock exchange but by the Finance Minister. 
Market activity is controlled by the State bond council 
which is in charge of open market transactions and 
price stabilization of governmental bonds. This council 
also determines which "agents de change" shall assemble 
orders in such bonds. The council can have the prices 
arising from the order situation quoted or can fix 
a price by intervention. Only one price per day is quoted 
for a given issue. 
c) Le marche du parquet (the "parquet" market) 
All securities which, although they have been admitted 
to a stock exchange quotation, are not traded in the 
market sectors so far named, belong to the "parquet" 
market. At the present time they number about 200 and 
comprise chiefly Belgian stocks and industrial companies' 
bonds. Only one price is quoted here per day, which, as on 
the "corbeille" market, is calculated and established in 
collective negotiating. The price must be based on sales 
of about Bfrs. 10 000. Day-to-day price changes in this 
segment may not exceed 5% for shares, 2% for bonds, 
5% for convertible bonds of which the corresponding - 127 -
share is quoted on the "parquet" market and 10% for 
convertible bonds of which the corresponding share 
is quoted on the "corbeille" market. For that reason 
merely bid or offer ("CMA", "CMP") are often quoted 
here. 
d) The exchange market for unlisted securities 
For some securities there is a need for trading even 
though the issuer has not applied for listing. The stock 
exchange commission accepts written applications by 
investors through their "agents" for the sale of such 
securities. Then, one week before the transactions are 
scheduled, it publishes a catalogue giving the number or 
face value, description and latest price of those 
securities which it considers suited to sale on the stock 
exchange. These securitites are then auctioned every 
fortnight at a special session on one or more afternoons 
("ventes publiques"). Beginning January 1977 the auctions 
will take place weekly. As before, bonds and stocks will 
be sold on the first auction of the month while the 
other sessions will be reserved exclusively for bonds. 
The monthly turnover achieved at the auctions has been 
nearly as great as a day's sales in listed securities. 
Often several hundred domestic and foreign issues are 
offered for sale. "Ventes publiques" also take place, 
though on a more modest scale, on the other Belgian 
bourses. 
Transactions of this kind also take place on a daily 
basis in about a dozen issues, basically according to 
the practice of the "parquet" market ("ventes publiques 
supplementaires"). These securities are called at 1.30 p.m. 
Their prices are published at the end of the official list. 128 -
III. OFF-EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE BELGIAN 
SECURITIES MARKET 
As already stated under I., the banks and "agents" 
must in principle funnel all orders in listed 
securities through the stock exchange. If no order is 
received, off-floor trading is legally permissible 
under certain circumstances. In that case a bank or 
"agent" must as a rule act as counterparty or at least 
prepare the contract note. 
In the case of Belgian bonds, the banks are generally 
prepared to enter upon transactions, since they hold 
large stocks of these titles themselves. Nevertheless 
in this connexion the "agents de change" and "agents 
de change correspondants" have a monopoly in registering 
secondary market transactions up to nominal amounts of 
Bfrs. 10 million. The banks are therefore primarily 
interested in larger transactions. With other bonds, too, 
particularly Eurobonds, the banks regularly trade for 
own account. Here they do not, in principle, need to use 
an "agent". Although holdings of Eurobonds are 
restricted due to currency risks, the banks make them-
selves available as counterparties in these securities 
even for very large transactions. 
With regard to stocks, the banks' position on the off-
floor market is weaker, as they are allowed to hold 
temporarily only positions in stocks. Nevertheless they 
are frequently brought into stock transactions by 
investors. In many such instances the customer's order 
can be executed only on a foreign stock exchange, in 
other instances the Belgian off-floor market is used. 
Like most stock exchange firms the banks operate here - 129-
only between the customer and one of the larger 
"agent de change" firms specializing in certain issues. 
These firms normally act as brokers and also hold 
positions in the securities in which they specialize 
whether these be unquoted Belgian stocks or foreign 
stocks. Some foreign stocks, in particular, enjoy a 
brisk turnover off the exchange. 
An even more important role - from the point of view 
of turnover - is probably played by block dealings in 
Belgian stocks. Here, too, some houses, especially 
banks, well known for their experience and their 
capacity, are prepared to arrange such business. An 
enquiry from an interested party will usually lead to 
two or three contacts. If the other side is found in 
this way, the bank accepts the securities for its own 
account and then immediately sells them again. 
Although there are no statistics, there is reason to 
suppose that the turnover in off-exchange block business 
and particularly in bonds may be substantial in 
comparison with sales on the stock exchange. - 130 -
THE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET IN 
THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG 
I. PARTICIPANTS AND ISSUES TRADED 
The only stock exchange in the country is that in the 
city of Luxembourg, which was set up as a public 
limited company in 1928 and has grown considerably in 
importance in the past two decades as a market for 
international securities. At the end of 1974 the 
exchange had 26 member firms, called "agents de change 
agrees en bourse". These members, like those in Belgium, 
are both commission minded and spread minded, in contrast 
to the "agents de change" in France and Italy who are 
in principle forbidden to trade on their own account. 
The members are domestic banks and the Luxembourg 
branches of foreign banks and broker firms. The number 
of members has increased continually in recent years. 
At the end of 19 76 the stock exchange had 32 members, 
five of which were broking firms and the rest banks. 
Some of the 80 or so banks in Luxembourg carry on 
securities business outside the exchange only. Security 
trading is subject to State banking supervision. An 
official of the Ministry of Finance is responsible for 
supervision of the exchange as State commissioner. But, 
as on other stock exchanges, it is primarily the 
members of the appropriate stock exchange committees who 
monitor dealings. 
By numbers of issues traded, it is Eurobonds that 
predominate. The trend in the number of securities 
traded can be seen from Table F - 1. - 131 -
Table F - 1 
Number of issues listed on the Luxembourg 
Bourse (at year-end) 
Type of 
security 
Bonds 
domestic 
foreign 
Stocks 
domestic 
foreign 
Units 
of invest-
ment 
companies 
Total 
1969 
46 
361 
23 
36 
90 
556 
1971 
45 
509 
24 
55 
91 
724 
1973 
47 
630 
24 
51 
90 
842 
1974 
44 
667 
24 
55 
80 
870 
Proportion of 
total, in % 
(1974 figures) 
5 
77 
3 
6 
8 
100 
Apart from the issues enumerated in Table F - 1, at least 
a dozen warrants on shares of foreign issuers are listed 
on the exchange. Since the Bourse publishes neither 
aggregate data on the volume in circulation nor data on 
turnover, it is very difficult to say just how important 
the individual categories are for the stock exchange 
secondary market. The most active securities would seem 
to be bonds denominated in Luxembourg, Belgian and French 
francs and in European Community units of account, but 
sales in stocks of Luxembourg steel companies and 
Benelux multinationals as well as in units of a few major 
investment funds is also substantial. The face amount 
outstanding of listed bonds in 19 73 was about $ 15 000 
million in the case of foreign issues and $ 500 million 
in the case of domestic issues. - 132 -
II. EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
IN LUXEMBOURG 
1, Trading in listed issues on the Luxembourg 
Bourse at the present time 
In Luxembourg the Bourse has a monopoly in quoting and 
publishing the prices of securities. There is spot 
trading only. A price cannot be quoted unless at least 
ten units are bought and sold or the value of the 
transaction is at least Lfrs. 5.000. During the time 
the representatives of the member firms are assembled 
on the floor of the exchange, from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m., 
both collective and individual prices of any listed 
security may be agreed on and they provide the basis 
for official quotations. 
Trading at the opening is most important. The opening 
price is basically a collective price (see Annex 2). 
The bonds and stocks are called over consecutively. 
The member firms' representatives then announce whether 
they wish to buy or sell. The interested parties 
publicly negotiate the price at which all orders can be 
executed, or at least more than at other prices. On 
account of the low turnover in many securities it often 
happens that only two members make a bargain at this 
price or that only one member introduces matching 
orders. Even in such cases an opening price comes into 
existence. Each opening price is called out aloud before 
being quoted. Frequently there are only buyers or only 
sellers on the market, with the result that a bid or 
an ask is quoted. 
After the opening price of a security has been - 133 -
established, the item may be called out again one 
or more times, as requested.. As a rule no collective 
bargains will then be made, but only individual 
contracts - and these will then also be quoted - or, 
if no counterparty appears, only bid or ask will 
be published. A second call is rare; usually only 
an opening price arises. Here, too, orders may be 
crossed on the stock exchange involving only one 
member firm instead of two as in the normal case. The 
representative calls out his intention to cross. Other 
dealers may intervene and as a result normal bargains 
may arise. Partial participation by another dealer is 
also possible, particularly if the two orders of the 
crossing firm are for a different number of units. The 
crossing dealer must always justify the transaction 
to the quotation commissioner. 
2. Ventes publiques 
On the Belgian model, the rules of the Luxembourg 
Bourse make provision for dealings in unlisted securities. 
Such business is nowhere near as important as it is 
in Belgium, however. Each year only a few "ventes 
publiques" are held, and those at irregular intervals. 
The application by a stock exchange member to auction 
unlisted, usually domestic, securities most often comes 
about in the course of the disposal of a deceased person's 
estate. In such cases the auction is conducted by a 
sheriff's officer on the floor of the stock exchange 
during exchange hours. - 134 -
3. Dealings under the planned Eurex system 
As is made clear by Table F - 1 , it is mainly foreign -
or more accurately, international - issues that are 
listed on the Luxembourg Bourse. These securities are 
usually traded in several countries, particularly 
where there are already links with the markets of other 
countries through the currency of denomination or 
through the issuer or the issuer's parent company. 
This generally makes geographical centralization of 
trading in these securities impossible. The traditional 
kind of stock exchange dealings in such securities will 
therefore be seen at the outset to be an unsatisfactory 
solution, since each dealer will want to follow the 
performance of a security on all sub-markets continually 
and will want to be in contact with such markets. This 
is less easily done from the floor of a traditional 
stock exchange than from offices of security-dealing 
firms. Accordingly, telephone dealings are the dominant 
method of trading in such securities. 
A traditional stock exchange, although it can still 
contribute to procedural efficiency in the information 
and decision-making spheres through the listing and 
disclosure requirements and by regular publication of 
prices, can no longer fulfil its two primary tasks in 
the execution sphere, namely assembling all information 
about the state of the market for a given security and 
bringing potential contracting parties into contact 
with each other. The Luxembourg Bourse has clearly 
recognized this and has sought a solution which will 
allow it to continue to do justice to its primary 
functions in the execution sphere in respect to trading 
in international securities. The Bourse has come to 135-
the conclusion that the traditional concept of the 
assembly of dealers on the floor of the exchange 
must be abandoned and that today only an automated 
stock exchange can offer the maximum degree of 
procedural efficiency for dealings in international 
securities. For this reason the Luxembourg Bourse has 
been working on the creation of a computer-assisted 
trading system known as "EUREX" since 1973. The project 
is supported by 69 well known security-dealing firms 
in 13 European countries and in Japan. Trade via Eurex 
is scheduled to begin in 19 78. 
Trading through the Eurex system is to be open not only 
to Luxembourg stock exchange members but also to market 
makers and commission-guided security-dealing firms 
throughout Europe, but not to institutional investors. 
Initially the market makers in London, Copenhagen, 
Amsterdam, Brussels, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Luxembourg, 
Paris, Zurich, Geneva, Milan and Rome will be linked 
with the central computer in Luxembourg. The other 
security-dealing firms will also be connected with 
this network. It is expected that 75 - 80% of the 
security-dealing firms handling international business 
will use the Eurex system. On account of differences 
in the financial standing of the participants, it will 
be possible at any time - on a confidential basis -
to exclude certain participants not acceptable as 
counterparties or to limit the volume of individual 
transactions with them. 
Whilst the market makers are to be provided with visual 
display and input units and with a printer, the other 
security-dealing firms will be able to operate adequately 
with their telex equipment. As with Ariel, dealing - 136 
will take place without voice contact. The Eurex 
system is based on the assumption that there will be 
several market makers for each security. The system 
will execute orders through these market makers by 
two different techniques. The first will be applicable 
to orders for round lots, the second to orders for 
odd lots. 
Only limit orders will be permitted. When a round-
lot order comes up, all the market makers (except, of 
course, those who are undesired partners on grounds 
of lack of standing) will immediately be asked to feed 
in their quotes as the name and identification data 
(currency of denomination, coupon rate, dates of 
coupon payment and maturity) of the security ordered 
will appear on the upper part of the display screen. 
If the order is an order to buy, for example, the 
computer will seek out the lowest ask from among the 
quotes fed in. The market maker who is the first to feed 
in the lowest ask secures the deal, provided that the 
limit permits a bargain to be made. On the middle 
section of his screen there will then appear, by way 
of confirmation, in addition to the name and identification 
data of the security, the transaction price - in this 
example it will be the same as the ask - the name of the 
contracting party and the nature of the transaction from 
that party's point of view (in this case a purchase), 
and the quantity traded. At the same time the system 
will print out confirmations for both parties. 
If the order is for more than a round lot or "standard 
quantity", the transaction will proceed very similarly 
to the execution of a normal order. The market maker 
with the most favourable price, with the lowest ask - 137-
for example, first receives the same information as 
in the case of a confirmation. He then has an 
opportunity to revise his ask upwards if he so wishes. 
So long as he remains below the limit and below the 
average of the asks fed in by all market makers, he 
will not lose the order and the system will print out 
the confirmation. Otherwise the deal will be made for 
standard quantity only except if the order is for all 
or none. Remaining round lots will be treated as a new 
order. 
Remaining odd lots and all-or-none orders, by contrast, 
will be subjected to the procedure for odd lots if the 
larger quantity premium of the market maker with the 
best ask exceeds the above-mentioned limits. In the 
case of an order to sell the procedure is the same, if 
the immediacy discount due to the larger quantity of the 
order produces a bid price that is below the limit or 
below the market makers
1 average bid price. 
If several market makers, in response to one large 
order, e.g. an order to buy, have fed in quotes with 
identical asks, each of them receives the above-
mentioned information about the order. The market maker 
who thereupon raises his offer the least (or is the 
first to raise it the least) secures the deal, provided 
that he has not exceeded the limit or the average ask. 
Otherwise the order must be divided up and/or the 
procedure for odd lots is applied. 
Odd-lot orders (and/or unexecuted large orders) are 
executed only after a round-lot order has prompted 
the market makers to enter quotes. The above-average 
bids and the below-average asks of all market makers - 138-
who did not succeed in participating in the business 
triggered off by the round-lot order are lowered to 
the average bid or raised to the average offer and 
applied to odd-lot orders automatically. All odd-lot 
selling and buying orders received are then executed 
and confirmed automatically at this average bid or 
average ask provided their limits allow it. 
In the event that there should be only one market 
maker for a given security, the procedure can be 
basically similar to the method just described except 
that in place of adjustment to the averages there 
will be an odd-lot differential (premium or discount 
for less than standard quantities). In addition, a 
solution to the problem of the maximum spread will have 
to be found. Further, it is conceivable that there 
might be no market maker in a given security. In that 
case the orders would simply be stored until a matching 
order was received.. Some participants could also 
declare themselves willing to enter matching orders 
in respect of certain securities if asked to do so. 
The matching order to sell with the lowest limit or 
the matching order to buy with the highest limit would 
then be successful and its limit would determine the 
price. 
The annual cost of the Eurex system is estimated at 
$ 2 to 3 million. On the basis of 1.500 transactions 
per day the system would pay for itself on a levy of 
$ 7 to $ 8 per transaction, which could be apportioned 
between buyer and seller. Against this levy one would 
have to set the participants' savings on telephone and 
telex charges which would have arisen on dealings 
without Eurex and also possible savings on staff costs. - 139 -
Eurex will prepare its data on transactions in such 
a way that the data will be able to serve as the 
basis for clearing operations via Cedel or Euroclear; 
Eurex will itself communicate such data to those 
systems. These two clearing systems have already been 
handling the bulk of the Luxembourg Bourse's bond 
transactions for several years, whereas share business 
has been cleared by the Bourse's own clearing and settle-
ment departments. 
III. OFF-EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY 
MARKET IN LUXEMBOURG 
As outlined in the foregoing section, international 
securities, especially, are traded over the telephone. 
Although no statistics on the extent of off-exchange 
transactions are available, there is no doubt that sales 
outside the exchange greatly exceed sales on the exchange. 
Above all, certain foreign banks in Luxembourg - in-
cluding some which are not members of the stock exchange -
have made a name for themselves as market makers in 
Eurobonds. In stocks, too, particularly in foreign 
stocks, and in investment fund units certain firms have 
become substantial market makers and publish lists 
showing their quotes. 
Several dozen domestic issues are regularly or 
occasionally bought and sold off the exchange. Where 
listed securities are involved, it is usually a case 
of in-house crossing. Since the majority of orders from 
investors within Luxembourg pass through three banks 
with many branches, these institutions are in an excellent 
position to cross orders placed before the opening - 140 -
in their trading departments. In the case of unlisted 
securities it is again these three banks which are 
in the best position to arrange deals. In this field 
they concentrate mainly on dealings in shares of 
companies that are associated with them, since these 
banks tend to know the few shareholders involved and 
hence to know potential buyers or sellers to whom they 
can address themselves when an order comes in. To a 
limited extent the banks are prepared to take or supply 
securities for own account. Securities traded in this 
way are usually shares of companies which are closely 
held and are therefore seldom bought or sold. However, 
one of the major banks has so far dispensed with 
applying for listing of its stock even though it is 
itself a member of the stock exchange. Its shares are 
traded on the market for unlisted securities organized 
by itself, in other words it acts as agent for transactions 
in its own stock. - 141 -
THE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET IN FRANCE 
I. PARTICIPANTS AND ISSUES TRADED 
In France there are seven stock exchanges, in Paris, 
Lyons, Marseilles, Lille, Nancy, Nantes and Bordeaux. 
Table G - 1 gives an idea of the relative importance 
of the individual exchanges. 
Table G - 1 
Volume of sales of French stocks on the official market 
at market values 196 4 - 19 75 1)  (in FF millions) 
Stock exchange 
Bordeaux 
Lille 
Lyons 
Marseilles 
Nancy 
Nantes 
Toulouse 
Provincial 
exchanges (6) 
Paris 
Total sales 
1964 
29 
(0,3) 
26 
(0,3) 
92 
(1,0) 
36 
(0,4) 
19 
(0,2) 
8 
(0,1) 
3 
(0,0) 
213 
(2,3) 
8 873 
(97,7) 
9 086 
1967 
14 
(0,2) 
25 
(0,3) 
85 
(0,9) 
35 
(0,4) 
35 
(0,4) 
23 
(0,2) 
-
217 
(2,3) 
9 080 
(97,7) 
9 297 
1970 
24 
(0,1) 
43 
(0,2) 
96 
(0,9) 
42 
(0,2) 
47 
(0,3) 
28 
(0,2) 
-
280 
(1,5) 
18 064 
(98,5) 
18 344 
1973 
125 
(0,4) 
82 
(0,2) 
170 
(0,5) 
71 
(0,2) 
152 
(0,4) 
47 
(0,1) 
-
647 
(1,8) 
34 948 
(98.2) 
35 595 
1974 
49 
(0,2) 
55 
(0,2) 
105 
(0,4) 
61 
(0,2) 
44 
(0,2) 
23 
(0,1) 
-
337 
(1,3) 
24 658 
(98,7) 
24 995 
1975 
59 
(0,2) 
52 
(0,2) 
84 
(0,2) 
110 
(0,3) 
50 
(0,2) 
20 
(0,1) 
-
375 
(1,2) 
30 846 
(98,8) 
31 221 
1) The figures in brackets represent the percentage of 
total sales for the year concerned. - 142 -
The Paris Bourse, with almost 99% of total stock 
exchange sales at market values, occupies a dominant 
position. In this it is supported by France's 
centralized system of government and the concentration 
of corporate head offices in Paris. Another contributory 
factor is the attitude of the banks, which channel 
surplus funds and customers' orders for nationally and 
internationally important securities from their branches 
in the provinces to their head offices in Paris. As a 
result demand for securities was concentrated in Paris 
even before the restructuring of the stock exchanges 
in 1961. Table G - 2 shows the distribution of securities 
and of turnover in securities over the Paris Bourse and 
the provincial exchanges as a whole. 
Table G - 2 
1) o) 
Number of and sales in ' securities traded 
on the "Marche officiel" 
Type of 
security 
French 
securities 
Bonds 
Stocks 
Franc Zone 
securities 
Bonds 
Stocks 
Foreign 
securities 
Bonds 
Stocks 
4)  Total ' 
Paris Bourse 
Number 
1 954 
(1 154) 
(800) 
64 
(42) 
(22) 
578 
(272) 
(306) 
2 596 
Sales 
51 876 
(26.818) 
(25 058) 
147 
(16) 
(131) 
5 678 
(21) 
(5 657) 
57 702 
Proportion 
of total 
sales 
89% 
(46%) 
(43%) 
0,3% 
(O) 
(0,3%) 
9,8% 
(0) 
(9,8%) 
99,1% 
Provincial exchanges 
Number 
453 
(186) 
(267) 
6 
(1) 
(5) 
-
-
-
459 
Sales 
552 
(177) 
(375) 
0 
(0) 
(0) 
-
-
-
553 
Proportion 
of total 
sales 3) 
0,9% 
(0,3%) 
(0,6%) 
0 
(O) 
(0) 
-
-
-
0,9% 
1) End of year 1975 
2) Turnover at market values 
in FF millions in 1975 
3) As % of total sales on the "Marche 
officiel" (all exchanges) of 
FF 58 255 million in 1975 
4) Differences are due to rounding - 143 -
By 1961 the only business still remaining to the 
provincial exchanges in connexion with most securities 
was the execution of orders at prices basically 
corresponding to those of the Paris Bourse. 
Table G - 3 
Allocation of securities traded on the "Marche 
Officiel" to individual stock exchanges, by 
number of issues, number of issuers and amounts 
outstanding (at end of 19 75) 
Exchange 
Bordeaux 
Lille 
Lyons 
Marseilles 
Nancy 
Nantes 
All provincial 
exchanges 
Paris 
All exchanges 
Number of securities 
and amounts outstanding ' 
Bonds 
27 
27 
25 
23 
55 
30 
187 
(4,4) 
1 468 
(246,9) 
1 655 
(251,3) 
Stocks 
30 
49 
61 
50 
59 
23 
2 72 
(5,3) 
1 128 
(157,7) 
1 400 
(163,0) 
Total 
57 
76 
86 
73 
114 
53 
459 
(9,7) 
2 596 
(404,6) 
3 055 
(414,3) 
Number of 
issuers 
33 
50 
63 
52 
57 
27 
282 
1 073 
1 347 
1) In FF thousand millions; the figures for the 
amounts outstanding are given in brackets. - 144-
But the Decree of 30 October 1961 then established 
the principle of the single market ("principe de 
l'unicite de cotation"), which meant that a security 
could be dealt in on one stock exchange in France 
only. The result of this decree was that the regional 
exchanges were allowed to provide a market only for 
those securities which were not quoted in Paris. In 
this way the importance of the regional bourses was 
reduced. Table G - 3 shows the present position. As can 
be seen from Tables G - 2 and G - 3, although about 
15% by number of all issues are traded on the provincial 
exchanges, this business contributes only 1% of 
all exchange sales in France. 
Each of the French stock exchanges in existence in 1961 
was maintained by an association of brokers ("compagnie 
des agents de change"). Under the reform of 28 December 
196 8 these associations were amalgamated to form the 
Compagnie nationale des agents de change, the governing 
body of which is the Chambre syndicale. In addition, 
the "agents de change" were given the opportunity to 
merge with each other or to co-operate closely. Many 
brokers made use of the opportunity to merge. The trend 
of turnover in recent years and the Government's 
refusal to allow an increase in commission rates may 
result in further mergers. 
Permission to the brokers to amalgamate initially halted 
the process of brokers in the provinces closing down 
and transferring their clients to the banks for lack 
of a sufficiently broad local business base following 
termination, under the stock exchange reform of 1961, 
of local trading in all securities whose principal 
market was Paris. Cessation of business by local brokers - 145 
led to the closure of the Toulouse Bourse in 1964; 
in other financial centres, too, this development 
was thought to be a probability. Thus in Marseilles 
there is now only one firm which confines its 
activities exclusively to the Marseilles area. Two 
broking firms have offices in Paris as well as 
Marseilles and another two have linked up with other 
brokers in Paris and on the other provincial exchanges. 
In summer 19 76 there were 107 "agents de change" in 
France (78 in Paris, 29 on the provincial exchanges), 
who worked in 77 firms ("charges") and employed a staff 
of 3 800; the largest firms employ up to 100 persons. 
"Agents de change" are appointed by the Minister for 
Economic Affairs and Finance. Intending applicants 
must be nominated by a retiring "agent de change" and 
approved by the Chambre syndicale. Before a candidate 
is admitted to the list of applicants he must prove his 
professional competence in an examination. To qualify 
to take the examination candidates must possess an 
appropriate university degree or must have had five 
years' experience working for an "agent de change" 
as an authorized dealer. 
"Agents de change" are primarily investor-commission 
guided. They devote themselves principally to broking 
business on the stock exchange and also act as advisers 
and administrators in connexion with their clients' 
assets. Firms of "agents de change" have often acted 
as advisers and executors to large family estates for 
generations and are taken into their clients' confidence 
to an almost unlimited extent in comparison with other 
professional advisers. In principle, "agents de change" 
are forbidden to deal for their own account, apart - 146 -
from long-term investment of their own resources and 
certain transactions in after-hours and unofficial 
trading, which will be discussed below. 
Deals in securities suitable for trading on a stock 
exchange may be validly concluded on the secondary 
stock market only through the agency of, or at least 
with the certification of, an "agent de change", unless 
such transactions arise directly between natural 
persons without the intervention of a third party. Some 
bankers hold that the brokers' monopoly makes security 
dealing more expensive. With large orders, in particular, 
investors frequently approach a bank in order to find a 
counterparty. But the actual bargain must be concluded 
by an "agent de change" and for this service he receives 
the full commission as fixed by the brokers' association. 
From the point of view of the bank and the parties 
involved the remuneration received by the "agent de 
change" in this instance is clearly out of proportion 
to the service he renders. Apart from the "agents de 
change" a certain role in the introduction of business 
is played by the "remisiers" or intermediate brokers, 
who usually work closely with a broker, but most of the 
orders are obtained by the banks, which normally receive 
30% of the commission for their services in introducing 
business. At the present time about 70% of all orders 
are transmitted to brokers by banks, even though the 
client has to bear additional bank charges in such 
cases. These bank charges are the main reason why 
institutional investors prefer to deal directly with 
"agents de change". 
In the event of the insolvency of a member firm of the 
Compagnie nationale all "agents de change" accept joint - 147 -
responsibility. To provide for the payment of claims 
an indemnification fund, financed by contributions 
from member firms in proportion to turnover, has been 
set up. Claims on the fund are so rare as to be 
officially described as non-existent. It is said that 
only one "agent de change" has gone bankrupt in 
recent years. 
The "agents de change" are supervised by two institutions, 
the Chambre syndicale and the Government's Commission 
des Operations de Bourse (COB). The Chambre syndicale 
supervises the business activities and the solvency 
of its members and exercises disciplinary powers over 
them. In addition, the Chambre organizes and controls 
stock exchange trading. The COB was set up in 1968 and 
has about 70 members. Whilst the Chambre syndicale is 
responsible for day-to-day supervisory activities, the 
COB confines itself to more general matters and to 
investigating complaints. For this purpose the COB may 
ask listed companies, stock exchange dealers and banks 
to provide information or it may have its investigators 
inspect all relevant documents. The COB has repeatedly 
made use of these wide powers of obtaining information. 
For instance, in its annual report for 19 75 it deplores 
the conduct of employees of "agents de change" who are 
said to have repeatedly dealt for their own account in 
securities in respect of which they held orders from 
clients. Supervision of trading on the exchange and of 
the "agents de change" is not, however, the principal 
function of the COB, which is to ensure that issuers 
comply with the disclosure regulations. In addition, it 
admits securities to official dealing (in the case of 
the "Marche hors-cote" this is the duty of the Chambre 
syndicale). - 148 -
In France there are about 1.5 million individual 
investors. About one million hold portfolios with a 
market value of less than FF 50 000, about 500.000 
of these investors hold portfolios with a higher value, 
and 15 000 hold portfolios with a market value of 
more than FF 1 million. Altogether, individual investors 
held 40% of quoted shares at market values in 1975 and 
55% of quoted bonds. Domestic enterprises and banks held 
30% of the shares outstanding but hardly any bonds. 
Domestic institutional investors held 15% of the shares 
and 45% of the bonds. Foreign investors held 15% of the 
shares outstanding. Institutional investors in France 
are regarded as including insurance companies, pension 
funds, open and closed investment funds, and the Caisse 
des Depots et Consignations, the central institute of 
the savings banks organization. There are about 1 million 
holders of units in investment funds and 2 million manual 
and white-collar workers with holdings in their companies' 
joint securities placement funds. 
A summary of the number of officially traded issues and 
amounts outstanding is given by Table G - 3. On the 
"hors-cote" market something over 1 000 titles are 
quoted, 660 of them in Paris. This market is principally 
for stocks, but a few dozen bonds are also traded. - 149 -
II. EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
IN FRANCE 
All French stock exchanges have a "Marche hors-cote" 
alongside the "Marche officiel". The main differences 
between the two markets lie in admission procedures, 
share of total turnover and dealing methods. Stocks 
may be admitted to official trading if the issuer has 
a share capital of at least FF 15 million (on the 
provincial exchanges FF 5 million), 25% of which must be 
publicly held. As already mentioned, the COB takes the 
decision on admission to stock exchange trading on 
recommendation from the Chambre syndicale after the latter 
has first made a preliminary examination of the form and 
content of the admission application. 
There are few admission requirements for securities to 
be traded on the "Marche hors-cote". The decision on 
admission is taken by the Chambre syndicale. A security 
is usually traded on the "hors-cote" market of the 
stock exchange in whose area the issuing company has its 
head office. A special feature of the procedure for 
admission to the "hors-cote" market is that not only the 
issuer but also a substantial shareholder who wishes to 
"mobilize" his shares may apply for admission to stock 
exchange dealing. 
The contribution of the "Marche officiel" and the "Marche 
hors-cote" to total sales is shown by Table G - 4. It can 
be seen that the "hors-cote" market contributes some 15% 
of sales on the provincial exchanges but in Paris, with 
barely 1% of that exchange's sales, its contribution is 
insignificant. - 150-
Table G - 4 
Distribution of sales on the Marche officiel 
and the Marche hors-cote 
■ 
Market 
Paris 
Marche officiel 
Marche hors-cote 
Total 
Provincial 
exchanges 
Marché officiel 
Marche hors-cote 
Total 
All exchanges 
Marché officiel 
Marché hors-cote 
Total 
1970 
34 234 
385 
34 619 
406 
94 
500 
34 640 
479 
35 119 
Sales 
1973 
67 541 
840 
68 381 
856 
168 
1 024 
68 397 
1 008 
69 405 
1975 
57 702 
479 
58 181 
553 
101 
654 
58 255 
580 
58 835 
Proportion o 
1970 
98,9 
1,1 
100 
81,2 
18,8 
100 
98,6 
1,4 
100 
1973 
98,8 
1,2 
100 
83,6 
16,4 
100 
98,5 
1,5 
loo 
2)  f sales 
1975 
99,2 
0,8 
100 
84,6 
15,4 
100 
99 
1 
100 
1) Sales in FF millions at market value 
2) Percentage of sales on the particular 
exchange or group of exchanges - 151 — 
The trading procedures on the two markets are outlined 
in the following sections. Whereas on the provincial 
exchanges all securities are traded by the time-
consuming "criee" procedure, since the dealers can 
easily cope with the relatively small volume of orders 
by this method, the Paris Bourse has several different 
dealing techniques. It is with these that the following 
sections are primarily concerned. 
1. The Marche officiel 
The official market consists of the forward market 
(Marche a terme) and cash market (Marche au comptant). 
The forward market may be further subdivided into a 
market for fixed-date forward trading (negociations a 
terme ferme), with monthly settlement periods with the 
possibility of extension, and a market for conditional 
forward transactions of various kinds (negociations a 
terme conditionnel). All officially-quoted issues may 
be traded on the cash market, but the most active 
securities only may be dealt in on the forward market 
as well. On the provincial exchanges dealings are basically 
for cash and only a few stocks are also admitted to 
forward trading. 
Some two thirds of sales in domestic and foreign stocks 
relate to the forward market. The volume of sales is 
strongly influenced by a few attractive issues, especially 
the Pinay loan, the price of which is linked to the price 
of the 20-franc Napoleon gold coin. This loan is traded 
on the forward market. In 19 75 sales in this loan 
accounted for about 12% of the volume of sales on the 
official market in Paris and in 19 74 for over 25%. - 152-
The ten most active stocks contributed about a quarter 
of exchange sales in 19 75. Almost half of the 19 75 
sales was attributable to 50 of the 2596 titles quoted 
in Paris. Some 10% of share volume was contributed by-
foreign stocks. 
a) Trading a la criee 
The criee procedure is the trading technique used on 
the forward market in Paris. In October 1976 about 170 
French stocks, 58 foreign stocks and 15 bonds were 
traded on this market in Paris. Criee trading is carried 
on at the "corbeille" by the "agents de change" themselves 
and at five posts by their clerks. Under this procedure 
each security is called consecutively by a "coteur" 
and the previous day's price is named. The coteur - in 
the "corbeille" it is an "agent de change", at the posts 
an official of the Chambre syndicale - then attempts to 
reconcile demand and supply provisionally at this price, 
a round lot generally being designated to be 25 units 
(for prices over FF 1.000, 10 units). If the calls "j'ai" 
(= I have), for example, predominate at this price, the 
coteur realizes that the price is too high. He therefore 
names a lower price, at which provisional contracts are 
again concluded in the same way. If "j'ai" calls still 
predominate, the price is lowered until finally only 
"je prends" (= I take) calls remain. From the two prices 
at which the opposing calls predominate the price-fixer 
chooses the one at which he thinks the market will be 
cleared. Repeated calling of a security for further 
collective negotiations of this kind is possible but is 
common only in the trading of a few active titles. - 153 -
b) Trading par opposition 
Trading "par opposition" is the method used on the 
cash market for smaller orders in respect of securities 
that are also traded on the forward market (comptant 
du terme). Compared with the forward market, turnover on 
this spot market is relatively modest. Investors prefer 
the forward market because its commissions and taxes are 
lower than those of the cash market. The name "opposition" 
procedure is said to have arisen because on this market 
an official of the Chambre syndicale enters the highest 
buying bids and the lowest selling offers from the clients 
of an "agent de change" in a book and every "agent de 
change" whose name appears in the book has the right to 
object to ("oppose") every price that has been calculated 
without taking into account his orders. 
Every "agent de change" is given the task of calculating 
the price of certain securities by the Chambre syndicale. 
A clerk of this "agent de change" first pairs off all 
unlimited buying and selling orders, then receives details 
from the brokers named in the "opposition book" of their 
limited orders and calculates the equilibrium price. This 
price may be established only if it diverges from the 
forward trading price of the stock by not more than 2%. 
If the divergence is greater, another price which lies 
within the permitted margin must be quoted. At this 
admissible price there will then of course be dis-
equilibrium on the cash market, and this disparity of 
demand and supply the "agent de change" responsible for 
the security must balance for his own account by -
generally profitable - arbitrage with the forward market. 
The price is entered in the opposition book. An official 
from the Chambre syndicale checks that it has been - 154 -
correctly established. The opposition books are 
kept available and may be inspected by any authorized 
dealer even after this first quotation. From the 
book there can be ascertained buying orders with 
limits below the quoted price and selling orders with 
limits above it; further orders may be added during 
stock exchange hours. Deals can be concluded against 
these bids and offers at any time, provided that the 
resultant individual prices do not diverge from the 
latest future-settlement price by more than 2%. So 
further prices can arise over and above the first 
quotation. But additional prices of this kind are rare 
and usually occur only in the most active forward-
market securities. 
c) Trading par easier 
For about 2.300 inactive securities traded on the cash 
market only there is a price-calculation procedure 
known as trading "par easier". In this case, too, each 
"agent de change" is given a certain number of 
securities the price of which he has to establish. 
His clerk receives in writing buying and selling orders 
from his colleagues from 12.00 to 12.30 p.m. in the case 
of stocks and from 12.30 to 1.00 p.m. in the case of 
bonds, and from these orders he must once a day 
calculate the collective price at which supply and 
demand balance monitored by the Chambre syndicale. 
d) Trading par boite 
This technique corresponds to the "par easier" procedure - 155 -
except that in this case the price is calculated by 
an official of the Charabre syndicale. The procedure 
is used when the Chambre considers it necessary to 
keep a close watch on the market performance of a 
security. This happens rarely. 
2. The Marche hors-cote 
As can be seen from Table G - 4, the Paris "hors-cote" 
market did over four times as much business by volume 
in 1975 as the hors-cote markets of all the provincial 
bourses together, although for the latter the hors-cote 
market is far more important than it is for the Paris 
Bourse. All securities which are not dealt in on the 
official market may be traded on the Marche hors-cote. 
As on the official market, business is handled by 
"agents de change" and their clerks. In this market 
segment there is spot trading only. Dealings on the 
provincial exchanges take place a la criee; in Paris 
several procedures are used. 
a) Procedure ordinaire 
Under this, the normal procedure, the equilibrium price 
is calculated by the par easier method. In principle, 
trading may also take place a la criee; thus until 
October 19 76 the prices of about 30 stocks of the hors-
cote market enjoying active turnover at times were 
established a la criee. But lack of interest in these 
collective negotiations resulted in the 6 60 hors-cote 
securities being put on to an exclusively par easier 
basis until further notice. - 156 -
b) Procedure speciale 
The 19 73 amendment of the Reglement general introduced 
the possibility of using a special trading method 
aimed at stimulating stock exchange business: the 
"contrepartie technique". Under this procedure one or 
more "agents de change" act as market makers in 
securities in which they have applied to the Chambre 
syndicale for, and been granted, authorization to act 
as market makers. This special authorization to deal on 
own account may be granted by the Chambre syndicale only 
in respect of securities of the hors-cote market. Each 
"agent de change" authorized in this way must, during 
all the time the stock exchange is open for business, 
quote his security or securities if asked to do so and 
be prepared to buy and sell at the bid or offer he has 
quoted; he is naturally free to alter his quote at any 
time. In this way continuous trading at individual prices 
may develop. It is mandatory to deal with a market 
maker in connexion with all securities for which a 
market maker exists. 
Although the "procedure speciale" was at the outset 
regarded as merely an experiment, it met with a good 
response at first. For a time more than a dozen 
securities were dealt in through market makers. But 
after a while most market makers exercised their right 
to surrender their authorization after a minimum of 
three months' operation. In its annual report for 19 75 
the Chambre syndicale mentions only two stocks as being 
still traded by this procedure. During 19 76 the 
procedure speciale had to be completely abandoned for 
the time being. The following reasons have been advanced 
for this: 157-
No competition developed. There were only one or 
at most two market makers for each stock. 
There was but little interest in dealing in the 
stocks which had been made the subject of the 
procedure speciale. Continuing the experiment with 
active stocks of the official market would seem a 
more promising course of action, but is not permitted 
by the Reglement. 
The relevant rules of the brokers' association for 
this method of dealing proved too strict. Burdensome 
regulations on book-keeping and on reporting of 
turnover and prices, together with restrictive 
requirements on the ratio of the market makers' 
positions to their capital, limited the market 
makers' freedom of action. 
The experiment did not appeal to potential clients; 
they tended to be sceptical about a broker dealing 
for his own account. - 158 -
III. OFF-EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY 
MARKET IN FRANCE 
Owing to the strict monopoly enjoyed by the "agents 
de change", off-floor business has been unable to 
attain any great importance in France. Very little 
business is done outside the stock exchange; what 
there is consists of so-called "private business", 
block transactions, and a very limited amount of after-
hours dealing. 
Private business means security transactions between 
natural persons which have come about without the 
professional intervention of a third party. Transactions 
of this kind are not covered by the dealing monopoly 
of the "agents de change". 
Large blocks of shares or bonds cannot usually be 
passed directly through the stock exchange as this 
would give rise to excessive price fluctuations. For 
this reason in France as elsewhere banks step in as 
brokers. The transaction must be certified by an "agent 
de change". If, in the opinion of the Chambre syndicale, 
a block of shares represents a majority shareholding, the 
buyer must either make a public bid or must put a notice 
in the official list giving the names of buyer and 
seller, date, price and number of shares involved. The 
buyer must state in the notice that he undertakes to 
acquire all shares offered for sale on the stock exchange 
during 15 business days at the same price as the majority 
holding. 
Since 1973 the "agents de change" and certain other 
security-dealing firms have been allowed to buy or sell - 159 -
securities traded on the Marche officiel to or from 
their clients for their own account outside stock 
exchange hours. The prices used in such transactions 
must be the latest stock exchange prices plus or minus 
a certain differential representing a purchase premium 
or a sale discount to cover the risk of price changes. 
The client giving the order must expressly ask for an 
immediate bargain. The broker is in principle forbidden 
to deal for his own account with a client on the basis 
of a power of attorney over the client's estate. All 
positions taken up for a dealer's own account must be 
liquidated in the next stock exchange sessions. In 
the interests of impartial operation the security-
dealing firms are not supposed to build up significant 
positions in securities. 
IV. ATTEMPTS AT REFORM 
Attempts to restructure the market system have been 
prompted by the fact that a few broking houses are in 
dire financial straits. Apparently, one third of the 
broking firms are finding it difficult to cover their 
costs from their income from stock exchange business. 
An additional factor is the interest of institutional 
investors and banks in more efficient dealing facilities, 
For these reasons three committees of the Chambre 
syndicale are currently investigating the possibility 
of and the scope for a reform of the stock exchange. 
One committee has been asked to examine the advantages 
and disadvantages of introducing a single method of 
dealing. The main procedures from which a choice is 
to be made are the word-of-mouth "criee" technique and - 160-
a computer-based "easier" method. But the chief topic 
of discussion is the introduction of simultaneous 
continuous dealing in all securities; this continuous 
dealing could take place partly on the floor of a 
stock exchange, partly in the form of exchange 
monitored telephone dealing as in the United Kingdom. 
The second committee is examining the question of 
whether it would be advantageous to have all securities 
traded for future settlement or all for cash. Alongside 
a uniform market for unconditional-delivery deals there 
could be an option market. 
Finally, the third committee is investigating the 
benefits of a comprehensive automated or at least 
computer-assisted information, dealing and clearing 
system which could possibly dispense with the traditional 
assembly of dealers on the floor of the exchange and 
which could keep investors and their advisers continually 
up to date on the current state of the market as is done 
in America. These ideas for reforms have aroused mis-
givings because, if implemented, they may take away 
jobs of brokers and their employees thus adding to 
the unrest among the employees who have repeatedly 
gone on strike. - 161 -
THE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
IN ITALY 
I. PARTICIPANTS AND ISSUES TRADED 
Official dealings take place on the country's ten stock 
exchanges. The stock exchanges of Milan, Rome, Turin, 
Genoa, Florence, Bologna, Naples, Palermo, Trieste and 
Venice were set up by statute. Milan is by far the 
most important stock exchange in Italy; in 19 74 
approximately 80% of official turnover in stocks and 70% 
of official turnover in bonds was effected in Milan 
(Table H - 1). 
Table H - 1 
Volume of sales at nominal values on the ten 
Italian stock exchanges in 1974 (in Lit. thousand 
millions) and proportion of total volume 
Exchange 
Milan 
Rome 
Turin 
Genoa 
Florence 
Bologna 
Naples 
Palermo 
Trieste 
Venezia 
Total 
Stocks 
Lit. 
thousand 
millions 
1 637 
137 
124 
78 
10 
8 
7 
5 
21 
4 
2 031 
Percent 
80,6 
6,7 
6,1 
3,9 
0,5 
0,4 
0,4 
0,3 
1,0 
0,2 
100 
Bonds 
Lit. 
thousand 
millions 
633 
183 
19 
6 
0 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
847 
Percent 
74,8 
21,6 
2,2 
0,7 
0 
0 
0,7 
0 
0 
0 
100 
All issues 
Lit. 
thousand 
millions 
2 270 
320 
143 
84 
10 
8 
13 
5 
21 
4 
2 878 
Percent 
78,8 
11,1 
5,0 
2,9 
0,4 
0,3 
0,5 
0,2 
0,7 
0,1 
100 - 162 -
By law only the "agenti di cambio" are privileged 
to deal on the floor of the exchange ("alle grida"), 
where they may be represented by up to three authorized 
clerks. The "agenti" hold a public office ("pubblico 
ufficiale"). Their stockbroking activity is incompatible 
with the exercise of any other profession or vocation. 
Agenti are pledged to impartiality and are not allowed 
to effect any business for their own account or for the 
account of persons closely associated with them 
(immediate members of the family, officers of their 
firms, employees). They may not hold shares in banks or 
institutions concerned principally with securities business 
and must maintain appropriate standards of professional 
secrecy. Their professional activities are further guided 
by a self-imposed code of conduct ("norme deontologiche"). 
The purpose of these statutory and quasi-statutory 
regulations is quite clear: they are intended to make 
impossible from the start information risks and realization 
risks such as fellow-travelling and counteraction due to 
brokers dealing for their own account. In order that 
losses which are inflicted despite these precautions may 
be recouped, a broker must deposit the sum of Lit. 1 million 
when he commences business. In addition, a joint indemni-
fication fund has been set up. This is financed chiefly 
from a further one-time guarantee deposit, which every 
broker must pay in on taking office, and from a special 
contract fee levied for this purpose on every security 
transaction. The indemnification fund is administered 
by executive committee, the Comitato Direttivo degli 
Agenti di Cambio; at the beginning of 1974 its assets 
amounted to about Lit. 400 million. 
Although the number of brokers is supposed to be limited 
by the volume of sales of each stock exchange, the - 163-
actual numbers show how widely this provision is 
interpreted. At the beginning of 19 75 there were 
254 agenti di cambio in the whole of Italy, only 114 
of them in Milan. These 114 employed 218 clerks with 
authority to deal, a figure which should be compared 
with the total of 169 stocks officially traded on 
the Milan exchange. An agente di cambio has no power 
to join another broker to form a single firm in order 
to exploit the advantages of joint operation when 
offering financial services and to strengthen their 
competitive position. Recently a few brokers have got 
into difficulties. In this connexion the large port-
folios of securities held for own account by brokers who 
are supposed to operate purely on a commission basis 
show that they have tried to boost their earnings, 
which have been declining in conjunction with the fall 
in turnover, by stepping up their own-account dealing 
and by other illegal banking and financial transactions. 
It is therefore natural to suspect that high imputed 
costs of guarding against transaction risks constitute 
yet another factor to be added to the unfavourable basic 
conditions affecting investment in stocks and bonds 
in Italy. 
Entry to the floor of the exchange is granted, in 
addition to the agenti, also to the intermediate brokers 
introducing business, especially with wealthy private 
clients, and to numerous representatives of banks and 
finance companies. They pass orders on to the agenti 
but otherwise have only observer status on the exchange. 
Outside the exchange, however, they may themselves 
deal, even in listed issues. Banks and finance companies 
make lively use of this right. Thus the large supra-
regional banks have set up efficient order-crossing - 164-
systems within their organizations, some of which 
are computer-based. For that reason a substantial 
part of sales even in listed securities does not 
reach the stock exchange at all. Estimates vary from 
25 to 75% of the volume of orders. The stock exchange's 
prices provide the basis for crossing. 
Law No. 216 of 7 June 19 74, complemented by three 
decrees dated 31 March 19 75, brought in new provisions 
restructuring stock exchange supervision in Italy. This 
law created a supervisory authority for the stock 
exchange and for listed companies (Commissione Nazionale 
per le Societa e la Borsa - CONSOB). It has its head-
quarters in Rome and has taken over a great many of the 
functions formerly discharged by the local stock exchange 
bodies (chamber of commerce, stock exchange delegation, 
brokers' association) and by the Ministero del Tesoro. 
There had often been difficulties over the division of 
responsibilities in the past. 
The tasks of CONSOB include the following: 
Monitoring compliance of listed companies with 
accounting regulations; monitoring the publication 
of annual and six-monthly reports; 
Taking decisions on admission of securities to, and 
temporary or definitive removal from the official 
list; 
Fostering the efficient working of the stock exchanges; 
Public supervision of securities trading; 
Investigating the advantages and disadvantages of 
a uniform national securities market. - 165-
CONSOB has five members: one chairman and four other 
members. They are representatives of the Ministero 
del Tesoro, the Banca d
1Italia, the revenue department, 
and the agenti di cambio. The fifth member is a legal 
expert. CONSOB has a representative at each stock 
exchange. The most important measure enacted by CONSOB 
to date is considered to be the regulation stipulating 
that where there is conditional forward trading or short 
selling collateral amounting to 90% over and above the 
sales proceeds must be deposited in securities or in 
cash. 
Little is known about the number of investors in Italy. 
In 1970 the Finance Ministry stated, on the basis of 
tax statistics, that the recipients of dividends 
numbered 564 000. In 19 74 a study of the Milan stock 
exchange found that there were possibly 1.8 million 
shareholders in Italy. This figure contains double-
counting to a considerable extent. The institutional 
investors largely confine themselves to transactions in 
bonds, not least because of government investment 
regulations. 
At the beginning of 19 75 216 ordinary and preferred 
stocks in 200 companies (199 Societa per Azioni - S.p.A. 
and one Societa in Accomandita per Azioni) were quoted 
on the Italian stock exchanges as registered shares. 
By number, these 200 companies represent about 0.4% 
of all Italian corporations (about 4 7 000); their share 
capital amounts to only about 35% of the total share 
capital in issue. On the Milan exchange 171 securities 
of 154 Italian companies and one foreign stock are 
quoted. A third of these stocks are inactive. It is 
said that there is a very much larger number of stocks - 166 -
for which their issuers could apply for listing with 
good prospects of success but who have not as yet 
done so. Some of these stocks are traded outside the 
exchanges (see Table H - 2). 
Table H - 2 
Number of Italian stocks traded on the 
various segments of the market 
Financial 
Center 
Milan 
Turin 
Rome 
Genoa 
Florence 
Naples 
Trieste 
Palermo 
Venice 
Bologna 
Listed stocks 
total
1
) 
traded on 
exchange 
146 
91 
84 
78 
47 
34 
29 
25 
19 
16 
traded exclu-
sively on 
that exchange 
48 
13 
6 
6 
4 
3 
4 
2 
1 
1 
Stocks traded 
on the 
Mercato _. 
Ristretto ' 
109 
22 
35 
32 
24 
18 
1) On all Italian stock exchanges 193 stocks of 180 issuers 
were listed. These statistics relate to spring 1972. 
Only eight stocks were quoted on all ten exchanges. 
2) Unofficial dealing - which was stopped in 1975 (see 
section III 2). 
These statistics relate to the end of 1974. The corres-
ponding figures for spring 1972 were: Milan 106, 
Turin 18, Rome 28. The three other markets did not then exist. 
In all, 120 shares were traded on the "mercati ristretti" 
in 1972, 14 of which were listed and admitted to exchange 
dealings in another city. - 167 -
The official list ("listino ufficiale") is dominated 
by over 600 fixed-interest securities, which can be 
divided broadly into governmental and corporate bonds. 
Of the total volume of sales in bonds for the stock 
exchange year 1974 (12/18/73 to 12/17/74) government 
bonds ("titoli di stato") accounted for 8%. The 
remaining 92% of turnover was attributable mainly to 
other governmental bonds. The contribution of corporate 
bonds to sales is negligible. In 1974 bonds to face 
amount outstanding of Lit. 40 800 000 million were quoted 
on the Milan stock exchange. In the same year stock 
exchange sales at face value amounted to only 
Lit. 6 33 000 million, or some 1.5% of the amount out-
standing. Obviously bonds are traded principally outside 
the stock exchange. - 168 -
II. EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY 
MARKET IN ITALY 
1. The forward market 
All stocks are traded forward, usually for the end 
of the month. In addition, almost all convertible bonds 
are bought and sold on the forward market, but unlike 
stocks they are also subject to spot trading. Dealings 
in Milan begin at 10 o'clock at two large circular 
counters or "rings" to which the securities are allocated. 
The securities are divided into an "A List" and a 
"B List"; a former "C List" with its own ring was re-
allocated to the two other counters due to insufficient 
turnover. Starting at 10 o'clock the opening prices 
("prezzi di apertura") are established. A member of the 
executive committee or a broker appointed by that body 
and an official of the chamber of commerce call the 
individual securities consecutively in the order of the 
relevant list (call system; A call, B call, C call). 
After a security has been called the brokers and their 
representatives commence collective negotiations. They 
call out bids and offers ("denaro" and "lettera") to 
each other and, if the bid or offer is for an amount 
other than a round lot, the relevant quantities. Starting 
from the basis of the closing prices of the previous 
day's trading and the trend before the stock exchange 
opened, the participants can in this way rapidly 
ascertain the state of the market. As in the French 
dealing "a la criee" (see p. 152), a price at which 
supply and demand balance is established. 
When the opening call is finished, at 11.10 a.m., - 169-
continous dealing at individual prices ("prezzi 
durante") in forward-traded issues begins at two 
smaller rings. For that reason columns are provided 
in the official list for the day's highest and lowest 
prices alongside the opening and closing prices. 
However, it is rare for a security to be the subject 
of more than one individual price in a day, apart from 
the ordinary and preferred shares of FIAT. 
From 11.30 a.m. until about 1 p.m. the closing prices 
("prezzi di chiusura", "prezzi del listino") are 
determined, by the same procedure as for the opening 
prices. If there are no transactions, an estimated price 
("prezzo nominale") is quoted. These closing prices are 
the official prices. Where the investor has not expressly 
requested execution at the opening price, settlement will 
be based on this official price. "C call" securities are 
called only on the occasion of the closing quotation. 
In addition to regular forward trading there is some 
conditional forward trading in a few active shares in 
Italy. One of the small rings is available for such 
dealings, which take place at individual prices. Turnover 
in this segment of the market is modest. 
2. The cash market 
All bonds are traded on a cash basis at one of the large 
rings. Basically the same trading procedure is used as 
in the opening of stock trading. However, bonds are 
called only once a day, so only one collective price 
is established each day. - 170 -
III. OFF-EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY 
MARKET IN ITALY 
1. Off-exchange trading in listed securities 
This segment of the market covers the extensive business 
of the banks and the activities of commission agents and 
financial corporations, whether these activities be 
crossing of clients' orders within their own institutional 
network or transactions for their own account. Most of 
the larger banks also execute small orders outside the 
stock exchange. In addition, this segment includes 
special markets for blocks of securities and for majority 
and minority interests in corporations; these markets are 
dominated by banks. Finally, there is also before and 
after-hours telephone trading. 
2. Trading in unlisted securities 
An organized market for unlisted securities (the 
"mercato ristretto" or "M.R.") developed at an early 
stage. The Milan M.R. had its beginnings in the 19 30s, 
though the first steps at organizing the market from the 
point of view of personnel and procedures did not occur 
until after the Second World War, as part of post-war 
reconstruction. More recently, "mercati ristretti" had 
grown up in Rome, Genoa, Turin, Florence and Naples. 
A total of 12 7 securities of 124 companies were traded 
at weekly sessions. By far the most important was the 
Milan M.R. with dealings in the securities of 109 companies 
and a turnover which was significant even in comparison 
with official trading on the Milan exchange and which - 171 -
exceeded the sales on other Italian stock exchanges. 
All bargains were for cash. 
Since the last session of the mercato ristretto in 
Milan on 12 May 19 75 these activities have been 
prohibited by a judgement of the Court of Appeal. The 
reason for the judgement was that the mercati ristretti 
had assumed a semi-official character. Dealings were 
organized by agenti di cambio, the weekly meetings took 
place in a special room in the stock exchange building, 
a collective price was negotiated for each security by 
the call method, and finally a certain degree of 
official supervision was provided by the Comitato di 
Vigilanza del Mercato Ristretto - a committee of five 
agenti di cambio - and by a representative of the stock 
exchange delegation and an inspector from the Finance 
Ministry, who were present from time to time during 
trading sessions. Initially prices and turnover were 
announced in the official list, later in the well known 
financial newspaper "II Sole - 24 Ore". The judgement 
was based on the restrictive interpretation of Art. 9 
(1), 3, of Law No. 272 of 20 March 1913 in conjunction 
with the implementing regulations of 4 August 1913. 
Under that legislation stock exchange facilities had to 
be denied to anyone who participated in dealings off 
the floor of the exchange; accordingly agenti di cambio 
had to be excluded from trading on the stock exchange if 
they participated in such assemblies or carried out 
transactions for persons supporting off-floor trading. 
An attack of this kind on functioning markets can be 
justified by reference to existing legislation. But it 
must be asked whether the legal basis for such action 
is still reasonable or whether it has been overtaken by - 172 -
economic developments. The mercati ristretti had a 
useful function as a trial market for securities 
prior to their admission to official dealings. Of the 
eight companies admitted to the Milan stock exchange 
in 1974 four had previously been traded on the mercato 
ristretto. Furthermore, certain securities which were 
officially quoted on some stock exchanges were traded 
on the M.R. in other financial centers. The attraction 
of the M.R. for issuers lay in its less demanding listing 
requirements. Continuing interest in such trading has 
now led CONSOB to study the possibility of resuming 
trading in the old or a changed form, perhaps under 
CONSOB"s direct supervision. In Parliament a bill to 
this effect has been introduced for the second time. 
Since the need for trading was not affected by closing 
down the M.R., new off-floor markets developed 
spontaneously. Nineteen banks, whose shares were formerly 
traded on the Milan mercato ristretto, jointly offered 
facilities for trading in their own shares. Dealings take 
place every Wednesday over the telephone. The normal 
commission is charged. Prices and sales are published in 
"II Sole - 24 Ore". The Banco Ambrosiano plays a leading 
role in this segment today. 
A similar initiative was taken immediately after the 
closure of the M.R. by the well known private financial 
corporation "La Centrale Finanziaria" in Milan, which 
had already been an active off-floor operator for some 
time. Every day from 10 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. this firm 
arranges transactions for banks, institutional investors 
and agenti di cambio, working by telephone. Basically, 
"La Centrale" is prepared to make a market in all stocks 
previously traded on the M.R. but it tries to execute - 173 -
its clients' orders preferably without dealing for 
own account. During the course of time it has come to 
concentrate on securities in its own financial group, 
particularly on bank stocks. Prices and sales are 
published daily in the above-mentioned newspaper. 
In Genoa and Florence the mercato-ristretto trading is 
now carried on by telephone though with a greatly 
reduced volume. In Turin an experiment with computer-
assisted handling of off-floor trading has been started; 
once a week the parties interested in a given issue are 
made known to each other through the system. Even the 
agenti di cambio in Milan continue to participate in 
off-floor dealing. In a side-room in the stock exchange 
building they can pin slips to a board, showing the 
names of the securities in which they wish to deal and 
stating their bid or offer. Interested brokers are 
informed in this way of potential counterparties without 
any infringement of the prohibition against participation 
in unofficial trading sessions. Since in some cases 
acceptance of a bid or offer is noted directly on the 
pinned-up slip, one may speak of a procedure of trading 
in writing. The sales of the successors to the former 
M.R., the banks with their telephone dealings, "La 
Centrale", and trade between agenti, is the same as that 
before the M.R. was closed down. - 174-
J. THE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
IN JAPAN 
I. PARTICIPANTS AND ISSUES TRADED 
As a result of American influence after the Second 
World War, specialized securities-trading firms -
usually called "securities companies" - have obtained 
a central position on the secondary market in Japan, 
while the banks have been restricted largely to the 
functions of investing and channelling business to the 
market. The extent of their business activities is 
determined by the licence granted them by the Ministry 
of Finance. All firms are allowed to participate in 
secondary market transactions, most of them being 
empowered to do so on own account as well as for others. 
With few exceptions, securities companies are also allowed 
to undertake new-issues market transactions, at least 
as sellers of the new stock, while underwriting is 
reserved to companies with capital resources of at least 
one thousand million yen; less than half of the securities 
companies are allowed to underwrite new issues. Only 
securities companies may become members of a stock 
exchange. 
Soon after enactment of the fundamental Securities and 
Exchange Law of 194 8 the number of securities companies 
rose to more than a thousand. By end-1974, however, only 
260 such firms existed having 1646 branches and 86 000 
employees. The "big four" have a share exceeding 50% 
of the volume of sales for investors. Well over 90% of 
turnover is transacted by the 140 companies that are 
members of at least one of the eight stock exchanges - 175 -
and which, in their secondary market business, are 
principally investor-commission minded. Over the 
past five years, their earnings from realized spreads 
have been equal to about 10% of their commission 
earnings. 
Table J - 1 
Members and shares in volume of sales 
of the Japanese stock markets 
Exchange 
Tokyo 
Osaka 
Nagoya 
Kyoto 
Fukuoka 
Hiroshima 
Niigata 
Sapporo 
All 
exchanges 
Number o 
at end o 
Total 
95 
58 
34 
19 
17 
16 
15 
12 
160
1> 
f members 
f 1974 
of which Saitori 
12 
5 
3 
-
-
-
-
-
20 
percentage 
share in „. 
volume 
in 1974 
78.4 
17.4 
3.1 
0.4 
0.2 
0.2 
0.3 
0.1 
100 
1) Because of multiple membership, this figure is smaller 
than the total of the members indicated in this column. 
2) Total share volume of sales 65 thousand million shares. 
On the basis of total sales at market value, the 
proportions are rather different. On this point, cf. 
Table J - 4. 
As Table J - 1 indicates, there are 20 member-commission 176-
minded broking firms in addition to the 140 primarily 
investor-commission guided members. In Tokyo and 
Nagoya they are known as "Saitori" and in Osaka as 
"Nakadachi". Unlike other exchange members, Saitori 
are in principle barred from trading for own account. 
Trading for own account by primarily investor-commission 
minded members contributed more than 50% to total sales 
in stocks at the beginning of the 1960s; nearly all 
customer orders must therefore have been executed against 
a bid or offer of a member. In 1973 - 1975 this pro-
portion had dropped to 22%. This sharp reduction in own 
account trading seems chiefly to have been the result 
of three supervisory measures. From 19 65 on, members 
have been allowed to trade on own account only if 
customers' orders could not otherwise be executed. 
Further, since 1965 members' earnings from realized 
spreads must not be distributed except for 30%, the 
other 70% being transferred to surplus for five years. 
As a third measure, a ceiling was placed on shares 
held for own account; the proportion of shares held 
to net assets of securities companies was initially not 
to exceed 50%. In 19 73 this ceiling was lowered to 40%. 
Finally, there are two special securities companies that 
concentrate chiefly on linking the various exchanges. 
They are admitted at Tokyo and/or Osaka and the one 
or other firm has a special member status at each of the 
six other exchanges. When orders cannot be executed at 
one of the small exchanges owing to lack of matching 
orders but ,/ould appear executable in Tokyo or Osaka, 
they are passed on to one of these firms which then 
executes them there and receives special member 
commission for doing so. The large securities companies 
do not need to use this service as they are themselves - 177-
members of the Tokyo and Osaka Exchanges and can 
consequently transfer orders internally from the 
small exchanges to the latter. 
Before the Second World War, unconditional forward 
trading, was by far the most important type of trans-
action. Since then, however, essentially only cash 
business has been transacted and settled on the third 
complete business day after the date of the contract. 
More than a quarter of all transactions, however, 
involve margin buying or short selling, so that despite 
the change-over to cash dealing, a strong forward 
ingredient has been retained. As in the United States, 
margin transactions are Government-regulated and the 
Ministry of Finance changes the margin requirements 
from time to time. In order to augment the supply of 
loans of money and securities for margin transactions 
beyond the supply by securities companies and banks, 
special institutions have been created known as 
securities finance companies. Their assets amount to 
a total of less than 300 thousand million yen. 
Supervision of the stock market has since 19 52 been 
directly in the hands of the Ministry of Finance which 
in mid-1964 set up a special department for this, with 
seven sections. In addition, the regional offices of 
the Ministry of Finance carry out supervisory duties. 
These bodies not only supervise the securities companies, 
the exchanges, the securities finance companies and the 
investment funds, but also some 5000 certified public 
accountants, as well as monitoring the disclosure of all 
issuers whose shares are regularly dealt in on or off 
the exchanges. The supervisory duties of the Ministry 
of Finance also, in particular, include fixing the - 178-
rates of commission of the securities companies, 
as proposed by the exchanges. For the periodical 
audit of professional participants in the market alone, 
the Ministry employs more than 220 specially trained 
inspectors. Government inspections are complemented by 
self regulation of the securities companies through 
the exchanges and through the Securities Dealers 
Association of Japan. The Securities Dealers Association 
was formed in 19 73 from a merger of the regional 
associations; its main function has been to devise and 
further develop guidelines for stock market business, 
particularly to protect investors. It also conducts the 
qualifying examinations for registered sales repre-
sentatives. At the present time, all securities companies 
are members of the Securities Dealers Association. 
Although there are no reliable statistics, it can be 
assumed that there are at least six million individual 
shareholders in Japan. Every seventh household owns 
securities. Individual shareholders in 19 73 held 
nearly a third of all shares in circulation (see Table 
J - 2). This means that their share is smaller than in 
1945, when they held more than half of all shares. After 
the war, their holdings increased to 61% by 1950 as a 
result of the dissolution of the Zaibatsu and the 
democratization of share ownership, but have since then 
dropped continuously. Contrary to what was the case, e.g. 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries, this trend was not the 
result of the institutionalization of share ownership 
but rather the consequence of efforts by industrial 
undertakings, insurance companies and banks to in-
fluence, through shareholdings, the policies of other 
companies wherever their own interests were involved. 
Preventive defence against foreign influences, too, - 179 -
Table J - 2 
Percentage shares of various groups of 
investors in Japanese securities outstanding 
Investor group 
Individuals 
Credit institutions 
Insurance companies 
Investment funds 
Securities companies and 
securities finance comp. 
Non-financial companies 
Public authorities 
Foreign investors 
Percentage 
stocks ' 
outstanding 
32.7 
17.3 
15.7 
1.2 
2.4 
27.5 
0.2 
2.9 
of 
bonds 
outstanding 
21.6 
72.2
3
) 
0.7 
• 
• 
5.6 
0.0 
• 
1) Listed stocks outstanding at end of 1973: 150 thousand million 
shares. Of the total par value of all Japanese stocks 
outstanding at end of 1974 of 13.5 billion yen (1973: 12.5 billion 
yen) the proportion held by private persons was 35.6% (1973: 35.0%) 
and that held by non-financial companies was 37.2% (1973: 35.2%). 
2) Total bonds outstanding at end of 1973, face value 36.4 billion 
yen. 
3) This figure also includes the share of the Central Bank, the 
investment funds, the securities companies and the securities 
finance companies. The Central Bank's share is 2%, that of 
the commercial banks 26.2%. 
has been a motive for this concentration of share 
ownership, which is called "Hojinka" or corporatization. 
Since corporatization leads to an increase in long-term 
holdings, it has not, contrary to institutionalization 
elsewhere, led to the secondary market being burdened 
with a substantial increase in large transactions. 
Instead, it has become evident in a certain narrowness 
of the market and has slowed growth in turnover. - 180 -
Table J - 3 
Number of listed companies  1) 
Exchange 
Tokyo 
Osaka 
Nagoya 
Kyoto 
Hiroshima 
Fukuoka 
Niigata 
Sapporo 
Number of listed companies 
End of 1975 
1 414 
988 
472 
231 
178 
238 
201 
193 
End of 1969
2
) 
1 250 (538) 
862 (164) 
434 (60) 
228 (3) 
170 (5) 
222 (8) 
194 (11) 
183 (11) 
1) Companies whose shares were listed on one or more 
exchanges at the relevant date. 
2) The number in brackets indicates the companies 
whose securities were listed exclusively at the exchange 
indicated. These numbers evidence the minor importance 
of the smaller exchanges even as markets for local 
securities. 
According to a survey covering 70% of sales in the 
"First Section" of the Tokyo Exchange, the share of 
individual investors, excluding companies, in 
exchange volume at market value in 1975 (1973) was 58% 
(64%), that of foreigners was 4.7% (5.4%) and that 
of investment companies, banks and insurance companies 
was 7.9% (5.7%). 
The shares of some 2600 companies are traded fairly 
regularly in Japan. At the end of 1974, the shares of 
1709 companies, with a par value of nine billion yen 
(market value about 40 billion yen), had been listed 
on one or several exchanges. The number of companies - 181 -
listed on the various exchanges appears in Table 
J - 3. The shares of the larger companies are 
generally quoted on all exchanges. The par value 
of all shares outstanding amounted to 13.5 billion 
yen. Of the 6200 or so bonds in circulation, with a 
face value of 4 3.6 billion yen at end of 1974, only 
360 were traded on the three largest exchanges; the 
other exchanges do not list bonds. Further, several 
hundred bonds are regularly exchanged over the 
counter. Dealing in bonds takes place mainly outside 
the exchanges. Sales in bonds on the exchanges amounted 
to only 3% of the total volume in bonds in 1974 of 
16.7 billion yen, and was largely the result of 
dealings in 2 35 convertible issues. - 182 -
II. EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE JAPANESE 
SECONDARY MARKET 
When the segments of the Japanese stock market are 
discussed, the obvious first point to deal with is 
the customary division into a First and Second 
Section. This division is made at the country's 
major exchanges - Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya. It was 
introduced in 19 61 when the three exchanges admitted 
the shares of several hundred companies which until 
then were being traded to an increasing extent over 
the counter only. Turnover had reached nearly 20% 
of all turnover on the exchanges. This was intended 
to allow investors in these securities to enjoy the 
fair and orderly trading procedures of the exchanges. 
The securities that had then already been admitted 
formed the First Section and the securities newly 
admitted from outside the exchange the Second Section. 
After a year in the Second Section, a share can rise 
to the First Section. At the Tokyo Exchange in 19 74, 
881 shares had been allocated to the First and 509 to 
the Second Section. Over 90% of all turnover on the 
Exchange takes place in the First Section. The round 
lot in both Sections has since 1972 been 1000 units, 
and up till then the round lot in the Second Section 
was 500 units. 
In 19 61 this distinction between the two types of 
stock was probably very sensible, since the securities 
differed greatly in quality. Today, however, these 
differences are slight. The divide between both Sections 
is largely the potential turnover of the stock, 
determined in Tokyo by its actual turnover (at least 
200 000 shares a month) and the distribution of the - 183-
shares (3000 shareholders holding at least 1000 and 
not more than 50 000 shares each, with a minimum of 
20 million shares publicly held. It should be noted 
in this connexion that the average price in Japan 
for listed shares is something less than 300 yen, 
so that these requirements mean little more than 
normal quotability. In the Second Section, a company 
can be accepted with only three million shares 
publicly held and 2000 shareholders. When an issue 
is assigned to the First Section, the exchange also 
certifies that the issuer has demonstrated a certain 
earning power and has refrained from publishing 
misleading information in the annual report of the 
company for the past five years, though in precisely 
this respect the exchanges have experienced some 
unpleasant surprises; in addition, these requirements 
apply also to the listing of securities in the Second 
Section and thus do not mark differences between 
both Sections. The exchanges of Osaka and Hagoya have 
similar if rather less stringent requirements of 
eligibility for the First Section. Securities in both 
Sections are essentially traded by the same procedure. 
A stock assigned to the First Section of an exchange 
and listed on various exchanges is not traded in the 
Second Section of any other exchange. The exchanges act 
without delay to assign a stock to the First Section 
or to reassign it to the Second or to delist it 
whenever this is appropriate according to the relevant 
standards. The point of this consistent but otherwise 
hardly meaningful allocation is not all that clear. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that it has been 
suggested in Japan to merge both Sections. The following 
comments therefore ignore the distinction between the 
Sections and concentrate on the different trading - 184 -
procedures that can be observed on the exchanges. 
1. Trading in major securities 
The exchanges at Tokyo and Osaka make available for 
high-volume stocks a special segment covering eight 
stocks in Tokyo and ten in Osaka. The procedure 
adopted is the Gekitaku. The opening and closing 
prices are determined without the assistance of a 
Saitori on commencement and at the end of trading in 
the morning (9 to 11 a. m.) and the afternoon 
(1 to 3 p. m.). The stocks can be traded continuously 
between the opening and closing prices though all 
prices in this segment are essentially collective 
prices. It is felt that the Gekitaku procedure is 
particularly efficient and speedy for dealing with 
the large flow of orders in these top securities and 
leads to largely uniform prices. 
In Gekitaku trading, an exchange employee calls out 
the securities one after the other at a special post 
around which the senior dealers of the member firms 
have gathered. As members make their bids, first the 
highest bids and the lowest offers that members are 
willing to bid on their own account or on behalf of 
their customers are determined. The highest bid will 
be a little below the lowest offer. 
Then the actual trading begins. The exchange 
employee signals the bid and offer by hand signs and 
members indicate the number of round lots that they 
wish to take or give at one of the two prices. In 
order to make a deal a few traders will then reduce - 185 -
their offer or increase their bid. If and when 
two or more bids allow a deal, this is made, but 
at a provisional price, let us say 172. Anyone who 
has made a transaction at this provisional price 
can be described as a provisional net buyer or as 
a provisional net seller, since he still has the 
opportunity to liquidate his provisional position 
wholly or partly during the collective dealing 
that takes place, as it is the final price and not 
the provisional one that applies to all deals. 
Ordinarily, supply and demand will not be completely 
in equilibrium at the provisional price. If demand 
predominates, the official will quote the next highest 
price (173). At this price there will usually be 
no additional demand but additional supply is likely 
to emerge either because additional orders become 
executable or because the price of 173 is too high for 
some provisional net buyers; they therefore liquidate 
by re-offering the shares that they had hoped to 
purchase at 172. If supply and demand are in balance 
at 173, this price is fixed and applies to all 
transactions. It may, however, quite easily happen 
that more than two stages are required for the dealers 
at the post to feel their way to an equilibrium price 
or, on the other hand, that the first negotiating 
round leads to such a price immediately. Balance is 
easier to achieve than might be expected from the way 
the Gekitaku procedure is structured, as members are 
usually ready to eliminate excesses of demand or 
supply by slightly increasing or reducing the extent 
of their bids. Only the final net sales enter into the 
turnover statistics. - 186 -
As mentioned, trading may take place in Gekitaku 
securities between the opening and closing prices 
at any time. Members deal with each other direct. 
However, here, too, the exchange employee in charge 
will co-ordinate dealings. He states the price at 
which in his opinion the market can continue to be 
cleared. If supply and demand do not balance out, 
he then feels his way with higher or lower prices 
towards the new equilibrium point and only when no 
further excesses are evident are further deals and 
a new price achieved. Exchange employees prepare the 
contract notes and have these confirmed by the 
parties. 
2. Trading through Saitori firms 
The bulk of listed stocks in the First and Second 
Sections are traded with the aid of Saitori. All 
orders must be passed on to the appropriate Saitori 
firm at the post for the security concerned. For 
its services the firm receives a member commission 
fixed by the exchange. The opening prices in the 
morning and afternoon are calculated by the Saitori by 
the Itayose method. At all other times during the 
exchange session, dealing can proceed continuously 
under the Zaraba procedure with the aid of a Saitori. 
Under the Itayose method, the Saitori determines 
a collective price on the basis of the orders in his 
book according to the maximum turnover principle used 
at many other of the world's exchanges. All buy 
orders that are either unlimited or which have a limit 
higher than the price ultimately fixed and all 
unlimited or lower limited selling orders must be - 187 -
fully executed; all orders limited at the collective 
price must be served with at least one round lot, 
all those buying or selling orders submitted by a 
member firm being regarded as a single order. If the 
pattern of orders is such that balancing is not possible, 
the Saitori will attempt to persuade one or several 
members to adjust their volume of orders to the 
situation. 
The Zaraba procedure corresponds to trading at continuous 
individual prices which is also standard practice 
elsewhere. As soon as an order is received which enables 
a sale to be made, the Saitori consummates the trans-
action, issues a contract note as in all other cases, 
has it confirmed by the parties and reports the price 
from his post to the appropriate exchange staff for 
inserting in the price indicator system. The Saitori 
establishes the price for individual deals. He does 
not negotiate with the employee of the securities 
company who brings him an order. If the limits of the 
orders held by the Saitori allow him some room for 
discretion, he must select a price as close as possible 
to the previous one. His discretion is further limited 
by the fact that he must note the sequence of orders -
which is governed by the limits and the time at which 
he receives the orders - in his book and observe it 
strictly. Since recourse to the Saitori is mandatory -
all orders, even ones that can be crossed, must pass 
through him - and since he may not deal on his own 
account, the basic neutrality of the Saitori is 
guaranteed. In order to prevent action by other 
authorized traders that might damage investors, the 
exchange has in particular drastically limited trading 
by exchange and member firm employees; they are banned - 188-
from margin transactions and may not liquidate a 
position established for own account on the same 
working day. 
This combination of Itayose and Zaraba does not 
apply only to shares but also to convertible bonds 
which became important only towards the end of 
the 1960s and were not admitted to trading on the 
exchanges until 1970. Since then, they have dominated 
bond dealings there. Foreign bonds, too, are dealt 
with in this way, although with the proviso that 
trading time for these is concentrated in a certain 
part of the session, namely two periods of thirty 
minutes each day. This restriction applies yet more 
stringently to all other bonds, for which only a 
collective price is determined by the Itayose 
procedure sometimes twice and sometimes only once. 
3. Trading on the exchanges without Saitori 
The five small exchanges have no Saitori. The volume 
of trading on their exchanges does not require 
elaborate organization and does not support specialized, 
floor-commission minded firms. Only a few hundred lots 
are sold each day, compared with the several hundred 
thousand on the Tokyo Exchange. Nonetheless, procedure 
essentially follows Itayose and Zaraba, exchange 
employees taking on the functions of the Saitori, 
and no floor commissions being charged. Most trans-
actions concern securities that are also listed on 
the main exchanges. 
The interesting point with these exchanges is not - 189-
so much their procedural techniques as why they 
should still exist at all. Several of the small 
exchanges are in fact themselves wondering 
whether their volume is sufficient to sustain the 
necessary machinery. The only Exchange to be closed 
after the Second World War was that at Kobe, 
an average-sized one judged on the basis of member-
ship. Other exchanges seem to wish to follow its 
example, though legal problems connected with 
personnel and resistance by employees make them 
hesitate to take this step. The Exchange of Nagoya 
considers entering option trading in order to better 
utilize its facilities. However, it appears that 
other exchanges will be closed in a not too distant 
future as the Tokyo Exchange during the last ten years 
increased its share in the volume of all exchanges 
by about 12 percentage points while the share of the 
seven small exchanges decreased from 3.1% to 0.9% 
(cf. Table J - 4). 
The execution of customer placed orders on a local 
exchange at prices differing from those prevailing at 
the principal market can hardly be reconciled with the 
principles of investor protection even when this is 
done by securities companies desiring to support the 
local exchange. Thus, the service of the special 
securities companies collecting orders on the presently 
existing six small exchanges for execution on the 
Tokyo or Osaka exchange (cf. Section I) is a significant 
contribution for the reduction of transaction risks of 
investors, though this service at the same time 
reduces the small exchanges to institutions for the 
crossing of orders at the prices of a principal exchange 
and for the transmission of bunched order data to Tokyo - 190 -
Table J - 4 
Distribution of volume of stock sales on 
Japanese stock exchanges for selected years 
Exchange 
Tokyo 
Osaka 
Nagoya 
Kyoto 
Kobe 
Hiroshima 
Fukuoka 
Niigata 
Sapporo 
Total 
volume in 
billions 
of yen 
Percentage of total volume 
1950 
55.0 
27.5 
6.7 
2.8 
3.3 
1.5 
1.3 
1.0 
0.8 
0.1 
1955 
64.2 
22.2 
5.5 
2.2 
1.6 
1.5 
2.0 
0.3 
0.4 
0.4 
1965 
69.2 
24.6 
3.0 
0.8 
0.6 
0.8 
0.4 
0.4 
0.1 
5.8 
1973 
74.0 
22.0 
2.6 
0.5 
0.3 
0.2 
0.3 
0.1 
20.1 
1974 
77.8 
18.3 
2.8 
0.4 
0.2 
0.2 
0.3 
0.1 
15.9 
1975 
82.0 
14.7 
2.4 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
19.0 
or Osaka. If it was not mandatory to execute all orders 
in listed securities on the floor of an exchange it 
would be more efficient to have the regional offices of 
the two special securities companies take care of both 
functions and there would be no need for the regional 
exchanges. Certainly, it would be detrimental to the 
securities traded on the regional exchanges exclusively 
if these exchanges were closed down. These securities 
would trade almost unnoticed in Tokyo while they receive 
considerable attention on a regional exchange, most 
likely even more attention than they could attract - 191 -
in over-the-counter trading. However, it is hard to 
believe that the issuing companies would be prepared 
to pay continuing listing fees sufficient to sustain 
the regional exchanges. - 192-
III. OFF-EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE JAPANESE 
SECONDARY MARKET 
1. Over-the-counter trading in listed securities 
In principle, all members of a Japanese stock exchange 
are required to conduct transactions in listed 
securities on the floor of an exchange of which they 
are members. However, for two reasons not all 
transactions in listed securities are effected on an 
exchange. Firstly, not all securities companies are 
members of an exchange, and secondly, the rule does 
not apply to transactions of a certain volume. The 
first point is unimportant since non-members will as a 
rule nevertheless pass their orders on to an exchange; 
in fact, a number of these firms have jointly set up 
a company, which is a member of the exchange, in order 
in this way to participate in commissions on the 
fifty-fifty basis still applying amongst older firms. 
The second point is of some importance, however, not 
only in the case of bonds but also in the case of 
shares, even ignoring the new issues market which falls 
outside the scope of this study. 
Share transactions involving fewer items than the 
designated round lot are excluded from the exchange 
requirement. There are two securities companies in Tokyo 
which have specialized in business of this kind. Other 
securities companies, too, regularly buy odd lots from 
investors but do not sell odd lots. They normally buy 
them at a price below the daily quotation, the amount 
of discount varying from one security to another. When 
existing shareholders are given the right to subscribe 
for a new issue, odd lots commonly arise and the - 193 -
issuing syndicate will then be prepared, for a 
limited period, to handle small orders at the day's 
price and for the usual commission. For this, they 
charge the issuer a special fee. In all other cases, 
one cannot generalize on the commissions and prices 
at which small orders are executed. Odd-lot business 
is of small account because of its low volume. The 
same applies to other over-the-counter transactions 
in listed securities, such as special block business, 
take-over bids, and when trading has been suspended, 
since transactions of this kind are rare in Japan. 
In the case of listed bonds, over-the-counter trading 
is, on the other hand, the rule except for convertible 
issues and certain foreign bonds for which the exchanges 
are the main market. True, mandatory exchange dealing 
applies to orders for government stock with face 
values between one million and four million yen and the 
same also applies to certain other issues and to 
convertible bonds, but exchange members can, exceptionally, 
discharge their obligations in this connexion by trans-
acting such business over the counter at the exchange 
price and charging the prescribed rates of commission; 
other securities companies, too, must apply these 
commissions for such business. 
The securities companies act for their own account 
when dealing with the customer in bonds off the exchange. 
Apart from the exceptions referred to above, they are 
not, therefore, bound by the exchanges' commission 
rules. However, they are in no way free to make their 
own prices. They must take the exchange prices as a 
basis and may apply to these only certain maximum 
immediacy premiums or discounts which, while increasing - 194-
with the size of the transaction, may not exceed 0.5% 
of the exchange price for government stock and 0.75% 
for other bonds. 
2. Over-the-counter trading in unlisted securities 
Over-the-counter trading in stocks is largely limited 
to Tokyo. As in the case of bonds, the securities 
companies act for their own account; here, however, 
they are free to quote and to negotiate prices. Although 
the number of issues traded from time to time is large, 
few securities have a market. The Securities Dealers 
Association in Tokyo records prices and volume of only 
some 80 stocks. Volume is at best comparable with that 
on the small exchanges. None of the over-the-counter 
securities can meet the listing requirements of the 
Tokyo Exchange although, in principle, no issuer is 
required to have his shares quoted on the exchange. 
In order to be registered with the Securities Dealers 
Association and included in their price information 
service, a stock must have been outstanding for two years 
and have drawn dividends. The issuer's capital stock 
must be 100 million yen or more (listing on the Tokyo 
Exchange is possible as from 500 million yen). 
Registration must be applied for by at least two legally 
independent members of the Association who declare 
themselves willing to act as market makers. However, 
they do not always live up to this obligation. Additional 
and more comprehensive organization was therefore being 
sought for the execution of orders off the floor. In 
19 76, the securities companies formed a joint institution, 
the Over-the-counter Securities Company (Tento Shoken), - 195 -
through which they have their orders for unlisted 
securities executed at prices that are as uniform as 
possible. This new institution, whose shareholders 
include nearly all the securities companies, absorbed 
the Tokyo Securities Dealers Association's stock 
information office, which has been collecting and 
publishing price information since 1969. 
As already mentioned, over-the-counter sales of bonds 
are quite substantial since less than 400 of the total 
of 6200 bonds in circulation can be traded on an 
exchange. Volume in this sector has increased rapidly 
in recent years and by 19 75 had reached 12 billion yen. 
The bulk of sales relates to unlisted issues. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that efforts have been made in 
recent years to improve the organization of this market. 
Many securities companies are market makers in bonds. 
The Securities Dealers Association in Tokyo requires 
weekly price reports from its members on about 2 70 major 
bonds, chiefly industrial loans having a value at issue 
of more than 10 thousand million yen; from the reports, 
the Association prepares a price list published each 
Thursday. The Tokyo Centre for Over-the-counter 
Quotations was set up in 1968. It receives bid and ask 
information for unlisted bonds from its members three 
times a week. The compiled information is released to 
member firms. The Center also issues a weekly price list. 
Finally, Tokyo Stock Exchange member firms licenced for 
underwriting in 1973 formed a joint office (Nihon Sogo) 
which arranges off-the-floor deals for their securities 
companies like a Saitori. It probably handles some 10% 
of over-the-counter bond sales. There have also been 
plans for some time for an independent rating service. - 196 -
Where transaction prices are published for unlisted 
bonds, the rules applying to immediacy premiums and 
discounts referred to in the previous Section also 
apply to unlisted securities. In order not to give 
these securities a transaction cost advantage over 
quoted bonds the commission rules for smaller 
transactions must also be applied here. 
3. The Gensaki market 
The Gensaki market deals mainly with bonds, both listed 
and unlisted. The special feature of this over-the-
counter market is the form of contract it employs. 
Here, securities are not sold outright but transferred 
exclusively on the condition that the seller undertakes 
to buy it back at a stipulated price after an agreed 
period. Sales under repurchase agreements are common 
in other countries, too, but there they never gained the 
importance they have in Japan, so that they will be 
dealt with only here. The chief parties interested in 
such transactions are the securities companies, 
institutional investors and commercial and industrial 
companies. 
These transactions under repurchase agreement are one 
solution to the problem of how bonds and, in certain 
cases, other securities as well, can be turned into cash 
when government measures such as maximum interest rate 
guidance or the fixing of maximum immediacy discounts 
or other institutional or economic factors make the 
outright sale of bonds very difficult and when a 
securities company or other firm requires liquid funds 
urgently. The origins of the Gensaki market may therefore - 197-
be found in the mid-1960s, when the securities companies 
wanted to liquidate at least part of the holdings they 
had taken up after intensive price-support operations. 
Even if no outright purchaser can be found at the pre-
vailing conditions, a seller of good standing can still 
offer terms attractive to the market under a repurchase 
agreement and by raising the repurchase price above the 
spot price. Although this difference in prices can be 
regarded as a form of interest, repurchased securities 
are at times carried on the accounts at the repurchase 
price. This can be taken as an example of how the rules 
restricting the distribution of trading profits 
(cf. Section I) can be adapted, by accrueing "trading 
losses" and carrying them on the accounts too, even if 
not openly. 
The Gensaki market has grown very rapidly in recent 
years, as has the market for outright bond transactions. 
In 1975, more than half of all sales in bonds, amounting 
to 26.2 million millions of yen, was in Gensaki business. 
In that year, the value of bonds traded on the 
Gensaki market amounted to 14.3 billion yen. The 
growth of the Gensaki market might have been even 
more impressive if the government had not imposed 
ceilings on securities held under repurchase 
agreements. - 198 -
K. THE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
I. PARTICIPANTS AND ISSUES TRADED 
The immense size of the capital market and the federative 
structure of the country foster a multitude of forms 
on the securities market in the United States impeding 
a succinct description of its present-day functioning. 
In addition, the secondary market is currently in a 
state of upheaval following several years of increasingly 
rapid change. The growing importance of institutional 
investors and the difficulties encountered by brokers 
in handling the rapidly increasing volume of business 
towards the end of the 1960s were a harbinger of this 
upheaval, which brought about a number of important 
events and developments such as the prohibition in 19 75 
of the fixed commission rates that had existed on the 
New York Stock Exchange since 179 2 and the Securities 
Reform Act of 1975, which codified a federal program for 
a primarily competition guided restructuring of the 
secondary market. This process is in no way complete. 
Accordingly, a comprehensive survey of the professional 
participants in the market and of the various kinds of 
firms dealing in securities and their function is no 
longer an easy matter. 
Broker-dealers, both commission and spread minded, 
certainly continue to play a central role in the stock 
market, even though the number of firms and their 
offices and employees has dropped in recent years 
(Table K - 1). Many of these firms are very small and 
associated only indirectly with the secondary market, - 199 -
e. g. by selling mutual fund investments or acting 
as investment agents. Trading in securities is 
concentrated chiefly amongst the thousand or so 
member firms of stock exchanges and, of course, the 
members of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
Table K - 1 
U.S. broker-dealer firms  1) 
End of Year 
1969 
1974 
Number of 
Firms 
4681 
(622) 
4096 
(508) 
Number of 
Offices 
13 115 
(4084) 
10 406 
(3441) 
Number of 
Employees 
366 000 
(165 000) 
36 8 000 
(123 000) 
1) The figures in brackets relate to the New York Stock Exchange. 
They cannot be exactly compared with the totals since the 
latter refer to the firms registered with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. Such registration was not mandatory 
before 1975 for exchange firms trading on the floor of the 
exchange only (e.g. specialists and floor brokers carrying 
on no business with nonmembers), which are included in the 
NYSE statistics. Broker-dealer firms not registered with the 
SEC, because they work only within one state or deal ex-
clusively with short-term paper or government bonds, are not 
included in the total figures either. The number of firms not 
covered probably totals a few hundred. 
This group includes the round dozen of national full-line 
firms engaged in practically all types of securities 
transactions and services on and off the exchange and 
who at the same time may also carry on commodity futures 
business, sell life insurance and offer general advisory 
services. They earn more than one half of all commissions. 
Full-service business of this kind is carried on by - 200-
some fifty other firms, but limited to certain 
areas of the United States. The large investment 
banking firms who also have a major stake in commission 
business, are also members of the NYSE, as are the 
firms who cater to institutional investors. Members 
of the NYSE certainly dominate the exchange commission 
business, corresponding with the position of their 
exchange. In addition, they obtain more than 70% of the 
orders for over-the-counter securities and many members 
are well known market makers for such securities. 
This applies both to market making in the normal way 
of business and to market making in blocks ("upstairs" 
market making - as opposed to "floor" market making 
by the specialist). 
When, in the past, mention was made of members of the 
American exchanges, it was usual to refer to the 
investor-commission minded firms as commission brokers 
and to differentiate among the others: odd-lot dealers, 
floor traders, specialists and floor brokers, members 
active almost exclusively on the floor of the Exchange. 
The simple odd-lot dealer no longer exists in New York. 
His function has become one aspect of the services 
offered by others. Once a few full-line houses began 
in 1976, to execute small orders (orders in odd lots, 
i. e. less than a round lot, a unit normally representing 
a hundred shares) inside their own offices, and at 
more favourable conditions for their customers than 
were offered by the one remaining odd-lot firm on the 
exchange, the basis for the latter's operation was 
removed and it gave up trading in May 1976. Moreover, 
the exchanges have been prohibited since May 1, 1976 
from fixing member commissions and the odd-lot 
differential, which was paid to the odd-lot dealers, was - 201 -
primarily a commission of that kind. As on other 
exchanges, at the NYSE, too, the specialists now trans-
act odd-lot business. 
Floor traders or registered traders deal on the floor 
of the exchange in securities of their choice for their 
own account. Due to the 1964 Amendments to the 
Securities Exchange Act, their scope has in fact become 
greatly restricted so that they are less important 
than in the past. Now the Securities Reform Act 
essentially bans trading for own account and provides 
no statutory exception for registered traders. 
Table K - 2 
Assets and earnings of major broker-dealer firms 
(in thousand million dollars) 
1)2) 
Year 
1969 
1974 
Assets 
24.2 
(18.5) 
25.2 
(22.2) 
Earnings 
Total 
5.8 
(4.5) 
5.3 
(4.7) 
of which 
Commissions 
2.9 
(2.6) 
2.6 
(2.3) 
Spreads 
0.7 
(0.4) 
0.7 
(0.6) 
1) A total of 2631 firms (1974: 2005) with gross earnings of 
at least $ 20 OOO in 1969. 
2) The figures in brackets relate to primarily investor-
commission-oriented NYSE firms (333 firms in 1969). 
Thus, registered traders may also cease to exist - 202 -
unless the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
creates an exception before the new provision becomes 
effective on May 1, 19 78. Such an exception will 
come about only if investigations of the SEC lead to 
the conclusion that the registered trader transactions 
are consistent with investor protection and the 
maintenance of fair and orderly markets. 
The specialists are both member-commission minded agents 
with powers to consummate transactions and market makers 
in the securities in which they specialize. Their 
transactions as market makers are statutorily excluded 
from the general ban on own account dealing and there-
fore not in jeopardy, although - as will be pointed out 
below - working conditions will change sharply for 
them. Many specialists fear that their activities as 
agents will be largely automated and they are therefore 
expanding by entering into competition with their 
former customers and taking orders from investors 
direct. This tends to remove the traditional distinction 
between commission brokers and specialists. Unlike 
their colleagues at the regional exchanges, the NYSE 
specialists may not, however, have institutional in-
vestors as direct customers. If this restriction were 
to be removed, the business of the specialist would 
similarly find a place in the range of the full-line 
firms as market making in unlisted securities has 
already done. On the one hand, "specialist" firms could 
further extend the range of services they offer and, 
on the other, the full-line and institutional houses 
would probably be prepared at least to act as market 
makers in listed securities as well, whether on the 
floor or off it. At present, the major exchanges do not 
allow their members to effect transactions in listed - 203 -
securities for their own account off the floor, 
however, the SEC intends to determine whether this 
restriction should be removed. 
The floor brokers execute orders for other exchange 
members and are therefore member-commission minded. Since 
generally only the members themselves are authorized to 
trade on American exchanges, floor brokers are used 
by firms who have no or too few members on the floor in 
order to execute the orders they receive. Moreover, 
from time to time, the discretion in having an order 
executed by a floor broker may be significant. The agency 
activities of floor brokers, like those of the specialists, 
is also threatened by automation plans in the long term. 
On the NYSE, all odd-lot orders and all orders for 100 to 
299 shares and also other orders from a few major firms 
are already passed to the appropriate specialist direct 
by electronic means. For the time being, however, it is 
the floor brokers who are really the beneficiaries of 
the reform since as from 1977, members of all exchanges 
can execute orders at any other exchange they wish. As a 
result, the share in total volume of transactions on 
behalf of members not themselves represented on an 
exchange may increase and so consequently will the 
importance of floor brokers. How the problem of access, 
e. g. to the NYSE for a broker who is a member only of 
a regional exchange, will be legally solved remains to 
be seen. Economically it has already been settled as a 
result of the unfixing of commissions - both for members 
of other exchanges and for non-members - and special 
firms already exist for correspondent business of this 
kind; the fee for access is freely negotiated with a 
member of the exchange, e. g. the NYSE. However, each 
exchange offers only a specific number of memberships - 204-
(seats), a practice that may be abandoned when the 
SEC and the exchanges legally solve the membership 
and access problem. 
Economic access of this kind now also makes it worth-
while for the American banks to consider approaching 
individual investors and this may produce competition 
for the broker-dealer firms that could in the medium 
term substantially weaken their present importance. 
As long as commissions were fixed, and possible channels 
for allowing rebates over and above the jointly fixed 
quantity discounts were very carefully partitioned, the 
banks had to ask for supplements to the ordinary 
commissions in order to cover their own costs and could 
not therefore compete with the broker-dealers, except 
perhaps in exceptional situations, for example during 
the broker crisis of 1968 to 1970, when investments and 
deposits with brokers appeared so hazardous to many 
investors that they were prepared, despite the additional 
fees, to transact their securities business through 
the banks. The American banks are still not members of 
the exchanges nor do they deal on them directly, but 
they can negotiate with members of the exchanges for 
commissions that leave them sufficient room for the 
necessary supplements without thereby ending up with a 
decisive competitive disadvantage as against other 
investor-commission oriented firms. However, there have 
been certain legal objections to their entering the 
commission business on securities. 
The Banking Act of 19 33 barred banks and their affiliates 
from new issue business and from trading for own account 
in corporate securities. It would, however, be quite 
wrong to assume from this, as many have done, that the - 205-
American banks have no part to play in securities 
business. The banks were left with the full range of 
business in governmental bonds. After 1933, they 
further retained and extended their very important 
position in various investment management activities 
of their trust departments, which held assets of 
$ 325 thousand million in 1,3 million trust accounts 
at the end of 1974. About one half of this amount is 
invested in stocks. The some 4000 banks with active trust 
departments either direct the resulting orders to ex-
change members or execute them themselves off the 
exchange through direct negotiation with market makers. 
In addition, it is generally the banks - registered 
shares are customary in the USA - who act as registrars 
for American companies and transfer title to new holders. 
Finally, the banks also have a strong position in 
custodianship and safe deposit business. 
The securities business falling within this scope was 
too narrow for certain major banks and already by the 
middle 1960s they were attempting to promote services 
analogous to those carried on by the broking houses 
for private investors. Their first venture, offering 
shares in common trust accounts managed by banks, in 
order to draw full cost benefit from economies of scale, 
foundered in 19 71 on resistance by the Investment Company 
Institute. This is an umbrella association of the 
investment companies and by bringing an action it had 
such offerings classified as unlawful new issue business, 
even though the banking supervisory authority had 
considered it permissible. In 1974, several major banks 
then proposed to their customers that certain amounts 
should be debited to their checking accounts each month 
and used to purchase a holding in shares of one or more - 206 -
of the thirty best-known American industrial corporations 
(AIS, Automated Investment Service). The NYSE's action 
against the banking supervisory authority which had 
approved this form of dealing proved unsuccessful. The 
court regarded this service as a modern crystallization 
of the banks' traditional agency activities, which carried 
with it no kind of risk to the solvency and prestige of 
the bank concerned. The banks are now prepared to take 
the next step. Contrary to the AlS-purchasing of pre-
selected stock via an exchange firm for a large number 
of customers simultaneously at predetermined times, they 
now also want to advertise the buying and selling of 
shares of any kind at the request of individual 
customers at any time and without any bunching of orders. 
The Chemical Bank in New York was the first to start a 
campaign for business of this kind which in the past has 
been transacted only reluctantly at customers' special 
request. The conditions now offered are highly competitive, 
Initially, the bank will limit its offer to investors who 
had accounts with it before the campaign started. It 
would appear to be the intention that this restriction 
will be dropped later. Whether the banks succeed and 
can penetrate still deeper into stock trading, will 
depend in the first instance on Congress, which is now 
having this matter investigated by the SEC. The SEC 
Report is expected in mid-19 77. 
This survey of the professional participants in the 
secondary stock market offering related financial 
services is by no means complete as yet. It does not 
seem necessary here to mention unusual combinations or 
special variants of certain functions, but besides 
broker-dealers and banks, there are a few firms which 
are directly or indirectly concerned with the trading - 207-
of securities and which deserve a brief mention. In 
June 1975, there were about 3420 federally registered 
investment advisers in the United States, advising 
investors on securities transactions for a fee. 
Reference should also be made to the well-known rating 
services for bonds and stocks. It should further be 
pointed out that the clearing and settlement of 
securities transactions in the United States lies in 
the hands of various organizations who, in some cases, 
are independent of the exchanges. Because of the 
procedural weaknesses in this sector, which became 
apparent in 19 6 8 to 19 70, such clearing agencies now 
require special registration to operate. Since 19 75 
registration is also required for transfer agents and 
registrars. This affects not only banks but also simple 
data-processing firms. Finally, mention should be made 
of the insurance companies who offer certain policies 
of special interest to issuers, investors and brokers. 
One type, for example, guarantees the servicing of one 
particular issuer's debt, another insures prompt and 
complete payment of interest and principal for certain 
investors, and some less well-known brokers insure the 
securities and the moneys of their customers in their 
custody against losses in the event of failure of their 
firm up to amounts substantially higher than those 
covered by the compulsory federal insurance. 
This compulsory insurance offered by the Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), was created in 
19 70 by federal act. In principle, it covers all 
registered broker-dealers, who are subject to its 
assessments. When a firm has to be wound up, the holdings 
of each customer are valued when the liquidation 
commences and deficiencies of up to $ 50 000 are made - 208 -
good due to a customer after his share in the assets 
has been paid to him and the stock that can be 
identified as his property has been returned. Cash 
claims are met up to $ 20 000 within the framework of 
the overall cover of $ 50 000. 
So many bodies are concerned in supervising securities 
business in the United States that a detailed listing 
is not possible here, not to mention an outline of 
their powers and overlaps in powers. The legislatures 
of all the states have, with one exception, since 
1910 enacted and further developed laws to control 
dealings in securities (the so-called "blue-sky laws"). 
To enforce the law, special supervisory authorities have 
been set up, known mainly as state security administrators 
or securities commissioners, who license brokers and 
dealers and monitor the issues that are to be sold 
within the State. Although these authorities are in no 
way insignificant, they have been overshadowed since 
1934 by the federal supervisory service, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. The SEC has nine regional 
offices and eight branches, in addition to its head-
quarters in Washington. At mid-19 75 it employed about 
19 50 persons, including 12 30 in Washington. Its budget 
amounted in 1974/75 to $ 45 million. Its responsibilities 
have continued to be extended, most recently by the 
Securities Reform Act of 19 75. It has far-reaching 
powers to improve the protection of investors, to strengthen 
competition and to perfect the mechanisms of the 
securities market. Of these powers it makes intensive 
use. This is evidenced particulary by the flood of 
regulations and reports and the 400 to 500 proceedings 
instituted each year for violations of securities law 
and regulations, partly enforced by administrative - 209 -
proceedings of the SEC, partly brought before the 
courts as civil or criminal proceedings. For all that, 
the SEC frequently is not involved in monitoring 
compliance directly but restricts itself to guiding, 
controlling and correcting the enforcement activities 
of other bodies. 
These bodies are known as self-regulatory organizations. 
The concept of self regulation has been retained, 
despite criticism from Congress. It differs from the 
principle of self administration of securities exchanges 
applied in most countries by its strong commitment to 
investor protection and, recently, more generally to the 
procedural efficiency of the U.S. securities market 
system as a whole. Its advantages are that persons 
engaged in trading have the best and most intimate 
knowledge of the market and for that reason, at least, 
are particularly well suited to monitor compliance. 
Further, supervision from within is usually less 
resisted than supervision by a specialized outside 
bureaucracy. Finally, the "supervised" the.nselves 
participate in fixing the standards of investor protection 
and are therefore more likely to keep to them; the 
result of this process may be that professional 
participants in the market more frequently cross the 
border between strict adherence to the rule-book and 
fair, ethical conduct in favour of the investor than in 
the case of investor protection by legislation or by 
government regulation. It of course happens often enough 
that rules devised in this way are violated, but direct 
government enforcement does not guarantee compliance 
either. The more relevant disadvantages of self-
regulation are that no one is eager to discipline a 
colleague and that any self-regulatory organization 210 -
will depend on the support of its members, particularly 
leading members; this leads to a tendency to unequal 
application of the regulations. The danger, too, that 
a cartel policy may be pursued under the cloak of 
investor protection is a disadvantage of self-regulation 
that is ever present. 
While self regulation in the strict sense was still 
practised after the Second World War, the regulations 
have so increased since then both in number and 
complexity and, consequently, also the number of full-
time officials engaged in this work, that one can no 
longer really speak of self regulation but of self-
regulatory organizations or of cooperative regulation, 
i. e. supervision by associations or their professional 
institutions. Such organizations include, in particular, 
the exchanges registered with the SEC and the National 
Association of Security Dealers (NASD) acting as a 
supervisor of trading off the exchanges. Like the SEC, 
they have substantial funds for further developing and 
implementing the comprehensive and highly detailed 
provisions of market organization that they 
promulgate after SEC approval. Since 1975, the self-
regulatory organizations have also included the clearing 
agencies and, to a limited extent, the Municipal 
Securities Rule-Making Board (MSRB). The origin of the 
MSRB may be mentioned. Trading in municipal securities, 
i. e. bonds issued by a state or by municipal authorities 
or their institutions, was, in the past, like that in 
all U.S. government securities, exempt from SEC super-
vision, and some 240 firms specialized solely in trading 
in municipals. Because of substantial abuse in this 
field, Congress was compelled here, too, to provide for 
rules for registration,examination and trading. 211 -
Since banks and other firms who were not members of 
one of the traditional self-regulatory organizations 
have a major stake in the trading of municipals, 
a new organization had to be created corresponding 
to the idea of self-regulation, at least in order to 
propose and adopt trading and examination rules. 
Finally, the three banking supervisory authorities in 
Washington are becoming increasingly important as 
federal supervisory authorities for the secondary 
market - the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. A bank falling 
within the scope of one of these authorities must be 
registered and monitored by it, e. g. as a transfer 
agent, clearing agency or municipal securities dealer. 
It should be mentioned lastly that the future trading in 
bonds on two commodity exchanges is subject to federal 
supervison by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
This separation of powers was tolerated in order to 
burden the individual security-dealing firms as little 
as possible with supervisory relations towards too 
many different authorities. This could, of course, also 
be achieved by an amalgamation of authorities, but 
a merger of the SEC with banking supervision, especially, 
seems inconceivable. 
The SEC's official exchange statistics list twelve stock 
exchanges at end of 1975 which have been registered 
by it and which have, accordingly, taken on the task 
of a self-regulatory organization (registered securities 
exchanges), and one exchange which, because of its 
minor importance, has been exempted from this obligation 
(exempted securities exchange), viz. that at Honolulu, - 212 -
Table K - 3 
Volume of sales on registered stock exchanges 
in 1975 at market value in millions of dollars 
(excluding option sales)
1) 
Exchange 
American SE 
Boston SE 
Cincinnati SE 
Detroit SE 
Intermountain SE 
Midwest SE 
National SE
4) 
New York SE 
Pacific SE 
Philadelphia-
Baltimore-
Washington SE 
Spokane SE 
All exchanges 
(as percentages) 
Total 
volume 
5 968 
1 871 
270 
197 
1 
7 305 
0 
142 923 
5 319 
2 723 
4 
166 580 
(loo) 
Stock 
volume 
5 666 
1 871 
270 
197 
1 
7 305 
0 
133 684 
5 229 
2 722 
4 
156 947 
(94.2) 
Bond . 
volume 
203 
0 
0 
O 
O 
1 
0 
9 070 
60 
0 
0 
9.335 
(5.6) 
Warrant 
volume3) 
98 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
161 
29 
1 
0 
289 
(0.2) 
1) The columns do not add to totals due to rounding. The row 
differences are due to rounding and to volume in rights, which 
though a component of total volume of individual exchanges is 
not specified in the table as only on the NYSE and on the PSE 
it did amount to more than 0 1 million (£ 7 million and 
1 million respectively). 
2) Sales of municipals and U.S. government securities are ex-
cluded. Bonds are traded mainly off the floor. The volume 
indicated reflects primarily sales of bank and industrial bonds 
and, to a small extent, foreign bond issues. 
3) Warrants are options of extended or perpetual duration to buy 
a security from the issuer of that security. 
4) The National Stock Exchange, New York, deregistered in 1975. 
In previous years its sales exceeded # 100 million. - 213-
where, in 1975, share transactions totalled only $ 1.5 
million. Volume on the eleven registered exchanges, 
excluding option volume, are set out in Table K - 3. 
At the twelfth registered exchange, the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange (CBOE), dealings commenced only in 1973 
and cover options exclusively. It does not therefore 
appear in Table K - 3. If the value of its option 
turnover is compared with the total dollar volume of 
other exchanges, the CBOE ranks amongst the leading 
regional exchanges. 
As Table K - 3 shows, volume on the exchanges relates 
almost exclusively to stocks. Table K - 4 focussing on 
the distribution of dollar volume over the major 
exchanges thus excludes bond volume as bonds are traded 
mainly off the exchanges. The share in total volume of 
individual exchanges has clearly changed in recent years. 
This will be discussed in the section on the stock 
exchange segments of the secondary stock market. 
This summary is incomplete, however, not so much 
because of the future trading in certain bonds taken 
up by two commodity exchanges in Chicago in 1975 and 
1976, but more pronouncedly because of the existence of 
the so-called "over-the-counter" (OTC) market. The 
OTC market extends to the whole of the new issue market 
(the primary market) but is considered here only in 
so far as it constitutes part of the secondary market. 
In certain segments it has achieved such a high degree 
of organization that, in its function at least, it is 
tantamount to a stock exchange, as has already been 
stated previously in connexion with the British Ariel 
System. - 214 -
Table K - 4 
Volume of sales (excluding sales of bonds and options) 
in selected years and distribution over individual 
stock exchanges 
Year 
I960 
1970 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Dollar 
volume in 
thousand 
million 
45.3 
131.7 
178.9 
118.6 
156.9 
Percentage share of the 
NYSE 
83.81 
78.45 
82.07 
83.75 
85.18 
Amex 
9.35 
11.11 
6.06 
4.40 
3.61 
MSE 
2.73 
3.76 
4.55 
4.75 
4.65 
PSE 
1.95 
3.81 
3.56 
3.51 
3.33 
PBW 
l.lO 
2.00 
2.46 
2.03 
1.73 
BSE 
0.60 
0.68 
1.00 
1.24 
1.19 
DSE 
0.34 
0.11 
0.21 
0.23 
0.13 
Other 
ex-
changes 
0.12 
0.08 
0.09 
0.09 
0.18 
This applies particularly to trading facilitated by the 
quotation system of the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD), which is called Nasdaq for short (NASD 
Automated Quotations). On the basis of its volume of 
£24.8 thousand million in 1975 ($ 30.5 thousand million 
in 1973), Nasdaq ranks second amongst the United States' 
exchanges, ahead of the Midwest Stock Exchange (MSE) and 
the American Stock Exchange (Amex). Due to a fair number 
of specialized professional participants in the market 
and because of the differing supervisory relations, the 
OTC market is expediently subdivided into a segment for 
corporate securities and another for governmental issues, 
in which, for the same reasons, a sub-segment covers 
U.S. Treasury and federal agency securities and another 
covers municipal securities. The customary break-down of 
the OTC segment for corporate securities is not out-
lined here as it appears in Diagram 3. Diagram 3 : Survey of the securities market in the United States 
\ 
Securities Market 
Exchanges 
N. Y. Regional 
Exchanges Exchanges 
OTC - Market 
/ 
OTC Secondary Market 
Markets for corporate securities, viz. 
New Issues 
Market 
Markets for governmental 
securities, viz. ' 
unlisted 
securities 
/ 
listed 
securities 
traded without traded traded traded without U.S. munici-
market makers via market via market market makers government pal 
makers makers and federal securi-
1 . -< agency ties 
Nasdaq securities 
(First market)  3)  (Second market)  3)  Third 
market 
Fourth 
market 
Secondary Market  Primary Market 
l 
to 
I 
1) Since this study is concerned chiefly with the securities market as a component of the capital market, 
no reference is made to the secondary markets for money market instruments such as commercial paper or 
negotiable certificates of deposit, although some writers consider them an aspect of the OTC market. 
2) Securities issued by foreign public bodies or international organizations are not considered separately, 
since as a rule they are traded like corporate securities. 
3) These terms are shown in parentheses as they are not in common use and are employed only to explain 
the more common terms "Third Market" and "Fourth Market". - 216 -
Table K - 5 
Market value of stocks outstanding in the United States 
at the end of selected years, in thousand million dollars 
Market value at end of year 
in respect of 
1. Total listed stocks 
of which listed on the 
a) NYSE
1' 
b) Amex 1) 
c) other exchanges^' 
2. Total unlisted stocks 
of which issued by 
a) domestic companies 
b) foreign companies 
c) investment companies 
3. Total traded stocks ' 
1970 
680.7 
636.4 
39.5 
4.8 
202.3 
113.6 
23.9 
64.8 
883.0 
1973 
763.9 
721.0 
38.7 
4.1 
201.4 
107.7 
28.6 
65.1 
965.2 
1974 
537.3 
511.1 
23.3 
2.9 
167.1 
71.5 
46.7 
48.9 
704.3 
1975 
718.3 
685.1 
29.6 
3.8 
206.7 
94.9 
50.6 
61.1 
925.0 
1} Up to 1976 no stock was listed simultaneously on both 
Amex and NYSE. 
2) The market value of stocks listed on other exchanges without 
being simultaneously listed on the NYSE or Amex. 
3) Stocks outstanding of companies closely held and conse-
quently not traded have been excluded. The value of such 
stocks at end of 1975 was estimated at $ 160 thousand million. 
On similar considerations and in order to avoid double 
counting, the market value of the shareholdings of domestic 
and foreign companies could be deducted from "Total traded 
stocks", i. e. $ 140.6 and 2" 75.5 thousand million at end of 
1975 respectively, so that $ 708.9 thousand million is 
obtained (total stock in "circulation"). 
Another interesting aggregate figure is the shareholding 
of individual and institutional investors jointly which is 
labelled somewhat misleadingly "total stock outstanding" by 
SEC statisticians. To determine this, the figure for stock 
in circulation of $ 708.9 thousand million is taken, 
$> 160 thousand million closely held by investors and domestic 
portfolio holdings of foreign stocks traded abroad ($ 13.5 
thousand million) are added, and, in order to avoid double 
counting, the value of the shares of investment companies is 
subtracted ($ 66.1 thousand million). This produces a figure 
for total stock outstanding at the end of 1975 of 
{$ 816.3 thousand million. - 217 -
Table K - 5 contains a summary of the market value 
of stocks traded on the various markets. Total 
stocks traded amounting to $ 925 thousand million 
at the end of 1975 compares with bonds outstanding 
of altogether $ 846 thousand million, of which 
$ 301 thousand million related to U.S. government and 
federal agencies securities, $ 224 thousand million 
to municipals and $ 321 thousand million to private 
domestic and foreign bonds. Table K - 6 summarizes 
the number of stocks and bonds traded on each exchange. 
No comparably accurate information is available for 
OTC securities. Nasdaq in autumn 1976 quoted about 
2700 securities, predominantly stocks. Roughly 100 
of these stocks were listed on the exchanges. Further, 
about 5000 stocks of smaller companies are regularly 
traded OTC, while transactions occur or bid or ask are 
quoted at least once a year in the stocks of four to 
five times that number of companies. For bonds the 
picture is similar: there is obviously little trading 
in most commercial and municipal bonds, but precise 
information for this segment is lacking. 
There are about 25 million individual investors in the 
United States. Both their number and their share in 
total stock outstanding have decreased in recent years. 
Their share of the total stock outstanding (cf. 
footnote 3 to Table K - 5) was 70% in 1960, 66% in 
1970, 56% in 1973 and 54% in 1975. Institutional 
investors increased their share from 1960 to 1970 
from 27% to 40%, while the share held by foreign 
investors rose from 3% to 6%. Instititional investors 
in the U. S. always include pension funds, insurance 
companies, investment companies, foundations and - 218 -
Table K - 6 
Number of stocks and bonds traded 
on U.S. exchanges 
2) 
Exchange 
Amex 
Boston 
Midwest 
NYSE 
Pacific 
PBW 
A1\ 3) 
exchanges 
4)  Stocks 
1973 
1423 
813 
697 
2069 
1035 
1177 
4006 
1975 
1338 
900 
716 
2123 
1051 
1152 
3907 
Bonds
4)5> 
1973 
202 
16 
13 
2101 
70 
59 
2347 
1975 
205 
16 
13 
2383 
85 
61 
2652 
Issuers 
1973 
1336 
780 
610 
1833 
861 
1001 
3475 
1975 
1280 
863 
629 
1892 
881 
970 
3404 
1) As of June 30 of the year indicated. 
2) Exchanges where less than 500 securities were traded 
have not been included. 
3) Unduplicated count, as the regional exchanges predominantly 
trade securities listed on the New York exchanges, the 
columns add to larger numbers than totals, although certain 
exchanges have been excluded. Less than 450 issues are 
traded only on the regional exchanges, viz. 65 stocks (1 bond) 
on the BSE, 36 (1) on the MSE, 70 (22) on the PSE and 
128 (5) on the PBW at end of 1974. Cf. Table K - 7. 
4) Securities of domestic issuers, except for about 120 foreign 
stocks and some 150 foreign bonds. 
5) Bonds issued by domestic public bodies not included. 
savings banks. Quite decisive, however, are the various 
accounts at trust departments: in computing the above 
shares, all trust accounts were included amongst - 219 -
institutional investors where the bank or trust 
company had title to the securities held (personal 
trusts and common trusts). Alternatively, 
management agency accounts may also be included 
(the investment decision lies not with the investor 
but with the bank). 
The share of individual investors in securities markets 
is even smaller if measured by their share in NYSE 
volume. This is explained primarily by the higher 
turnover ratio of institutional portfolios, and to a 
lesser extent simply by data collection problems. 
Contrary to data on holdings, data on orders are 
available for all institutional investors, even for a 
number of smaller institutions with unknown holdings. 
In addition, many orders received from banks are 
attributed to institutional investors for the sake of 
simplicity. On the NYSE in 1974, 51% of volume was 
related to institutional investors, 23% to individual 
investors and 26% to transactions by NYSE members for 
own account. The reverse still applied in 1963, when 
individual investors were the dominating group of 
participants with a 46% share of dollar volume on the 
NYSE, compared with 29% for institutional investors. 
The share in volume of individual investors is 
generally higher on other markets than the share of 
institutional investors, which shows that institutional 
investors prefer to invest in securities listed on 
the NYSE. - 220-
II. EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Traditionally, securities trading in the United States 
is spot trading. Stock exchange transactions in 
stocks are regularly settled on the fifth full 
business day following the date of the transaction, 
normally, therefore, one week later. There have been 
objections to fixed-date forward trading mainly for 
fears of large transactions rigging the prices. 
Certainly, each spot or cash market contains forward 
trading elements creeping in via credit purchases and 
short selling, but the extent of an investor's 
position in stocks and convertible bonds is clearly 
limited by the comprehensive federal margin requirements 
and by the investor's own resources confining his 
purchasing or selling power within narrower bounds 
than in other countries. In addition, the purchases 
on margin are permitted only in listed securities and 
some 800 others traded off the floor. Because of the 
relatively high margins, the safety of claims for 
cash or securities against credit purchasers or 
short sellers is put into doubt only if prices fall 
or rise very sharply and the risk of cumulative forced 
liquidations of bull or bear positions is consequently 
slight. The preference for cash transactions means 
that there is one market for each stock on each 
exchange only, even for the stocks of the largest 
companies, parallel forward and cash markets as found 
on European stock exchanges being unknown. 
Since 1973, however, forward trading has become in-
creasingly popular with investors and it may revitalize 
the business of broker-dealers. It is therefore - 221 -
conceivable that marketing considerations will lead 
to further initiatives of the securities market 
community not only in the field of options but also 
in the area of fixed-date forward trading. However, 
the main problem in the immediate future is the 
integration of spot trading into a national market 
system. This complex subject will be dealt with 
below after the existing segments of the market have 
been described. 
1. Exchange segments of the cash market 
a) The segments of the New York Stock Exchange 
The NYSE will list the common stock of a company only 
if at least one million common shares with a market 
value of at least $ 16 million are publicly held. 
There must be at least 2000 round-lot shareholders. 
Further, before-tax profit must have amounted to as 
much as $ 2.5 million or more in the most recent year 
and to at least $ 2 million in each of the preceding 
two years. These initial listing requirements assure 
substantial activity in the stock. Even so, this 
activity does not always suffice for the NYSE's typical 
trading method. Some stocks have therefore been assigned 
to a special market segment. Thus, in addition to the 
typical round-lot trading there are special procedures 
for low-volume stocks. There are also special 
procedures, for other reasons, for blocks of shares 
and for odd lots, and a segment for bond trading. 
The NYSE's typical trading procedure is continuous 
trading in the "crowd", the members assembled at - 222-
a post. At each post there are a number of 
"specialists", who handle specific securities, and 
dealers interested in a particular issue will 
gather round the specialist concerned. Daily sales 
averaging $ 250 000 should suffice for a security 
to be traded by this procedure, although daily 
volume in the most active stocks on the NYSE runs up 
to four to eight times this amount. It must be noted 
that the trading session is long by European standards. 
The NYSE is open for trading from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. 
The designated unit of trading is the "round lot", 
usually 100 shares. Continuous trading in the crowd 
is therefore commonly called round-lot trading. The 
procedure begins with a collective negotiation 
("opening") in which the specialist determines a 
collective price for each of his stocks at which the 
market can be cleared and which deviates from the most 
recent closing price as little as possible. The 
specialist is expected to balance any disparity of 
supply and demand by transactions for his own account. 
After the opening trading at individual prices 
commences. In principle, brokers may deal with each 
other in the crowd directly; the greater the activity 
in a security, the more frequently will this occur. 
Since several bids and offers are usually in the market 
at any time, the sequence is important in which they 
have to be brought together for individual deals. 
As on other exchanges, the highest bid and the lowest 
offer rank first. When bids or offers are made at the 
same price, the one called out first is entitled to 
priority. In addition, where bids or offers are made 
simultaneously, the largest may have precedence. 
In certain situations, however, the sequence rules - 223 -
depart from these principles in order to put brokers' 
clients in a better position than exchange members, 
e. g. in order to give priority to an investor's 
bid that was called out later over an equally high 
bid of a registered trader. 
Round-lot trading is also moulded by other rules, 
most importantly by a whole range of investor protection 
provisions frequently aiming at fellow travelling and 
counter-action by members. They greatly restrict 
own-account dealing by members by banning it in certain 
situations or subjecting it to onerous reporting 
requirements. Further, an exchange member, with the 
exception of the specialist or registered trader, may 
on his own account only accept bids or offers initiated 
by others; he must not initiate such trades himself. 
However, members may buy or sell securities for own 
account if they conduct themselves like normal 
investors and place orders on the Exchange through the 
usual channels without prior special contact with their 
floor personnel. Less than 10% of volume is attributable 
to own-account dealing on the Exchange by members 
(excluding specialists). Trading between brokers in 
the crowd therefore as a rule relates to customers' 
orders executed without the intervention of a member-
commission oriented or a spread minded member. 
However, in a particular stock there may frequently be 
not enough orders to allow round-lot trading directly 
between brokers. Exactly then the specialist is supposed 
to ensure as speedy an execution as possible, either by 
quoting the stock for own account, i. e. by acting as 
market maker, or by taking into his "book" for 
execution orders with limits away from the market - 224 -
and other orders that are not immediately executable, 
i. e. by acting as member-commission oriented agent. 
The specialists
1 transactions for own account on 
the Exchange amount to about 13% of all purchases 
and sales; this would mean that a specialist was 
involved in about one transaction in every four in 
his function as market maker either as buyer or as 
seller. The specialists' share in members' own account 
trading has been on the increase in the past few 
decades. Thirty years ago, a specialist was to be 
found on one side of the transaction on his own account 
only in one exchange trade in seven. 
As in any combination of agency and own account 
trading, the specialist's business involves certain 
conflicts of interests. The NYSE has dealt with this 
matter in greater detail and more clearly in favour of 
the investor than any other exchange that permits this 
combination. Further, its continuing efforts to implement 
these rules fully are appreciable. Reference may be 
made especially to the decisions of the Board of 
Governors, the highest level of NYSE management, in May 
19 76 to lend more weight to past performance of a 
specialist when considering what securities should be 
allotted him. However, such conflicts are not solved 
easily. 
When a specialist decides whether or not to act as 
market maker, there is always one investor who is 
disadvantaged and another who is favoured. This problem 
may best be appreciated if a situation in the book is 
imagined in which the lowest offer of a customer lies 
at least three minimum price variations, e. g. at least 
three eighths, above the highest limit of a purchase - 225-
order. If the specialist receives a market order to 
buy and sells for own account, he certainly satisfies 
the buyer but prevents the customer who is down 
on his book with the lowest offer from being served as 
the specialist's offer must be even lower. The 
opposite applies should the specialist, as market maker, 
bid for a market order to sell. If he does not act 
as market maker, the limited orders on the book would 
be executed in sequence, but the market orders received 
would be dealt with at less favourable prices than in 
the former case, where the specialist deals on own 
account. In the latter case, he always lays himself open 
to the reproach that he is in breach of his duties as 
market maker, in the former, investors with limited 
orders complain that the specialist is earning a spread 
without risk under the protection of their orders and 
is preventing these from being executed in a promising 
market. 
The various exchanges have solved this problem in 
different ways. In some markets, there are no market 
makers and on others no limited orders. The CBOE uses 
both, but separates the two functions of the specialist. 
In theory, this approach is a neat one. Market makers 
and investors placing limit orders both attempt to gain 
price advantages by making themselves available as the 
other side to those persons who want to have their 
orders executed immediately. Both are therefore 
competitors for immediacy premiums or discounts and it 
is not, after all, customary to leave the management of 
one's own business to one's competitors. The CBOE 
approach has its disadvantages, however; a particular 
point is that a market maker who does not know the 
book is taking on a greater risk than a specialist and - 226 -
will consequently quote a wider spread, i. e. a 
bid and offer further from the putative equilibrium 
price. 
The specialist approach may therefore be correct as 
far as procedural efficiency is concerned where the 
reduction achieved, as compared with other approaches, 
in the cost of immediacy altogether more than offsets 
the increase in the imputed cost of guarding aginst 
the risk of non-execution. Accordingly, criticism 
of the specialist is superficial where it refers only 
to the conflict of interests but it must be taken 
seriously where it aims at the specialist's monopoly 
position. If the specialist is able to realize 
arbitrarily high spreads despite especially favourable 
conditions of working because of his knowledge of the 
limited orders for his securities, this specialist 
solution is not justified. The NYSE accepted this 
criticism after long hesitation and since May 19 76 has 
been prepared, for the first time in a decade, to 
permit competition between two specialist firms while 
in the past it allowed only one specialist for each 
security. Competition between NYSE specialists was 
common in the past and generally arose wherever 
one specialist firm's service was unsatisfactory. 
In addition to trading between brokers and trading 
between brokers and specialists, individual prices also 
arise in round-lot trading through the offsetting of 
orders by a broker or by the specialist ("crossing"). 
It is worth noting that this activity may not occur 
quietly and the two tenders that are to be offset must 
be called, with the offer at least one minimum price 
variation above the bid. The member himself then - 227 -
accepts bid or offer. The dealing price must lie 
within the quote then prevailing on the market, since 
otherwise the rules on the sequence of orders would 
be violated. Each member may break the cross by 
accepting either offer or bid. 
The NYSE provides for a special procedure for inactive 
stocks ("cabinet dealing"). They are not traded at one 
of the horseshoe-shaped dealing posts but on a corner 
of the floor. Here, only ten shares make up a round lot. 
Instead of a book, cabinets are largely used with 
index cards on which the open orders are noted. Unlike 
the book, these cards are accessible to all members. 
Anyone who finds a suitable order goes to the appropriate 
specialist for execution. Special rules apply here, 
too, to trading in odd lots, for example the specialist's 
customary delivery period is extended to a maximum of 
two weeks. 
Owing to the institutionalization of share ownership, 
block transactions have become common. At the NYSE, 
a "block" means 10 000 shares. Even in the early 1960s, 
it was generally possible to execute orders from 
institutional investors by round-lot dealing. Then, the 
quantities involved were probably lower. However, the 
rules of the NYSE were already making provision for 
special forms of transaction for the purchase or sale 
of a block by a single party - exchange acquisition and 
special bid, and exchange distribution, special offering 
and secondary distribution. However, the disadvantage 
of these procedures to the initiating party was that it 
had to pay at least twice as much commission as for a 
transaction of the same size in round-lot dealing, while 
investors appearing on the other side could generally - 228-
trade commission-free. Further the process for such 
transactions is precisely laid down. Because of their 
cost and inflexibility, such procedures are 
consequently used but seldom. Nor shall we consider 
them in detail. Their share of NYSE volume is less 
than 1%, while total institutional block transactions 
amount to 15 to 20% of NYSE volume. 
Nonetheless, these procedures, with the exception of 
secondary distribution, employed two features which are 
essentials of present-day block trading, first, the 
special effort by broker firms to assemble sufficient 
orders on the other side and second, execution of the 
overall transaction as a cross on the NYSE. On both 
points, the modern block transaction differs substantially 
from the special forms of earlier times. First of all, 
the special effort is no longer focussed on the mass of 
individual investors but on a few institutions and 
other broking firms, and secondly, the cross no longer 
takes place within the current bid .- ask spread of the 
round-lot market but at a price outside it. Further, 
the initiating side today generally leaves execution of 
the block transaction to a specialized firm at the NYSE 
which is registered with the Exchange as a block 
positioner. 
The NYSE provided for the block positioner in its 
rules in 19 72 and gave him special rights and obligations. 
However, the business of the block positioner had by 
then fully developed as a reaction by institutionally-
oriented member firms to the increasing volume of 
orders from their customers, in exactly the same way 
as a hundred years earlier the specialist was not 
created by the Exchange but appeared spontaneously - 229-
in response to the need for dealers to be represented 
at various markets after the NYSE had ceased calling 
securities individually one after the other in 
favour of simultaneous, continuous trading of all 
securities. The block positioner is also known as the 
"upstairs market maker", as opposed to the floor market 
maker, the specialist. If these descriptions are not 
in fact quite appropriate they do point in the right 
way. The block positioner is agent and dealer in a 
similar way as the specialist at opening, even though 
he does not limit himself to dealing in only a few 
securities. 
His function is best explained by looking at a 
hypothetical sale of a block of stock worth at least 
a million dollars. The block trader with a member firm 
carrying on institutional business and registered 
as block positioner will normally receive orders of 
this size only if he guarantees execution to the in-
stitutional investor at a minimum price, at which his 
firm is prepared to take up the block as "market maker" 
or, better, "positioner" on own account. He usually 
suggests to look for buyers at higher prices. If the 
client agrees the trader confidentially contacts other 
institutions and the block traders with other firms 
that he knows or suspects are interested in the stock, 
until he has obtained sufficient orders to buy. This 
process is called block assembling, so that he may also 
be called a block assembler. Frequently, the orders 
obtained prove inadequate and the firm will decide to 
take up the excess shares, on average about one 
quarter of the shares involved. 
Since crossing the block off the floor would violate - 230-
NYSE rules, the firm's floor member is notified 
thereafter. Hypothetically the floor member may do 
the following. He goes to the post where the stock 
is traded, asks the specialist for the bid, accepts 
it straightaway, immediately calls another, sub-
stantially lower bid for the whole of the block and a 
corresponding ask a minimum variation above and 
accepts the latter. This is done in five seconds or 
less, so as to allow no one to break the cross. 
This rough and ready course of action formally 
constitutes a correct cross, but has never been the 
rule and since 1972 has even been in conflict with the 
NYSE regulations. The Exchange would at least like 
to see all those orders to buy executed which are 
unlimited or limited at the price of the crossing or 
at the pre-existing bid or at any price in between and 
which are held by the specialist or by members in the 
crowd, in order to protect such orders against 
non-execution which would offend the investors who 
placed them. 
However, there is a different and even more convincing 
point of view. The conditions offered by a block 
assembler may not appeal to those contacted. They all 
may have declined and then they sent their orders to 
the Exchange direct, so as to acquire the shares yet 
more favourably if the block is to be crossed at 
something less than the price offered them. There is 
certainly no reason to protect such orders against non-
execution. The NYSE rules in fact provide for the block 
positioner intending a sale first asking the specialist 
how much he wishes to buy at the various possible 
crossing prices for himself and for the book. He will - 231 -
then try to meet these requirements; orders coming 
in later will not be protected. The cross thereupon 
becomes the finale to a special collective negotiation, 
in which the block assembler's orders and all the 
orders to buy existing in the specialist's book at a 
certain time are executed if limited at the crossing 
price or above. This price is consequently also called 
the clean-up price. 
If the block positioner does not put this question to 
the specialist, he must meet all orders to buy before 
he can increase his position and must then in any event 
make 5% of the block or 1000 shares, whichever is 
greater, available to the specialist. The purchase of 
a block is subject to corresponding considerations 
and rules. 
In the case of blocks worth about half a million dollars, 
the special function of the block positioner is not 
always perceptible. It may happen in such cases that 
the specialist comes up with the other side by using 
the orders on his book, by bidding for his own account 
and by asking other members known to him for assistance. 
This may be sufficient to cross the block at an acceptable 
price or, at least, prevent the block positioner from 
looking for an interested institution "upstairs". 
However, here, too, a collective price, that normally 
lies outside the quote existing up till then, interrupts 
the sequence of individual round-lot trading prices 
and renders the special nature of block trading visible. 
Block positioning is profitable primarily because of 
the commissions involved. The NYSE specialist is not 
allowed to have his own corporate and institutional - 232 -
customers in order to ensure that he attends to 
his duties impartially and uninfluenced by material 
inside information which he might obtain from such 
clients. He is supposed to be on equal footing with 
his clients at least as far as corporate information 
is concerned. No one can therefore expect a specialist 
to be prepared to carry block positions as he cannot 
have institutional customers and thus receives a 
small fraction of the total commission only, in the 
case of a cross much less than even the full member 
commission which he could collect if he himself crossed 
the block. Thus, not surprisingly, the specialists 
participate for own account less in block trading than 
they do in round-lot trading. The larger the block, 
the lower their participation. 
The specialist must therefore be complemented as a 
market maker by the block positioner. This also applies 
to the specialist as agent, since agency costs on blocks 
tend to be lower than those of positioning the block 
and since the specialist has no means at his disposal 
either on the floor or off it for active, economic block 
agency because of the range limitations on institutional 
clients. The evolution of a market segment for block 
trading with special participants and procedures as 
a response to institutionalization therefore seems 
sensible but primarily to have been occasioned by 
the range regulations that protect specialists and 
block positioners against mutual competition, although 
the necessary cooperation might jeopardize the intended 
effect of limiting the range. A few full-line houses 
would most likely combine both functions under one 
roof if the restricting regulations were rescinded. 
Recent developments in odd-lot trading point in this 
direction. - 233 -
For small orders and for dealing in odd lots a 
special and highly refined procedure has existed at 
the NYSE for the best part of a century, since the 
individual negotiation of individual prices for such 
orders would give rise to transaction costs quite 
disproportionate to the value of the securities 
transferred. Instead of executing all such orders in 
a special collective negotiation at a collective price, 
as is customary on some European stock exchanges, the 
NYSE prefers individual execution but the prices for 
these are not negotiated but simply derived according 
to the type of order from the bid, offer or price 
prevailing in the round-lot market. The rules of the 
NYSE provide about a dozen different standard orders 
for odd lots. For example, anyone who places an order to 
buy "on offer" will obtain execution at a price lying 
at a so called odd lot differential of one eighth of a 
dollar above the offer or ask of the stock prevailing 
on receipt of his order at the Exchange, irrespective 
of whether a round lot was traded on the offer or not. 
The shares are supplied by the odd lot dealer. He 
adjusts his position by round-lot transactions if buy 
and sell orders in a security do not balance. 
This derived pricing of odd-lot orders has greatly 
facilitated the automation of odd-lot dealing from 
receipt of orders by member firms to dispatch of the 
confirmation. This automated system for odd-lot dealing 
was operated by Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., the only pure 
odd-lot dealer still existing in the 19 70s. Then in 
October 19 75, the largest member firm at the NYSE, 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc, began to 
bypass this odd-lot dealer by bunching all odd-lot 
orders received before Exchange hours and executing - 234 -
them at opening without demanding the odd-lot 
differential from the customer in addition to the 
investor commission. Merrill Lynch's further plans 
to execute odd-lots off the floor on rationalization 
grounds and to act off floor as odd-lot dealers for 
the firm's customers without asking for a differential 
was rejected by the NYSE but was supported by the SEC. 
Merrill Lynch put their plans into effect in January 
1976. Consequently, Carlisle DeCoppet lost one quarter 
of their turnover and after much hesitation decided 
to give up odd-lot business and to sell their trading 
system to the NYSE for $ 3.5 million. Since May 19 76, 
the function of odd-lot dealers has been taken up 
by the specialists in the securities allotted them, 
as had long been customary for cabinet stocks at the 
NYSE and on the other American exchanges. They do 
charge an odd-lot differential of one eighth of a 
dollar on all transactions other than at the opening. 
In July 19 76, one other large member firm followed 
Merrill Lynch's initiative. 
Trading in bonds on the NYSE amounts to only 6.3% of 
total volume at the Exchange, as Table K - 3 indicates, 
although the market value of the bonds listed amounts 
to nearly half of the value of all NYSE listed stocks. 
This disproportion is explained in part by the lower 
rate of turnover of bonds as compared with stocks. 
In addition, bonds are traded primarily over the 
counter. Contrary to the situation in stocks where it 
is mandatory for members to trade on the floor, bonds 
have long been subject to only a very mild form of 
this requirement which applies only to industrial and 
foreign bonds. Trading in what are called free bonds 
or active bonds is conducted almost exclusively - 235-
by the few floor brokers who deal in bonds only and 
are consequently called bond brokers. These brokers 
deal with each other without specialists and are 
aptly called the "free crowd". Round-lot trading 
rules apply with certain modifications, e. g. as to 
the sequence of orders. Over 2000 of the 2600 bonds 
listed on the NYSE are rarely or never sold and are 
called inactive bonds or cabinet bonds since the bond 
brokers write orders received for such securities 
immediately on index cards and file them in a cabinet. 
Where two orders match, an Exchange employee passes 
them to the bond brokers concerned for execution. 
Cabinet bonds also include all U.S. government bonds, 
all municipals and all foreign loans. Transactions 
in U.S. government securities are settled regularly on 
the first business day following the trading date, 
contrary to transactions in other securities. 
All cabinets for bonds are to be dispensed with 
in spring 19 77 and orders will then be transferred 
to the NYSE over the Exchange computer system. 
Dealers can read orders off display screens at 
the Exchange. In October 19 76, 2 35 cabinet bonds 
had already been transferred to this filing 
system, which is known as the Automated Bonds 
System. 
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b) The market segments of the Amercian 
Stock Exchange 
The American Stock Exchange (Amex) is often 
regarded as a department of the NYSE, as the segment 
of the market complementing the NYSE from below, 
as the half-way house for shares of expanding 
companies on their rise from the OTC market to the 
NYSE. This interpretation is supported by the Amex 
listing standards. Requirements as to number of 
shares publicly held, round-lot shareholders and 
profits amount to 40% of NYSE requirements and other 
criteria are relatively less stringent. Conversely, 
the NYSE criteria for delisting a stock are so framed 
that a stock to which they apply can usually pass 
over to the Amex. Since 1911 - when Amex was still 
called the New York Curb - it has not been possible 
to deal in stocks on the Amex which are listed at 
the NYSE, and vice versa. 
In 1962, the Amex itself was complemented from 
below by a third New York exchange, the National Stock 
Exchange (NSE), which listed successfully securities 
that did not meet Amex requirements. The members of 
the Amex and the NSE are predominantly NYSE members. 
If a share qualified for the "senior" Exchange and 
was listed there, it could no longer be listed and 
traded on its previous market. 
This listing policy proved to be a disadvantage both 
to Amex and to NSE. On the one hand, the stocks of 
the smaller companies seemed little suited to 
institutional investors while the contribution of 
such investors to exchange volume has increased - 237 -
sharply in recent years. On the other hand, the 
NASD improved the organization of the over-the-counter 
market considerably in 19 71 and has made great 
efforts to persuade companies not to seek a stock 
exchange listing backed up by the lower initial 
and continuing listing fees of Nasdaq as compared 
with the NYSE and Amex. Both developments have 
harmed the two smaller New York exchanges. The NSE 
stopped trading in 19 75. Contrary to the development 
at other exchanges, the number of stocks and 
issuers on the Amex fell (Table K - 6), the share 
of Amex listed securities to total securities in 
circulation declined (Table K - 5), and in terms 
of its share in the dollar volume of all exchanges 
the Amex in 1974 lost its traditional second place 
to the Midwest Stock Exchange. 
The Amex did not take these reverses lying down 
but pursued various plans to improve its position. 
While its efforts to admit foreign companies not 
fully meeting SEC disclosure requirements came to 
nothing, the SEC approved the Amex option trading 
programme which began in 19 75 and has since contributed 
substantially to turnover. Similarly in 19 75, the 
Amex produced an independent, attractive programme 
for dealing in government bonds. Finally, the 
Securities Reform Act proved advantageous to the 
Amex by causing the SEC, in May 19 76, to classify 
the New York listing policy as restrictive to 
competition and requiring it to be changed. In August, 
the first issuer, Varo Inc., decided to continue its 
listing on the Amex after its stock had been listed 
on the NYSE. In the meantime, other companies have 
followed Varo's lead. - 238-
The trading procedures at the American Stock Exchange 
are substantially the same as those at the NYSE. 
This applies particularly to stock trading. Round 
lots are, as on the NYSE, traded continuously in 
the crowd and through specialists. Since the average 
turnover per security on the Amex is lower than on 
the NYSE, specialists here are even more the focus of 
trading and participate on own account at least in 
every third transaction. Odd-lot trading has here 
long been in the hands of the specialists, but, as 
on the NYSE, has been handled increasingly by the major 
member firms since early 19 76 - i. e. off the floor. 
Block transactions are by no means as important as 
they are on the NYSE, since the stocks listed on 
the Amex, with an average market value of $ 22 million 
per security at the end of 1975 as against $ 323 
million on the NYSE, frequently cannot offer the 
market depth that institutional investors require. 
The Amex has therefore remained a market primarily 
serving individual investors. 
Although there are certain differences in trading 
methods and rules compared with the NYSE, they are 
not particularly significant within the context of 
this study. There are, however, several appreciable 
differences in bond trading. First of all, all bonds 
are assigned to specialists, although the Amex 
also has provisions for cabinet trading. Secondly, 
the Amex - as indicated above - has since 19 75 had 
a special procedure for some 2 50 Federal government 
and Federal agency bonds, namely trading through a 
so-called U.S. Government securities dealer on the 
floor of the Amex. Although, unlike his namesakes 
outside the Amex, he is a specialist obliged - 239 -
to buy or sell as a market maker such securities 
with face values of $ 1000 to 99 000. Further, 
unlike an ordinary specialist and more like an 
odd-lot dealer, he bases his prices on those of 
the main market. For this reason he is linked 
direct with the leading OTC market makers. This 
unusual arrangement is allowed by a special Amex 
rule. For this segment of the market there is also 
a special clearing system that dispenses with the 
necessity for physical handling of the securities 
because it is based on entries in the books of the 
Federal Reserve Banks. In this way, it was possible 
to substantially reduce the transaction costs for 
government bonds, which in the past had proved 
prohibitive for small and medium-sized investors. 
Many investors have begun to use this new Amex 
service. - 240-
c) The regional exchanges 
The regional exchanges, as Table K - 7 shows, have 
virtually no significance as principal markets. The 
table sets out the securities, and their market 
values, that are traded exclusively on exchanges 
outside New York, i. e. on those of Boston, Cincinnati, 
Detroit, Spokane and Honolulu and on the Midwest Stock 
Exchange in Chicago, the Pacific Stock Exchange in 
Los Angeles and San Francisco, the PBW Stock Exchange 
in Philadelphia and the Intermountain Stock Exchange 
in Salt Lake City. Unfortunately, there is no 
corresponding information on volume. Some impression 
may be gained from a comparison. An adequate idea of 
the significance of the regional exchanges as principal 
markets for securities will be obtained if one imagines 
the stock trading on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange 
distributed over nine different exchanges. 
The decline of the regional exchanges set in during 
the Depression, when numerous securities disappeared 
from the quotation lists. It was speeded up by 
regulatory changes. While the issuers of exchange quoted 
securities were exempted from State supervision under 
a number of "blue-sky laws", the more demanding provisions 
of the new Federal legislation affected precisely 
these companies. The listing of a security on an ex-
change made the issuing company subject to the provisions 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 19 34 on periodic 
disclosure, on proxies and on insider trading, which 
went beyond what had been hitherto required under the 
admission conditions of regional exchanges. Further, 
the Securities Act of 19 33 stopped new issues from 
being introduced on the exchanges, i. e. it prevented - 241 -
Table K - 7 
Securities traded exclusively on regional 
exchanges 
1) 
Securities 
Common stocks 
Number 
Market value in $ million 
Preferred stocks 
Number 
Market value in $ million 
Bonds 
Number 
Market value in $ million 
All securities 
Number 
Market value in $ million 
(as a percentage of the 
market value of _. 
all quoted securities ) 
End of 
1973 
246 
2809 
126 
974 
32 
501 
404 
4284 
(0.48) 
year 
1974 
271 
1947 
131 
814 
41 
488 
443 
3249 
(0.41) 
1) Excluding U.S. government and municipal securities. 
Bonds issued by foreign entities are not traded on the 
regional exchanges, but five stocks from such sources 
are traded on the PSE and two in Honolulu, having a 
market value of # 97 million at the end of 1974. 
2) Corresponding percentages relating to stocks only were 
4.1% for preferred stocks and 0.38% for common stocks 
at the end of 1974. The corresponding figure for bonds 
only was 0.19%. - 242-
the exchanges being used as primary markets. These 
laws may have established a trend amongst issuers 
either to seek a listing on the New York exchanges 
or to have the securities traded over the counter. 
However, this trend continued after the Exchange Act 
was amended in 1964 and the said provisions were 
extended to OTC companies who have assets exceeding 
$ 1 million and issued at least one class of 
equity securities (e. g. stocks, convertible bonds) 
held by 500 or more investors. Although companies 
likely to be listed on a regional exchange generally 
meet these criteria, the trend in number of stocks 
quoted exclusively on the regional exchanges has 
continued downwards though slowing down since 1964. 
There were more than 1000 such stocks before 
World War I compared to 400 in recent years. 
It is therefore obvious that other factors have to be 
sought to explain why the smaller companies find the 
regional exchanges so unattractive. We might refer 
first to the improvement in organization of the 
OTC market. Developments, particularly in telephone 
and telex facilities, have improved communication 
substantially between stockbrokers and reduced the 
need to hold meetings to deal in securities of local 
interest. This need probably largely explains why 
more than thirty regional exchanges still existed 
in 1935. Regulation of the OTC market by the NASD may 
also have played a part. A second fundamental factor 
is the sphere of interests of the broker-dealers who 
transact new issues business for smaller companies 
locally or regionally. After the issue, they can 
receive the mass of orders for the securities placed 
by them. If they decide to become market makers in - 243 -
such securities, they need not share the potential 
spreads or commissions from such orders with a 
specialist or with anyone else. Furthermore, they 
can attempt to affect investor behaviour and the 
profitability of their trading positions through 
reports and analyses on such securities in ways beyond 
question. True, the risk of unfair guidance of 
investors is imminent, but even a broker-dealer who 
acts impeccably, is hardly likely to advise an issuer 
to seek a stock exchange listing before the security 
has attracted widespread investor interest and keenly 
competitive market makers. 
The regional exchanges are therefore, today, primarily 
competitive markets, sub-markets for securities listed 
on the New York exchanges. Well over 90% of the 
volume on regional exchanges relates to securities 
whose principal market is at New York. The role of a 
sub-market has chiefly come to them spontaneously. 
The major regional securities were listed in New York 
but were still traded regionally (dually listed 
securities, dual trading). There has been local interest 
in other widely held New York listed securities for 
decades and, consequently, a local market for them, 
though their issuers never applied for a local listing 
(multiple unlisted trading). It was natural for the 
larger regional brokers to become members of the New 
York exchanges. The technique of continuous trading was 
copied from New York and the local prices were checked 
against if not derived from those reported from New 
York by ticker tape. In other words, odd lots and 
smaller round-lot orders were traded locally, on a 
regional exchange, for the sake of efficiency, at 
New York prices. The customer suffered in principle - 244-
no disadvantages compared to a New York execution 
and the broker saved on costs. 
The Exchange Act left to the SEC the decision as 
to whether an exchange could get involved in the 
multiple unlisted trading of additional securities. 
The SEC permitted multiple trading in order to 
maintain at least a few regional exchanges. However, 
towards the end of the 19 30s it temporarily required 
that the regional exchanges establish prices based 
on orders received instead of simply using New York 
prices. Since then, several regional exchanges have 
included a provision for their market makers that 
either their bid or their ask must or should be better 
than in New York and they are attempting to contain 
within very narrow limits price differentials as 
against New York that are unfavourable to investors. 
In 1941, the SEC blocked an attempt by the NYSE to 
compel its members to give up trading on the regional 
exchanges. It was not least these measures by the 
SEC that enabled the regional exchanges to maintain a 
6 to 7% share in the volume of all exchanges through 
two decades, increasing it to 8% in the 1960s and to 
over 11% quite recently. 
One important reason for this growth of the regional 
exchanges is the increasing importance of institutional 
investors, whose interests they met in a variety of 
ways. Firstly, they allowed certain commission rebates 
that New York exchange members were not permitted 
to give. Later, they admitted institutional investors 
themselves as members of the exchange so that, in 
this way, the ban on rebates could be circumvented; 
these opportunities for institutional investors to - 245-
deal on the exchange on their own account either 
themselves or through affiliates, were, however, 
restricted in 1973 and will be completely forbidden 
as from 19 78. Such arrangements have become less 
important as a result of the gradual unfixing of 
commissions, beginning in 1971 with the investor 
commission on that part of orders that exceeded 
$ 500 000 and, in 1972, with that part exceeding 
$ 300 000; in 19 75, exchange fixing of investor 
commissions was banned as was, in 19 76, that of member 
commissions. 
In addition, the regional exchanges also offered 
favourable terms, apart from commission, for 
introducing block business. On the one hand, the 
transactions did not appear on a New York ticker and 
therefore caused less reaction, while on the other, 
the exchange member need take no account of the 
specialist when crossing a block on a regional exchange, 
so that the profitability of block assembling is not 
affected by the level of orders held by the specialist, 
as is the case at the NYSE. The former benefit was 
superseded in 19 75 by the consolidated ticker tape, 
while the second is threatened by the central limit 
order book (CLOB). Both these elements of the National 
Market System are dealt with in Section IV. 
A second factor for the growth of the regional ex-
changes was their open-minded attitude towards foreign 
firms dealing in securities whom they admitted as 
members even when the latter were subsidiaries of 
foreign banks. However, owing to an SEC decision of 
19 76, the New York exchanges may no longer exclude 
the subsidiaries of foreign firms from membership. - 246-
The regional exchanges will therefore lose their 
attraction for such members and also for institutional 
investors. It is open to doubt whether they can 
maintain their share in volume at 11%. The regional 
exchanges will in future have to rely less and less 
on competitive advantages of a regulatory nature, 
apart from the New York transfer tax on shares. 
Certainly, the regional exchanges have largely created 
these advantages themselves, however, further 
successful action of this kind seems unlikely. 
Accordingly, the regional exchanges will in the future 
have to depend mainly on the third factor on which 
their growth has been based - their ability to make 
headway against the New York exchanges through further 
innovations in their services for members and through 
competition between members. The Midwest Stock Exchange 
especially has distinguished itself in this direction. 
Continuously and sooner than other exchanges, it took 
steps to modernize its arrangements for settlement and 
established an order switching system. 
The spreads quoted by regional specialists in the 
650 or so New York securities traded on the MSE are 
often narrower than on the principal markets and changes 
in these quotes become evident on the display terminals 
at the offices of broker-dealers more rapidly than 
those of other exchanges as the MSE has bids and asks 
collected at shorter intervals since the end of 1975. 
The MSE finds some additional support in its location 
in the second largest financial centre of the United 
States. The Pacific Stock Exchange is also favourably 
located and further benefits from the time-zoning. 
It is primarily their competition as organizers of - 247-
advanced markets that adds importance to the 
regional exchanges despite their relatively modest 
volumes. Furthermore, the initiatives of the 
regional exchanges as self-regulatory organizations 
have enlivened and advanced the debate on stock 
exchange policies. 
2. Exchange segments of the forward market 
a) Option exchange markets 
Up to 19 73, options in the U. S. were traded off the 
exchanges only. Standard contracts for over-the-
counter trading of options are provided by the Put 
and Call Brokers and Dealers Association in New York, 
which has some 20 members who specialize in option 
trading and who receive, mainly via other brokers, 
orders from buyers and writers of options. A NYSE 
member firm, usually the writer's broker, guarantees 
the option. As in all other countries, the striking 
prices of new contracts fluctuate with the price of the 
underlying security on the cash market, and the period 
of time within the option may be exercised (usually 35, 
65 or 95 days or 6 months and 10 days) begins on the 
date of the contract. 
The Chicago Board of Trade, the world's largest 
commodity exchange, where in former years securities 
were traded as well, has been working on plans for 
exchange trading of options since the end of the 
1960s. In 19 72, it established the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange (CBOE). Trading commenced there late 
in April of 19 73. The Board of Trade has invested - 248-
$ 2.5 million during the CBOE's five years of 
development. The CBOE's success has been astonishing. 
The number of its members rose during the first 
three years of trading from 400 to 1300, while the 
price of a seat, initially $ 10 000, increased 
tenfold. By the end of 1974 the original trading floor 
had to be given up, as it had become too small. The 
market value of the options sold is already equal to 
the dollar volume of sales on the major regional 
exchanges and many times the sales ever achieved by 
the Put and Call Brokers and Dealers Association, 
although so far dealings have been restricted to 
calls on barely 90 stocks. However, opportunity for 
further expansion is limited. The number of American 
stocks suitable for option trading on the Exchange is 
estimated at a few hundred at the most. Option sales 
in additional securities is likely to be relatively 
small and puts do not attract investors as much as do 
calls. In 1977, puts are due to be traded on the floor 
but the SEC has not yet given its approval and a 
decision has been postponed repeatedly. The success of 
exchange trading of options is also reflected in the 
fact that the Amex and other exchanges hope to 
stabilize their volume by adopting option trading. 
In 1975, the Amex and the PBW started dealings in calls, 
the PSE doing so in 1976. The Amex was eager to follow 
the CBOE as early as 1973 but was blocked by the SEC. 
Option trading at the Amex covers 60 stocks and it is 
hoped to extend it to 100 stocks and several govern-
ment bonds; at the PBW, calls are at present traded on 
27 stocks and at the PSE on 20 stocks. Trading of 
options on a particular stock on more than one exchange 
has been permitted recently. The NASD, too, is planning 
option trading in.major OTC securities through Nasdaq. - 249-
Finally, even old established markets such as the 
exchanges in Amsterdam and London and the NYSE 
wish to follow the example of the newly-fledged 
CBOE. 
The CBOE's success is based primarily on its option 
contract and on its well grounded and efficient 
trading procedures. Although the CBOE option contract 
is concluded between the writer and the buyer, and 
the former receives the option price from the purchaser, 
the writer does not remain contractually linked to 
this specific buyer throughout the duration of the 
option. Instead, the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) 
is the issuer and obligor on every option outstanding 
and its obligations are backed up by the obligations 
of writers to the OCC, and the buyer obtains option 
rights only as towards the OCC and not towards a 
specific writer. This removes the need for an additional 
guarantee and the writer becomes independent of the 
buyer. Thus, similar to futures trading, the writer is 
free at any time to relieve himself of his obligation 
by an offsetting closing transaction, by buying back 
an option of the same class. Like the buyer, he can 
therefore give up his holding at any time. He need 
no longer await a decision by the buyer. 
In order to provide an opportunity to buy an option 
of the same class at any time, CBOE option contracts 
are not for standard periods but for standard expiration 
dates, there being four such dates a year (the last 
Monday in January, April, July and October). Striking 
prices, too, are standardized (e. g. 25, 30, 35), 
contrary to traditional option contracts. Dealing in 
a "maturity" always starts something over nine months - 250 -
beforehand, so that at least three maturities with 
at least one striking price each can be traded in 
for each security; if the price of a security moves 
so far from the striking price prevailing hitherto 
that it comes closer to a possible higher or lower 
striking price, trading in additional classes is 
usually opened having the new striking price and any 
of the existing expiration dates. All open classes 
can be dealt in up to the last trading day before the 
expiration date; claims arise against the OCC, 
circulate or expire through set-off. Consequently the 
CBOE approach channels all call trading in a 
particular security into at least three and mostly 
not more than twenty combinations of striking prices 
and expiration dates instead of spreading it over 
a practically unlimited number of co-existing 
combinations as with calls on the OTC market. 
This highly flexible instrument, the substantial risks 
within which can be easily discerned and contained, 
seems on the one hand to offer private and institutional 
investors, as writers, an opportunity for additional 
profits on holdings of securities underlying options 
and could therefore have a positive effect on the 
cost of capital to such companies. On the other hand, 
it offers even those investors whose assets are small 
extremely interesting opportunities for combinations 
with other investments. This is not the place to 
discuss such combinations, but there is no doubt that 
their possible applications have appealed intellectually 
to a great number of American investors and have 
thereby contributed towards the success of the CBOE. 
It is worth noting that the basis for this success 
was two improvements in market organization, quite - 251 -
simple in themselves, namely additonal moves towards 
standardizing option contracts, and the unlinking 
of buyer and writer after the payment of the option 
price. 
In its trading procedures, too, the CBOE went a few 
steps further than other American exchanges. Like the 
latter, the CBOE has brokers, particularly floor 
brokers, who can deal with each other in the crowd. 
As mentioned in Section 1a), the specialist has been 
replaced partly by the purely member-commission 
oriented board broker and partly by the (purely spread-
oriented) market makers. The board broker executes only 
limited orders on behalf of non-members. The offers 
and bids in his public limit order book have precedence 
over all other tenders at the same price. To keep the 
spreads as narrow as possible, the CBOE is promoting 
competition amongst market makers. Of 1300 members, 
500 are market makers, of whom over 300 devote them-
selves entirely to this function. Fifteen market 
makers, including ten full-time market makers, work 
at each of the 33 posts, where they deal in all 
securities. The CBOE is sharpening competition between 
the market makers further by allowing them to conclude 
a specific portion of their transactions in securities 
of other posts, in which they do not specialize. 
Further, the CBOE lays down low maximum spreads in 
certain cases. The market makers' share in volume is 
35 to 40%. While the PBW uses a procedure similar 
to that of the CBOE - an exchange employee, the 0B0 
(order book official), takes the place of the independent 
board broker - options are traded on the Amex and 
the PSE exactly like stocks in the normal round-lot 
procedure and option-dealing powers have been granted 
to their specialists. - 252 -
Transactions are settled through the OCC on the 
day after trading date. Unlike over-the-counter 
business, contracts are held in the form of book 
entries eliminating the handling of certificates. The 
SEC has required the exchanges following the CBOE 
example to make use of the OCC, so that the latter 
has become the national clearing agency for option 
business. Option prices and number of contracts sold 
are disseminated by a joint facility, the option 
ticker of the Options Price Reporting Authority. 
Consequently, the aims of the National Market System 
have already been achieved on both points. 
b) Markets with fixed-date forward trading in securities 
At the beginning of Section II it was implied that 
trading of securities on forward and cash markets on 
one exchange at the same time is unknown in the 
history of American stock markets. Traditional forms 
of dealing in options do not contradict this state-
ment, if only for the reason that such business 
would appear reasonable as a preliminary or complement 
to cash business. A different view might be taken 
with regard to CBOE options; these calls may appear 
to be a very close substitute for fixed-date forward 
deals or for the purchasing of securities on credit. 
Even this interpretation, however, does not mean that 
there are parallel markets in the above sense as these 
options are in principle to be traded on other 
exchanges than the underlying stocks. 
This may change in the near future. The NASD scheme 
for options dealing already points this way as does, - 253 -
to a certain extent, the existing trading of warrants 
and of the corresponding stocks on the same ex-
change as adopted even by the NYSE in 19 70. Until 
a short while ago, the SEC and the exchanges seemed 
to fear that options dealing in any form could lead 
to a fragmentation of the market for a given stock, 
without there being any clear price relationship 
between the sub-markets. This kind of fragmentation 
would be undesirable particularly because options are 
a substitute for - according to interpretation -
either stock or warrant, i. e. for a financial 
instrument of a specific company and, unlike an 
additional issue of such instruments, they do not 
necessarily bring funds either to that company or to 
any other. Fragmentation could lead to issuers being 
disadvantaged in the issue of "proper" instruments. 
Empirical research has, however, so far indicated no 
special effects of CBOE trading on the volume of 
sales of the underlying stocks (corresponding effects 
on the warrant market have not been investigated 
as yet). Accordingly, the fragmentation argument is 
weakened as regards CBOE options as a close substitute 
for fixed-date forward business and, consequently, 
also as regards such business itself. Nevertheless, 
there does not at present appear to be any advance 
towards a fixed-date forward market for stocks. 
However, there has recently been fixed-date forward 
trading in the instruments of two public issuers. In 
the autumn of 1975, the Board of Trade took up future 
trading in Government National Mortgage Association 
mortgages and at the beginning of 19 76, the International 
Monetary Market at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange - 254 -
commenced future dealing in U.S. Treasury bills. 
The units of trading on these markets are too high 
for private investors ($ 1 million in the case of 
Treasury bills) and just this indicates that markets 
have been created here that serve primarily to 
hedge positions and facilitate planning of major 
firms. The market is used mainly by larger banks 
and other financial companies. As in the case of 
other new services it may take years before this 
service is desired by and offered to a wide circle 
of investors. However, the initial success of this 
trading has led to expectations that other debt 
instruments will also be included insofar, as in the 
above cases, as this is possible without SEC approval. 
Because of the prime importance of stocks to pensions 
schemes in the U. S., future trading in stocks could 
be especially interesting to certain institutional 
investors. However, without any clear indication of 
the benefits of such trading, which may become 
evident as experience in futures dealing of government 
bonds is gained, the SEC is unlikely to approve it. - 255 -
III. OFF-EXCHANGE SEGMENTS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
While investors in securities traded on the exchanges 
can ask commission-oriented brokers to execute their 
orders, which the brokers can do in most cases 
without approaching a spread-oriented dealer, on the 
over-the-counter market we usually find spread-oriented 
dealers acting for investors. There are several 
reasons for this. Firstly, over-the-counter trading 
is not localized, unlike exchange dealing. Since there 
is no meeting-place, there is no opportunity to offer 
securities for sale at successively lower prices to 
a number of experienced traders or to make successively 
higher bids until another trader accepts it. Such 
auction proceedings, which most of the world's stock 
exchanges have raised in one form or another to the 
principle of market appraisal of the value of 
securities - the principle of establishing a price -
cannot be applied to dealings off the floor. Dealers 
operating on the over-the-counter markets in the 
United States must therefore rely on a different but 
equally valid method of establishing the price when 
they wish to effect a sale or purchase. Their answer 
is the principle of market making. This principle has 
been found so attractive by many exchanges that they 
have included it in their dealing procedures either 
as an exclusive method for establishing prices or, 
at least, as a complement to the auction principle. In 
fact, no one can show better that he considers a 
price to be correct than through his willingness to 
buy or sell the security concerned in any quantity 
at precisely that price; wide spreads and limits on 
quantities are signs of hesitant judgement. In such - 256 -
cases it would therefore appear preferable to 
negotiate with the market maker. In the past, such 
negotiations were often necessary and gave rise 
to the term "negotiated market" (in contrast to 
the auction market), an expression which no longer 
fits the modern image of the OTC market. 
A second reason for the spread orientation of many 
dealers on the OTC market is the multiplicity of 
securities traded here. In many cases a single phone 
call to a market maker will suffice in order to buy 
an internationally-known stock for a client while in 
other cases, where there is no market maker, long 
and extensive enquiry may be necessary in order to 
bring about a transaction. Not just this multiplicity, 
however, but also the variations in procedure lead 
to differences in transaction costs. A broker-dealer 
may be prepared to accept a limited order to sell 
although there are no specialized brokers in the OTC 
market, nor could there have been in the past, to 
whom he can pass on such an order. Commission will 
consequently be very low in some cases and very high 
in others. This is why there have never been commission 
rules in the OTC market as there were on the exchanges. 
As in other countries, it is even common to avoid 
disclosing the commission by using net prices. In 
fact, not the market maker, but the broker-dealer 
approached trades with the investor as a principal for 
his own account. The NASD checks whether a "mark-up" 
"mark down or commission charged is reasonable. 
If they exceed 5% of the market value of the securities 
involved, the NASD will in principle question their 
appropriateness. - 257 -
The above comments may have given the impression 
that there are always three parties involved in 
an OTC transaction - the client, a retail dealer 
and a market maker (or wholesale dealer). This 
impression was intentional. It reflects the basic 
pattern of a deal on the OTC secondary market. 
Variations in this basic pattern are, however, common. 
Firstly, in the case of normal transactions, e. g. 
through Nasdaq, the "retail dealer" will usually 
act as broker and charge commission. Secondly, more, 
or other, parties may become involved. Thirdly, 
however, fewer parties may be involved. Hardly any 
market makers pure and simple still exist; only a few 
houses still make markets with a few dozen traders 
in hundreds and, in one or two cases, in more than a 
thousand securities, and do not transact any other 
or other appreciable business in addition. On the 
other hand, the full-line firms have strongly expanded 
their trading departments. Since these firms attract 
not only a substantial part of exchange orders but also 
the mass of OTC orders, a great many clients trade 
direct with the market maker. Further variations in 
the basic pattern will become clear in the sections 
on the third market and the fourth market, following 
the comments on Nasdaq. 
1. Off-exchange markets for corporate securities 
a) Nasdaq 
The importance of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations, Nasdaq for 
short, is apparent to anyone who stops to think - 258 -
how a customer's purchase order has to be executed 
where a security is traded by five or even ten 
over-the-counter market makers. They are all phoned 
and the market maker having the lowest ask is 
re-called. In the meantime, another market maker 
may have lowered his ask and so, on the one hand, 
one can never be sure whether the best price has been 
secured even if it proves possible to deal at the 
lowest offer elicited and, on the other, one can 
possibly after further telephone calls be faced with 
the same situation. It is obvious that this procedure 
is neither effective nor efficient. As early as 1963 
the Report of Special Study contained the then 
revolutionary suggestion that market makers' quotes 
be entered in a computer system from which all or at 
least the best bids and offers could be ascertained 
at any time. 
The NASD took up this suggestion in 1964 and by 1967 
had with the aid of the consultancy firm Arthur D. Little 
developed a proposal and found in Bunker Ramo the only 
manufacturer willing to venture such an information 
system for the whole of the United States. Bunker Ramo 
invested $ 25 million in the system. It started work 
on February 8, 19 71 and at that date was able to supply 
more than 700 NASD member firms with quotes for 2 400 
stocks not listed on the exchanges. At this early stage, 
there were as many as 350 000 enquiries a day, the 
present average being more than double that number. 
In April 1971, after lengthy and intensive discussion, 
which even involved the courts, 36 listed securities 
were included in Nasdaq. Since May 1972 it has no 
longer been relevant for admission to Nasdaq trading 
whether a security is listed on an exchange or not. - 259-
In February 19 76, NASD purchased Nasdaq from Bunker 
Ramo for about $ 10 million. Today, Nasdaq data can 
be interrogated at some 30 000 terminals. At the 
end of 1975, Nasdaq covered 2598 securities for which 
a total of 372 firms were making markets. There was 
an average of six market makers per security. 
Nasdaq works at three levels. At Level 3, market makers 
enter their quotes into the system. They can follow 
the quotations of all other market makers and the 
latter's reaction to their own quotation changes 
on the visual display unit of their terminal. Predictably, 
this improved flow of information stepped up competition 
and this was one of the Nasdaq effects welcomed by few 
market makers only; it is therefore likely to have 
delayed implementation of the system. 
At Level 2 terminals, bids and offers can be interrogated 
but not, as on Level 3, entered and changed. This, 
therefore, is the broker or retail dealer level. If 
a retail trader has, for example, to buy a security 
for a customer, he first keys in the code for the 
security, then presses the "ask" key and the five 
lowest offers with the corresponding market maker 
identifiers appear before him on the display screen, 
the lowest appearing first. (If there are more than 
five market makers, the trader can also see their asks 
by pressing the "more" key). The trader will then 
generally telephone the market maker with the lowest 
offer and accept it. The larger market makers make the 
call easier and cheaper for him by providing local 
phone numbers in a fair number of financial centers or 
toll-free phone numbers. - The same applies mutatis 
mutandis to an order to sell. - 260 -
Level 1 service of Nasdaq is intended for advisers 
and major investors. They do not need special terminals 
for this but only the customary information units. 
They do not have access to the quotes of specific 
market makers, as in Level 2, instead, they obtain 
the representative quotation, i. e. the median of 
bids and the median of asks. Since customers frequently 
place orders only when they have up-to-the-minute price 
information, Level 1 saves time for the adviser as 
Level 2 does for the retail trader. 
The time relief resulting from Nasdaq for market makers, 
retail traders and consultants can more or less be 
assessed from the opinion of market makers that Nasdaq 
has reduced the number of calls to be answered to 
anything between a fifth or even a tenth of their number 
before 1971, as based on a specified number of deals. 
In addition, there are other benefits such as 
1. the higher probability that the customer obtains 
execution at the most favourable price currently 
available, which also means an end to arbitrage 
between market makers; 
2. tne usually lower cost of immediacy; 
3. substantially improved flow of information 
to the NASD resulting in more effective supervision; 
4. direct protection of institutional investors in 
particular against realization risks as they can 
obtain market information without the help of 
third parties who frequently divined the investor's 
intentions as a result of his enquiries and thus 
at times bought or sold ahead of the client, and - 261 -
5. a greater willingness on the part of newspapers 
to publish quotations and volume in OTC securities 
in the Nasdaq system and so reduce investors' 
information costs. 
It is true that the newspapers do not cover all Nasdaq 
securities, but at least specialized publications 
can improve on the past by offering reliable information 
on volume and quotations in all Nasdaq securities. 
Although the Nasdaq system itself does not permit 
automated trading, as does, e. g., Ariel (Section A III 
1) supra), Nasdaq is more than merely a quotation system. 
Even before Nasdaq, securities were traded on the OTC 
market under certain rules as on the exchanges, namely 
the Uniform Practice Code and NASD's Rules of Fair 
Practice. In addition, Nasdaq offers comprehensive and 
up-to-the-minute market information and evidence of 
buyers and sellers of acceptable standing ready to 
trade - market makers in the system are subject to special 
capital requirements. Thus, the market organized by 
the NASD provides members with a service in their own 
offices which in the past they could secure only by 
going to the exchange. When a number of authors refer 
to the introduction of Nasdaq using the term "over-the-
counter revolution", this is not only to recognize the 
great leap forward in the procedural efficiency of this 
market but especially to acknowledge that a new form 
of organization has resulted here which operationally 
gives the same service as an exchange but which for 
the first time in history functions entirely without 
a local concentration of trading and without dealers 
meeting together. - 262 -
However, Nasdaq has further features of an exchange 
beyond those referred to above. They include, 
firstly, "authorization" or listing standards for 
securities. The NASD requires a security to meet at 
least the following requirements: two market makers 
dealing in it, 300 investors holding it, 100 000 
shares publicly held, and the issuer having assets 
of $ 1 million and a minimum capital and surplus of 
$ 500 000. Special provisions apply to foreign 
securities. Where they are not statutorily obliged to 
do so, issuers must register the securities voluntarily 
with the SEC (cf. Section II 1 c above). Since mid-1974, 
the NASD has been charging both initial and annual 
Nasdaq quotation fees. Market makers, too, must be 
admitted and meet special requirements, e. g. as to 
capital. They must report their volume and may not quote 
spreads exceeding a certain multiple (a minimum of 
1 1/4 and a maximum of 2) of the prevailing representative 
spread of a security. Even if the number of firms with 
Level 2 and 3 terminals is taken as an indication of 
the number of member firms, Nasdaq has the charac-
teristics of a major exchange. There are some 650 such 
firms who together utilize more than 1100 terminals 
for Level 2 and 3 service. These firms include, as 
might be expected, the major full-line houses; other 
noteworthy members are foreign security dealing firms, 
especially the major Japanese houses, the largest 
American life assurance company and other institutional 
investors, and the three largest banks in the United 
States. - 263 -
b) Third market 
The third market is the market for over-the-counter 
dealing in exchange-listed stocks through market 
makers. About a thousand securities are regularly 
dealt in here. One third of volume results from the 
trading of 50 stocks. As mentioned in the previous 
section, a number of listed stocks have also been 
"authorized" for Nasdaq trading since 1971, these now 
amounting to just under a hundred securities. Thus, 
one trading method used on the third market was just 
discussed above, and the other trading procedure will 
dealt with in paragraph d) below covering trading in 
securities not authorized for Nasdaq. We shall therefore 
now discuss chiefly the reasons for the existence of 
the third market and its impacts on developments in 
other markets. 
The focal point of the third market are a few firms 
having market making in listed securities in common 
who are also active in various other lines of the 
securities business. These market makers together 
achieve higher volumes of sales than any of the 
American exchanges other than the NYSE. They were not 
originally exchange members nor had they anything to do 
with exchange members. Their aim was in fact to compete 
with the exchanges. In the 1960s they were increasingly 
successful in this. Dollar volume on the third market, 
measured by the sales of NYSE-listed securities, 
amounted in the mid-19 60s to 3% of NYSE dollar volume, 
4% in 1968 and about 8% in 1970, 7% in 1973 and 1974 
and 6% in 1975. It is noteworthy that the third market 
stagnated and then started to decline in precisely 
the years when exchange firms were forced into greater - 264-
competition in commissions. 
The two chief reasons for this success were the two 
freedoms of the market maker who is not an exchange 
member. The first was his freedom to determine his 
commissions or spreads on all securities, not only on 
listed securities, and, secondly, he was free to produce 
transaction services by the procedure of his choice. 
An exchange member, on the other hand, would in 
principle have had to use the exchange for any transaction 
in listed securities and charge the exchange minimum 
commissions to each non-member even if the latter was 
himself a broker and had obtained the orders. Although 
many non-members could reduce the commission load 
through arrangements with members or the regional 
exchanges, for others, dealing with a market maker on 
the third market remained worth-while for commission 
reasons. Only in 19 72 did the SEC introduce a general 
rule by which 40% of the commission paid by the investor 
went to the non-member. Since over-the-counter market 
makers tend to offer net prices that correspond to 
those on the NYSE or which are better on one side of 
the market, a non-member who transacts with a market 
maker achieves the same results as an exchange member 
in the crowd. A few hundred broker-dealer firms 
probably use the third market chiefly because of this 
low-cost access. 
Predictably, demand of these firms was directed towards 
the better known stocks listed on the NYSE, on which 
market making positions on the third market consequently 
concentrated. That the smaller broker-dealers frequently 
have to execute odd-lot orders is of little consequence 
in trading through market makers; after all, no attempt - 265-
is ever made to match orders. Small orders can 
therefore be executed exactly like any other at the 
bid or ask prevailing. Many market makers have 
long proceeded in this way and some of them waive 
the odd-lot differential on listed securities. The 
new odd-lot procedure used by Merrill Lynch was 
directly foreshadowed by the procedure used in the 
third market. 
The smaller broker-dealer firms, however, are not the 
only ones to have for some time been interested in 
direct access to the market which they are denied by 
the exchanges, owing to the restriction on the number 
of members. Banks, too, can execute orders here and 
charge their customers competitive commissions. The 
third market has, in particular, opened ways for 
institutional investors towards low-cost transactions. 
Its growth therefore reflects partly the trend towards 
institutionalization and partly the ability of this 
market to adapt to institutional investors. The 
leading market makers on the third market early recognized 
the special needs of these investors. They have set up 
a strong capital base so as not to be daunted by the 
risks of carrying major positions and then used this 
to trade blocks with institutional investors rapidly 
and at prices that they could not obtain on an exchange. 
In this way the market makers attracted business away 
from the exchange. Following the example of primary 
dealers in U.S. government securities (see 2 a) infra), 
block positioning and, where necessary, block assembling 
was already the customary practice on the third market 
at the beginning of the 1960s, even though these terms 
were not used. At the same time, specialists on the 
New York exchanges were forbidden to have institutional - 266-
customers and the basis for the further splitting-
up of the market-maker functions on the exchanges had 
therefore been laid, while the market makers on 
the third market today still trade blocks as well as 
odd lots and round lots. In 1965, more blocks of 
10 000 shares and above were traded on the third market 
than on the NYSE, which only later was able to catch 
up with the third market's lead and soar well beyond 
it. Since 1969, electronic information and trading 
systems, which will be dealt with in the next section 
have facilitated the liquidation of market-maker 
positions resulting from block trading on the third 
market. 
Due to the prestige of certain market makers several 
regional exchanges were eager to accept them as members. 
By the provisions of the Securities Reform Act, the 
New York exchanges, too, are compelled to cease 
preventing their members from trading with third-market 
market makers. In this way, these market makers are 
being integrated into the "first markets" whom they 
led as regards the product offered and in such substantial 
matters as free access to the market and unfixed 
commissions. Their way of conducting securities business 
with a distinctly competitive emphasis has had a 
lasting effect on the stock market policies of the 
United States. - 267 -
c) Fourth market 
Trading between institutional investors is commonly 
called the fourth market. This trade almost exclusively 
concerns listed securities. The other side is not 
found through a stock exchange nor does a market maker 
temporarily substitute the other side; the other side 
is sought outside the exchange and in as direct a 
manner as possible. The fourth market is consequently 
distinguished from the exchanges, Nasdaq and the third 
market as over-the-counter trading by institutional 
investors in listed securities without market makers. 
Other definitions are possible and could produce a 
systematic division of the OTC market. However, they 
tend to focus less on the most prominent special 
features of the OTC sector than on a theoretical 
pattern of dividing lines which intersect these prominent 
marks like the grid on a map cuts through towns and 
mountains. 
When an institutional investor buys or sells securities, 
another institutional investor is often to be found 
directly or indirectly on the other side. There is 
nothing therefore more obvious than to try to do business 
with each other without the intervention of third 
parties, firstly to save fees and secondly to avoid 
the risk of fellow travelling and counter-action by 
all those who come to hear of a projected block trans-
action, by keeping this transaction to a market to 
which only institutional investors have access. Direct 
contact is a possible but seldom successful way of 
achieving a trade on the fourth market. Obviously, 
institutional sales and purchases of a stock intended 
for a particular period will match only by chance so - 268-
that the fourth market can consequently only fulfil 
a complementary role. In addition, simple direct 
contact, e. g. by telephone, is unsatisfactory or 
too expensive even for such a limited role. Better 
forms of communication were conceivable and have been 
adopted. 
In 1969, two automated systems first offered their 
services to institutional investors - AutEx and Instinet. 
They still exist today. AutEx allots institutional 
investors a passive role since exchange members and 
firms on the third market broadcast to these investors 
the nature and extent of the transactions desired 
and also consummate the transactions either on an 
exchange or over the counter if an investor takes up 
all or part of the offer which has been transmitted 
electronically and observed on visual display units. 
While AutEx, like the Block Automation System (BAS) 
set up by the NYSE and its most recent competitor 
Comstock, which offers the same service as AutEx at 
lower prices, amounts more to a mechanized form of 
block assembling than to an inter-institutional market, 
Instinet (Institutional Network) is precisely that and 
is consequently generally assigned to the fourth market. 
Instinet allows institutional investors in all parts 
of the United States to feed tenders anonymously into 
the system through their terminal. Tenders are either 
broadcast and, consequently, visible on all screens 
linked to the system, or are entered into the system 
discreetly, i. e. only recorded in the system order 
book for the security concerned, and are thereby shown 
only to those who are interested in that particular 
security and consequently display the order book, - 269 -
a classified list of bids and offers, on their visual 
display units. Instead of a tender, mere interest in 
a particular security may be transmitted. Trans-
actions can be negotiated directly via the Instinet 
terminals, which is not possible on AutEx. Trans-
actions are settled through the Institutional 
Networks Corporation in New York, which runs Instinet. 
We need not deal with other particulars of this 
system here, since its British equivalent, Ariel, has 
been described fully above. 
Instinet had 64 members in spring 1976, including the 
major American banks, insurance companies and pension 
funds. However, the institutional investors not only 
deal amongst themselves as the largest market maker 
firms on the third market also have access to the 
system and are active participants. Where transactions 
are made with these firms, they serve primarily to 
adjust their market-making positions. Instinet, like 
Ariel, charges periodic fees for its services, but 
also grants credits for order inputs and for deals 
amounting to 30% of the commission charged on the total 
transactions effected by a participant during a day. 
The small group of so-called fourth market houses 
also works on similar fee systems. They help 
institutional investors find a suitable other side in 
the following way. They record an institutional 
customer's interest in certain securities but, unlike 
the block assembler or the Instinet user, do not 
seek an other side but simply wait until a corresponding 
interest is indicated. In this way, only the specialized 
fourth market house has knowledge of an investor's 
willingness to trade. A negotiator from the fourth - 270 
market firm consummates the trade by calling the 
two parties, who remain unknown to each other, and by 
negotiating price and quantity. Settlement, too, 
is arranged by the firm. This method of dealing has 
considerable advantages: there are no quantity premiums 
and discounts, realization risks are practically 
eliminated and the commission of fourth market houses 
lies below that of exchange firms, even after the 
unfixing of commissions. 
d) Other markets 
Over-the-counter trading in corporate securities that 
are not listed on an exchange nor traded with the 
aid of Nasdaq will be dealt with briefly below. The 
number of securities on this market can only be 
estimated on broad lines. In statistical terms, we 
could say that some 30 000 stocks and 10 000 bonds are 
quoted or traded at least once a year. For several 
thousand of these securities there is at least one 
market maker, so that he is involved in transactions 
along traditional 0TC dealing lines. The market maker's 
name is also discovered by the traditional method. 
The National Quotation Bureau in New York each day 
publishes stock quotation sheets, usually called pink 
sheets because of the colour of the paper, and yellow 
bond quotation sheets. They normally list the security, 
the name of the market maker(s), with telephone numbers 
and quotes for the previous day. These sheets are the 
bible of 0TC dealers. On several hundred pages a day, 
they list some 15 000 securities (including Nasdaq 
securities). A quarter of these are bonds. Yet more 
comprehensive are the corresponding cumulative - 271 -
publications published each month in book form. 
Practically all OTC retail firms subscribe to the 
sheets and can thereby assist investors interested 
in a security traded in this segment. 
If there is no market maker for a security, it may 
nevertheless be found on the sheets, since they report 
bids or offers and mere indications of interest as 
well. If nothing is to be found there, a broker-dealer 
could himself insert listings in the sheets through 
the National Quotations Bureau. However, he must then 
pay the relatively high annual fees for insertion 
privileges provided that he and the security in 
question are accepted by the Bureau; there is a kind 
of admission to the sheets. In addition, there are 
SEC-reguirements to be met by anyone who publishes 
tenders or quotes or who wishes to use a quotation 
service for corporate securities. In order to prevent 
dealings in worthless securities there is a requirement 
that sufficient information is available on the stock 
and its issuer, whether from the SEC or from the 
broker-dealer himself who has the security carried by 
a quotation service. Besides the sheets, there are one 
or two similar periodic lists, e. g. the Securities 
Quotation Service weekly lists and the Fitch daily 
Nasdaq sheets. 
Further, there are transactions on the OTC market 
supported not even by sheets. These transactions tend, 
however, to be of very small extent and to concentrate 
on a broker or market maker dealing in the securities 
of local companies for local investors. Finally, it 
happens that businessmen connected with a particular 
issuer are prepared to arrange transactions for others 
in this issuer's securities. - 272 -
2. Markets for governmental securities 
a) The market for U.S. government and 
federal agencies securities 
As is evident from the Buttonwood Tree Agreement of 
1792, the NYSE was originally primarily a market for 
bonds of the new federal government. The proportion 
of off-the-floor dealing in such securities has 
fluctuated in the course of time, but the banks have 
long played a predominating role if only because of 
the importance of federal bonds as cover for the 
banknotes of the (private) national banks. In 1925, 
over-the-counter sales were so much greater than sales 
on the exchanges that the public authorities ceased 
supporting the exchanges. The Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, now the implementor of American open-market 
policy and even then responsible for transactions in 
government securities, withdrew from the NYSE in that 
year. Today, exchange volume in these securities is 
well below 1% of OTC sales. 
At the end of 1974, the face value of U.S. government 
securities outstanding which were suitable for trading 
on the secondary market (marketable issues) was 
$ 283 thousand million; of this, $ 120 thousand million 
was in the form of treasury bills. Of the total amount 
outstanding, 36% was held by the Federal Reserve 
System and government bodies, 16% by banks, 13% by 
foreigners, 3% by the individual states and municipalities, 
and 3% by insurance companies and other corporations. 
Agency securities outstanding amounted at the end of 
19 74 to about $ 90 thousand million. Sales on the 
secondary market of U.S. government and federal agencies - 273-
securities in 1974 amounted to about $ 600 thousand 
million, on the basis of sales by primary dealers, 
which may be formally compared with total exchange 
volume of $ 125 thousand million. 
The focus of trading today is the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York (FRBNY) as agent for domestic and foreign 
government bodies and central banks. The FRBNY deals 
exclusively with the so-called primary dealers. It 
becomes interesting for the FRBNY to consider a 
dealer for its transactions when he has achieved a 
very appreciable volume of sales. It then includes him 
in its list of primary or reporting dealers and 
installs a direct telephone connexion with him. All 
information about prevailing quotations is collected 
via this private line and thus is available in the FRBNY 
trading room. The number of these dealers has increased 
greatly in recent years. Traditionally, there were 
barely twenty dealers; although still only 24 by mid-1974, 
by mid-1976 there were already 31 firms. Thy bond-
trading departments of major banks and the more or less 
full-line broker firms today dominate the list with 
thirteen and ten entered respectively, while the 
specialized bond houses that led the market in the 
past are now clearly in the minority. 
These primary dealers are market makers in the grand 
manner, each one handling securities at a rate of 
about $ 100 million a day. The unit of trading amongst 
dealers is half a million dollars. Typical of this 
market are the virtually uninterrupted contacts to the 
FRBNY and to major customers. Towards noon, it is 
usual for the FRBNY to ask all dealers for bids or 
offers within a few minutes (go-around). While these - 274 -
large bids or offers are collected and compared, 
trading is often in abeyance until the dealers know 
whether their bids or offers have been accepted 
or not. The procedure for large transactions with 
investors is different. Here, a decision is made 
immediately. Dealers are normally prepared to make 
bids in millions. In other words, "block positioning" 
is the rule; "block assembling" occurs, if at all, 
only with extremely large orders. 
In addition to the primary dealers, there is a range 
of less important market makers. A large number of 
banks, too, deal with their customers on own account. 
Other banks and broker firms are prepared to execute 
orders for investors. Their commissions, long determined 
by competition, were in fact mainly so high for small 
transactions that they rendered uneconomically orders 
for only a few thousand or tens of thousands of 
dollars. The Amex procedure described above in II 1 b) 
has eliminated this problem. The Federal Reserve 
maintains a custody and clearing system for this market 
that dispenses with the need for physical handling of 
certificates. 
b) The market for municipal securities 
The bonds of the 50 states and of tens of thousands 
of cities, towns, villages, counties, districts and 
statutory authorities (municipal securities) differ 
markedly from all other securities in that interest 
on them is not subject to federal individual or 
corporate income taxes. These securities are therefore 
held almost exclusively by private investors, banks - 275 -
and insurance companies who pay such taxes in full. 
The face amount outstanding has increased appreciably, 
from $ 92 thousand million at end of 1964 to $ 145 
thousand million 1970, to $ 224 thousand million 1975 
at end of year. Since these securities are largely 
of local importance only, the secondary market for 
them is structured in much the same way as for 
securities of the smaller private issuers. However, 
not only the mass of broker-dealers of all sizes are 
to be found in this market, but also nearly all banks 
and 240 specialized firms. Trading is aided by the 
blue list, which here corresponds to the pink sheets. 
There are market makers only in the larger issues. 
Smaller issues often have very narrow markets, the face 
value issued frequently amounting only to a few million 
or even to several hundred thousand dollars, owing in 
particular to their partition into several series, so 
that such issue has hardly any secondary market and 
can be bought or sold only at very high transaction 
costs. Consequently, experiments have been made 
recently with joint issues of a number of municipalities, 
an approach that has long been customary practice in 
other countries. 
Interest on municipal securities is paid either out 
of general taxes (general obligation bonds), or out of 
special levies (special assessment bonds), or out of 
receipts from the project financed (revenue bonds) such 
as bridges, roads, ports or dormitories. Thus, there 
are wide differences between the various municipals 
which investors can evaluate only with great difficulty 
on account of the enormous number of securities and 
issuing entities frequently overlapping and embracing 
the same taxpayers and which are therefore liable to - 276 -
give rise to fraudulent offers by persons attempting 
to cash in on the trust inspiring public status of 
the issuer. To this must be added the financial 
difficulties even of the municipalities, who now and 
then provide misleading information. Given the unsatis-
factory organization of all spheres of the secondary 
market for municipals, it is not surprising that their 
tax exemption no longer gives them a significant yield 
advantage over fully taxable loans. As already stated 
in Section I, an attempt is only now being made to 
develop suitable regulations for this large market. - 277-
IV. THE NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM 
1 . Origins and developments 
For more than three decades, 90% or over of all dollar 
volume in listed stock was concentrated on the New 
York exchanges. These exchanges had established 
complementary segments clearly delineated by differing 
prestige and listing requirements. This implied sub-
stantially overlapping membership. Competition between 
the New York exchanges was practically non-existent. 
Although the SEC had supported the regional exchanges 
in order to maintain actual or at least potential com-
petitors, the leading members of the regionals were 
normally members of the New York exchanges. Thus, the 
concept of a central exchange system with departments 
for the regional execution of matching orders, particular-
ly smaller orders, was essentially implemented providing 
a protection for investors that was exemplary in many 
respects thanks to intensive supervision. 
As from the mid-1960s this system increasingly came 
under pressure. The volume of transactions by institutional 
investors grew rapidly and these investors became less 
and less willing to accept the price and quality of 
the financial services offered without demur. As regards 
prices particularly, the commission cartel allowed no 
direct concessions; on the other hand, competition in 
ancillary services, payments to third parties designated 
by the investor (give-ups) and the increasing flood of 
rules against such practices developed in a way that 
attracted criticism. Since the regional exchanges and, 
particularly, the third market seemed more alive to - 278 -
the requirements of institutional investors, they 
were able to increase their share in volume 
impressively. From early 1967 to 1971 the third 
market, with but three exceptions, every quarter 
showed a further increase in relation to volume on the 
NYSE. The share of the New York exchanges in total 
volume dropped to little over 80%. 
Further, the NYSE had in the mid-1960s given its members, 
in order to facilitate their capacity planning, fore-
casts of the growth in volume in the coming years which 
very soon proved to be far too low. Business on the 
Exchange could, after 1967, frequently no longer be 
settled by the due date, the more so as it was extremely 
difficult to obtain sufficient qualified back-office 
staff for the traditional, labour-intensive settlement 
procedure. These difficulties increased further as more 
and more customers, out of caution, required delivery of 
the certificates instead of leaving them in their 
broker's custody. Many broking firms lost control and 
had to close down or merge. Weaknesses in supervision 
by the NYSE and the SEC with regard to solvency became 
very evident. The SEC finally approved increases in 
commissions in order to help firms to bear their higher 
staffing costs, partly the result of increased competition 
in ancillary services, and their losses, which ran into 
millions, on account of box differences, and in 1970 
Congress reluctantly set up an insurance scheme for 
brokers' clientele in the Securities Investors Protection 
Corporation. By this time the question frequently 
being asked was whether a market system less geared to 
the New York exchanges and controlled more by competition 
than through supervision might not have extended its 
capacities and modernized itself earlier. - 279 -
In February 19 71, Nasdaq offered an answer to this 
question. In the over-the-counter sector, where cost 
increases could not be neutralized simply by 
officially approved increases in commission as they 
could on the exchanges, advances of technology had 
been transformed into rationalization and capacity 
effects, initially with AutEx and Instinet in a small 
way and, now, with Nasdaq, on a wider front. It is 
certainly not mere coincidence that the SEC was able 
in April 1971 to introduce the stage-by-stage decontrol 
of commissions, which was completed in 19 76. Nasdaq 
further offered a solution to the problem of how, 
despite fragmented markets, an investor and the broker 
representing him could rapidly and cheaply be put on 
the road to the best market for executing his order. This 
problem had long been apparent in the OTC market and 
because of the increasing importance of the regional 
exchanges and the third market, it was now also affecting 
listed securities. 
Already in March 19 71 the SEC had taken stock of the 
situation and explained what the consequences would be of 
modern technology to stock exchange policy. Its comments 
on market structure in the letter of transmittal of the 
Institutional Investors Study Report, clearly evince the 
following goals: 
1. A "central" market system without local concentration 
of trading should be created for securities of 
national importance; the previous form of competition 
between sub-markets for these securities no longer 
corresponds to the state of technology. 
2. Forces of competition should more than in the past - 280-
complement appropriate regulation. Regulation 
should primarily be aimed at eliminating activities 
detrimental to the functioning of the market, while 
competition should promote functionally appropriate 
behavior such as willingness to assume risks and 
innovation. Existing unnecessary restraints on 
competition should not distort the evolution of the 
central market system and must therefore be abolished. 
The following sub-goals spell out in detail this 
new emphasis on competition: 
a) commissions should be freely negotiated between 
broker and investor; 
b) all qualified brokers should have access to the 
central market system, and all qualified spread-
oriented firms must be able to participate in 
the system, whether as market makers or as block 
positioners; 
c) all investors should have access to this system; 
private investors with market orders to buy (or 
to sell) should be able to benefit from the 
immediacy discounts (or premiums) resulting from 
block sales (or purchases) by institutional investors; 
d) investors' agents must be able to deal directly 
with each other and it must therefore be possible 
to bypass spread-oriented dealers; 
e) there should be prompt reporting of all securities 
trades to the public on a comparable basis. 
Government bodies should only state goals and principles, 
act as observers and prevent unwelcome developments, 
if necessary. Market participants should themselves 
implement the central market system. - 281 -
These goals have outlasted the years of debate on 
the future structure of the stock markets. Lively 
discussion arose after William McChesney Martin, 
the former President of the NYSE and Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board for many years, submitted a 
report to the NYSE in August 1971. His proposals 
were largely in accord with the goals of the SEC, e. g. 
his recommendation of a consolidated exchange ticker 
tape. However, Martin stuck by the concept of the 
specialist and wanted to see third market transactions 
integrated into the NYSE. He further urged standardization 
of the trading rules of the exchanges and sounded a 
warning against the unfavourable effects of competition 
which could result from a concentration of stock business 
into the hands of a few firms following the decontrol 
of commissions. 
In February 1972, the SEC issued a long statement on 
a central market system. This would be limited to listed 
securities and be achieved by centralizing market 
information, on the one hand, through an information 
system similar to Nasdaq providing details of all quotes 
(composite quotations system) to guide investors to the 
most favourable market in each case, and on the other, 
through a common reporting system on the price and 
volume of each transaction (consolidated tape). The SEC 
set up three advisory committees with members represent-
ing the securities industry in order to study particular 
issues concerning the market information disclosure 
systems, the requisite regulatory changes and the 
integration of block trading. The two relevant sub-
committees of the Senate and House of Representatives 
simultaneously undertook extensive hearings and comprehensive 
studies which resulted in a number of bills and eventually - 282 -
in the Securities Reform Act. 
When these five studies were completed, the SEC again 
came forward with a policy statement. One principle 
spelled out in detail concerned the trading of 
investors directly with each other through their 
(commission-oriented) agents. It is based on the idea 
that immediate execution by spread-oriented dealers 
should occur only if the investor requests it (i. e. if 
he places an order without limit or effectively without 
limit) and if this service cannot be offered by another 
investor who has placed a corresponding unlimited or 
limited order. In line with the practice on individual 
exchanges, such orders should have nation-wide precedence 
over all orders for the account of broker-dealer firms 
at the same price. 
To assure that limited orders by customers are always 
granted such precedence in the overall system, the SEC 
suggested a central electronic order book for limited 
orders of investors (consolidated or central limit order 
book, CLOB). It is possible in this way, amongst other 
things, to determine reliably what orders are to be 
executed on the other side in a block transaction. It 
protects the investor's order against non-execution when 
transactions take place at prices equal to his limit or 
at even more favourable prices, e. g. on price swings 
resulting from block dealings. The congressional sub-
committees placed special emphasis on the requirement 
that precedence should be given to investors' orders, 
that investors should be protected against non-execution 
and that the best price available on any sub-market 
should be secured for private investors, contrary to 
the traditional practice on parallel exchange and 
OTC markets. - 283-
A subsequent development was the publication of the 
report of a further industry committee set up in 
May 1974, intended to advise the SEC on implementing 
the central market system. The report appeared in 
summer 19 75 and advocated, amongst other things, in 
addition to precedence for investors' orders, 
precedence for bids and offers by specialists and 
market makers over those by other dealers, and also a 
continuation of the ban on specialists (but not on 
market makers) having direct institutional customers, 
and, finally, order protection against non-execution 
only for orders placed with a specialist. Its more 
controversial recommendations required the merger of all 
exchanges and a single central self-regulatory 
organization for the market system with minority 
representation of the securities industry on the supreme 
decision-making body. 
Discussions on the Central Market System then entered 
their fifth year and many broker-dealer firms had through 
their representatives at hearings or in committees 
obtained the opportunity of familiarizing themselves 
with the new concept, of discussing it, and of making 
proposals that not infrequently put earlier recommendations 
into doubt. Even before the SEC's new exchange policy 
produced its first clear successes, the market system 
was given a new name by the Securities Reform Act and 
a new advisory body was statutorily created. 
The 19 75 Securities Reform Act contains a programmatic 
section on a "National Market System" which once again 
lays down the goals of the SEC proclaimed in 1971, 
with the exception of access to the market system for 
all qualified broker-dealers. However, the SEC was - 284 
empowered to require excnanges to increase the number 
of their seats. Congress has authorized the SEC to 
issue regulations on practically all matters that 
could affect the market system. The Act created the 
National Market Advisory Board (NMAB), which is 
composed of representatives of broker-dealers and of 
the public. It was due to report to Congress by end 
of 1976 on how the National Market System could be 
implemented, whether a new central self-regulatory 
organization, the National Market Regulatory Board, 
was required, how such a board might be organized, and, 
what further legislative steps should be taken. 
Further, the NMAB was to advise the SEC. The NMAB has 
initially asked others, especially the self-regulatory 
organizations, for proposals and has held public 
meetings in various towns. 
Despite ever more consultations, some of the SEC's 
goals have already been achieved, or substantial 
progress has been made toward them: 
commissions are no longer fixed; 
- the NYSE, as described above, had by 1972 intro-
duced some public order protection against 
non-execution even in case of block transactions; 
there are competing specialists on the NYSE; 
there is competition between specialists of the 
NYSE and those of the Amex; 
uniform net-capital rules were adopted and also 
a uniform rule on short sales which is, however, 
temporarily suspended; - 285 -
the consolidated tape, a joint price and volume 
reporting system for all markets of listed 
securities, has been in operation since June 1975. 
The tape constituted the first successful step 
towards consolidation; 
it has been decided to allow differences in trading 
procedures and rules to continue as long as they 
do not jeopardize the goals of the National Market 
System; competition will decide what forms persist. 
2. Consolidation hitherto 
As early as March 1972, the SEC had published for 
discussion two proposed rules which would serve as a 
basis for a common ticker ("consolidated tape") and 
a common quotation system of all markets for listed 
securities ("composite quotation system"). While the 
rule for the consolidated tape became effective that 
same year, that for the system for the composite display 
of quotation information for multiply traded securities 
has so far not got beyond the proposal stage, despite 
repeated changes. Nonetheless, there has been progress 
in both fields. 
a) The consolidated tape 
On the basis of the rule concerning the consolidated 
tape, the five leading exchanges and the NASD, as 
representative of the third market, made proposals to 
the SEC on how information on prices and quantities 
of individual transactions could be continuously 
collected and disseminated. The SEC accepted this - 286 -
proposal in May 1974. It was phased in after some 
delay in 1975. 
The ten markets involved, eight exchanges (NYSE, Amex, 
MSE, PSE, PBW, BSE, DSE and CSE), the market makers 
on the third market, and Instinet, report prices and 
quantities of all transactions continuously to the 
Securities Industry Automation Corporation (SIAC), a 
subsidiary of NYSE and Amex. It operates the consolidated 
tape for the Consolidated Tape Association, whose 
members are the NASD and the five major exchanges. This 
information is then distributed over the former NYSE 
and Amex ticker tapes. Tape A shows all transactions 
in NYSE listed stocks irrespective of where they are 
traded and Tape B indicates the transactions in those 
securities admitted for trading only at other exchanges. 
This information is also stored and the most recent 
prices and turnover of any security can be inter-
rogated by dealers or investors on display units if 
they are prepared to pay the $ 1000 a month for this 
service, so as to have the most up-to-date information 
available at all times for their decisions. In this 
way they receive reliable access to the latest 
information at any given time, since instantaneous 
dissemination of data in this case is never impeded by 
the limited maximum speed of the tapes. Each transaction 
is identified as to where it took place. This 
innovation was opposed particularly by market makers 
on the third market since they rightly feared that 
changes of their positions could thereby be traced 
by sophisticated tape readers. 
The consolidated tape seems to have reduced price - 287 -
differentials between the markets. It enables the 
investor to have an appreciably better insight 
into the stocks subject to and the extent of block 
trading. This also applies to private investors 
whose access to market information is clearly improved 
by the new system and who now are on a more equal 
footing with the professional market participants. 
Further, the consolidated tape at the beginning of 
19 76 led to changes in the contents of the stock 
price lists in the daily newspapers as most newspapers 
then ceased to publish for each listed security the 
opening price, highest price, lowest price and closing 
price of the day on the main exchange only. Instead 
they began to take these data from the entire market 
system. The opening price may now originate from the 
NYSE, the highest price from the third market, the 
lowest price from the MSE and the closing price from 
the PSE, which, owing to time zoning remains open 
longer and, like the third market and Instinet, 
continues to report its prices up to 5.30 p. m. 
New York time. Consequently, the lack of order protection 
against non-execution is made increasingly more 
apparent to investors since a broker can pass a limited 
order only to a specialist on a single exchange. On 
the one hand, this leads to a host of complaints by 
the investing public and, on the other, it increases 
the interest in a central order book for limit orders. 
b) The composite quotation system 
A broker quite often cannot reliably say what orders 
are immediately executable and where the investor's 
best opportunity lies even if he is informed on latest - 288 -
prices on all markets. What he needs in fact is 
a survey of bids and offers on all markets for the 
multiply traded securities with which his orders 
are concerned. Nasdaq has shown how this overall 
view can be given him. For the exchanges and their 
specialists, however, the matter of a quotation 
system is of secondary importance: Exchange members 
tend anyway to route their orders to their exchange 
through well-organized channels, and the reliable 
and prompt ticker information combined with the 
provisions to stabilize prices and with the obligation 
on specialists to trade when necessary mean that for 
any individual exchange a quotation system is an 
investment yielding hardly any additional benefit, 
contrary to the OTC market, where established 
relations to market makers, if they exist at all, are 
far less extensive and where up to last year there was 
no ticker information of any kind. It is true that 
several exchanges have for a number of years had a 
quotation service for their members, but in contrast 
to Nasdaq the bids and offers are not firm and often 
outdated. Their quality fluctuates from exchange to 
exchange and from specialist to specialist. This 
situation on the one hand reflects the objectives of 
the exchanges - only a smaller and aspiring competitive 
exchange such as the MSE can be interested in a first-
class quotation service - and, on the other, specialists 
concentrate primarily on trading with their crowd and 
not on the anonymous dissemination of quotes, nor do 
they have tueir own terminals specially equipped for 
the convenient reporting of quotes as do the market 
makers on the Nasdaq system. 
Consolidation of the quotation systems of the exchanges - 289-
would have had little impact for that reason alone. 
In addition, quite a few firms would undoubtedly 
have preferred to know nothing about better bids 
or offers on other markets as they are not geared 
to efficiently handle executions on certain markets 
and thus prefer the normal routing channels. Further-
more, a number of exchanges have long had rules 
that virtually forbid the execution of orders on 
the third market. Only late in 19 75 did the SEC come 
through with the gradual suspension of these rules 
and all exchange members will be free as from 1977 
to choose where to execute their customers' orders. 
The SEC, which at first sought an arrangement for 
the composite quotation system similar to that of the 
consolidated tape, could not overcome the opposition 
of the exchanges against providing information on 
their specialists' quotes free of charge to private 
information services or, under a later proposal, to 
the SEC itself. The SEC, troubled by technical and 
regulatory problems in implementing the ccnsolidated 
tape caused to some extent by the lack of enthusiasm 
on some exchanges, no longer wanted to be directly 
involved in the development of a quotation system. 
It therefore finally limited itself to removing the 
barriers to such a scheme and to relying on competitive 
forces to develop a quotation display system. As a 
first step, the SEC, in March 19 75, required the 
exchanges to eliminate all provisions that prevented 
the information services being given access - in return 
for a fee - to current quotations and obstructed the 
dissemination of such information not just to members 
but also to other broker-dealers and investors. For 
the reasons outlined, no rapid progress was anticipated, 
however. - 290-
Only one undertaking was, at the end of 1975, 
offering a consolidated quotation service for all 
securities quoted on the NYSE, the MSE and the 
PSE. In 1976, Instinet began to offer a similar 
service distinguished by the fact that the display 
unit also indicates in each case the time when the 
quote on a particular market was last changed or 
confirmed. If, at the beginning of 1977, exchange 
members are able freely to choose on what market they 
will expedite their customers' orders, they will at 
least have a further quotation service available. 
NASD has decided to offer at that date a new Consoli-
dated Quotation Service (CQS) at Levels 2 and 3 of 
Nasdaq. It is intended to cover all shares and 
warrants listed on the NYSE and to be available daily 
from 9 a.m. to 6.30 p.m. New York time. CQS will 
correspond to the existing Nasdaq service described in 
Section III 1 a. In addition, it will indicate the 
number of round lots behind each bid and ask, 
information which is of particular importance to 
institutional investors. The NASD belives that invest-
ment of $ 1.5 million will be necessary for implementing 
the CQS. With CQS it is reverting to long-standing 
plans. Back in 19 72 it had started on an experiment 
in which the quotes of PBW specialists for NYSE listed 
securities traded on the third market were included 
in Nasdaq in order to demonstrate the potential of 
this system. 
CQS will not immediately solve the problem of data 
quality but it may be expected that complaints on 
backing away from bids or offers entered as experienced 
when Nasdaq was started up, will soon lead to regulatory 
measures. Late in July 19 76 the SEC had drafted and - 291 -
published for comment a rule requiring quotations 
to be firm. This draft has been criticized from a 
number of sides, including the official Council on 
Wage and Price Stability which fears that implementation 
of the regulation will have inflationary effects and 
which has asked for a more thorough-going analysis of 
the project. Without a reliable quotation system it 
will be difficult for the regional exchanges and the 
third market to hold out against the largest exchange 
and to attract orders after they have been deprived 
of some of their advantages by the consolidated tape 
and the unfixing of commission rates. Further delay in 
the implementation of a composite quotation system 
is clearly likely to benefit the market share of the 
New York exchanges and may in this way settle the 
question of competition in a national market system. 
3. Future stages of consolidation 
The importance of a central order book for limited 
orders (CLOB) to secure priority for investors
1 bids 
or offers and to protect their orders against non-
execution, particularly when block transactions occur, 
in the whole market of a multiply traded issue, not 
only in its sub-market on an individual exchange, 
has been explained in Section 1. In the United States, 
limit orders make up about 20% of all orders on the 
exchanges. They are particularly important since they 
openly reveal investors' judgements on prices and 
compete with market makers' bids and offers. 
A CLOB, as a system protecting limited orders, would 
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orders, and would do so in two ways - firstly because 
the best available price would be secured for both 
limited and unlimited orders, and secondly, because 
the CQS (or another quotation system) might have to 
include limit orders as additional bids or offers and 
expand the range of bids and offers shown on the screen, 
possibly narrowing or even eliminating the spread. 
Thus, the problem immediately arises of matching bids 
and offers and, consequently whether CLOB can be 
used as a consummation mechanism and whether trading 
should be fully automated. If we go that far, CLOB 
includes both protective systems; unlimited orders 
could in any event be integrated into the CLOB and, 
consequently, into automated trading, as buy orders 
limited above the prevailing price or limited sell orders 
below it. 
The CLOB consequently presents stock exchange policy 
with a crucial problem. A decision as to CLOB techniques, 
as to whether the system could be used for consummating 
a transaction, implies a decision as to which member-
commission-oriented members of the exchange, a particu-
larly influential group on the American exchanges, would 
lose their jobs through automation. 
The National Market Advisory Board, like the SEC, has 
opted for a protective system of this kind. Both have 
asked for system proposals. Proposals submitted should 
conform to the goals of the National Market System, 
implementation should be possible in the near future 
and the initial and the continuing expenditures of the 
system should be in line with the benefits anticipated. 
As might have been expected, some organizations have 
recommended relatively minor changes, while others have - 293-
suggested a largely automated system. Not all the 
proposals can be gone into here. We shall merely 
attempt to give a summary of the chief elements of 
the plans of the NYSE and NASD. 
The NYSE recognizes the advantages of comprehensive 
protection against non-execution that a CLOB would 
offer, but considers it to be a problematical and 
over-expensive concept at least at present. Since 
system-wide protection of investors against non-
execution would produce clearly more favourable contract 
prices only on major price swings, the NYSE is 
orienting its proposals to transactions that normally 
give rise to such swings, namely block transactions. 
Instead of a CLOB for all limit orders, they feel it 
is sufficient if an enquiry is made on all exchanges 
before block transactions are effected to find out to 
what extent orders for the security concerned are 
to be executed according to the books there at the 
prices at which the block transaction might be 
consummated. 
To this end the NYSE suggests an Order Indication 
System (OIS) that could be set up in nine months. For 
this purpose, the terminals with display units, which 
already exist on the exchanges and on the third market, 
could be used and connected to a central computer. 
All specialists would be informed of each block order 
by this system and they could then inform the specialist 
or market maker handling the block of all the orders 
they hold that should be taken into account. In this 
way, information could also be obtained immediately 
as to what orders were included in the block cross. 
A computer print-out of all information exchanged - 294-
would allow execution of the orders to be checked 
at any time. 
The NYSE considers that an investment of $ 6 50 000 
and annual costs of $ 600 000 would be needed for OIS. 
The aggregated price advantages for those placing 
limit orders are likely to match these costs even if 
only a relatively small number of block orders is 
executed on markets other than the NYSE (the additional 
protection of limit orders by OIS is negligible for 
block orders crossed on the NYSE as the mass of limit 
orders is held by NYSE specialists). In addition, there 
may well be price advantages to institutional investors. 
In line with the requirements of procedural efficiency 
and with the goals of the National Market System, the 
need for immediacy services of market makers and of 
block positioners and their spread earnings would 
both be less than they would be without OIS. 
Like the NYSE, the NASD builds its proposal on the 
basis of existing data-processing systems. Since 
Nasdaq already has a nationwide communication network 
available which is by no means utilized to capacity 
it may be considered for linking the systems of the 
exchanges. A few American exchanges have electronic 
order switching systems by means of which member firms 
can route their orders directly to the appropriate 
specialist. Under the NASD proposal, all orders will 
initially come on to the specialists' books in this 
way. The books will become automated and no longer 
kept manually. A separate book will be kept, or 
several books where there are competing specialists, 
for each exchange on which a security is traded. Only 
the specialist can read a book, and only his own - 295 -
book, on his display unit (and possibly the exchange's 
consolidated book, if the exchange so decides). 
However, the highest bid and the lowest offer for the 
security at each exchange will be generally accessible 
through CQS, together with the quotes of market 
makers on the third market, and it is likely that 
some of the bids and offers will reflect investors' 
orders held on an exchange. 
This linking of the order switching systems could 
facilitate the forwarding of orders to the market 
offering the best execution and could thus aid the 
specialist and complement the CQS. However, the NASD 
suggests it primarily as a move towards automated 
trading. If a broker receives, e. g. a market order to 
buy, he can first of all check through CQS whether a 
reasonable price will be attained. If he then enters 
the order, it immediately and automatically hits the 
lowest ask in the whole system and so the transaction 
is consummated. The contract note is then printed out 
on his terminal and on the terminal of the broker or 
market maker whose offer was hit. Finally, the CQS 
and the book, if it is affected, are automatically 
updated, and the sale is reported on the consolidated 
tape and is recorded for settlement purposes. The 
system would be programmed in such a way that the 
sequence rules (priority and precedence rules) would 
be observed. 
With block orders, the procedure under the system 
proposed by the NASD would be as follows. The investor 
negotiates with a block positioner directly or 
indirectly in the usual way a price at which he can, 
for example, sell a block. As in the case of a cross, - 296-
the block positioner does not know at this point how 
many shares he will have to add to his position at that 
price without consulting the specialist. He then would 
enter the block order into the system limited at this 
price which will lie below the prevailing price, 
and the purchase orders limited at or above the 
block offer will be executed against the block order 
automatically. The projected system responds as 
described in the paragraph above and indicates the 
part of the order not yet executed. These shares left 
are then bought as previously agreed outside the system. 
The information concerning this contract is, finally, 
keyed into the positioner's terminal for ticker 
reporting and for settlement purposes. 
According to the NASD this proposal could be implemented 
within two to three years and would require an invest-
ment of about $ 10 million. Unlike the NYSE proposal 
it would even in the case of minor price differences 
secure for the customer the best price available 
throughout the market system and at the same time give 
system-wide protection against non-execution. It would 
implement the CLOB, to which no one, however, would 
have full access. The traditional trading on the 
exchanges would be discontinued, the floors possibly 
being retained as working space for 'the specialists. 
The floors of some regional exchanges would not even 
change appreciably in appearance, only the specialists' 
telephones losing their importance as compared with 
the terminals. However, the lively dealers' meetings 
would disappear at the major exchanges; the crowd, 
hitherto the essence of exchange trading, would no 
longer have a function. The specialists would retain 
their privilege of consulting the book of their exchange - 297-
which would facilitate their market making. This 
privilege would become all the more valuable as 
more orders came to their exchange. The NYSE specialists 
would thus retain their specially advantageous position. 
A supplementary proposal made by the NASD entailing 
no substantial additional investment would eliminate 
these advantages. According to this plan, investors' 
consolidated orders would all be displayed anonymous-
ly on the screen of the terminal together with the 
market makers' quotes. In this way all market makers 
would obtain the same order information. In addition, 
it would be obvious in the case of block orders how 
many shares would have to pass through the book and how 
many would have to be positioned at each price 
acceptable to the institutional investor. 
The problems with an "open book" of this kind have 
been discussed for years. It could increase realization 
risks, especially it would facilitate counter-action. 
Where, however, competing market makers participate 
in automatic dealing with an open book, orders to buy 
with limits too high and orders to sell with limits 
too low would not at all appear in the book as they 
would be executed immediately against market makers' 
offers or bids respectively and consequently would not 
be exposed to counter-action. The open book is nothing 
new in exchange trading. It has, for example, long 
been used for active stocks on the Brussels Exchange 
and for inactive stocks on the NYSE. In neither case 
are market makers involved; at the NYSE, however, the 
appropriate specialist always checks whether the 
contract price is reasonable. Knowledge of the book 
enables the investor and his broker to realisticly - 298-
limit orders and so to protect themselves against 
counter-action. Besides, a broker still may 
gradually increase bids or reduce offers when trading 
with the aid of an automated open book as he does now 
when trading in the crowd. As now on the floor, 
this procedure is all the more likely to lead to a 
favourable deal for his customer the more actively 
the securities concerned are traded and the more 
that dealers actually observe new entries in the open 
book. An open book seems unsuitable for inactive 
securities without competing market makers, however. 
Where there is only one market maker, it is likely 
that there will be no adequate competition between bids 
or offers protecting out-of-line limit orders against 
counter-action. If there are no market makers, an open 
book would saddle an investor and his broker with the 
task of a market maker to name the price that they con-
sider to be the market price on the basis of information 
that will be limited and possibly manipulated - even 
an empty book is conceivable in this case - and 
continuously to monitor the bid or offer. 
Merrill Lynch have come forward with a proposal similar 
to that of NASD which expressly provides for a market 
segment for automated dealing in inactive securities 
along the lines described above with the aid of an 
open book, even if there are no market makers. This 
proposal also differs in an other interesting way 
from that of the NASD. A broker who feeds his order 
into the system has his task made much easier in this 
case. Whereas under the NASD proposal he would himself 
have to decide on a limit within the spread or on 
immediate execution, under the Merrill Lynch system - 299 -
the programme would make this decision for him: the 
broker simply enters the order; if the prevailing 
spread for a security is wider than is normal for 
an order of this size, a bid is at first transmitted 
for a few minutes at a price within the spread, or 
even "broadcast" in the case of major orders, as 
with Instinet. 
Merrill Lynch go further than the NASD even on crucial 
points. The firm's proposal deprives not only the 
floor broker but also the specialist of any further 
function as agent, no longer recognizes a specialist's 
book, and consequently provides for no member commission 
at all. Merrill Lynch, unlike the NASD, say so quite 
clearly. Since member commissions total at least 
$ 40 to 70 million a year, there is no doubt that trans-
action costs for investor-commission-oriented firms 
could be reduced substantially by a system of the kind 
conceived by the NASD and Merrill Lynch. Because of 
the sequence rules, the specialists - or rather, the 
market makers - cannot seek via wider spreads compensation 
for member commissions lost. 
It is still too early to say what consolidation steps will 
result from these and other proposals, but undoubtedly 
trading techniques will develop more or less along 
the above lines. A possible next step towards consoli-
dation was proposed by the NYSE in autumn 19 76. This 
would mean combining order switching systems at the 
exchanges in a way that would allow every specialist 
(and apparently oblige him) to pass on executable 
orders electronically to the market which according 
to CQS information allows execution at prices most 
favourable to the investors who placed the orders. - 300 
This so-called "dealer inter-market order-switching 
system" (DIMOS) could, according to the NYSE, be 
implemented within a year for $ 750 000. DIMOS 
follows the lines of the NASD proposal, though it 
does not go quite so far, since it would in each 
case leave it to a specialist or market maker to 
execute the orders and automated trading is not 
contemplated for the time being. Forerunners of DIMOS 
already exist in simple form linking specialists by 
loudspeaker and microphone. The best known link of 
this kind is that between the floors of the PSE in 
San Francisco and in Los Angeles. In the past year 
a similar link was introduced between the BSE and the 
PBW. DIMOS could expediently complement a CQS as a 
system protecting unlimited orders and other immediately 
executable orders and relieve individual brokers of 
the trouble of passing on their orders themselves to 
the most favourable market. 
The NASD and the six largest exchanges formed the 
National Market Association (NMA) to work toward a 
nationwide system jointly two days before the NYSE 
Chairman announced the DIMOS proposals at San Francisco. 
Although the NMA does not wish to encroach on the 
independence of the exchanges, individual exchanges 
will have the opportunity to merge. The first official 
discussions on a possible merger of the NYSE and 
Amex have begun. 
For the NYSE, the merger would give it access to 
option trading. By combining administrative and 
supervisory functions into one organization, the 
Securities Industry Association estimates that savings 
would be made of several million dollars annually. - 301 -
Because of the drop in Amex volume, its expenses 
have risen, despite economies, from 0.1% to 0.4% of 
sales, an extraordinarily high ratio for an 
exchange of this size, so that radical measures are 
indicated. A further attraction for merging arises 
from the competition that has just begun between 
specialists on the Amex and on the NYSE. This 
competition reduces the advantage of the New York 
specialist in the securities concerned as against 
other specialists and market makers, since there is 
no longer a "consolidated" book but only a New York 
book divided between the two exchanges, and consequent-
ly no longer any predominant principal market. A 
merger would at least for a few years recreate the 
natural competitive advantage of the dominant financial 
centre. Finally, the merger would allow a comprehensive 
system of competing specialists to be set up in New 
York and would therefore fall in with the goals of 
the National Market System. 
Finally, reference should be made to consolidation 
steps with regard to settlement and custody sphere. 
A prerequisite for the execution of orders at any market 
within the National Market System is the existence of 
a reliable and equally comprehensive system of settle-
ment. The settlement of transactions between members 
at different exchanges should be burdened at the most 
with costs only slightly above those of settlement 
between members of the same exchange. There would 
otherwise be the risk of the efficiency gained by a 
National Market System in the execution sphere being 
lost by additional costs of settlement, by costs of 
money and securities working balances tied up in 
various clearing associations and the need to monitor - 302 -
them, and through additional delivery costs. Work 
has been in progress in the United States for years 
on improving clearing and settlement. In the spring 
of 19 76, the NYSE, Amex and NASD merged their clearing 
organizations (Stock Clearing Corporation, American 
Stock Exchange Clearing Corporation and the National 
Clearing Corporation, into the newly formed National 
Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC)). 
The developments that led to the NSCC and the NMA 
could hardly fail to affect the present scope and 
structure of self-regulatory organizations. As outlined 
in Section I, there are at present numerous regulators 
whose powers to some extent overlap. There have been 
many proposals for delimiting these powers so that 
regulatory costs can be reduced. In an analysis, the 
NASD arrives at the conclusion that in this way 
# 10 million could be saved. Three self-regulatory 
organizations would, they say, suffice - a supervisory 
body for the settlement and custody sphere, one for 
the joint execution sphere, i. e. for the secondary 
markets in the narrow sense, and one to check on the 
financial and organizational soundness of broker-dealer 
firms, to check the professional competence of their 
staff and to monitor the primary market. This third 
self regulator would also take disciplinary actions 
against broker-dealer firms and their staff. Although 
the three bodies would be under the control of the SEC, 
some observers feel that the consolidation in super-
vision and in clearing and settlement could jeopardize 
further improvement of the organization of American 
securities markets by stifling competition and 
innovation. - 303 -
Part 
DETERMINANTS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SEGMENTATION 
OF SECONDARY MARKETS 
A. FACTORS DETERMINING SEGMENTATION 
At the end of Part 1 of this study we posed three 
questions. The basis for these questions is a situation 
which is widely regarded as the norm: a security is 
listed on a stock exchange and is traded exclusively 
on that stock exchange. From this situation - at first 
sight so straight-forward and orderly - there are 
deviations of differing degrees from country to country, 
and this gives rise to the questions: why are listed 
securities often traded on other stock exchanges, 
why are they also traded off the exchange, and why are 
many securities not dealt in on a stock exchange 
at all? Whom do these deviations benefit, what are 
their advantages and disadvantages? The questions as to 
why some securities are traded both on and off the 
exchange and why others are not traded on a stock 
exchange at all can be answered together and will be 
dealt with first. 
Anyone seeking an answer to these apparently simple 
questions will first notice that the dividing line 
between stock-exchange and non-stock-exchange markets 
varies from country to country. The smallest deviations 
from our "norm" will be found in the country whose 
stock exchange is equipped to handle securities with 
the most widely varying average sales, which can deal - 304-
with both small, medium-sized and very large orders, 
and which has long trading sessions (for the sake 
of exposition we shall disregard the fact that it 
may be mandatory to deal through a stock exchange). 
But the descriptions given in Part 2 suggest that 
an apparently ideal stock exchange of this kind 
simply does not exist. In reality, stock exchanges 
either attempt - unsuccessfully - to cover the whole 
of the secondary market or they confine themselves 
at the outset to organizing only part of that market. 
In the section that follows we shall discuss the 
reasons for this. 
I. DIFFERENCES IN THE COST OF PROVIDING FINANCIAL 
SERVICES AS FACTORS DETERMINING SEGMENTATION 
The financial services provided by a stock exchange in 
what we have called the "execution sphere" are part-
services, which nevertheless constitute an important 
part of the transaction services demanded by investors 
from security-dealing organizations. The first part-
service which a stock exchange renders is the fastest 
possible consummation of securities transactions at 
fair market prices. "Fastest possible" means, firstly, 
that it is more likely that the other side to an order 
will be found rapidly - indeed often immediately -
through the stock exchange than in any other way; 
secondly, that a minimum amount of time is required 
for actually effecting the bargain itself. Stock ex-
changes keep the time required down to the minimum by: 
using standard contracts for securities 
transactions; - 305 -
standardizing orders; 
ensuring a minimum solvency of members, i. e. 
the counterparties to stock exchange contracts; 
requiring bids and offers made to be binding; 
providing the opportunity of having limited orders 
held on the market ready for execution by other 
members or employees of the stock exchange; 
laying down time-saving stock exchange terminology; 
employing other refined organizational measures; 
in short, by subjecting orders or bids or offers to 
certain trading procedures. These procedures homogenize 
both supply and demand in such a way that as many 
matching bids and offers as possible come into being. 
The decisive factor governing what we have called the 
first part-service is not primarily the organizational 
details but the fact that a great number of bids and 
offers are brought together, traditionally concentrated 
at one time and in one place. However, it is the way 
a stock exchange is organized over and above this basic 
concentration that determines how strongly a security-
dealing firm is attracted to bring its orders to a 
stock exchange and how easily other markets can set 
themselves up in competition. 
The second part-service rendered by a stock exchange 
is the provision of information on the state of the 
market and, in particular, information on the current 
price of a given security for a given kind of bargain, 
e. g. for cash or for future settlement. This part-
service is the result of the first part-service but - 306 -
also precedes it in that it renders it easier to 
make bids or offers on the stock exchange in line with 
the market. The first part-service is therefore 
usually demanded in conjunction with the second. But 
the second part-service may also be offered on its 
own, especially in connexion with off-exchange 
trading, and it is of particular interest in connexion 
with the crossing of orders outside the exchange be-
cause in this case the first part-service is not needed. 
It is therefore understandable if a stock exchange 
refuses to give price information which, as in the case 
of current bids and offers, reveals existing opportu-
nities for bargains to persons who are not compelled 
to transact their business through the stock exchange. 
Owing to the link between provision of the two part-
services, we need base our considerations in the 
following sections only on the central financial 
service rendered by a stock exchange, namely facili-
tating the fastest possible consummation of securities 
transactions at fair market prices. The segments 
within a stock exchange mirror which procedures an 
individual stock exchange considers most efficient 
at providing this service for securities with certain 
turnover characteristics. Our examination of the 
markets in various countries has clearly shown that 
stock exchanges, in assigning securities to certain 
market segments, use as a criterion the expected 
turnover in the security in question and/or the size 
of the individual transactions involved. 
In some securities there is a strong and continuing 
demand every day over a lengthy period of time for 
transaction services; for other securities this - 307 -
demand is only sporadic. As in all lines of business, 
it makes sense to use different methods for the 
mass-production of transaction services than are 
used for occasional production. The securities to 
be found on a secondary stock market may be classi-
fied into various groups with typical turnover 
characteristics. It is these typical turnover charac-
teristics more than anything else that determine the 
number and structure of the segments that will be met 
with on a secondary market. 
From the number of the segments and the nature of the 
procedures chosen the possible dividing lines between 
the stock-exchange and the non-stock-exchange markets 
will emerge. It is obvious that the dividing lines 
will be differently situated in different countries. 
A few examples may illustrate this statement. The 
American exchanges offer procedures for continuous 
trading during a long exchange session under which 
orders are matched and there is as a rule no need for 
the assistance of a market maker. These procedures 
demand substantial turnover in every stock traded in 
this way. Therefore the bulk of American stocks do 
not qualify for dealings on these exchanges. On the 
Japanese and some continental European exchanges 
collective-price procedures are used; here the 
definitive or at least the provisional price is 
calculated from the bids and offers received. These 
procedures can accomodate securities having various 
turnover characteristics and are suitable, as their 
employment for calculating the opening prices even 
on the NYSE shows, for very active shares as well. 
But they provide a solid basis for determining prices 
only if a certain number of orders enter the - 308 -
calculation. Therefore the procedure ought not to 
be used for stocks in which there are only 
occasional dealings; in this way markets outside 
the official stock exchange may become necessary. 
The unrestricted application of this procedure to 
inactive securities in Paris makes sense only despite 
the additional safeguard provided by maximally per-
mitted price changes, if one must assume that no-one 
is prepared to deal in such stocks by a more suitable 
procedure. The least room for securities traded off 
the exchanges only is left by procedures which are 
either directly geared to individual prices, as in 
the United Kingdom and Denmark, or by collective-
price procedures allowing trading at individual prices 
in collective negotiating sessions ..where orders are 
insufficient, as in Italy, Luxembourg or on the French 
provincial exchanges. 
These points have explained the most important reason 
why exclusively off-floor traded securities exist 
at all and why the number and composition of such 
stocks varies greatly from country to country. There 
are other reasons, particularly the initial costs and 
the recurring costs of listing to issuers. Since some 
issuers, for various reasons, consider these costs 
excessive, one finds in many countries securities 
which could quite clearly satisfy the requirements of 
a stock-exchange market-segment but which nevertheless 
are traded only off the exchange. These securities, 
however, are the exception in the group of stocks 
dealt in exclusively outside the exchange. 
The pattern of the segments of a stock exchange, or, 
to put it another way, the orientation of the - 309-
procedures used in it, is an important starting-
point also for answering the question why listed 
securities are traded outside the stock exchange: 
some stock exchanges have geared certain segments 
to transactions which, taken individually, neither 
exceed nor fall short of a certain volume (trans-
actions of "normal" volume), and offer no procedures 
- or only rather unsuitable procedures - for handling 
anything except normal transactions. Whereas, for 
example, French, German, Belgian and American stock 
exchanges have supplemented these segments by 
creating facilities for dealing with small orders or 
odd lots, the Japanese exchanges offer no dealing 
services for odd-lot orders. Odd-lot trading in 
listed stocks in Japan therefore has to take place 
outside the exchange. In Denmark this is also the case, 
since the procedure provided by the stock exchange 
is not in fact used. 
Similar circumstances are found in connexion with 
block transactions. Admittedly, there is, on account 
of the differing turnover characteristics of different 
securities, no clear dividing line separating block 
deals from transactions of normal volume as there is 
between the latter and odd-lot dealing, but the 
larger the desired transaction the less likely it is 
that it will be possible to find the other side to 
a bargain at a fair market price in the market segment 
for transactions of normal volume. Since the search 
for a counterparty can often be successful only outside 
the exchange, some stock exchanges, quite logically, 
dispense with special block-trading procedures. Other 
exchanges, by contrast, offer several block-trading 
procedures at the same time. For example, the NYSE - 310 -
is prepared to call on investors far and wide over 
its ticker to make bids or offers and in 1970 it 
set up its Block Automation System. The success of 
these methods has been very varied. BAS, as we 
have stated, was soon closed down and a Japanese 
system for handling block transactions through the 
exchange has been awaiting its first proving trial 
for ten years. Other procedures seemed to have become 
obsolete with the passing of time but then suddenly 
came back into demand. Some were successful but did 
not succeed in stopping anything like all the off-
the-floor block transactions. 
A few more points should bring out the reasons for 
the existence of off-exchange trading in quoted 
securities. The limited success of stock exchanges in 
integrating security trading wholly into stock 
exchange dealing is in itself nothing remarkable. 
Stock exchanges provide certain financial services. 
With some transaction services they enjoy a distinct 
cost advantage, with others they do not. That is the 
first reason. The second reason lies in the fact that 
stock exchanges, like any other business concern, 
only produce services of a certain quality; just as 
in the manufacture of motor vehicles or safety razors, 
similar or substitute products in plain or "de luxe" 
design are conceivable and they are in fact offered 
particularly on the larger and more competitive stock 
markets and within those markets particularly for 
block orders. Further explanation of both reasons 
is called for. 
The latest developments in odd-lot dealing in the 
United States show the limits of the cost advantage - 311 -
accruing from the joint provision of transaction 
services. Aided by ticker tape and quotation systems, 
a few exchange members with a large number of clients 
and with positions in most listed securities can 
provide the financial service of executing small 
market orders in listed stocks entirely within their 
own house, taking stock in at the prevailing actual 
bid or supplying stock at the current ask, and can do 
it more cheaply than if they made use of the stock 
exchange's part-service and passed their orders to 
the stock exchange; other members are not able to 
do this and accordingly continue to use the stock-
exchange segment devoted to odd-lot dealing. The large 
Danish and Italian banks and some market makers on 
the American "third market" have long been using such 
procedures. Large security-dealing firms are often 
able to find the other side to orders of normal or 
even fairly large volume without the help of the stock 
exchange, whether by in-house procedures for identi-
fying offsettable orders, as is especially common 
in Italy and Denmark, or by specializing in block-
assembling. In all these cases the security-dealing 
firms are interested only in the stock exchange's 
second part-service (provision of information on the 
state of the market). As for the "fastest possible 
consummation of transactions", they are able to 
arrange this more cheaply themselves. 
Expressed in terms of the theoretical categories 
laid down in Part 1 of this study, we can state as 
follows. Firstly, a stock exchange or other organizer 
of the market will confine itself to providing those 
financial services for which joint provision for a 
large number of security-dealing firms is clearly - 312-
superior to individual provision (financial 
services of category 2). Provision of the other 
financial services that can be marketed for a 
consideration (category 1) remains the province of 
the individual security-dealing firms themselves. 
Secondly, classification of services under category 1 
or category 2, and hence the boundary between stock-
exchange and non-stock-exchange trading, can never 
be definitive. It depends on the many factors which 
determine cost functions under individual or joint 
provision of services and on which part of these 
cost functions is relevant due to the demand for the 
services prevailing at the time. It is therefore 
quite possible, as happens elsewhere in the world 
of business, that some firms will decide to provide 
the services themselves whereas others will decide 
that the services should be hived off to a joint 
organization (or to another specialized firm). 
With the foregoing explanations we have given 
sufficient reasons why there will usually be off-
exchange trading in listed securities even where from 
the investor's point of view the quality of the tran-
saction services offered outside the exchange is 
identical with that of those offered by the exchange 
itself. Of course, in some countries interest in off-
floor trading cannot manifest itself because it is 
mandatory to consummate securities transactions on a 
stock exchange. Transaction services in connexion with 
before and after-hours dealings, too, also prohibited 
in some countries, can be classified as services of 
category 1 and hence can be explained as non-stock-
exchange activities. If investors wish to trade outside 
stock exchange hours only very infrequently and if - 313 -
the potential participants in such dealings in a 
certain issue are known, there is no point in 
keeping the stock exchange open for the sake of an 
occasional transaction; before and after-hours 
telephone dealing will suffice. As the example of 
the stock exchange system in the United Kindgom and 
Ireland shows, such before and after-hours dealings 
need not take place "outside the exchange". Since 
the British and Irish system is based on the market-
maker principle and hence telephone dealings before, 
during and after normal stock exchange hours are 
regarded as a regular form of exchange transactions, 
bargains may be done at any time provided that at 
least one jobber can be reached on the telephone. 
Thus far we have merely explained whether certain 
financial services should be classified as category 1 
or category 2. For the purposes of this study that 
would seem sufficient. In other connexions detailed 
analyses of the cost function for provision of the 
services by individual firms or for a joint organization 
might be necessary. A note about the factors determining 
the costs of provision of the services on an individual 
basis would seem appropriate at this stage, however. 
Monopolies in dealing on a stock exchange, whether 
their basis lies in private law or in action by the 
public authorities, and, connected with this, minimum 
commissions for stock exchange services, constitute 
an essential cost factor working to the advantage of 
the provision of services on an individual basis 
and therefore favouring off-exchange trading. In 
Denmark, for example, this factor probably stimulated 
efforts to cross orders within individual banks. In 
other countries this effect is forestalled by - 314-
forbidding the banks to offer certain transaction 
services in their own country, while in other 
countries of the Community such banks are themselves 
members of the stock exchange or could become 
members. Such prohibitions on the provision of 
services prevent the supplier with the most efficient 
procedure from becoming established. 
A security-dealing firm will compare its costs for 
in-house production of financial services with the 
costs of operating through a particular stock exchange, 
and it will take into account also other security-
dealing firms, other market organizers, in particular 
other stock exchanges prepared to sell this firm the 
transaction services it needs. Limited access and 
minimum commissions are an important factor in this 
connexion too. In the United States and the United 
Kingdom these restrictions on competition have helped 
other markets to emerge in competition. The dealing 
facilities provided by the fourth market or by Ariel 
do not even have to be more efficient than those pro-
vided by the stock exchanges, they must merely charge 
the security-dealing firms or investors using these 
competing markets lower rates of commission than are 
charged by stock exchange members. For this reason 
commission regulations have helped competing markets 
to maintain themselves in existence throughout the 
world. A regional stock exchange in the United States, 
in Belgium or in Germany, for example, gives the 
security-dealing firm which is merely a member of 
that exchange direct access to dealings in the 
securities listed there; on the third market not even 
membership is required for this. If every security-
dealing firm had commission-free access to the principal - 315 -
market or to every stock exchange, or at least 
access at commissions dictated by competition, they 
would probably not be interested in the regional 
exchange or the third market at all. In the United 
Kingdom the former members of the regional exchanges 
have acquired such access as a result of the 
amalgamation of the stock exchanges and it is thought 
that within a few years all or almost all of the 
provincial exchanges will have been closed. In America 
a similar development is expected now that commissions 
are allowed to be competitive. 
This in part answers under the aspect of the costs 
for individual security-dealing firms the initial 
question that had so far not been addressed: why are 
many titles traded on more than one stock exchange? 
This answer is applicable primarily to national but not 
to international parallel exchange markets. Dealing in 
a foreign security on a domestic stock exchange has 
indeed commission advantages for the members of the 
latter, but if such dealings are organized there will 
be substantial additional cost advantages due to the 
fact that an order can be executed here in fewer and 
simpler stages than on a foreign stock exchange. In 
particular, there is no need for the usual foreign 
exchange transaction or for the use of the foreign 
settlement system. With the progress of communications 
technology and the development of national currency, 
payment and delivery systems, comparable costs within 
a country have ceased to be significant although they 
have been decisive for the emergence of stock exchanges 
in all financial centres of any standing. - 316 -
II. DIFFERENCES IN THE QUALITY OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AS FACTORS DETERMINING SEGMENTATION 
As mentioned, the reason for the existence of competing 
markets does not lie only in the cost advantages 
offered to investors and/or security-dealing firms but 
very often also in the special quality of the tran-
saction services they offer. In the case of a few non-
stock-exchange markets this is obvious: 
1. The third and fourth markets in the United States, 
as explained in Part 2, offer block-trading 
facilities of a different quality from those offered 
by the NYSE or the regional exchanges. 
2. The dealing facilities of the British stock exchanges 
basically include the sercice of a market maker and 
the market maker cannot be bypassed as on other 
exchanges; Ariel and other British markets outside 
the Stock Exchange offer transaction services with-
out the market-maker service. 
3. In the case of bond trading in other countries the 
situation with regard to the market-maker service 
is exactly the opposite of that in the United 
Kingdom: it is the rule on non-exchange markets, 
but is unknown on the exchange. 
4. Financial services offered in connexion with dealings 
in unlisted titles are usually different from and 
of lower quality than those offered in connexion 
with stock exchange trading; prices in the former 
often have a narrow basis and it is therefore good 
practice that they should be made public only in the 
form of bid-ask spreads. - 317-
The last example indicates that quality differences 
may be connected with the typical turnover character-
istics of a security. Therefore stock exchanges mindful 
of their prestige, such as those in America, refuse 
to offer transaction services for low-volume stocks. 
The German exchanges are prevented from providing 
such services for a different reason: the legal system 
links the official stock exchange price with certain 
rights which can make sense only if that quoted price 
constitutes a reliable basis. That is why trading in 
a group of securities is not organized by the stock 
exchange - or at least not officially - when it 
might be in other countries. 
Where listed issues are traded not off the exchange 
but on several domestic exchanges, the differences in 
quality between the dealing facilities are usually 
less obvious. It is true that dealing procedures on 
such exchanges are generally not completely identical 
and the turnover characteristics of a security may 
vary from one financial centre to another, with the 
result that the security is assigned to different 
segments within stock exchanges; but these differences 
probably do little to explain why parallel dealings 
take place on domestic exchanges. This also applies to 
the argument that major investors, in particular, 
prefer their orders to remain in the hands of their 
local banker or broker and are not forwarded to other 
firms for execution. Sometimes, however, the different 
exchanges' standard contracts differ so much that -
unlike the differences hitherto mentioned - their 
effect on the position attained by an investor as a 
result of a transaction is not marginal but is quite 
decisive, as when a contract specifies that settlement - 318-
should be "for the account" or should be merely 
conditional as with option contracts. The latest 
developments in the United States demonstrate that 
there is quality competition between stock exchanges 
that goes beyond the quality of the transaction 
services and focusses on the creation of positions 
in securities in such a way that these positions 
will better conform to the preferences of certain 
investors. 
Trading in foreign titles on domestic exchanges can 
also be seen in this light. Because the qualitative 
differences between trading services are more marked on 
the international than on the national scale of 
comparison, these differences are also of significance, 
particularly owing to differences in settlement periods 
and differences in safeguards against transaction risks, 
But a stock exchange with foreign securities primarily 
offers domestic investors easy access to positions 
which are composed of a foreign currency position and 
a securities position. Such positions will often be 
an interesting complement to domestic portfolios. 
Finally, as explained in the first part of the study, 
every transaction service affects the interest of the 
issuers; this is obvious in the case of dealings in a 
security on foreign stock exchanges when the issuer 
thereby gains improved access to a large and efficient 
capital market. - 319-
B. ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED FORMS OF SEGMENTED 
SECONDARY MARKETS 
The reasons why securities are traded in different 
market segments have been discussed in the foregoing 
sections. In this section we are concerned to answer 
the question of how the segmentation is to be 
evaluated. The criterion used is whether segmentation 
does or does not increase the efficiency of the 
organization of the market - procedural efficiency -
in the execution sphere. In Part 1 it was shown that 
the criterion of procedural efficiency was one which 
took due account of the interests of both investors 
and issuers and also those of the security-dealing 
organizations provided they accepted competition on the 
markets for their services. Since this study is directed 
principally towards the execution sphere, we need not 
have regard to all elements of procedural efficiency. 
It will be sufficient if we make clear the influence 
of segmentation on: 
1. The cost of finding the best price available for 
the investor and the cost of consummating the 
trade itself; 
2. the cost of guarding against transaction risks; 
3. the investor's transaction-related information 
costs; 
4. the cost of immediacy. 
The investor's transaction-related information costs 
were classified under the information and decision-
taking sphere on page 29, but since with the information - 320 -
about the state of the market part of the data 
required by an investor for taking a decision is 
produced in the execution sphere, these costs must 
also be considered here. Our analysis of the 
reasons for the emergence of different market 
segments suggested that it would not be appropriate 
to attempt an overall appraisal of segmentation. 
But neither would it be reasonable to present the 
reader with a detailed evaluation of every theoret-
ically conceivable or actually existing form of 
segmentation as a host of segments could be constructed 
based on the factors determining segmentation. 
What we shall try to do here will be merely to assess 
a few important basic forms of segmentation, 
selected neither according to a rigid taxonomic 
system nor arbitrarily but on the basis of the pro-
gramme of reference of this study (Annex 4). The 
system used for reference purposes will be a country's 
integrated secondary market, in other words: 
a central stock exchange. A central stock exchange 
may be homogeneous or it may be divided into several 
segments. The two solutions will first be compared 
with each other. This will enable many basic problems 
to be cleared up and from this will emerge a basis of 
comparison for the assessment of a few more realistic 
types of segmented secondary market. - 321 -
I. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A SEGMENTED 
AS OPPOSED TO A HOMOGENEOUS CENTRAL STOCK EXCHANGE 
We will start by postulating an imaginary central 
stock exchange. Let us suppose that the management of 
the stock exchange has set itself the objective of 
arriving in a few years' time at a situation where all 
the country's security transactions are voluntarily 
effected on the central stock exchange. The requirement 
that all security dealings have to take place on the 
central exchange would then be lifted and all other 
restrictions on competition in securities business 
would be abolished. In our imaginary country there are 
about a dozen stocks with very high daily turnovers; 
several hundred stocks are bought and sold only a 
few times a year; between these two extremes are to 
be found a large number of other stocks with inter-
mediate turnover characteristics. For the sake of 
simplicity we will not specify the composition of 
the membership of the exchange, and in particular 
we will not say whether market makers or mfjmber-
commission-orientated traders can exert strong influence 
on management. Automation of dealing is not an imme-
diate possibility; electronic data-processing systems 
for the transmission of order and transaction data, 
on the other hand, have been adequately developed. 
In the previous section it had become evident that 
special procedures tailored to the turnover charac-
teristics of a security could reduce the cost of 
finding the other side offering the best price 
available as compared with the cost under a universal 
procedure. There are no fully satisfactory universal 
procedures, not even for transactions of normal - 322 -
volume, transactions which stand at the centre of 
this study and on which therefore the following 
analysis concentrates. The only universal procedures 
to be considered are a collective-price procedure 
and dealing through market makers. 
Collective-price procedures are not, however, used 
on any large stock exchange in a uniform way for 
active and inactive securities. For the less active 
titles a calculated collective price is sufficient. 
Transfer of the task of calculating the price to a 
single dealer or stock exchange employee - to take 
the extreme case, which occurs quite often - helps 
reduce to a minimum the time a dealer requires to 
find the best available price and to consummate the 
bargain (cf. Annex 2). We shall call the markets for 
securities in which procedures of this kind are used 
"Segment 2". But in the case of very active stocks 
demand and supply change so rapidly that calculation 
of a price is difficult without the aid of a computer 
into which all bids and offers are fed by the members 
on a continuing basis and can be withdrawn or 
changed; the rapid flow of orders may require a new 
calculation before the first one has been finished. 
For that reason the Tokyo and Paris exchanges employ 
special collective-price procedures for such 
securities ("Segment 1"). The NYSE does not have such 
procedures and therefore frequently suffers its 
well-known delays in determining the opening prices 
and in coping with other peak inflows of orders that 
occur from time to time - much to the delight of 
its competitor exchanges which can then attract business 
to themselves since although they operate by the same 
mehtod as the NYSE they have very much smaller - 323 -
volumes of orders to deal with. So they are in a 
better position to handle peak loads. 
If the management of the central stock exchange opts 
for collective-price procedures, then for the reasons 
just stated it will set up not a homogeneous execution 
sphere but at least two different segments. If the 
exchange wished to have all dealings handled by 
market makers, it would compel all other dealers and 
investors to make use of the financial service 
"immediate bargain" for every transaction. Even if the 
price of this for active securities were zero, that is 
to say if the market maker let his bid and ask merge 
and the members could either buy or sell at this 
price, an additional and superfluous party would 
nevertheless be involved in many cases - in comparison 
with other individual-price procedures and in comparison 
with collective-price procedures based on the auction 
principle (cf. Annex 2). If only for that reason, the 
spread will never be zero (cf. Annex 3). A competitor 
stock exchange could exploit this disadvantage of a 
market-maker-based individual-price procedure, and 
this has happened in London. From the point of view 
of the cost of seeking the best available price and 
the cost of consummating a trade, a segmented central 
stock exchange is superior to a homogeneous one. 
Under the second aspect of procedural efficiency 
in the execution sphere, the aspect of guarding against 
transaction risks, too, a segmented central exchange 
seems to be more advantageous. Protection - particular-
ly of investors - against realization risks in the 
execution sphere on the stock exchange is achieved 
basically through competition between bids or offers, - 324 -
whether in the form of competition between market 
makers or because such competition is implicit in 
trading methods based on the auction principle, par-
particularly in the collective-price procedures. 
From this an important distinction can be drawn: it 
is quite possible that turnover in a security, 
although sufficient to attract two or three market 
makers, does not provide enough orders to enable an 
collective price to be calculated reliably. The 
characteristics of the least active Nasdaq stocks 
suggest that such securities do exist. So a "Segment 3", 
in which the stocks are traded exclusively through 
market makers, could make sense on grounds of 
investor protection. However, in the case of many even 
less active securities, such as are frequently listed 
on all European stock exchanges, one can only in ex-
ceptional instances assume that there is sufficient 
competition to provide protection for investors. 
Strong additional safeguards must therefore be built 
into the organization of stock exchange dealing here, 
especially to protect isolated incoming orders against 
counteraction ("Segment 4"). The French attempt to 
arrange for a few very inactive titles of the Paris 
"hors-cote" market to be traded through market makers 
("procedure speciale") also showed - as did the 
segmentation of the OTC market in the United States -
that such securities are not suited to market-maker 
dealing as they do not attract market makers and that 
a great many securities must be assigned to a fourth 
segment. 
The "ventes publiques" in Brussels and the "Efterbtfrs" 
in Copenhagen are good examples of how investors can 
be adequately protected in Segment 4. Such system-- 325 -
inherent safeguards require additional dealing time 
in comparison with the simple calculation of prices 
from time to time, and in the Belgian example 
additional costs arise for the printing and 
distribution of lists of offers. These costs must 
be weighed against the expected reduction in the cost 
of guarding against transaction risks. It is quite 
possible that such considerations under the second 
relevant aspect of procedural efficiency suggest a 
splitting of the market sector for inactive stocks, 
that is to say that they lead to a segmentation beyond 
what seemed necessary under the first aspect. As we 
will be coming back to this finding, which already 
seems plausible at this early stage of the analysis, 
we will call it "Basic Structure A" for short. Basic 
Structure A is characterized by being composed of 
Segments 1 to 4. The reasons presented in favour of 
Segments 2 and 4 are very strong. Segment 1 is necessary 
only if there are some securities enjoying extremely 
active trading. The reasons for the existence of 
Segment 3 are not prima facie compelling. 
To prevent misunderstandings, let it be said quite 
specifically: safeguards against realization risks in 
the execution sphere do not manifest themselves either 
alone in special trading procedures nor are they 
superfluous in the market segments in which there is 
normally intense competition between tenders. Rather, 
other safeguards are also possible and are applicable 
in all market segments. Such safeguards are particular-
ly marked on the NYSE. In part they are directed against 
several types of realization risk, e. g. by attempts 
to avoid short term price fluctuation and preferential 
treatment for stock exchange members by means other - 326-
than competition, in part they are directed against 
individual relaization risks. These safeguards do 
not determine the trading procedure, they merely add 
a certain emphasis. By audits, rewards and penalties 
the stock exchange management, in particular, is 
able to lend weight to these points of emphasis. 
Some safeguards, taken on their own, are hardly of 
interest to the investor, e. g. the fact that a cross 
by a specialist for his own account requires the 
subsequent approval of the broker of the person who 
gave the order. Other safeguards would be attractive 
to knowledgeable investors who would possibly be quite 
prepared to buy them as special financial services, 
e. g. the obligation of the dealer to execute clients' 
orders to buy ahead of his own orders with slightly 
lower limits (i. e. to abstain from "fellow-travelling"), 
or execution in accordance with general rules on the 
sequence of execution which give priority to investors. 
Since, however, like safety belts in cars, they will 
not be bought by everybody voluntarily, the question 
arises: should not the provision of such financial 
services be made mandatory (see p. 19 f.)? This set of 
problems cannot be further discussed here, however, 
The safeguards referred to are not relevant to a 
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a 
homogeneous central stock exchange vis-a-vis a segmented 
one, as they can be built into the trading procedure in 
both cases. 
The investor's transaction-related information costs 
are the third aspect that must be taken into account 
in assessing procedural efficiency. The relevant point 
here is merely the question of the effective and 
efficient production of basic information about the - 327-
state of the market, not the use of that information. 
What information, presented in what form, will on 
the one hand make it easier for investors to take 
decisions and on the other hand be appropriate for 
assisting supervision of stock exchange members by 
the investors themselves is not dependent on the 
type of central stock exchange and therefore need not 
be discussed. Whatever type of central stock exchange 
the management adopted, all market information would 
be in its hands and it could ensure that information 
on current bids and offers, and on the latest prices 
and quantities traded were available to investors. 
But as mentioned at the beginning of this section, 
the NYSE faces difficulties occasionally in establishing 
the opening price shortly after the exchange has 
opened. On some occasions a whole morning has gone by 
without any dealing taking place on the NYSE and 
there was therefore no information available on the 
NYSE on the state of the market. So an investor planning 
a transaction in one of the stocks affected would 
either have to do without information on prices or 
would have to obtain it from other markets, which 
would entail additional expense, unless there were a 
consolidated tape or a composite quotations system. 
The aspect of information costs underlines - in such 
extreme cases - the importance for procedural 
efficiency of a dealing technique suited to the turnover 
characteristics of the security and suggests, as 
did our discussions in connexion with the first aspect, 
that there should be a special segment for the stocks 
with extremely active trading, in other words that 
the market in active securities should be divided 
into a Segment 1 and a Segment 2. Similar considerations - 328 -
apply in respect of less active titles. It is 
conceivable that trading in these securities through 
market makers will produce a more continuous flow 
of information on current bid and offer prices 
than trading based on collective prices, under which 
in certain circumstances there are either no bids 
or offers at all or none at fair market prices. The 
aspect of transaction-related information costs thus 
provides another argument for Segment 3. 
The fourth aspect, the cost of immediacy, brings us 
to a whole range of important questions. First the 
stock exchange management must decide how far it 
should meet the wishes of investors and dealers to 
be able to do business at any time of day. If it 
gives very high priority to such wishes, it will 
strongly support continuous trading at individual prices, 
probably through market makers and in that case 
possibly by dispensing with collective prices and in 
the extreme case even by making it mandatory to deal 
through a market maker. Segments 1 to 3 might then 
have to give way to a single homogeneous segment. 
Mandatory dealing through a market maker, as applied 
by the British and Irish system to most securities, 
brings the market maker into contact with the full 
flow of orders and therefore makes it easier for 
positions to be closed as quickly as possible; in 
other words mandatory dealing with jobbers reduces 
the market maker's risk and thus reduces the cost of 
providing the financial service "immediate bargain". 
Dispensing with trading at collective prices has a 
similar effect. Whether this advantage for the 
market maker will be reflected in the cost of immediacy 
to the investor will depend principally on the - 329-
competition to which a market maker is exposed, 
whether from other market makers in the same security, 
from limited orders (not possible where market-maker-
dealing is mandatory), or from market makers in 
similar securities. 
As explained in Part 1, what is important is not that 
every individual category of market-organization-
determined costs should be minimized but that the 
sum of these costs in the execution sphere should be 
kept to a minimum, and this applies to the transaction 
services demanded by investors in this sphere. Where 
all investors are satisfied if they are able to deal 
in every security at least once a day, the immediacy 
services will not be taken into account in determining 
the optimum segmentation of the central stock exchange. 
In that case "Basic Structure A", which was arrived 
at after discussion of the first two aspects, will 
be the result. Where, however, all or almost all 
investors desire to be able to do an instant bargain 
at any time they like, the relevant market-organization-
determined costs must always include the cost of 
immediacy. Reduction of these costs as a result of 
mandatory market-maker-dealing may offset the additional 
cost of consummating a trade caused by dealing at 
individual prices through market makers as opposed to 
dealing at collective prices. The stock exchange 
management must therefore first ascertain the pro-
portion of investors who desire immediacy services 
and are prepared to accept additional transaction 
costs to get it. Only then can it try to determine 
the optimum degree of segmentation and the form the 
segments are to take. - 330-
Some indication of the proportion of investors 
desiring immediacy services is provided by the pro-
portion market orders bear to total orders. 
However, security-dealing firms usually prefer 
market orders on cost grounds and tend to try to 
persuade their clients to give their orders in this 
form, for instance by charging higher commissions 
for limited orders. If only for that reason it is 
not just those who give limited orders who are 
prepared to wait for a bargain. Statistics on the 
proportion of limited orders are not usually available, 
but in any case the proportion is probably substantial. 
On the NYSE every second or third bargain involves 
a limit order. This statistic does not take into 
account the fact that it is precisely the larger 
orders that are generally limited. It would therefore 
mean inviting the creation of competing markets, if 
the stock exchange management were to accomodate the 
investors who were unwilling to wait for a bargain 
and thus failed to ensure that those willing to wait 
had the lowest possible transaction costs, in other 
words if it made the second group subsidize the first. 
But mandatory market-maker-dealing implies just that. 
Without precise knowledge of investors' preferences, 
it would probably be best to start from Basic 
Structure A since this structure does not force 
investors who are willing to wait for a bargain to 
subsidize those who are not. Basic Structure A should, 
however, be supplemented in order to accomodate 
trading at any time. The volume of orders coming in 
from investors unwilling to wait for a bargain 
determines firstly the length of trading session, 
and secondly the way in which Basic Structure A - 331 -
is supplemented. Supplementing Basic Structure A 
may in some circumstances not be necessary at all. 
A succession of collective prices at short intervals 
may already be provided for in Segment 1 , as in 
the Gekitaku procedure in Japan. Nor is supplementing 
necessary in Segment 3 of Basic Structure A, in 
which market makers are in any case introduced in 
order to reduce the transaction risks. Segment 3, 
for the existence of which it has so far not been 
possible to advance compelling reasons, would receive 
great additional justification if there were a high 
proportion of investors unwilling to wait. For 
securities in Segment 4 an investor cannot expect 
standing facilities for immediacy services. 
The question as to the additional structural elements 
providing for immediacy services to investors un-
willing to wait is therefore primarily relevant in 
connexion with Segment 2 and, within limits, also 
in connexion with Segment 1. In addition to trading 
at collective prices, trading at individual prices 
will also be admitted here. Where there is a very large 
number of transactions it may make sense to recruit 
one or more market makers, as the example of the CBOE 
shows. Smaller turnovers may still be sufficient to 
support a specialized trader who is spread-orientated 
and member-commission-orientated as well, a person 
who appears with different duties on many exchanges, 
as a "specialist", a "hoekman" or a "Kursmakler" 
(official broker). Or it can be left exclusively to 
any investors and/or dealers who are willing to wait 
for their bargain to hold themselves ready with their 
bids or offers as potential counterparties for those 
unwilling to wait, either with the help of an "open - 332 -
book" as in Brussels, or with the help of a 
"closed book" as in the case of the Saitori or 
without a book as in Italy. Whenever structural 
elements of this kind are encountered we shall, 
in the following segment, speak of a "modified Basic 
Structure A". 
The modifications, especially of Segment 2, in the 
form of the introduction of trading at individual 
prices may, however, give rise to additional 
realization risks for investors unwilling to wait for 
a bargain. In trading at individual prices without 
(competing) market makers it is quite possible for 
example that an order will lead to the only bid or 
offer that is on the market at all, so that for this 
or other reasons there is no protection through 
competing bids or offers on the other side of the 
transaction. One answer to problems of this sort 
might be additional specific investor-protection 
measures as on the NYSE, the cost of which is usually 
borne not solely by the investors unwilling to wait 
but by all stock exchange users. It is conceivable, 
therefore, that for such cases extension of Segment 3 
at the expense of Segment 2 would be the more 
efficient solution. A third solution would be to do 
without individual prices for all the securities of 
Segment 2 for which generally there will not be 
competing bids or offers in dealings at individual 
prices. Dealing could then always take place 
exceptionally at individual prices if, owing to a 
sudden higher inflow of orders, there was certainty 
that there would be competing bids or offers, in other 
words when there were a fairly large number of 
investors and dRalers unwilling to wait. This flexible - 333 -
and efficient solution is practised in Amsterdam 
("opengaan van gesloten hoeken"). 
The analysis has reached a point where it is possible 
to answer the question posed. Only in the extreme 
case where there are no or hardly any investors 
willing to wait for a bargain can taking into account 
the cost of immediacy lead to Basic Structure A 
being rejected as being over-segmented. In that case 
one would possibly recommend a Basic Structure B 
consisting of two segments, one for all securities 
attracting market makers and one for all other 
securities. Only very detailed investigations of 
relevant costs could help one to specify whether it 
was possible for Basic Structure B ever to be the 
superior solution and if so, from what (high) minimum 
proportion of persons unwilling to wait for a bargain. 
Such investigations would be beyond the scope of this 
study. However, the structure of most stock exchanges 
suggests that the demand for both types of trans-
action service - transaction service with or without 
immediacy service - can be very efficiently met with 
a modified Basic Structure A. Moreover, a modified 
Basic Structure A does not necessarily violate the 
principle that investors willing to wait should not 
be forced to subsidize investors not willing to wait. 
In conclusion, let us touch on a few peripheral 
problems. To relieve Segment 1 and the upper part 
of Segment 2 a special segment for small orders may 
be very appropriate. The stock exchange management 
may, as the French and Belgian examples show, combine 
the establishment of such a segment with a differen-
tiation of the standard contracts and thus limit - 334 -
the scope for potential competition by other 
market organizers. For the same reason segments for 
various forms of conditional forward trading, 
e. g. for option trading, could also be established. 
Since segmentation of this kind is not central to 
our study, we shall not go into it any further. 
Finally, block segments may be necessary for those 
blocks of securities which cannot be handled in the 
course of normal stock exchange trading or, more 
precisely, whose buyers and sellers would have to 
accept such high costs of immediacy and cost of 
guarding against realization risks on the stock ex-
change that a special transaction service would pay 
for itself if it wholly or partially prevented such 
costs arising and itself cost less. As the description 
of block trading in the United States has shown, a 
special block transaction service of this kind must 
start outside the stock exchange. The problem of the 
integration of block dealing thus resembles the problem 
of the integration of parallel market, which will be 
discussed in the next section but one. 
Finally the question arises whether it may be possible 
that a segmented central stock exchange has no dis-
advantages at all; so far it has been possible only 
to bring out its advantages as compared with a 
homogeneous central stock exchange. Our considerations 
have been based on the bargain-dependent components 
of transaction costs or at least on the components 
directly explicable by the number and size of the 
transactions, on - so to speak - the variable production 
costs of transaction services. (Of course, it only 
makes sense to speak of variable costs here if one 
follows the plan of this study and bears in mind - 335 -
that the total service corresponding to the trans-
action costs is made up of elements produced 
partly by the stock exchange, partly by other 
security-dealing organizations, partly by the super-
visory authorities and partly by the investors them-
selves.) Now in assessing the cost of securing the 
best available price and the cost of consummating 
the trade itself, as well as the cost of guarding 
against transaction risks, there are no doubt fixed 
costs to be taken into account in addition to the 
variable costs, particularly the costs of the stock 
exchange itself and those of supervision of the 
exchange. Since a segmented stock exchange is more 
complex than a homogeneous one, the costs of the 
former are probably somewhat higher than those of a 
homogeneous exchange. But the degree of complexity 
is certainly not so much greater that more intelligent 
and better-qualified staff are required for a segmented 
exchange. The additional costs are therefore likely 
to remain within narrow limits and should be out-
weighed by the reduction in "variable costs" as a 
large number of transactions is concerned. A related 
possible disadvantage of a segmented central stock 
exchange might be the periodic reviews of the 
allocation decisions taken earlier as the turnover 
characteristics of a security may have changed to an 
extent requiring reallocation to another segment. 
Since such work might on the one hand slightly increase 
the fixed costs of the stock exchange management but 
on the other hand reduce the variable costs, what 
has just been said also applies to this point. 
So the question of whether a homogeneous or a 
segmented central stock exchange is the better solution - 336-
from the point of view of procedural efficiency 
has been answered. Our analysis has shown the 
superiority of a stock exchange divided into segments. 
It only remains to decide what form of central stock 
exchange should serve as the reference system for 
assessing secondary markets with non-exchange 
segments and with several stock exchanges. The 
reference system for the purposes of the next section 
will be a central stock exchange of Basic Structure A. 
In Segments 3 and 4 it included the type B as a 
special case and uses more general assumptions with 
regard to the proportion of participants not willing 
to wait for a bargain, the turnover characteristics 
of the securities traded and the main source of income 
of members, be it spreads or commissions. 
II. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF VERTICAL DIS-
INTEGRATION OF A SEGMENTED CENTRAL STOCK EXCHANGE 
It has become clear on the last few pages that two 
kinds of segmentation may be distinguished: a vertical 
segmentation, as in Segments 1 to 4 or their equivalents 
in the real world, and a horizontal segmentation. 
Every security is in principle assigned on the basis 
of its turnover characteristics to a single vertical 
segment only (provided that it is traded on only one 
market, e. g. only on a stock exchange). Each vertical 
segment may then be supplemented by horizontal segments: 
by special segments e. g. for odd lots, blocks, options, 
and it may be divided into two or more sub-segments 
such as parallel markets or competing markets. 
Whilst the next section of the study will deal with - 337 -
questions of horizontal segmentation and in particular 
with the problem of parallel markets both within and 
outside the stock exchanges, the present section 
will concern itself with the question of how we should 
evaluate a situation in which the vertical segments 
are not comprised within a central stock exchange but 
come under the control of serveral different market 
organizers, in other words where some of the securities 
are traded on a stock exchange and some are traded off 
the exchange. Exchange traded securities may be 
distributed over different stock exchanges, as for 
example in New York over the NYSE and Amex when there 
was no dual listing or in France over the Paris Bourse 
and the provincial exchanges, with no security being 
traded on more than one exchange, on more than one 
market. For the securities traded on the largest stock 
exchange, which is generally the case with the bulk 
of active stocks, there is no difference between 
this set-up and a segmented central stock exchange. 
Thus, this section of the study will not focus on 
the leading exchange but will concentrate on the inter-
mediate and lower segments which have found special 
market organizers. Non-exchange market organizers can 
be found in all the countries we have examined except 
Denmark and France, exchange market organizers for 
securities of the intermediate and lower segments on 
the other hand were observed in pure form only in 
France and the United States. - 338-
1. Several stock exchanges as market organizers 
The American and the French case of disintegration 
of an (imaginary) segmented central exchange, as 
we may call them in line with the course of our 
analysis, differ from each other. The most striking 
case is the unique example of the division of the 
market between NYSE and Amex. Since both stock 
exchanges are basically examples of a modified 
Segment 2, the existence of two exchanges is very 
hard to understand. Admittedly, issuers moving up 
to the NYSE have to pay another initial listing fee. 
Moreover, owing to the enormous volume of sales and 
the traffic associated with it another floor may be 
required in addition to those of the NYSE. But neither 
of these reasons is an adequate explanation for the 
existence of two complete sets of stock exchange 
apparatus in one city. The explanation is more likely 
to lie in the fact that the NYSE has been unable to 
secure acceptance of its listing requirements from 
a fairly large number of issuers whose securities fit 
the Segment 2 and unwilling to frame these requirements 
as to encompass all securities eligible for this 
segment. This has left room for a second stock ex-
change. Since both exchanges' listing requirements 
have grown closer over the decades and now that, 
with the unfixing of commissions, the limit on the 
number of members of the NYSE is no longer as important 
as it once was, the verdict on this unique case from 
the point of view of the participants has become the 
same as the criterion of procedural efficiency would 
suggest. Since the dealing techniques are largely 
identical, there are no differences from the single 
stock exchange situation from the point of view of - 339-
procedural efficiency in the execution sphere 
apart from distinctly higher fixed costs, resulting 
from the fact that there is administrative dupli-
cation. This increases the cost of providing the 
transaction services. The contemplated amalgamation 
of the two exchanges therefore seems logical. 
However, this first case, like all other cases of 
disintegration, also has its competitive-dynamic 
aspects, and these will be discussed at the end of 
this section in their overall context. 
The second case is exemplified by the French provincial 
stock exchanges. The reform of the French stock ex-
change system in 1961 ended the mixture of vertical 
and horizontal segments which is typical of the smaller 
exchanges in the other countries examined. The purely 
regional securities are usually stocks with low 
turnover. Thus in France the disintegration of a 
segmented central exchange into several exchange 
markets splitting off the lower segments has just as 
distinct a real background as has the just described 
case of splitting off parts of the upper segments 
in the United States. Both cases have in common the 
problem of duplicative stock exchange facilities and 
additional costs of exchange supervision compared 
with a situation where there is a segmented central 
exchange. This duplication may reduce procedural 
efficiency. In contrast to the first case, however, 
it seems that there may be positive effects here on 
those components of transaction costs directly 
related to the number and size of transactions. 
These effects will be examined below, by reference 
once again to the four aspects or sub-elements of pro-
cedural efficiency which are relevant to the execution 
sphere. - 340-
The cost of finding the best price available and 
the cost of consummating the bargain were formerly 
no doubt very favourably influenced by the fact 
that most of those interested in regional securities 
lived near the provincial exchanges and communications 
with these exchanges were therefore short and inex-
pensive. These short lines of communication still 
exist today, but their significance in connexion 
with the cost of finding the other side has diminished; 
with the advent of electronic order-switching systems, 
they are of little account. Where the provincial 
exchanges employ the same trading methods for securities 
in the lower segments as does the central exchange, 
no further positive or negative effects arise apart 
from the fact that on a central exchange there is a 
greater number of persons ready to deal in securities 
of all kinds so that it may on occasion be easier to 
find the other side or encounter competing tenders. 
Of course, this applies only where at least some 
of the stock exchange members are allowed to deal 
in the securities concerned for their own account or 
on behalf of others on a discretionary basis and 
where dealing procedures on the central stock exchange 
do not impede the participation of these members. 
However, smaller stock exchanges frequently use 
dealing procedures different from those that would be 
found for securities of lower segments on a central 
exchange. On the French provincial exchanges such 
securities are traded at individual prices - or at 
collective prices provided there are sufficient 
orders - in a collective negotiating session in which 
generally all dealers at that exchange take part 
("a la criee"), whereas in Paris such securities - 341 -
in principle are traded "par easier", that is to 
say at calculated collective prices only. These 
procedures increase the time spent by each dealer per 
trade and accordingly will tend to increase the 
transaction costs. Fortunately, the traders on a 
provincial bourse are usually not really busy and 
draw salaries well below those required at the location 
of the central exchange. 
Of course, these expensive procedures can be expected 
to have a positive effect on the cost of guarding 
against transaction risks, as has already been stated 
in setting out the reasons for the advisability of 
Segment 4. With these procedures the appropriateness 
of the price is assured as it implies the judgment 
of a fairly large number of dealers. Since less attention 
is usually paid to dealings in inactive issues on 
large exchanges than on provincial bourses, an argument 
emerges here in favour of stock exchanges exclusively 
concentrating on securities of the lowest segment. 
This argument fails, however, if the central exchange, 
which serves as the basis for comparison, is segmented 
"correctly", i. e. has developed the "right" procedures 
for the securities traded on it. The argument there-
fore points in the direction of competition between 
market organizers. This competition must first bear 
out which organizer - in certain circumstances 
supported by favourable production conditions - has 
found the "correct" procedure and can therefore offer 
the most competitive transaction services. 
Under the aspect of the investor's transaction-related 
information costs there are no substantial advantages 
or disadvantages compared with a segmented central - 342-
exchange, apart from the afore-mentioned duplication 
of facilities. From the point of view of the cost 
of immediacy no clear advantages or disadvantages 
can be discerned. 
In conclusion, the second case of vertical dis-
integration of the secondary market into several 
exchanges does not seem to increase the procedural 
efficiency of the secondary stock market compared 
with a segmented central exchange either. Admittedly, 
a central stock exchange might not be suitably 
organized in the area of Segment 4 and additional 
stock exchanges could remedy this defect. Nevertheless, 
this advantage of splitting would, because of the 
low turnover in the bottom segment, only in the rarest 
instances counterbalance the disadvantage of 
additional costs due to duplication of facilities. 
It is to be feared, therefore, that such exchanges 
would not themselves be able to bear the financial 
burden of maintaining markets for bottom-segment 
securities since neither investors nor issuers would 
be prepared to pay commissions or listing fees that 
were sufficiently high to cover costs. Thus the French 
provincial stock exchanges have to rely on subsidies 
and the Paris Bourse actually has to charge higher 
listing fees than the provincial exchanges as an 
incentive to listing in the provinces. It must not be 
overlooked that such stock exchanges and their members, 
above and beyond their transaction services, render 
special financial services in the form of financial 
public relations for regional securities, that they 
improve the standing of provincial financial centres 
and often keep alive a centuries-old tradition. 
Moreover, like other institutions involved with - 343 -
securities, they may fulfil further important 
functions beyond their primary purpose. None of 
this is a justification, however, for stock exchanges 
which handle lower-segment securities becoming a 
cost burden on issuers and investors in the upper 
segments. Even these stock exchanges should in 
principle be able to withstand competition and offer 
transaction services of competitive quality at 
attractive prices. If such transaction services 
can be provided neither by a central stock exchange 
nor by several stock exchanges, it seems better 
that other forms of market organization should be 
allowed to come into play. 
2. Exchange and non-exchange market organizers 
The third case of a disintegrated secondary market 
which will be discussed here differs from a segmented 
central stock exchange in that in addition to one 
or more exchange market organizers there are also 
non-exchange market organizers who devote themselves 
to various different vertical segments. In this 
connexion we shall examine the question of what 
advantages and disadvantages accrue if, instead of 
one central exchange or several exchanges organizing 
all segments, some segments are catered for by one or 
more exchanges but others are looked after by non-
exchange market organizers. Of course, it is difficult 
to distinguish exchanges from non-exchange market 
organizers. In the execution sphere a stock exchange 
is characterized by the fact that it helps its 
members (security-dealing firms and also, exceptionally, 
certain investors) to transact business more cheaply - 344-
by making elaborate dealing procedures available 
to them, by supplying information on the current 
state of the market and by making it easier to 
find counterparties of acceptable financial standing. 
Since the settlement sphere is frequently organized 
not by the stock exchange itself but by one or 
more other bodies and since stock exchanges conceive 
their functions differently in the decision-taking 
and information sphere, these two spheres are of no 
help in drawing the dividing line; for example in 
London, Brussels and on the smaller American exchanges 
securities may be dealt in even though they have 
not been listed, whereas most other exchanges always 
do require some form of admission, although they may 
maintain a form of admission on less stringent 
conditions alongside the official listing. Therefore 
a demarcation on the basis of the execution sphere 
seems most appropriate. 
Unfortunately the above-mentioned criteria for the 
execution sphere similarly do not enable one to make 
a clear distinction. As stated in Part 2, Ariel, 
Nasdaq and Eurex would certainly qualify as stock 
exchanges under those criteria as would possibly some 
other market organizers and their markets. It might 
be helpful to base the differentiation, in accordance 
with the traditional concept of a stock exchange, 
on the regualr assembly of traders on the floor of 
the exchange. But the fact that not only Nasdaq and 
Eurex but also the National Market System in the 
United States and telephone dealings between brokers 
and jobbers in the United Kingdom and the Republic 
of Ireland - which are regarded as stock exchange 
dealings - would be classified "non-exchange" - 345 -
demonstrates that this criterion is of limited 
value. Therefore it might seem appropriate to dis-
regard the difference between "exchange" and "non-
exchange" dealings and to focus on the vertical 
segment organized as we did analysing the first two 
cases of disintegration. Nevertheless the following 
criterion was used in Part 2: dealings that take 
place on the floor of a stock exchange were classified 
as "exchange" and all other dealings were classified 
as "non-exchange", apart from telephone dealings 
between brokers and jobbers in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland. In the present context, too, that method 
provides us with a useful dividing line between ex-
change and non-exchange forms of market organization. 
This terminological clarification suggests the 
following two steps. First, one must determine what 
segments could have their procedural efficiency 
improved by having dealing take place without a 
physical assembly of dealers, in other words one must 
decide where, even within a segmented central exchange, 
dealings off the floor would seem appropriate. Only 
when this preliminary question has been answered can 
there be a discussion of the advantages and disad-
vantages of dividing the market-organizing function 
between exchange and non-exchange organizers. As in 
Section I, it will again be assumed here that automation 
of dealing is not yet possible. Nevertheless, certain 
consequences of automation will be examined where 
this now appears necessary. 
It became clear in Section I that dealings in Segments 
1 and 2 ought to take place on the auction principle. 
Both segments are therefore prima facie unsuited to - 346-
trading off the floor since in the absence of 
automation the personal presence of as many dealers 
as possible at the place of dealing, e. g. in the 
crowd, is essential. The securities of Segment 3, 
on the other hand, are best dealt in, as we have 
shown, by the market-maker principle; therefore, since 
the introduction of the telephone, trading on the 
floor of the exchange is no longer necessary here. 
This applies particularly when there is only one 
market maker. From the point of view of the cost of 
consummating the trade, it seems more advantageous 
in this case if the contact, which otherwise serves 
to transmit the order to the floor booth of the firm 
holding the order, is established direct with the 
market maker resulting in immediate execution. Since 
a market maker can also usually be phoned on the floor 
of the exchange, this is no argument for trading off 
the floor but simply an argument that efficient 
trading without an assembly of dealers is possible 
in contrast to the situation formerly prevailing. 
Trading direct by telephone is also to be recommended 
from the point of view of the protection against 
transaction risks, since an order becomes known to 
fewer people, thereby reducing the risk of "fellow-
travelling". However, with trading decentralized it is 
a disadvantage that the market organizer does not have 
as easy access to information about prices and market 
makers' spreads as on the floor of the stock exchange. 
Firstly, supervision - and hence the cost of guarding 
against transaction risks - may thereby be rendered 
more expensive, and secondly off-floor trading may 
hamper the central supply of up-to-date information on 
the state of the market to investors and to the - 347-
market makers themselves. Insufficient information 
about developments on the market as a whole may 
result in market makers charging higher forward-
cover premiums in decentralized dealing than when the 
operations are concentrated on the floor of a stock 
exchange, although the more titles a market-making 
firm holds positions in the less likely is it that 
this effect will occur. 
When traditional communications technology is used 
there is a great deal to be said, therefore, for 
concentrating trading on a floor even in Segment 3. 
But with communications improved by the introduction 
of an electronic quotation system, as has happened with 
Nasdaq, the drawbacks mentioned disappear, as they are 
attributable primarily to lack of insight into the 
latest state of the market which is considerably 
improved by systems like Nasdaq compared with the 
simple traditional concentration of information on the 
floor of the exchange. But modern price information 
systems operated by some stock exchanges provide 
equally good insight. However, Nasdaq or similar 
systems solve the problem of securing the best available 
price where there are several market makers better 
than does mere spatial concentration of market makers 
on a floor. A further advantage of spetially-decentra-
lized trading with an electronic concentration of 
trading information compared with spatially-concentrated 
dealing may be that personal contact between competing 
market makers is less resulting in narrower spreads 
due to intense competition. Since in decentralized 
dealing market makers are free to choose the location 
they operate from, they may be able to reduce their 
costs in this way, tax advantages possibly being - 348-
a factor. Finally, an important advantage of de-
centralized dealing is the possibility that regional 
firms which would not contemplate participating in 
trading on a distant stock exchange may be induced 
to become market makers. In this way, too, more 
competition would be generated between market makers, 
with a favourable effect on the cost of immediacy. 
To sum up, it can be said that with communication 
facilities increasingly being improved and made 
cheaper a spatially-decentralized form of dealing in 
Segment 3 will tend to be able to reach a higher degree 
of procedural efficiency than dealing on the floor of 
a stock exchange. 
In the case of Segment 4, the question whether dealing 
on the floor of the exchange is more efficient than 
a decentralized form of dealing again cannot be the 
subject of a simple answer. Very few stock exchanges 
have tried to organize such dealing and only in the 
case of France and Denmark can one speak of an almost 
complete integration of Segment 4 into exchange 
dealing. In contrast to Segments 1 and 2, for which 
trading on the floor of the stock exchange is the 
rule in all countries, no uniform solution has emerged. 
However, it appears that off-floor trading predominates 
as it does in Segment 3. 
The question as to the cost of finding the best price 
available and the cost of consummating the trade in 
decentralized dealing as opposed to dealing on the 
floor of a stock exchange is sufficient to reveal the 
most important aspects. For any given security the 
probability of finding an other side at all must 
inevitably be greatest and the choice of the best - 349-
counterparty the easiest where there is a con-
centration of all bids and offers. This is true 
regardless of the number of bids and offers arising 
in a given period, that is to say even when there 
is so little activity in a security that no firm 
makes a market in it. Because of economies of scale 
where there is intensive use of stock exchange 
facilities, because of the auction principle and its 
importance for combating transaction risks, and 
because of simplicity of supervision, it is best for 
trading to be concentrated not at any random location 
but on the floor of a stock exchange. Now, since it 
very often happens with securities of Segment 4 
that only one order at the most is received in a day, 
it appears to be a good idea to intensify the 
concentration by going beyond spatial concentration 
and the usual temporal concentration of dealings and 
achieving an even stronger temporal concentration 
as in Copenhagen with the weekly calling of the B List 
or in Brussels with the weekly or monthly "ventes 
publiques". In this way the probability of a bargain 
being done would be heightened and at the same time 
the daily call could be cut out, thus saving dealers' 
time. This approach assumes that the stock exchange 
and its members accept that they should only passively 
receive and execute orders; against that background 
it makes sense, even though, like the daily attempts 
to quote inactive securities customary on other 
exchanges, it is no guarantee that any transactions 
can be effected. 
Most days it will not be possible to find an other 
side at all. Therefore the question arises whether 
transactions in securities of Segment 4 cannot be 350 -
brought about in another way, i. e. not by passive 
waiting for counter-orders but - by analogy with 
block assembling - by actively contacting potential 
counterparties. As outlined in Part 2 (see for 
example pp. 73, 96, 138, 255), some firms and indeed 
some individuals are very well qualified to fulfil 
this function by virtue of their contacts with share-
holders in a company or with a comparable body of 
persons. Their search for a counterparty regularly 
results in transactions even in situations where mere 
concentration would not. There is basically no reason 
why a member of a stock exchange who is investor-
commission-orientated and at the same time specializes 
in a few inactive securities, such as the Belgian 
"specialiste", should not make contacts of this 
kind outside the exchange and thus combine the advantages 
of such contacts with the advantages of a concentration 
of dealing. This unusual combination, which is not 
permitted in all countries, could be successful in 
some cases, but frequently the expense of making such 
contacts will not be worthwhile in view of the small 
volume of business that can be expected. Other security-
dealing firms, particularly banks, however, do possess 
the necessary knowledge and contacts even in minor 
financial centres by virtue of their activities in 
other fields. To them therefore falls the role of 
successfully acting as occasional brokers in securities 
of their customers that are rarely dealt in; many 
banks deliberately engage in such activities and 
actively organize a market in stocks of issuers who 
are affiliated to them. 
From the point of view of transaction risks, a 
situation arises here that is in general very difficult 351 -
to assess. Nevertheless, it is more likely than 
with dealing in the same securities on the floor of 
an exchange that an investor will be able to sell 
or buy within an acceptable period of time and 
at prices that seem more or less reasonable to 
persons with knowledge of the stock in question. 
Other requirements are hardly relevant unless these 
two basic prerequisites are fulfilled, in other 
words basic effectiveness takes precedence over 
efficiency. 
This is not to say that dealings in Segment 4 ought 
to take place off the floor of the exchange. Just as 
stock exchange managements in the higher segments 
place specialist dealers at the centre of trading, 
so one could envisage firms with special contacts as 
"central brokers" with a duty to consummate bargains 
on the floor. But making it mandatory to deal on 
the floor would in these cases raise costs unreasonably 
since the counterparty will be sought outside the 
exchange and there will be no competing bids and offers 
on the floor anyway; in contrast to the situation with 
block transactions, for example, there will be no 
orders on the stock exchange awaiting execution and 
therefore be no need to protect orders against non-
execution. Other aspects of investor protection point 
to the same conclusion. The investor faces transaction 
risks primarily as he decides on the transaction and 
places the order. Contrary to the situation in the 
higher segments, he usually cannot expect rectification 
by the time the execution phase has been reached, 
e. g. a competitive pricing of his order to sell 
limited well below what would be considered a fair 
market price. In other words, the importance of a - 352 -
well-organized dealing procedure for and its 
contribution to the protection of investors decreases 
as the frequency of transactions in the securities 
concerned declines. To sum up, it emerges that 
dealing on the floor of the exchange seems superfluous 
wherever certain security-dealing firms, by virtue of 
their contacts, are able to bring about executions 
more dependably than can the exchanges by virtue of 
their spatial and their usual temporal concentration. 
In those securities for which such brokers are not 
available the exchanges could try to facilitate 
occasional transactions on the floor. 
Now we are prepared for the main question: what are 
the advantages and disadvantages of dividing the 
market-organizing function between exchange and non-
exchange organizers? In principle, a "central broker" 
of Segment 4 could be a member of the exchange with 
all the rights and duties attaching to such membership, 
even if he were not subject to the requirement that 
all dealing must take place on the floor of the 
exchange - like some British jobbers who, because of 
the nature of their business, do not deal on the floor 
of the exchange. So the stock exchange management 
could regard all dealing in Segment 4 as exchange 
trading and could organize and supervise it accordingly. 
This would correspond to the concept of a segmented 
central stock exchange which endeavours to establish 
and maintain in all segments procedures that are 
effective and as efficient as possible. If, however, 
this solution seldom occurs in reality, it is for a 
number of reasons which do not require examination 
since they are not of great significance for the 
overall assessment of the third case of vertical - 353 
disintegration, be those reasons unevenly graduated 
listing requirements, listing fees unacceptable 
to small issuers, prestige-seeking by stock ex-
changes, demarcations imposed by stock exchange 
law, cost considerations entertained by the stock 
exchange management, and/or simply the knowledge 
that hardly any benefit can accrue from the trans-
action service rendered by the stock exchange -
unlike the situation prevailing in the higher 
segments. 
It seems to depend primarily on the aspirations of 
individual stock exchanges whether or not they wish 
to organize the whole secondary market - from the 
stage of advising the client to the stage of con-
summating the bargain or even right through to the 
settlement stage, A typical example of an exchange 
with comprehensive organizational aspirations is the 
Stock Exchange of the United Kindgom and the 
Republic of Ireland. The Stock Exchange registers 
even every occasional transaction effected by its 
members in securities of Segment 4, since these off-
floor transactions (cf. pp. 68 and 74) require 
approval, and as soon as sales show a certain degree 
of regularity the Stock Exchange does not allow the 
security to continue to progress gradually within 
Segment 4 but calls upon the issuer to apply for 
an exchange listing. Hence the issuer has to make 
sure that a minimum portion of the issue is publicly 
held, the security is listed and progresses directly 
to Segment 3, for which the Exchange possesses an 
outstandingly suitable trading procedure. 
For that reason non-exchange market organizers - 354 -
of Segment 4 play a much smaller role in the 
United Kingdom and Ireland than they do in other 
countries. Only in France and Denmark is their 
role of even less significance, but that is mainly 
a consequence of official regulations, although 
in Denmark it is also the result of the limited 
scope of the Danish secondary market. Since non-
exchange market organizers are more strongly in 
evidence in all the other countries examined, 
the fact that a different situation has emerged 
seems to call for an explanation. The British and 
Irish concept of an exchange may be applauded as 
an attempt at comprehensive self-regualtion but 
it may also be explained by saying that this Exchange 
can have no interest at all in non-exchange market 
organizers of Segment 4 since it trades in securities 
of Segments 1 and 2 by the procedure of Segment 3 
and that it must therefore necessarily regard every 
market organizer as a potential competitor with 
good prospects of success in the upper segments as 
well. Stock exchanges that are conficent of the 
efficiency of their dealing procedures can afford to 
tolerate non-exchange market organizers. 
To sum up, it can be said that the more a country's 
stock exchange or stock exchanges concentrate their 
organizational efforts solely on the execution sphere, 
the more likely is it that they will neglect the 
Segment 4 securities and the more frequently will 
non-exchange market organizers be found in that 
segment. Efforts by exchanges to organize the 
secondary market more comprehensively tend to produce 
a segmented central stock exchange or exchange 
system. At first sight a central exchange which - 355-
regulates the entire secondary market and is 
optimally segmented would seem to be the best form 
of market structure from the point of view of 
procedural efficiency, since only this form will 
prevent a superfluous duplication of facilities. 
But this finding is based on assumptions that are 
hardly in line with facts: there would have to be 
certainty at all times as to which financial 
services of what quality would have to be offered 
to investors and issuers on the secondary market 
and as to how such services could be most efficient-
ly provided. Under these circumstances an efficient 
central stock exchange would be conceivable. There 
is no guarantee, however, that such a central 
stock exchange would always adapt itself promptly 
and correctly to the preferences of investors and 
issuers and would improve its "production" techniques 
as soon as more efficient methods became available. 
It therefore seems sensible to regard procedural 
efficiency not as something static or related to a 
particular point in time but as a dynamic concept 
relating to a fairly long period of time. Accordingly 
one should concentrate less on the question of 
which secondary market structure offers the highest 
degree of procedural efficiency at a given moment 
than on the problem of how a high degree of procedural 
efficiency can be guaranteed in the long run. 
From this angle it seems quite acceptable for 
several mutually independent market organizers to 
exist side by side, despite the costs caused by 
duplicative facilities. In other lines of commerce 
and industry the decision to forgo the cost savings - 356 -
that could be achieved by concentration of pro-
duction is for similar reasons one of the tenets 
of antitrust policy. Duplication usually works to 
the advantage of investors and issuers as well 
as it does in favour of consumers generally. 
This is the easiest way of ensuring that there is 
a market organizer for each segment improving 
procedural efficiency. Whereas an organizer of all 
segments can afford to neglect or subsidize one or 
more segments, the organizer of a single segment 
will always try to attract as many issuers and 
investors as possible to his market by the quality 
and price of the services he offers. It is not a 
matter of indifference to him which organizer an 
issuer decides to opt for. If he is successful, the 
organizer of one segment will exert competitive 
pressure on the organizer of another segment and 
thus force him to improve the production and the 
marketing of his transaction services. As a result, 
the direction of the competitive pressure may well 
be reversed, unless both organizers save themselves 
the trouble of competing by co-operating or 
amalgamating. 
The neglect of a vertical segment or of part of it 
has become evident in recent years on several 
occasions, e. g. the establishment of the Tento 
Shoken in Japan (see pp. 194 f.). In this context 
one may also want to refer to the markets that 
replaced the "mercati ristretti" in Italy (see 
pp. 170 - 173), and to the activities of Nightingale 
& Co. in London (see pp. 74 f.), a firm trading in 
securities with turnover characteristics which 
do exist, although not in line with the philosophy - 357 -
of the Stock Exchange. There is a recent example 
for the beneficial effects of pressure emanating 
from a competitive market organizer: the effect 
of the NASD and its Nasdaq system on the New York 
stock exchanges (cf. pp. 236 - 239), which was 
particularly evident in connexion with the shares 
of the Bank of America. On the basis of its turnover 
characteristics this stock could long have been 
traded in Segments 1 or 2 but up till 19 76 the Bank 
of America allowed it to be dealt in only off the 
exchange, that is to say by a procedure that was 
optimal only for securities of Segment 3, though 
other major banks have had their shares listed on the 
NYSE for some years. Clearly, the issuer was con-
vinced that NASD had organized Segment 3 so much 
better than the stock exchanges had organized the 
higher segments that even the basically more suitable 
procedure used could not increase procedural 
efficiency in trading the share. Not until the NYSE 
allowed commissions to be determined by competition, 
as it was standard practice in off-board trading, 
and after the NYSE had adopted competition between 
specialists and allowed orders to be executed on the 
third market in a practical manner did the Bank 
apply for listing, expressly referring to the above 
innovations as the reason for its action. The result 
of these developments was to ensure that on the one 
hand investors in the Bank's shares who were not 
willing to wait for a bargain suffered no disadvantage 
through the stock exchange listing since the intensive 
competition between market makers could continue, 
and on the other hand that clear advantages were 
produced for investors who were willing to wait. - 358 -
From the longer-term aspect the thesis of the 
superiority of a sole market organizer for the entire 
secondary market, which seems acceptable from 
static analysis, is untenable. Dynamic analysis 
suggests a market structure comprising vertical 
segments, or even parts of such segments, under the 
control of several competitive market organizers. 
It is irrelevant today whether the market organizers 
in the two lower segments operate a trading floor 
and thus may be called "exchange" or not. A secondary 
stock market that is vertically segmented in this 
way will be the basis of comparison for the next 
section which is devoted to the assessment of 
parallel markets and similar forms of horizontal 
segmentation. - 359-
III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SELECTED FORMS 
OF HORIZONTAL SEGMENTATION OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
As stated at the beginning of Section II, a horizontally 
segmented secondary market is characterized by the 
fact that instead of there being a single market for 
a given security there are several sub-markets. This 
horizontal segmentation or fragmentation is more pro-
nounced in the upper vertical segments of the secondary 
market than in the lower. In addition to the principal 
market for the security, on which most transactions 
of normal volume are effected, there are special 
(horizontal) segments for odd lots, for blocks, and 
for forward trading, and sub-segments for offsettable 
orders and for before and after-hours dealings, as 
well as sub-segments in the form of domestic and 
foreign parallel markets. Majority-interest transactions 
will not be regarded as forming part of the block 
segment for our present purposes. The price of a 
controlling interest is influenced by special company-
law and tax factors and the market for controlling 
interests can therefore be regarded not as a horizontal 
segment. It is a special market which is not 
distinguished from the principal market solely by 
differences in market organization. 
The factors giving rise to various forms of horizontal 
segmentation have been set out in Section A and it 
has emerged from Section B I that special segments 
will be found even in a central stock exchange which 
strives to attain the highest degree of procedural 
efficiency and does not wish to give other market 
organizers any openings for successful competition. 
Therefore our prime concern here will be to examine - 360 -
the importance of parallel segments for procedural 
efficiency. The two main problems of horizontal 
segmentation are the result of the decentralization 
of bids and offers in a security; they will first 
be explained paradigmatically by reference to 
in-house crossing and by the example of a parallel 
market. In the light of the findings that emerge 
we shall then evaluate other forms of horizontal 
segmentation and analyse the special problems 
attaching to such forms. 
1. Advantages and disadvantages of in-house crossing 
Whilst in-house crossing is common in Italy, Luxembourg 
and Denmark, it is forbidden or severely restricted 
in all the other countries under consideration as 
it is mandatory there to deal solely through a stock 
exchange. "In-house crossing" or "offsetting" refers 
to the consummation of securities transactions on the 
basis of orders or other bids or offers held within 
a security-dealing firm and at the prices prevailing 
on the principal or another market. In short, off-
setting means in-house matching of bids and offers at 
prices established elsewhere. Admittedly, it is 
irrelevant where the crossing takes place and for that 
reason regional stock exchanges on which orders are 
executed at the prices prevailing on the principal 
market were described as crossing facilities in Part 2 
(see for example pp. 116, 129 f., 24 3 f.). Hence the 
problems to be addressed in this section are more 
general than it may appear at first sight, particularly 
since other transactions, e. g. certain block trans-
actions, may also be judged to constitute crossing. - 361 -
In the passage that follows we shall assess in the 
light of the relevant aspects of procedural 
efficiency the advantages and disadvantages of 
the execution of orders by in-house crossing as 
against the concentration of all bids and offers in 
the principal market. 
The cost of finding the best counterparty and the 
cost of consummating the bargain are obviously 
reduced by crossing. Where orders can be offset, no 
costs arise for passing on the orders or for their 
execution at the principal market, e. g. member 
commissions. Offsettable orders are usually matching 
unlimited orders; in exceptional cases limited 
orders, whose limit is so far away from the market 
as to be without significance, may also be offset. 
If owing to unexpected price fluctuation such limits 
become effective, the crossing firm must substitute 
its own bid or offer for the limited order scheduled 
for crossing that has become inexecutable. "Risky 
crossing" of this sort is conceivable, but in 
practice only "safe crossing" is met with, mainly 
because it provides the simplest way of separating 
offsettable orders from those to be transmitted to 
the floor. Moreover, orders with limits far away from 
the market are extremely rare, in contrast to orders 
limited close to the market and market orders. No 
costs usually arise for separating offsettable orders 
since the firmls order department records and sorts 
the orders received anyway. 
In connexion with the cost of guarding against tran-
saction risks, it is appropriate to deal with 
realization risks and information risks (see 362 -
pp. 24 - 28) separately. We will first examine 
whether there are in fact any realization risks 
at all that result from crossing, that is to say 
whether it is possible for an investor to obtain 
a worse price where there is offsetting than he 
would if the bids and offers were concentrated 
entirely on the principal market. The answer to this 
question as to the effect of offsetting on prices 
depends on whether, if there were no offsetting, 
the orders would have to be executed on the 
principal market at certain specified times at 
collective prices or whether they would have to be 
executed continuously at individual prices. Where 
there are collective prices, only the net balance of 
market orders can have any influence on the price; 
the absolute number of units the market orders are for 
is irrelevant, so there is no realization risk as 
a result of offsetting here. Only where there are 
unexpectedly sharp price movements is there a 
danger that "risky" - but not "safe" - crossing will 
accentuate the price movement and hence give rise 
to a special realization risk. As stated above, this 
occurrence may be disregarded. 
Another complication would arise if, as a result of 
in-house crossing, no price could be established 
on the principal market for lack of orders. This 
conceivable disadvantage of crossing is, however, 
unlikely to occur, as the orders other than those 
to be crossed would in that case have to be all on 
one side or limited in a way that the highest bid 
is below the lowest offer. Since in that situation 
a collective price could not be readily determined 
even if there were not any in-house crossing and - 363-
since in such circumstances the existence of 
offsettable orders seems particularly unlikely, 
no significance will be attributed to this disad-
vantage. In reality there will be no in-house 
crossing in securities that are not regularly 
dealt in, with the result that sub-segments for 
crossing will be found only in the two upper 
(vertical) segments, in line with the thesis set 
forth at the beginning of this section. 
A further argument against offsetting might be based 
on the fact that on some exchanges a price may be 
quoted only if a certain number of units were traded. 
It would therefore seem appropriate to ban in-house 
crossing in order to enable a price to be quoted 
more often. However, if a particular firm would 
forward to the floor matching market orders for the 
quantity required even the smallest limited order 
is enough to determine (or at least to influence) the 
price. Thus, the purpose of such rules - to let 
only price-judgements determine the price clearly 
expressed in and backed up by orders of sufficient 
weight - is better served by making in-house crossing 
mandatory than by banning it. The effect of a ban 
on offsetting on the scaling-down of orders, which 
is permitted on some exchanges in order to allow 
transactions even where there is a substantial excess 
of supply or demand, should be regarded in the 
same way. Admittedly, a ban on offsetting could 
increase supply and demand on the floor equally by 
the amount of the orders that would otherwise have 
been crossed and thus enable a higher quota. But it 
would still not be possible to ascertain the price 
that clears the market firmly based on the auction - 364 
principle. As in the case of minimum quantities, 
a ban on offsetting merely improves the outward 
appearance of an intrinsically unsatisfactory 
situation. This advantage is insignificant, particu-
larly since many stock exchanges prohibit dealings 
in situations of disequilibrium in order to protect 
investors from the risk of transacting at prices 
that are not fair market prices. 
In the case of continuous trading the question as 
to whether there are any realization risks occasioned 
by in-house crossing can be answered only if the 
origin of the price at which crossing takes place 
is known. Whereas in the previous instance execution 
without offsetting would have taken place at a certain 
collective price such as the opening price or at 
the price calculated once a day, there is no such 
clear reference price in the present instance. 
Basically, therefore, we must accept that the price 
will be affected. Even if the bid or ask prevailing 
on the principal market is used as the basis and 
offsetting takes place for example on the bid, 
offsetting increases the risk of non-execution since 
behind this bid there may be a buying order 
which will be ignored even though it reached the 
market before the buying order that was crossed. 
Against this disadvantage, however, there is an 
advantage for the buyer involved in the cross who, 
thanks to offsetting, is able to buy not on the 
offer but on the lower bid. A cross at a price 
within the spread would obviate non-execution 
problems and would give rise to no other realization 
risks. If the spread is wider than two minimum 
price-variations, it may be advisable, for the - 365-
purpose of a more accurate determination of the 
price, for the bids or offers to be called out on 
the floor of the principal market. In place of 
an (off-exchange) offsetting there would than be 
an exchange offsetting (see for example pp. 62 f., 
133 and 226 f.), which is not offsetting in the 
proper sense at all since in this case the price 
is determined on the principal market, on the floor. 
Except where the current spread is known, is not 
wider than two price-variations, and the bargain is 
done within the spread, realization risks as a 
result of in-house crossing cannot be ruled out if 
there is continuous trading at individual prices. 
It would be different in the case of continuous trading 
at collective prices encountered in Japan and France. 
Here a clear reference price would always be available 
in the form of the next collective price and what 
has been said above in connexion with trading at 
collective prices will apply. 
So far we have not taken into account the fact that 
in-house crossing may take place between an order and 
a matching unlimited bid or offer for the account 
of the offsetting firm. A chance offsetting transaction 
for own account should be viewed no differently from 
any other offsetting transaction. However, since the 
transaction costs relating to own-account crossing 
may be lower for the firm than the transaction costs 
in connexion with a normal bargain, there may be 
an increased readiness on the part of the firm to 
make changes in its own portfolio. If one assumes 
that if it did not cross in house the firm would 
have to pay a member commission, the situation can 
be expressed as follows. A contemplated change in the 366-
portfolio which, in the absence of offsetting, 
would result in a sufficient yield only if the 
selling price on the exchange were higher by the 
amount of one member commission than at present -
a change which is therefore not made - could be made 
by means of own-account offsetting if an offsettable 
buying order was received. Provided there is trading 
at individual prices the in-house cross could be 
made at the bid prevailing, which would be extremely 
favourable to the client and which could be raised 
slightly in order to avoid non-execution problems 
as explained in the paragraph above. This effect 
has repercussions on supply and demand and may 
therefore lead to price effects. These price effects 
do not, however, entail realization risks. On the 
contrary, they should be welcomed from the point of 
view of allocational efficiency since they represent 
a step in the direction of a situation in which there 
are no transaction costs. If, on the other hand, 
the own-account offsetting transactions occur neither 
by chance nor for reasons of cost-saving but are 
motivated by inside knowledge, the firm can be 
interested in offsetting only because it is desired 
that the strength of existing differences of opinion 
with regard to the value of the security should not 
become apparent through exceptionally high published 
volume, in other words what arises in this case are 
not realization risks but information risks caused 
by in-house crossing. 
Information risks caused by in-house crossing can 
arise if accurate knowledge of the trend of the volume 
of sales is relevant for decision-taking by one or 
more investors and for the success of their decisions, - 367 -
but the real trend of turnover is concealed by-
undisclosed crossings. Of course, if the principal 
market does not publish volume figures for individual 
securities at all, offsetting cannot impair the 
"transparency" of volume trends. Where sales of 
individual securities are published, it is advisable, 
if there are in-house crosses, for the principal 
market to be kept informed of these transactions, and 
this also applies under the aspect of investors' 
transaction-related information costs. 
The cost of immediacy, which is relevant in this 
connexion only where there is trading at individual 
prices, does not arise for persons placing offsettable 
orders since crossing replaces the immediacy service. 
As far as the speed at which a market maker can 
liquidate his position if he so desires, crossing 
is without influence, and so there is not even a 
negative repercussion on the provision of this service 
for other investors. However, there no longer has 
to be any subsidizing of investors who are unwilling 
to wait for a bargain by those investors, who, 
thanks to offsetting, no longer need this service 
and no longer permit a market maker to earn a spread 
in riskless transactions. This must be considered 
a further advantage of in-house crossing. The execution 
of orders at an offsetting price within the current 
spread is a reflection of this advantage. 
One sometimes encounters the view that a ban on 
in-house crossing increases the depth of the market, 
i. e. it would make it possible to buy or sell 
substantially more units if small price concessions 
are made. However, if there are offsettable (unlimited) 368 -
orders even maximum price concessions are not 
sufficient, for example, to give access to the 
offsettable market orders to buy where there is 
an urgent sale; no price is low enough to displace 
the market orders to sell. Basically, therefore, 
the depth of the market cannot be increased by 
bringing offsettable orders to the floor. 
In conclusion, the existence of sub-segments for 
in-house crossing in the two upper market segments 
would increase procedural efficiency where dealings 
take place at collective prices if offsettable 
orders are crossed at the next collective price and 
if the volume of crosses is reported to the 
principal market for publication. Crossing of orders 
which would otherwise be executed on the floor at 
individual prices causes serious concerns because the 
current spread on the principal market is not 
usually known and quickly changes. If, however, the 
spread is known, an offsetting at a price in the 
middle of the spread gives the investors involved such 
clear advantages that possible realization risks 
occasioned by in-house crossing are counterbalanced. - 369-
2. Advantages and disadvantages of parallel markets 
Parallel markets are facilities for transactions in 
certain securities characterized in the following 
six ways: 
1. there is at least one other market (the principal 
market) for transactions of normal volume in 
these securities; 
2. the prices are established autonomicly, i. e. 
on the basis of orders received and not merely 
taken from another market; 
3. the individual transactions are of normal volume; 
4. as a rule, at least two security-dealing firms 
are involved in the transactions; 
5. dealing takes place on the principal market and 
on the parallel markets at the same time, although 
the length of the trading sessions may differ; 
6. the various markets in a particular security are 
linked with each other through arbitrage. 
The features stated above provide sufficient demarcation 
between parallel markets, particularly vis-a-vis 
in-house crossing of orders at prices established 
elsewhere, vis-a-vis special segments such as block 
markets and facilities for the execution of odd-lot 
orders, and vis-a-vis a market system, another form of 
spatially decentralized dealing. Parallel markets in 
the sense of our definition are often met with in 
real life. Firstly, they take the form of stock 
exchanges: in Germany, Japan, Italy, the United States - 370 -
and to a lesser extent in Belgium a fairly large 
number of securities are traded on several domestic 
stock exchanges simultaneously. Secondly, in these 
and other countries there are parallel markets outside 
the stock exchange for securities listed on the 
exchange, especially for bonds but also, as the 
example of the third market in the United States 
demonstrates, for stocks. In assessing this important 
form of horizontal segmentation we need not specify 
which market is to be regarded as the principal 
market and which market or markets as the parallel 
markets. 
As in Section II, the competitive-dynamic aspect 
will initially be ignored. We shall first discuss 
the advantages and disadvantages of parallel markets 
vis-a-vis a secondary market that is merely 
divided into vertical segments, viewing the matter 
under the static aspect. 
From the point of view of the cost of finding the 
best price available and the cost of consummating 
the bargain, the question immediately arises whether 
centralization of the orders would not in many cases 
make it possible to promote a security traded on 
several markets to a higher segment and hence to 
deal in it by a more efficient procedure. In this 
connexion it must be borne in mind, first, that 
parallel markets exist mainly for securities which 
rightfully belong in the upper segments. Secondly, 
Segment 1 is of exceptional character and differs 
little in its degree of efficiency from Segment 2. 
Thirdly, Segment 2 is characterized by the broad 
spectrum it covers, accomodating securities with - 371 -
modest turnover as well as highly active secu-
rities. For these reasons progress to a higher 
segment seems either improbable or irrelevant. The 
fact that securities of Segment 2 can be traded 
on several markets by the procedures of Segment 2, 
because there is a sufficient inflow of orders 
even on smaller markets, may constitute an important 
reason for the existence of parallel markets. It 
is by no means certain that centralization of the 
orders would not reduce the total flow of orders to 
all markets. Even apart from arbitrage orders, 
parallel markets are thought to have the effect of 
stimulating investor interest in trading, since for 
example the members of regional exchanges open up 
remoter markets for transaction services. It can 
be left open whether the efforts to sell transaction 
services would be less strenuous and less successful 
if there were no parallel markets. Whatever the answer 
to that question, centralization of orders would 
probably not mean that the securities traded on 
parallel markets would be assigned to higher segments. 
Another factor which may be relevant under the 
first aspect of procedural efficiency of the execution 
sphere are the short channels of communication where 
there are regional parallel markets. It is no 
longer as important as it once was, although it 
does still remain an advantage. Thus, it can be said 
that parallel markets under this aspect exhibit 
slight advantages rather than disadvantages. 
The situation is different if one looks at it from 
the angle of the cost of guarding against tran-
saction risks, an aspect that is closely connected 
with finding and securing the best price available. 372 
With centralization the originator of the order 
deals, through his broker, with the most favourable 
counterparty on the entire market for the security 
in question, in other words, he has access to the 
lowest offer or the highest bid, whereas on 
parallel markets he deals merely with the most 
favourable counterparty on a sub-market, which 
often implies access to only the second or third 
bid or offer. Trading in a system with parallel 
markets therefore necessarily causes an investor 
price disadvantages in many cases compared with the 
situation obtaining where all trading is centralized 
on a single market, for example the execution of 
a selling order against a bid at 130 at a time when 
there is sufficient demand at 132 on a second 
market. This entails other investors not receiving 
execution, for example an investor or investors who 
have placed orders to buy at 132; where there was 
centralized dealing, orders to buy with a limit 
of 132 would be executed before those limited at 
130. These investors must watch transactions being 
done on a parallel market without themselves 
receiving execution, despite their higher buying 
limit. 
Now it is often objected that this distinct disad-
vantage of parallel markets is insignificant because 
it is removed by arbitrage. That is partly correct. 
Without a doubt arbitrage ensures that prices on 
parallel markets do not diverge widely and tends to 
keep prices on all markets in line so that extreme 
differences between the most favourable bid or offer 
for a security on a sub-market and that on another 
market do not arise. Without a doubt, too, arbitrage - 373-
reduces the risk of non-execution. Thus it is quite 
conceivable, in the example we have given, that 
an arbitrageur on the first market knew about the 
bid at 132 on the second market and accepted the 
incoming selling order at 130 in order immediately 
to effect a complementary bargain on the second 
market at 132. Without arbitrage neither order 
would have been executed. To put it another way, 
orders are basically always passed on to the sub-
market with the most favourable bid or offer, but 
for this there arise unit "passing-on costs" amounting 
to the difference between the two most favourable 
tenders, the amount of the gross arbitrage profit. 
This spread is earned by the arbitrageur and not by 
the selling investor as it were without horizontal 
segmentation. 
To avoid misunderstandings, we emphasize that the 
comparison being made here is not between parallel 
markets with arbitrage and parallel markets without 
arbitrage but between parallel markets (with arbitrage) 
and a dealing system that is only vertically segmented, 
i. e. one that is centralized. With centralized 
dealings there is no way that prices diverge and the 
problem of non-execution can be much more easily and 
completely solved than by arbitrage which is of no 
help if the net arbitrage profit is zero or negative 
or if the collective prices are established at 
different points in time. In addition, every investor 
then has the chance to have his order executed against 
the most favourable bid or offer on the market, in 
other words to earn the unit gross arbitrage profit 
for himself or at least to share it with the investor 
on the other side of the transaction. If a dealer 374-
with knowledge of the orders were to prevent this 
by placing himself between the two investors for 
his own account, his spread earned could be 
described as the result of risk-free counter-action. 
The division into sub-markets makes such conduct 
easier and also facilitates straightforward (non-
risk-free) counter-action, because orders will 
tend to remain unexecuted on the market for longer. 
Without prompt execution an important protection 
against counter-action is lost. Arbitrage could 
therefore appropriately be described as risk-free 
inter-local counter-action. For the investor, the 
"chance" of doing a deal with an arbitrageur entails 
a transaction risk. 
From this angle it is natural that the NASD and the 
London Stock Exchange do regard it as a success that 
they have removed arbitrage by setting up Nasdaq 
or by merging the stock exchanges in the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland and by introducing 
the MPDS. To sum up, it can be said that the spread 
earnings just described clearly represent market-
organization-determined costs for the investor and 
therefore tend to reduce procedural efficiency. 
Every arbitrage profit of a dealer reduces the yield 
to the investor from holding securities. 
The significance of the gross arbitrage profit for 
procedural efficiency can be illustrated by an 
example. In Germany the proportion of arbitrage 
transactions to volume of sales in stocks is probably 
at least 5% and the average gross arbitrage profit 
can be assumed to be 1-2% of the market value. On 
turnover of DM 10 000 million there is thus an 375-
aggregate gross arbitrage profit of DM 5 - 10 million 
or 0.05 to 0.1% of volume. That gives an idea of 
the amounts involved. It would surely be a mistake 
to suppose that aggregate market-organization-
determined costs could be reduced by amounts of 
this size if parallel markets were dispensed with. 
Without a doubt additional costs of passing on the 
orders to the central market would arise if there 
were to be centralization and there would also be 
other additional communication costs (i. e. additional 
costs for finding the best price available and 
additional costs of consummating bargains) and these 
costs would arise for all orders not hitherto passed 
on to the principal market and not merely for those 
affected by arbitrage. Even if these additional 
costs are higher than the aggregate gross arbitrage 
profit, from the point of view of procedural efficiency 
parallel markets - contrary to first appearance -
should not be unreservedly welcomed, since one would 
also have to assess such disadvantages of parallel 
markets as for example the risk of non-execution 
which is present even if there is arbitrage. If, 
however, the additional communications costs are 
lower, parallel markets would clearly be disadvantageous 
here compared with a market segmented only vertically. 
Progress in communications technology raises the 
question whether the additional communications costs 
might not be lower than 0.04 to 0.08% of the tran-
saction value of an order. These rates are derived 
from the rates mentioned above, bearing in mind 
that volume equals executed orders from one side of 
the market only and that for a good third of the 
orders in Germany no additional communications costs 
would be incurred. The rates would probably be 
different in other countries. - 376 
If more thorough investigations, which would be 
beyond the scope of this study, were to produce the 
rather surprising finding that progress in 
communications technology does not for the time 
being suggest that parallel markets should be 
abolished in some countries, not even where there 
are markets situated close to each other and with 
intensive arbitrage connexions, there would still 
be two other possible ways of increasing procedural 
efficiency by reducing the gross arbitrage profit. 
Both ways lead to a market system. The first possi-
bility would be to create a quotation system on the 
model of Nasdaq and the CQS (see pp. 257 - 262, 290 f.). 
Additional communications costs would then be incurred 
for fewer orders than under spatial concentration; 
these costs and the costs of the system would possibly 
be lower per period than aggregate gross arbitrage 
profits, thus increasing procedural efficiency. The 
second possibility would be for the arbitrageurs to 
offer for a member commission a special service 
similar to that provided on the Japanese regional 
exchanges by special securities companies (see pp. 176 f., 
189) and to execute orders on behalf of investors on 
the sub-market with the most favourable bids or 
offers, so that at least a part of the possible net 
arbitrage profit remained to the investor. 
To sum up, it appears at first sight, under the aspect 
of the cost of guarding against transaction risks, 
that there are distinct disadvantages of parallel 
markets on account of the risk of counter-action both 
straight and inter-local and on account of the 
additional risk of non-execution. So far, only the 
effect of the additional risk of inter-local - 377-
counter-action (arbitrage) has been weighed 
against the advantages of parallel markets in 
connexion with the cost of finding the "best" 
price available and the cost of consummating a 
bargain. 
Parallel markets increase at least one further tran-
saction risk, the risk of price frauds. Admittedly, 
price frauds are realization risks which are 
attributable to the settlement sphere, since in 
case of a price fraud the investor is credited with a 
selling price lower than that actually obtained or 
is charged a purchase price higher than that actually 
dealt at. But it is the execution sphere which 
provides the basis for price frauds; these can occur 
if several prices are reported for one security in 
the course of a day, particularly on different 
markets. 
Inter-local price frauds, that is to say the 
crediting or charging of prices of a sub-market other 
than that on which the bargain was actually done, 
are more harmful to the investor than simple inter-
temporal price frauds, which can also occur under a 
centralized dealing system, for the following reason. 
Because of the counter-action character of arbitrage, 
explained above, the prices at which bargains are 
done will more often lie at the limits of the orders 
and less often between the limits of immediately 
executable orders than will be the case with a 
centralized dealing system. Expressed in another way, 
and related to a particular security, this means that 
under a system of parallel markets viewed as a whole 
a higher daily "high" and a lower daily "low" can - 378 -
be expected in any security than under a centralized 
system. Parallel markets thus increase the potential 
spreads obtainable from price frauds and hence 
increase the incentive to commit price frauds. There 
was information available neither on the importance 
of the additional price-fraud risk occasioned by the 
existence of parallel markets nor on the reduction 
of the risk of fellow-travelling. As mentioned earlier, 
where there is decentralized execution of orders fewer 
people will get to know about an order; in this case 
the dealer's closeness to his clients may well affect 
his conduct. Moreover, the opportunities open to a 
"fellow-traveller" may be concealed owing to the fact 
that a large order is spread over several sub-markets. 
Since a dealer who learns of a part-order only will 
have to assume that additional bids or offers will 
facilitate execution as a result of arbitrage, he 
will have less incentive to "fellow-travel" than a 
dealer who has knowledge of the large order on a 
central market. 
From the point of view of the investor's transaction-
related information costs there first arises the 
problem of adequate publicity for turnover, particu-
larly if some sub-markets publish no daily turnover 
statistics for individual securities. We may dispense 
with a detailed discussion of this point as a similar 
situation was analysed in the section on in-house 
crossing. Prompt reporting of prices on all markets 
is also less easy to achieve than under a centralized 
system. Some problems and opportunities of consolidated 
price and turnover reporting have been outlined in 
Part 2, on pages 285 - 287. - 379-
It is often claimed that parallel markets reduce 
the depth of the market and therefore increase the 
cost of immediacy. The depth of the market has 
two sources. The opportunity of an instant bargain 
is offered either by persons placing limited orders 
or by market makers or other dealers who take 
positions spontaneously in return for price premiums 
or discounts (see Annex 3). The first source does 
not appear to be directly impaired by parallel 
markets. If one compares all sub-markets in aggregate 
with one centralized market, there is no reason to 
expect that the flow of orders should be thinner 
or that there should be fewer limited orders held 
on parallel markets. As explained above, owing to 
decentralization some orders will not be executable 
at all or will be executable only by arbitrage, with 
the result that it it likely that there will be more 
orders held on the parallel markets. The possible 
stimulating effect of regional stock exchanges on 
the demand for transaction services points in the 
same direction. On the other side, indirect effects 
cannot be excluded, for example the spread between 
"high" and "low" prices may have repercussions on the 
placing of limits on orders, and the rates of trans-
action costs (which are dependent on horizontal 
segmentation) may have an effect on the inflow of 
orders. - In contrast, the effect of parallel markets 
on the second source of market depth, a source which 
is not accessible everywhere, is likely to be 
unfavourable. Firstly, market makers and other dealers 
find conditions on a centralized market more favourable 
to the liquidating of positions owing to the con-
centrated flow of orders and secondly they are 
possibly exposed to keener competition through 
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limited orders. Under a spatially-decentralized 
system of dealing, conditions as favourable as on 
a secondary market that is segmented only vertically 
can be provided for them only by integrating 
parallel markets in a single market system. 
Thus we find no definite disadvantages from the 
point of view of the cost of immediacy. Naturally the 
individual sub-markets are shallower than the market 
as a whole. Since orders in most cases come into only 
one sub-market, there will normally be lower net 
sales proceeds or higher gross purchase expenditures 
than is the case with centralized bids and offers. 
Of course, investors often try to obtain the benefit 
of the full depth of the market by spreading large 
orders over sub-markets. This procedure is laborious, 
but if the investor were to go to only one market he 
would rely on the modesty and self-restraint of 
the arbitrageurs. Even then the state of the market, 
particularly the volume of orders on individual 
sub-markets, will never be anticipated correctly, 
so that some bargains will have to be done with 
arbitrageurs. For that reason, e. g. in the case of 
a substantial sale, the net sales proceeds will be 
lower, even where orders are spread, than on a central 
market, but this is due not to narrowness of the 
market as such but to the difficulty of choossing the 
right market. What is usually complained of as the 
narrowness of parallel markets should strictly 
speaking be laid at the door of a different short-
coming: the impossibility, on parallel markets, of 
regularly and reliably finding the other side 
offering the best price available on the market as 
a whole. - 381 -
An important disadvantage of parallel markets is 
the cost of duplicative facilities. An indication 
of the forgone economies of scale may be found by 
relating the expenses of various stock exchanges 
to the volume of sales effected on their floors and 
by comparing the resultant stock exchange costs 
expressed as a thousandth part of volume for large 
and small markets. Unfortunately data on the costs of 
the stock exchanges were available only for American 
parallel markets. The four largest American regional 
exchanges, at least, provide comparable dealing 
facilities and assume similar regulatory functions. 
In addition, they deal almost exclusively in equities. 
So the expenses and volumes of these exchanges may 
be used to provide some idea of the orders of 
magnitude involved. Admittedly, the four exchanges 
do not all quote the same securities, but that will 
hardly have any impact. In 1975 the stock exchange 
costs expressed as thousandths of volume were 0.70 
for the NYSE, 2.2 7 for the PSE, 2.94 for the MSE, 
and 4.05 for Amex. The volume on these exchanges is 
shown in Tables K - 3 and K - 4 on pp. 212 and 214; 
the tables show that the NYSE with over 80% of overall 
volume is the largest exchange, the PSE with a little 
over 3% is the smallest, with the MSE and Amex having 
slightly higher shares of volume than the PSE. On 
average for the years 1972 - 19 75 stock exchange costs 
as a thousandth part of volume amounted to 0.64 for 
the NYSE, 2.10 for Amex, 2.66 for the MSE, and 1.86 
for the PSE. 
From what we have said so far the reader may have 
gained the impression that on the whole the disad-
vantages of parallel markets, when judged from the - 382-
static point of view, outweigh their advantages 
as compared with a secondary market that is segmented 
only vertically. In many cases this first impression 
will be correct, but the decisive point is the 
relative weight of the advantages and disadvantages. 
In the case of dealings in foreign securities, in 
particular, the disadvantages probably do not out-
weigh the advantages, since orders of domestic investors 
in respect of such securities, as stated on page 315, 
can be executed with fewer and simpler steps than on 
markets abroad. In many cases of parallel markets 
for domestic securities more thorough investigation 
from the static viewpoint would probably reveal the 
advisability of greater centralization of dealing, 
either by merging parallel markets or by changing to 
a market system. 
From the competitive-dynamic point of view, a 
reduction in the number of market organizers would 
give cause for concern. What has been said on pages 
355 - 358 also applies here by analogy. Here, too, 
the use of advanced dealing procedures may be better 
ensured by competition between market organizers than 
by any other means. It is naturally also a feature 
of this competition between market organizers that 
one will lose business to others, just as the NYSE, 
contrary to its original objectives, has lost its 
business in governmental bonds almost completely to 
non-exchange market makers (see p. 272). Market-maker 
trading of bonds was successful compared with trading 
bonds on the NYSE mainly because limited orders are 
very much less common in bond transactions than in 
the trading of equities and the investor in bonds 
is generally interested in immediate execution. - 383-
Other aspects are the lower risk of holding a 
market maker's position compared with the situation 
with shares, which keeps the cost of immediacy 
down, the competition between off-floor market 
makers, and their remarkable capabilities of 
assuming position risks. In bond dealings in some 
other countries, especially in Germany, a similar 
development seems to have started or even to be 
well under way. 
The misgivings that many people entertain about 
dealings off the floor of a stock exchange probably 
result largely from the fact that they take "off-the-
floor" to mean unregulated, unorganized and obscure. 
But the connexion is not fundamental. Certainly the 
parallel markets organized by the NASD or Ariel, 
to name but two examples, are at least as strictly 
regulated and transparent as many traditional stock 
exchanges. For that reason we have not distinguished 
between exchange and non-exchange parallel markets 
in this section. The success of a non-exchange market 
at the expense of a stock exchange is thus thoroughly 
to be welcomed, if both markets employ convincing 
dealing procedures. 
The same is true of parallel stock exchanges. In 
contrast to the situation in the past, when problems 
of communications justified these exchanges, today 
the existence of parallel markets is based more and 
more on successful competition. Parallel markets 
are thus increasingly becoming competing markets 
with greater or lesser differences in their 
transaction services, their dealing procedures and 
their commissions. This produces a situation in - 384 
which regulations and practices that restrict 
competition must be avoided. On the one hand it 
must be possible that one market can lose all its 
business to another if the quality and price of its 
transaction services are not competitive. On the 
other hand an existing or even a new and innovative 
competing market must have the chance of attracting 
all the business there is. Accordingly, making it 
mandatory to deal through a stock exchange, commission-
fixing arrangements (cf. pp. 313 - 315) and exchange 
territories must increasingly be regarded as obstacles 
to the further development of the secondary market. 
Where progress is not possible through quality and 
price competition, regulations or arrangements of 
this sort prop up parallel markets which, had there 
been competitive access to all markets, would have 
long since had to cease business, in other words 
these restrictions prevent the centralization of 
dealing. If, however, as a result of new develop-
ments, progress is possible in the production of 
transaction services, such restrictions may impede 
or delay the growth and success of competing markets -
regrettably, as competition in the first place could 
answer the question what degree of horizontal 
segmentation is desirable. 385 -
3. Evaluation of other forms of horizontal segmentation 
Some forms of horizontal segmentation can be inter-
preted partly as in-house crossing and partly as 
parallel markets, so that in this way their essential 
advantages and disadvantages as compared with a 
market that is segmented only vertically can be brought 
out indirectly. In-house crossing has been defined as 
in-house matching and non-autonomic pricing of orders. 
"Out-of-house" off-floor crossing or external crossing 
would at first sight seem illogical, since the orders 
might just as well be passed directly to the floor. 
Nevertheless some practices can quite well be 
described as external crossing. Where a security-
dealing firm is not a member of the principal market 
and therefore has to pay a non-member's rate of 
commission - fixed on a cartel basis - for the 
execution of orders on the principal market, the 
crossing facilities already mentioned in Section 1 
grow up, in the form of regional stock exchanges. 
So long as such regional stock exchanges abstain from 
establishing prices autonomicly, the disadvantages 
of parallel markets will not arise. It is therefore 
quite understandable that the SEC after a few months 
abandoned its decision, taken in its early years, 
to compel the regional stock exchanges to establish 
prices based on orders held instead of relying solely 
on New York prices. The American third market, too, 
can be interpreted in this way to a certain extent. 
Because of its qualitative aspects, however, it 
also has definite competing market characteristics. 
Special segments must also largely be regarded as 
means of crossing and hence under the aspects of - 386 -
procedural efficiency the judgement on them must 
often be favourable. In the special stock exchange 
segments for odd lots in the United States and 
in France (dealing "par opposition") the dependence 
on the prices established on the principal market 
is evident. In Germany this dependence results 
from the fact that the collective price for small 
orders is established while the continuous trading 
takes place. Thus, in a similar way as in "par 
opposition" trading or in American odd-lot dealing, 
any excess orders that cannot be crossed at the 
prevailing price on the principal market are absorbed 
by the princiapl market. 
Some special segments for block transactions also 
display distinct characteristics of in-house crossing. 
In addition to commission advantages the crossing of 
blocks may yield substantial savings of cost of 
immediacy and it frequently reduces the high imputed 
cost of guarding against "fellow-travelling". It is 
often worth-while to wait patiently for orders on the 
other side (fourth-market houses in the U.S.) or at 
least to precede the planned execution on the principal 
market with what might be described as an attempt 
at offsetting, by briefly announcing one's interest 
to potential counterparties before proceeding to the 
principal market if no matching interest is found 
in this preliminary approach (Instinet, AutEx, Ariel, 
Comstock). Systems such as AutEx and Comstock, in 
addition to the advantages of offsetting which they 
provide, also have the effect of sharpening the 
commission competition for block orders as they offer 
a good chance of arranging crosses to smaller 
security-dealing firms which, unlike the large broking 387 -
firms, have not been able to establish contacts 
with institutional investors and thus cannot 
as well assemble the other side to a block 
transaction on their own. Furthermore, the first 
three systems initially displayed the characteristics 
of competing markets: they, or at least some of 
their participants, in contrast to the members of 
the exchanges, offered the mere execution service 
without any investment advice and were thus pioneers 
of the "unbundling" of transaction services. In the 
United States a fair number of exchange members has 
adopted this practice. Ariel in London, on the other 
hand, has retained its character as a competing 
market, particularly since dealing without jobbers 
is a special feature there. 
The disadvantage of these systems is the fact that 
prices are usually determined autonomicly within 
the special segments resulting in price differences 
compared with the principal market. As in the case 
of parallel markets, this raises problems of non-
execution and in many cases also problems of 
arbitrage. A well-devised solution of this problem 
is that found by the NYSE. The crossing of blocks 
on this exchange at the clean-up price (see p. 231) 
combines major advantages of crossing, obviates non-
execution and arbitrage between block segment and 
principal market, and in addition ensures reporting 
of the transaction. Because of the growing turnover 
in the block segments one may feel inclined to ask 
which segment should be called the principal market 
and which the special segment. Despite high volume, 
the number of orders in the block segments is 
generally much smaller than on the principal market - 388-
and prices thus cannot be readily established, 
neither by auction nor by market-maker principle 
(see Annex 2). Not least for this reason it is 
unlikely that the block markets will relegate the 
present principal markets to the status of special 
segments for "small" orders, a process to which 
there would in principle be no objection. There is 
another conceivable disadvantage of block segments 
that seems unimportant: the block segments' in-
creasing share in volume could mean that some 
securities would have to be relegated to Segment 3. 
This danger is small because institutional investors 
are interested principally in the top securities, so 
that despite the effects of institutionalization 
the principal markets would still be left with orders 
sufficient to establish individual or even collective 
prices. 
Finally, let us mention briefly the most important 
advantages and disadvantages of before and after-hours 
dealing: 
1. The total cost of finding the best price available 
and the cost of consummating the bargain are 
lower under this procedure than if stock exchange 
hours were to be extended. Not all the participants 
in a regular trading session need to stand by for 
occasional transactions among a readily discernible 
group of participants. 
2. The investor unwilling to wait for execution tends 
to face increased transaction risks (see p. 332). 
3. Price and volume reporting may be insufficient. - 389-
4. For the investor there is the chance of 
transacting immediately, in line with the 
rationale of "modified Basic Structure A" 
(see p. 331 f.) . 
If, on the other hand, as is frequently the case, no 
investors take part in the dealings at all and the 
security-dealing firms trade among themselves with-
out publicity, this by definition does not affect 
procedural efficiency. 
Two special cases of before and after-hours dealing 
call for additional appraisal. Firstly, before-hours 
dealing gives the dealer an opportunity to base his 
operations on the price trend expected on the basis 
of clients' orders received, e. g. where there is a 
surplus of buying orders he will try to acquire stock 
at prices as near as possible to the previous day's 
prices. As there is a danger that stock will be taken 
up which would otherwise have been directly available 
on the principal market, e. g. on the stock exchange, 
this practice is to be qualified as a special kind 
of "fellow-travelling". A certain degree of protection 
against this transaction risk is provided by regulations 
which stipulate that no security-dealing firm may 
buy or sell for own account at prices at which 
clients' buying or selling orders which the traders 
of that firm hold or know about could be executed. 
Secondly, the trading of foreign securities before or 
after domestic exchange hours, but during dealing 
hours on the principal overseas market for such 
securities shows characteristics of both offsetting 
and parallel markets. It does not matter whether 
one interprets this trading as a parallel market or - 390 
a kind of crossing facility for ascertaining the 
excess supply or demand to be absorbed by the 
principal market. In either case this trading still 
contributes to increasing the procedural efficiency 
of the secondary market. - 391 -
C. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF AUTOMATED TRADING 
ON SEGMENTATION 
Although the effects of electronic data processing 
on securities trading relevant to this study have 
been described in some detail, particularly in 
Part 2, we have not yet systematically discussed 
their effects on procedural efficiency. The programme 
for the study requires to point out the advantages 
and disadvantages of a market system providing for 
automated trading compared with markets working 
with traditional methods from the point of view of 
the interests of the investor (see Annex 4). Thus, 
it seemed appropriate to discuss questions related 
to automated trading at this point separately although 
they could equally well have been incorporated in 
Section B. 
An obvious question at this point is whether it might 
not be possible to reduce the degree of horizontal 
segmentation by linking sub-markets electronically 
in order to reduce the disadvantages of parallel 
markets without losing their advantages. Before taking 
up that question, we must first make clear how the 
transition to an automated system of dealing is to 
be judged. No detailed comparison of methods is 
possible within the framework of this study, of 
course. Our analysis will therefore be confined to 
a few fundamental considerations and will be based 
on the relevant passages in, especially, Part 2 
(see pp. 69 - 73, 90 - 92, 108 f., 121 f., 134 - 139, 
233, 235, 257 - 262, 268 f., 281 - 302). Because of 
their different characteristics, automated trading 
in Segments 1 and 2 will be discussed separately from - 392-
that in Segments 3 and 4. 
In most of the countries examined electronic order-
switching systems are increasingly being used 
to reduce the cost of processing the orders. These 
facilities have partly been created by large security-
dealing firms for own use and are partly a service 
provided by the stock exchange available to all 
members. These systems pass all or some of the 
orders automatically to the floor offices of individual 
member firms or direct to the market for the 
security, e. g. to the specialist on the NYSE. In 
addition, the work necessary for the clearing and 
settlement of stock exchange transactions is either 
already carried out by means of electronic data 
processing systems or attempts are being made to work 
towards this solution. With a linking of the order-
switching system and the clearing system on a stock 
exchange by means of automated trading, the order 
data, once fed into the system, would be locked in the 
system from the placing of the order right up to 
settlement. This result would be very interesting from 
the point of view of the total cost of execution of 
the order. From the point of view of supervision and 
transaction risks, too, such a solution would have 
substantial advantages. In the first place, the 
progress of the transaction could easily be recorded 
chronologically - as is not the case with the 
traditional procedure - and could if necessary be 
traced in detail, for example for the purposes of 
investigating complaints from investors. Secondly, 
the system would be programmed to take account of 
investor protection regulations in the execution 
sphere and would provide a more reliable guarantee 393-
of their application than is possible with vocal 
communications. 
Nevertheless, anyone who has ever experienced a 
day of lively business on the floor of a major 
stock exchange will doubt whether the results of 
this breath-taking activity can ever be achieved 
by the sober methods of electronic data processing. 
Many exchange members regard the information which 
they gain from the behaviour, the appearance and the 
voice of other dealers as very important and can 
barely imagine working successfully under different 
conditions. They point out that a proper view of 
lively or even hectic dealings in a particular 
group of securities can be gained only by a trader 
who is actually present on the floor of the exchange. 
These arguments against the automation of dealing seem 
to have become less substantial in recent years. It 
is recognized that a quotation system if properly 
planned can provide an excellent view of the state 
of the market provided that the bids and offers 
displayed are firm. No doubt systems of this kind 
are unable to provide information on a par with that 
gained by direct observation of other traders. But 
in the future the cost advantages of automated 
trading will emerge more clearly and will probably 
make traders more ready to do without information to 
be gained by direct observation on the floor. It 
should be noted that dealing over the telephone has 
greatly reduced the degree of personal contact. 
Trading systems like Instinet and Ariel do not even 
provide for voice contact. The members of the Cincinnati 
Stock Exchange started trading by a similar method - 394-
recently and on the NYSE thousands of orders for 
less than 300 shares each are executed each day 
by specialists without any personal contact with 
other dealers. In the trading at calculated 
collective prices there has for a long time been no 
personal contact at all in many cases; the purely 
arithmetical operation can be taken over completely 
by the computer, as the example of the Brussels 
Bourse demonstrates (see pp. 121 f.). 
Nevertheless, there is still no major stock exchange 
with a trading system that is largely automated. 
This is not surprising when one considers the demands 
that are placed on such a system. The task of 
automatically executing small incoming orders at 
predetermined prices as in odd-lot dealing, recording 
the execution, and storing the relevant data for 
clearing purposes is relatively simple and hence was 
solved at an early stage, as was the problem of 
developing a computer-assisted system of trading 
whereby bids and offers are communicated by electronic 
means to the specialist or, as in the case of Ariel, 
to a relatively small group of participants and 
accepted by feeding in instructions, if desired 
after negotiation through the system. But where there 
is a large number of participants and a rapid 
succession of bids and offers of differing sizes 
from both sides of the market, computer-assisted 
dealing at prices directly determined by the traders 
themselves is impracticable. However, this situation 
is typical of the principal markets of Segments 1 
and 2. In this case the computer itself must take 
over the job of finding the most favourable existing 
bids or offers on the other side and then doing - 395 -
bargains if the limited orders on file or other 
bids and offers are reasonably related. As Merrill 
Lynch's proposal states (see pp. 292 f.), the system 
should be able to recognize unfavourable spreads. 
It would have to be programmed in a way that it 
would first make a bid or offer within the current 
spread. If this bid or offer was unsuccessful, a 
bid (for example) would have to be repeated at a 
lower price after a few minutes. An addition, the 
program would also have to contain safeguards 
protecting investors if there is an insufficient 
number of competing bids and offers. 
Finally, the system must at least be able to manage 
an orderly opening at collective prices which, at 
any rate in Segments 1 and 2, precedes trading at 
individual prices. Contrary to trading by traditional 
methods, the problem here, even with extremely active 
securities, does not seem to be the calculation of 
the collective price, and therefore different tech-
niques for Segment 1 and Segment 2 no longer seem 
necessary neither for the opening nor for subsequent 
transactions as the system could even cope with 
individual bargains coming in very rapid succession. 
It is quite conceivable that at the opening the 
system might transmit a provisional collective 
price for each security on the basis of the orders 
on file at that particular moment for a certain period 
before dealing commenced, say for 30 minutes, either 
continuously or at short intervals. On the basis of 
this information additional orders could be con-
tinuously fed in by dealers and by investors via 
their brokers if they thought the provisional opening 
price was favourable. Trading would then be opened - 396-
at the collective price which had been reached 
by the time dealings were due to commence. 
What we have said should be enough to give an 
indication of the complexity of complete automation 
of the execution sphere. It will also have made clear 
that - as was to be expected - none of the principles 
of auction trading becomes obsolete and that hence 
the problem of an insufficient number of competing 
bids and offers still remains - the main problem of 
investor protection in the execution sphere. The 
goal of a system of automated trading is primarily 
to reduce the cost of processing orders in the 
execution sphere, particularly by doing away with the 
physical assembly of dealers and doing without the 
intervention of member-commission-oriented market 
participants, who for that reason are the strongest 
opponents of the developments that are taking place, 
whereas the investor-commission-oriented houses see 
advantages in them. Apart from the reduction of these 
costs there may be additonal advantages as the 
strictly non-arbitrary way in which business is 
conducted may convince investors that their orders 
are being executed fairly. The speeding up of the 
transactions is another factor contributing to this. 
As in Nasdaq trading, the execution of an order could 
be confirmed within a very short time, while the 
client is still with the representative advising him, 
and this would frequently facilitate additional 
transactions. 
Because of the different interests of the participants 
in the market and the difficulties of automation, it 
is not surprising that developments in this field 397 
are slow and that the strongest impulses towards 
the further development of security-dealing 
techniques in the United States emanate from the 
legislature and the regulatory agencies and are 
directed not towards individual stock exchanges but 
towards a market system. Even a joint quotation system 
linking all sub-markets reduces the disadvantages 
of parallel markets described above in detail 
although the problem of passing the order on to 
the market with the best bid or offer available 
remains unresolved, particularly for small firms. 
Integration of all sub-markets into a system of 
automated trading removes these disadvantages completely, 
in particular it would make sure that each investor 
obtains execution at the most favourable price 
available within the whole system. Of course, the 
system has to be so attractive that all market 
participants will use it. In order to make sure of 
this attractiveness, it seems necessary to have 
several market organizers. It is true that the concept 
of a market system prevents a parallel market from 
emerging as a competing market. Within the market 
system competition can take place only through the 
prices of securities and through the price, range 
and quality of the financial services offered, assuming 
that the quality is not fixed by the system. It is, 
however, quite conceivable that there should also be 
competition between market organizers of various 
different vertical segments or part-segments to 
attract issuers, especially between the market 
organizer of Segment 1/2 and the market organizer of 
Segment 3. 
For several reasons automation of Segment 3 appears - 398-
an easier task. Firstly, the number of transactions 
is smaller than in the segment above it. Secondly, 
the roles of the market participants are more 
clearly defined; only the market makers have to feed 
in prices and therefore only their bids or offers 
can be accepted. Thirdly, there are no member-
commission-oriented dealers whose resistance has to 
be overcome. It is thus not surprising that progress 
is most in evidence in this segment. Although Nasdaq 
is primarily a joint quotation system for its market 
makers, a later transition to automated trading was 
envisaged from the beginning and is expected to be 
brought into operation as soon as the clearing and 
settlement system has been perfected for securities 
authorized for Nasdaq trading. A second example of 
progress in Segment 3 is Eurex. The positive effects 
of these systems on procedural efficiency are obvious; 
thus, the individual aspects are not discussed here. 
The fact that Eurex also provides for dealings in 
securities which have no market maker represents a 
first step towards automation of trading in Segment 4. 
For years to come such steps can be expected only 
as a complement to developments primarily designed 
to cater for more active titles. Automation of trading 
can reduce the cost of processing orders, ensure that 
investor protection regulations are observed, improve 
the transparency of the market, and sharpen competition 
between dealers. But the boundaries marked out by 
the turnover characteristics of a security cannot be 
overcome by automation of trading any more than 
by traditional dealing procedures. - 399-
D. CONCLUSIONS FOR THE STOCK EXCHANGE POLICY 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
In undertaking this study we were asked to provide 
an answer to two overlapping questions: 
1. Is a similar form of organization for the 
secondary stock markets of the individual Member 
States desirable in the interests of a proper 
functioning of the Common Market? 
2. Which is the better form of organization: an 
integrated market or a fragmented market? 
The second question must be answered before the first, 
since if it is not known which is the superior form 
of organization there is no way of knowing whether 
the market structures of the individual Member States 
should be harmonized. 
Our analysis of the execution sphere of the secondary 
markets in the Member States of the European Communities, 
Japan and the United States has revealed that in 
every country there is vertical segmentation, usually 
to a very marked degree. Horizontal segmentation is 
also found to exist in every country examined. In 
addition to horizontal segmentation within national 
frontiers there is horizontal segmentation inter-
nationally as the top securities of- almost every country 
are being traded on foreign markets. The analysis has 
shown that vertical segmentation improves the efficiency 
of secondary markets and must be based on the turnover 
characteristics of the securities traded. Horizontal 
segmentation, although it has serious disadvantages - 400 -
in some cases, is necessary at least for ensuring 
procedural efficiency of dealings in foreign securities. 
In addition, the existence of parallel markets and 
different market organizers for vertical segments is 
very desirable from a longer-term point of view. 
Competition between market organizers generally 
means that technical and economic progress is translated 
swiftly into more efficient trading procedures. In 
contrast, there is little incentive to develop advanced 
procedures within a national centralized stock ex-
change officially supported by exclusive trading 
privileges. This aspect is of particular importance 
today, given the prospects opened up by advances in 
communications technology. 
The superior form of organization of a secondary market 
is thus not a central exchange with a uniform method 
of trading for all the securities circulating in a 
given country. Instead, there should be several 
competing market organizers offering different dealing 
techniques for different securities or even for the 
same securities. A market more or less segmented in 
this way does exist in all countries of the Community. 
The answer to the question what degree of segmentation 
is desirable will essentially depend on: 
1. the turnover characteristics of the securities 
traded in a country; 
2. the dealing procedures actually in use in the 
country and the dealing procedures capable of 
being introduced; 
3. the state of communications technology and the 
cost of data transmission; - 401 -
4. the nature and extent of the demand from various 
groups of investors for transaction services; 
5. the number and structure of business and 
financial centres in a country. 
Now we may turn to the question of whether a similar 
form of organization for the secondary markets of 
the individual Member States is desirable in the 
interests of a proper functioning of the Common 
Market. The five factors determining the appropriate 
degree of segmentation of a secondary market, listed 
above, vary from country to country. Therefore 
differing organizational structures may well be 
necessary for the secondary markets of different 
countries as a result of the particular environment 
of the national markets. Thus four fully developed 
vertical segments (cf. pp. 321 - 333) will be advisable 
for a few countries only. In some countries the 
secondary stock market may at times be perfectly 
organized that no scope is left for competing markets. 
Moreover, it is to be expected that the importance 
of individual vertical segments and of special segments 
for small orders or blocks will be different. The 
overall appearance of properly segmented secondary 
stock markets will in principle differ substantially 
from country to country, even if certain individual 
segments, particularly the principal markets for 
active stocks, display a largely uniform basic 
structure. 
One might be tempted, on the one hand, to develop 
certain market structures on the basis of the five 
factors that appear to represent the optimal solution - 402 
attainable at the time the analysis is made and 
to try to introduce these structures by means of 
stock market policy measures. On the other hand 
one could leave it to actual and potential market 
organizers to carry out such analyses and to deduce 
from these the best way to conduct their competitive 
operations. 
In principle, the second alternative is to be pre-
ferred. Contrary to policy makers and regulators 
the market organizers have first-hand knowledge of 
how the four factors listed first have altered with 
the course of time and what trends of development 
are to be expected. Besides, it is the market organizers 
who will have to implement the impending structural 
alterations and they will be better motivated to do 
so by pressure of competition than by plans for 
reform. What has been said in Part 2 and in the last 
sections in particular has shown that competition 
between market organizers, where it is allowed and 
encouraged, can be very effective. 
From this emerges the requirement that stock ex-
change policy should not prescribe the direction and 
the extent of changes in the market structure but 
should lay down the basic rules for competition on 
stock markets, particularly for competition between 
market organizers. These basic rules should firstly 
provide for protection of the market user, primarily 
of the investor, through rules tailored to the 
particular segment and secondly - and this is the 
important point for our present purposes - they 
should give adequate scope for appropriate segmentation. - 403 -
Adequate scope for appropriate vertical segmentation 
implies a number of specific requirements. Firstly, 
it must be possible for security-dealing firms to 
form or to join a stock exchange in order to trade 
active securities by the auction method at collective 
prices. Secondly, market makers must be allowed to 
operate. Thirdly, security-dealing firms wishing to 
offer transaction services in inactive securities 
must not be restricted to any one type of procedure 
and in particular must not be compelled to deal 
exclusively on the floor of a stock exchange. 
Allocation of securities to a vertical segment should 
preferably be left to competition for issuers between 
the market organizers; this requirement implies that 
more than one market organizer must be permitted 
to operate. 
Adequate scope for appropriate horizontal segmentation 
means that every group of security-dealing firms that 
is convinced that it can offer a transaction service 
that appeals to certain investors must be free to 
set up a parallel market or a special segment. Every 
market organizer, e. g. every stock exchange, must 
be able to squeeze out another market organizer by 
quality competition or price competition without being 
restrained, either directly or indirectly through 
member firms, e. g. by territorial protection, 
minimum rates of commission or uniform listing fees. 
It would be presumptuous to assert that a competitive 
framework of this kind was sufficient to ensure the 
highest possible degree of procedural efficiency 
at all times. In most Member States turnover on 
secondary stock markets, and hence earnings from - 404-
commissions, are modest. Consequently, the funds 
available to finance further development are 
strictly limited and in many cases the incentive to 
competition is small, especially when a keen 
competitor expects negative repercussions on his 
other lines of business. Furthermore, the fact that 
in the smaller countries there are few security-
dealing firms and the long tradition of restrictions 
on competition in security dealing stand in the way 
of competition between market organizers. Finally, 
the efficiency of co-operative trading in active 
securities reduces the chances of success of a new 
market organizer in Segments 1 and 2. 
For these reasons a stock exchange policy which 
relies mainly on competition for a continual improve-
ment in procedural efficiency may not be adequate 
in small countries. In larger economic areas, however, 
and especially within the Common Market, such 
reservations become less significant, for the following 
reasons. Firstly, there are in the countries of the 
Community 33 associations which operate one or more 
stock exchanges and a substantial number of other 
market organizers, behind which, however, there are 
groups of security-dealing firms in a few cases only; 
in contrast to the situation in the United States, 
for example, the European stock exchanges tend not 
to be linked by double or multiple memberships. 
Secondly, the shares of major European companies are 
increasingly held and traded in several countries 
of the Community and the number and importance of 
parallel markets within the Community have continuously 
increased. Thirdly, these parallel markets, with the 
help of elaborate dealing procedures, provide 405 -
differentiated financial services and offer them 
for sale at different prices. Since the Community 
is expected to continue to develop more in the 
direction of a uniform economic and monetary area 
than in the reverse direction, the disadvantages 
of these parallel markets will increasingly come to 
outweigh the advantages, but at the same time there 
will be a gradual transition from parallel markets 
to competing markets and the market organizers 
will inevitably find themselves exposed to ever more 
intensive competition. 
The starting situation for a competition-oriented 
stock exchange policy in the Common Market is there-
fore exceptionally favourable. Such a policy would 
certainly not bring about spectacular changes in 
the market structure overnight, but it could well 
be expected in the medium term to lead to an 
appropriate segmentation more reliably than would 
intervention by the authorities. Competition would 
reduce the number of parallel markets and force some 
market organizers to cease business or to specialize. 
It would in any case seem more appropriate to 
encourage and await this development than to take 
immediate action, whether within individual Member 
States or at Community level, to combat the disad-
vantages of parallel markets on the basis of existing 
market structures, e. g. by planning a market system 
as the Americans have done. 
In order that the favourable starting situation for 
competition between market organizers can produce 
its desired effects, the barriers restricting the 
scope for appropriate segmentation in individual - 406 -
Member States must be removed (cf. p. 403). More-
over, an investor or his broker, in trying to find 
the best price available must be free to accept -
in addition to those on domestic sub-markets - the 
bids or offers on other parallel markets within the 
Community without any special difficulties. It 
should not matter whether the bids or offers are on 
the book of an exchange formed either by banks or by 
brokers. All that is needed is for a few basic 
conditions of dealing to be harmonized; in particular, 
more strenuous efforts should be made than has so 
far been the case to standardize delivery conditions 
so that it will not make any difference to an investor 
where in the Community he has to deliver or take 
delivery of securities. 
A third prerequisite for competition could be 
achieved if further efforts to abolish stock exchange 
contract and transfer taxes and similar taxes were 
successful (see p. 37). As long as such taxes are 
levied at different rates and on different bases, 
a market may lose ground even though it offers the 
best conditions for the efficient provision of trans-
action services. On account of the low level of 
transaction costs in relation to the value of a 
transaction, even small differences in rates of tax 
on the value of securities bought or sold can mean 
that a market has absolutely no chance of competing 
successfully with markets in another country where 
there is a lower rate of tax or no such trifling 
tax at all. Value-added taxes on commissions, charged 
in some countries in addition to taxes on the value 
of transactions, have less impact and may be influenced 
by rationalization measures, but they too hamper 
competition. 407 -
As was said at the beginning, no more can be expected 
from all efforts to improve the procedural efficiency 
of secondary stock markets beyond the high standard 
already reached than a trivial reduction of the 
cost of capital and a modest inccrease in the yield 
from securities. If substantial importance is attached 
even to such efforts on account of their long-term 
effects and on account of their repercussions on the 
relative attractiveness of direct and indirect 
financing, it must not be overlooked that direct 
financing can be assisted more easily and effectively 
in the Member States of the Communities in other 
ways, whether by removing the trifling taxes just 
mentioned or by further efforts to reform corporate 
income taxes, in particular, in such a way that 
equities are no longer discriminated against as 
instruments of financing. - 408 -
Annex 1 
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN COST OF CAPITAL, EFFECTIVE 
YIELD AND REQUIRED RATE OF INTEREST, TAKING INTO 
ACCOUNT MARKET-ORGANIZATION-DETERMINED COSTS 
The reasoning on pages 9 to 16 was based on certain 
relations between the market-organization-determined 
costs and other variables, which are developed in 
greater detail in this annex. We used as our 
starting-point the interests of investors and issuers: 
investors, we said, desire to obtain the highest 
possible effective yield, while the issuer wishes to 
keep the cost of his capital as low as possible. 
We maintained that the lower the market-organization-
determined costs the better the interests of both 
groups would be served. 
The proof is adduced in two stages. After the relevant 
variables and concepts have been introduced, we first 
examine the relation between the capital cost rate and 
the effective yield on the entire issue for all 
investors who hold parts of the issue. The second stage 
widens this relationship to include the minimum interest 
rates required by investors. 
We assume that the entire bond issue matures at the 
same time. Tax aspects are disregarded. The values of 
risky variables may be interpreted as expected values. 
But for the sake of simplicity the reader may also 
assume that there is certainty. 409 
Explanation of symbols used: 
P Price which an investor is prepared to pay 
maximally in competitive bidding at the time 
of issue of the bond (bid price) 
P, Price which the investors actually pay 
P Price after t periods 
P Price after m periods (special case of P. ) 
P„ Issue price of the bond 
n Number of periods after which the bond matures 
(original time to maturity) 
m Number of periods after which some investors 
sell the bond 
Z Interest payment for one period on a bond having 
a face value corresponding to the price basis 
of the bond (e. g. DM 100 face amount) 
k Investors' required interest rates per period 
(minimum yield requirement) 
k' Effective yield on total bond issue over its 
term n (average effective interest rate of all 
investors holding parts of the issue) 
k" Effective yield for investment period m 
k Effective yield for investment period n (group 1) 
k Issuer's cost of capital rate for the funds 
raised by means of the bond issue 
T Redemption price 410-
x Aggregation index showing that a total is 
involved, e. g.: 
Px is the gross proceeds of the issue 
Z stands for the total interest payments on 
the issue per period 
K„ Flotation costs  E 
KI Investor's information costs per period pro-
portionate to face amount commensurate with 
price basis 
KT Investor's proportionate transaction costs on 
purchase or sale 
Kv Investor's proportionate custody costs 
per period 
K Cost to the issuer of servicing the issue 
per period 
K The issuer's redemption costs (special case of K ) 
K. Market-organization-determined costs 
NVE Net sales proceeds for a bond in the nominal 
amount of the price basis (P -Km)  ^ m T' 
a Share of total issue bought by a group 
of investors 
i Index for a group of investors 
t Time index 
k Required interest rate k of the person with the 
gr lowest bid price resulting in a transaction 
(or of the marginal investor in the bond issue) - 411 -
For the marginal in-
vestor we can say that: P = P_  Y °gr
 E 
The marginal investor still buys at this issue 
price but will not buy at a higher price. 
The issue price could be determined in three ways: 
1. The issuer invites bids from interested parties 
who indicate their P and then offers the issue 
o 
at the price at which the entire issue can 
just be placed (Dutch tender method). Allotment 
is made to all investors whose P is higher than 
o
 3 
or the same as the issue price; the bids of 
marginal investors are sometimes accepted in part 
only. 
2. The issuer or his investment banker estimates the 
price which would emerge under 1. The bond is 
then publicly offered for sale at that price 
(normal method). 
3. The issuer proceeds as under 1. above but instead 
of selling the entire issue at a uniform price 
he accepts the tenders in sequence, beginning with 
the highest bids, at the P stated by the bidders 
until the issue is fully sold (American tender 
method or bid-price system). - 412-
Diagram 4: Dutch tender method 
= P_ 
Jgr 
Amount issued 
The ensuing analysis is based on the Dutch tender 
method. For the sake of simplicity K and K at the 
time of the issue are not expressly stated, they are 
implicitly included in K„ and P . Below the P of  r
 2 E o o 
the three groups of investors introduced on pp. 10 f. 
are determined (PQ1/ P 2
 an
d
 p 3)-- 413-
Investor group 1 
(Investors who are certain that they will hold 
the bond until maturity) 
n Z n K T 
p = £ E Y. —— + 
o
1 t = 1 (1+k)
f
c t = 1 d+k)* (1+k)
n
 
If Z. and K„. (and later also KT and Kr7) are assumed 
t Vt X w 
to be constant over time, then we have 
P , s (Z - K„)
(1+k)n-
1 + 
°
1
 
V (1+k)
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or 
P 
(Z - Ky)((1+k)
n-1) + T-k 
°
1 " (l+k)
n-k 
Investor group 2 
(Investors who may be forced to sell their bonds 
before maturity. The time of sale is dictated by 
extraneous circumstances) 
(Z - IO ((1+k)
m-1)+ NVE-k 
p = 1 
(1+k) ■ k 414-
Investor group 3 
(Investors who may wish to sell their bonds before 
maturity. In this case the time of sale is not 
dicated by extraneous circumstances. These investors 
will wait until favourable conditions for sale arise 
and therefore require continuous information.) 
(Z - K^- K ) ( (1+k)
m-1) + NVE-k 
p = ¥ ± 
(1+k) -k 
While the above equations for P determine the investor's 
o 
bid price, the following equations for Pa1 serve to 
calculate the effective yields k or k" and finally k'. 
As our assumptions result in Pa always equalling P , 
there is seemingly no reason to differentiate between 
P„ and P-. The reason that we do differentiate is simply 
that this method of presentation makes it possible to 
achieve a clear separation between the sphere of the 
issuer and the sphere of the investors. The formulae 
for P . apply mutatis mutandis to P„ . , instead of the 
oi
 c
r
 x Ai 
required interest rates k we here have an effective 
yield, in the case of investor group 1 it is k , the 
net yield to maturity at the time of issue: 
(Z - K )((1+k )
n-1) + T-k" 
P, 
pA1 (1+k )
n-k~ 
or we have the net effective yields k" for investment 
periods m in the case of P and PA3, e. g. - 415 -
(Z - IC - K ) ((1+k")
m-1) + NVE-k" 
p = - = 
A3 (1+k")
m.k" 
Since the exact time of sale is irrelevant for the 
purposes of this analysis, we shall assume for the 
sake of simplicity that there is only one investment 
period m. Strictly speaking, there could be at least 
as many different periods m as there are investors 
in groups 2 and 3. 
For the issuers the following equation applies; with 
its help we can calculate the cost of capital rate 
V 
(1+k_)
n-1 T
X + K* 
P* - K* = (Z
X + K*) = + "* 
E
 E
 W d+kE)
n.kE (1+kE)
n 
px Rx _
 (Z" - K^)((1+kE)
n-1) + (T
X + K^)-kE 
E
 E ' (
1+kE)
n'
kE - 416 -
1. Relation between effective yield k' 
and the cost of capital rate 
This section sets forth in detail what has been 
outlined on pages 12 to 15. 
Assumptions: 
W 
a) E K? = 0; j = E,I,T,V,W and K? > 0 for all j 
j=E
 3
 D 
b) PE = Pt = T 
c) The whole issue is sold at a single P 
In addition, the general assumptions and definitions 
set out on pages 409 to 415 apply. 
For investor group 1 we now can say that 
p _ Z ((1+k")
n-1) + T-k" 
(1+k ) -k 
and for groups 2 and 3 
Z ((1+k")
m-1) + P -k" 
p - m 
A2,3 (1+k")
m-k" 
Since investor groups 2 and 3 do not hold the bonds 
until maturity, whereas k' is defined for the total 
term n of the issue, the new investors who take 
the place of the original investors must also be 
taken into account. Thus we have to define the 
effective yield k of investor groups 2 and 3 and - 417 -
of the new investors who take their place, for 
the investment period n: 
Z1 Z. P P Z_. 
1 + 1—* + ™ S + 3 + 
A2'
3 (1+k
+) (1+k
+)
2 (1+k
+)
m (1+k
+)
m (1+k
+)
3 
Z T 
+ -
 n 
d+k
+)
n d+kV 
It is assumed here that m lies between 2 and 3. Every 
other assumption obviously produces the same result. 
In addition, we may say that 
x a.|.Z*((1+k~)
n-1) + a.,-T*.k 
ai?A
2
 = (1+k-)
n-k-
and 
x a2-Z^((1+k
+)
n-1) + a2-T^.k
+ 
2 A2 ~ /i .i
 +\ n , + 
(1+k ) • k 
Because of assumption a), 
a3
PA3
 =
 a2
PA2 
For P„ we have 
Z
X((1+k„)
n-1) + T
X.k„ 
p
x = a.
 h 
d+V
n-
kE 418-
Finally, 
a1
PA1
 +
 a2
PA2
 +
 a3
PA3 =
 PE 
therefore 
Z
x((1+k
,)
n-1) + T
x-k' Z
x((1+kE)
n-1) + T
x-kE 
d+k')
n-k' (1+kE)
n-kE 
and thus k' = k„ 
Because of assumption a), this result was to be expected. 
The main purpose of deducing it is to show how k' arises. 
k
' is the average yield of all investors who hold 
parts of the issue, whether for n, m or n-m periods. 
Here we proceeded on the basis of three groups of 
investors and therefore we discounted three cash flows. 
Without assumption a), differences in market-organization-
determined costs would mean that as many series of 
payments would have to be determined and finally 
aggregated as the issue comprises bonds (the extreme 
case). The rate of interest at which this aggregated cash 
flow must be discounted in order to obtain the gross 
proceeds of the issue is k'. In discounting the non-
aggregated or partially aggregated cash flows to P ., 
+ - effective yields of the class k or k are arrived 
at. k' comprises all such effective yields. (It may 
be noted that on account of assumption a) k'= k = k 
here and on account of assumption b) k'= k".) - 419-
Let us now drop assumption b). If P„ * P. * T, we 
£1 t 
nevertheless still find that 
k' = k  E ' 
although it now generally holds that k" * k'. The 
equation for PA„ , makes it clear that it makes no differ-
ence to k and hence to k' how high P is and how 
r m 
often a bond changes hands provided assumption a) applies. 
If assumption a) is dropped, then 
W 
E K
X > 0; j = E,I,T,V,W and K
x > 0 for all j 
j=E
 :
 : 
In that case k
1 < k„ 
In interpreting let us assume that only investors of 
group 3 are involved. In that case a, = 1, and: 
P
x = P
x 
A3 E 
x T,x T,x. ....,,.. n * s , -x. , T,x  (Z -K^-Kj) ( (1+k') -D+TTc'  K: 
d+k'j'V (1+k')
m 
(Z
X+K
X) ((1+kE)
n-1) + (T
X+K^)kE | ^ 
(1+kE)
nkE 
If the gross proceeds of the issue P„, the interest, 
the redemption payment and the market-organization-
determined costs are known, then k' and k„ can be - 420-
calculated. As will be demontrated below, k' depends 
on the required rate of interest k. Higher values 
always occur for k„ than for k'. The higher the 
market-organization-determined costs, the more k„ 
will exceed k'. Therefore, with given minimum yield 
requirements of investors, an increase in procedural 
efficiency will be in the interests of the issuers. 
It also becomes clear from the last equation that 
procedural efficiency should strictly speaking be 
measured by the sum of the discounted market-organi-
zation-determined costs and not simply by the sum 
of those costs undiscounted. 
Now let assumption c) be dropped as well. If the 
entire issue is not placed at a single P„ but at 
PE 
several (e. g. American tender method), what has been 
said is not in principle altered, since every portion 
of the issue sold at a certain PE can be regarded as 
a separate issue. The same applies to issues of 
serial bonds. 
Relations between the cost of capital rate 
and the required interest rates 
After the relations between kE and k' have been 
kE 
analysed, the question arises as to the relationship 
between k„ and k. It may appear that under the Dutch 
tender method k' = k .If investors of group 1 only 
were involved this would be correct. But for investors 
of the other groups k" = k . Therefore k' and k cannot 
gr 
in principle be compared as we do not compare 
interest rates for securities with different terms. 
The same basic problem arises if we relate kE and k. 421 -
However, the problem can be circumvented if 
assumptions a), b) and c) are once again made. 
Assumption b) (P = P = T) implies that k" = k'. 
Hence k„ and k are comparable. 
Assumption c) in specific terms shall mean the 
following: the whole issue is placed at a single Pp 
at which all bids above PE are met and also all 
demand of marginal investors (at P_). 
In the above section we found that under these 
assumptions k' = k_ Since now k' = k it follows that 
gr 
k_. = k  E gr 
If assumption a) is dropped, then 
k_. > k  E gr 
since k' = k and since k' < k„ as shown above for  gr E 
this case. The importance of procedural efficiency 
for kE and P emerges clearly. 
If assumption c) is dropped, but not assumption a), 
we find under the American tender procedure that 
kE = k 
In this case every investor would be supplied at 
the P he has quoted. Hence k takes the place of k 
o ^ gr 
If both assumption a) and assumption c) are dropped, 
then we find, partly for the same reasons, partly by - 422 -
analogy to the case qhen we merely dropped 
assumption a): 
kE > k 
If both assumption a) and assumption b) are dropped, 
required interest rates can no longer be logically 
compared with k_. Instead, we may show the effect 
of k on P_. From assumption c) it follows that 
P^ = P  E ogr 
The marginal investor may be an investor of any group. 
As the formula for P _ is comprehensive, it will be 
used here. 
p (z - KV- KI)((i+kqr)
m-i) + (pm-y-kqr 
°9
r (1+k )
m-k 
gr gr 
This equation shows that, for a given k , the lower 
the K , K and K are, the higher the issue price 
will be. If one bears in mind that the lower the K^ 
and K are, the higher the interest payments Z may 
be, it becomes clear that the influence of both costs 
on P„ operates in the same direction as the influence 
of K„ and K and also of K_. In other words, with a 
given amount of funds available to cover charges 
related to a financing instrument, the higher the proce-
dural efficiency the higher the required interest rates 
which an issuer is able to meet. 
To sum up we can say that strictly speaking procedural 
efficiency whould be measured by first aggregating 
the market-organization-determined costs K„, KT, Km 
hi X I , - 423-
IC. and K at the times at which they are incurred 
using a typical pattern of transactions, then 
discounting the aggregated flows and finally adding 
up the discounted amounts. Since the resultant amount 
is representative only for a certain amount issued, 
e. g. for the bond issue considered here (or for the 
securities outstanding on a given secondary stock 
market), it is advisable to relate it to net sales 
proceeds (Pp - K„) in the amount of one unit of value, 
e. g. of one Deutsche Mark (or to measure these costs 
per Mark of securities outstanding). The higher the 
procedural efficiency, the closer will the effective 
yield of all investors investing in a certain 
financing instrument be to the cost of capital of 
that instrument k„ and the lower will be the cost 
of capital given certain required interest rates. 
An increase in procedural efficiency would usually 
bring with it adjustments which would benefit the 
issuers and most likely the investors as well, in 
short k„ would fall and k' would rise. 424-
Annex 2 
THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF ESTABLISHING MARKET PRICES; 
THE MARKET-MAKER PRINCIPLE AND THE AUCTION PRINCIPLE 
1. Plain orices 
■*-
The prices of securities may be negotiated between 
buyer and seller in the same way as any other market 
price. However, if only two parties are involved 
there is a considerable danger; owing to insufficient 
information on the securities traded or on the 
state of the market, owing to the skill of one party, 
or for other reasons, a price may be agreed at which 
other dealers would have definitively been either 
buyers or sellers only. Such a price thus often fails 
to clear the market and it is in that case not an 
equilibrium price. 
2. Qualified prices 
In order to ensure that buyers and sellers deal at 
prices that can be regarded as equilibrium prices 
at the time of the bargain (qualified prices), stock 
exchanges and other market organizers prefer trading 
procedures that go beyond the methods of price 
negotiation commonly found in other lines of business. 
With the help of these procedures dealers either feel 
their way towards the price clearing the market or 
they calculate it. The procedures are based sometimes 
on the market-maker principle, sometimes on the 
auction principle. In the next section we briefly - 425-
discuss the fundamental ideas behind the two 
principles in order to make it easier to understand 
the procedures used on the various stock ex-
changes as described in Part 2. 
a) Individual prices based on the market-maker 
principle or the auction principle 
As outlined on page 255, the basis of the market-
maker principle is the judgment of the market maker 
as to the correct price of a stock or bond. Unlike 
the judgment of an ordinary buyer or seller, the 
market maker's judgment is of special quality. No-one 
can demonstrate more convincingly that he considers 
a price to be correct, i. e. capable of clearing the 
market, than by being ready to buy or sell the 
security in question at that price - in the ideal 
case in any quantity desired. This is precisely how 
a market maker is supposed to behave and in so doing 
he subjects himself to the operation of a regulating 
mechanism. 
If his judgment is correct he will buy and sell 
securities and his position over the course of time 
will vary around zero. In other words the market 
clears itself at this price. If his judgment is in-
correct, the market maker's position will tend to 
build up in one direction; the market will not be 
cleared at this price and the market maker will have 
to adjust his quote. If his price is too low, for 
example, he will continually have to sell more than 
he buys; his short or bear position builds up. He 
will therefore raise his offer and usually also - 426 -
his bid. This regulating mechanism governing 
market making means that a market maker's prices 
are very reliable when dealings are brisk but that 
the less often a security is dealt in the more 
the prices will lose their special quality. 
The only persons involved when a bargain in done 
with a market maker are, as in agreeing a plain 
price, the buyer or seller and the market maker. 
The price arrived at in this way is called an 
individual price. Unlike the collective price, the 
individual price applies only to a single deal binding 
only two parties. If dealing takes place through 
a market maker, only these two parties are involved 
in the negotiation (individual negotiation). There-
fore this procedure is well suited for dealings that 
are not spatially concentrated (e. g. telephone 
dealings). 
The situation is different with individual prices 
based on the auction principle. Although in this 
case, too, only two parties are involved in the 
bargain itself, there should be many interested 
parties taking part in the actual negotiation 
(collective negotiation). Here the special quality 
of the individual price does not come about as a 
result of the market maker and the regulating 
mechanism to which he is subject but instead is 
produced by competition between the parties inter-
ested. An auctioneer initiates the negotiation by 
inviting bids or offers. Of all the dealers who 
react to this the one making the most favourable 
bid or offer secures the bargain. 427-
There are many procedures and variant procedures 
for establishing prices based on the auction 
principle. Unlike the procedure in an ordinary 
auction, the bidding in stock exchange dealing is 
not initiated by an auctioneer but by a bidding 
dealer himself. The initiating dealer adjusts offers 
successively downwards or bids successively upwards 
if no counterparty immediately emerges. In contrast, 
in an ordinary auction outside the stock exchange 
the adjusting of the bids is usually left either to 
the reacting interested parties, to the auctioneer 
or to a price indicator (auction dial) and it is 
confined to only one side of the market. The 
modifications used by stock exchanges allow as many 
auctions to take place simultaneously on the floor 
of the exchange as desired. They also make it 
possible for two initiators to move towards each 
other ("double auction"). Such a double auction for 
the determination of individual prices, albeit 
guided by an auctioneer, is found in its purest form 
and in a particularly distinct version on the 
Hovedb^rs in Denmark (see pp. 80 f). 
More often than not the auction character of exchange 
trading is discernible only wiht difficulty. But 
of course what is important is not the appearance 
but the substance, the principle. To save time, 
lengthy bidding battles are dispensed with. Since the 
state of the market is generally fairly well known, 
a dealer can and will cry out his offer, for instance, 
just above the market price and will often be success-
ful with his first or second call; he may be compared 
with an auction dial in the deletion procedure, 
with the hand starting at a price only a little - 428 -
higher than the market price. The presence of a 
fairly large number of experienced dealers ready 
to trade produces a bargain at a fair market price 
promptly. Although often only two dealers actually 
speak up and the remainder appear to be taking no 
part in the trading, it is nevertheless a case of 
collective negotiation: the readiness of all present 
to competitively intervene at any time helps to 
produce an individual price clearing the market. 
With intense competition even that individual price 
has all the characteristics of a qualified price 
which a dealer would openly negotiate for two clients 
all by himself (for an example see pp. 226 £., 
crossing). 
b) Collective prices 
A collective price is a price at which all (more 
than two, at least) those parties simultaneously 
consummate transactions who have orders on the market 
executable at that price. Thus, in contrast to the 
individual price, it applies not just to a single deal 
but to a fairly large number of simultaneous deals. 
Collective prices are particularly well suited for 
heavy exchange trading where there is a large-scale 
inflow of orders. They are generally the outcome 
of collective negotiation and in every case they are 
based on the auction principle. This is obvious in 
the case of the Gekitaku procedure in Japan (pp. 184 f.), 
in which there are usually several successive 
auctions, each building upon its predecessor, which 
lead to the determination of a price. There is first 
a double auction between initiating dealers which 
ends with a first provisional price. Then the excess - 429 
of demand or supply is ascertained. This excess is 
auctioned in the immemdiately following second * 
auction in which an exchange employee calls out -
albeit once only a higher or lower price at 
which the interested parties may come in. If an 
excess still remains at this price, it too is 
auctioned. If the market is cleared, the collective 
price has been established. A one-sided auctioning 
of surpluses also occurs on the Belgian stock ex-
changes, e. g. on the forward market of the Brussels 
Bourse (p. 122). 
In other variants of trading at collective prices, 
total demand and total supply are balanced by means 
of a single double auction. The best example of 
this is found in the "criee" procedure on the Paris 
forward market (p. 152). In this case it is somewhat 
difficult to recognize that we still look at an 
auction since usually both supply and demand change 
as the coteur adjusts the price towards the 
equilibrium price. Thus, for the sake of clarity, 
we assume for a moment that we happen to come across 
the extreme case of a one-sided auction. Here the 
auction character is apparent. In this case supply 
may be based only on market orders; therefore it 
does not diminish if the (provisional) price is 
called successively lower, exactly as in the case 
of the auction of an individual offer. If demand 
initially exceeds supply, buyers withdraw as the 
provisional price is raised until eventually the 
supply is just sufficient. If demand initially falls 
short of supply, additional buyers come in as the 
price is lowered until the supply is met. Thus the 
collective price has been established. It is the - 430 -
highest price at which the supply can be sold. 
The highest bids have succeeded in the competition 
among buyers. The reverse case can be envisaged 
for a given demand based on market orders to buy 
only. Then we have competition among sellers. What 
applies for the auction of one side of the market 
also holds for the simultaneous auctioning of both 
sides, of supply and demand, for the double auction. 
Calculation of the overall or composite price from 
the bids and offers on the book is simply the simulation 
of a double auction of the entire demand and the 
entire supply "a la criee" on paper or in the 
computer. By matching the aggregate supply and the 
aggregate demand at each price one arrives in 
principle at the same result. Of course, there is no 
longer any feeling of the way towards the equilibrium 
price; in the normal case the equilibrium price is 
the straightforward result of a calculation. In the 
pure or almost pure form these variants of the double 
auction are found in the "par easier" procedure 
(p. 154), the "par opposition" procedure (p. 153), 
in official non-continuous trading in Germany (p. 107) 
and in stock exchange trading in the Netherlands 
(p. 92). 
These procedures are extremely efficient; they 
require a minimum of dealers' time per transaction. 
Their reliability, however, heavily depends on the 
number of limited orders in hand. A further possible 
disadvantage compared with other forms of double 
auction may be thought to be the fact that they do 
not take account of the latest information about 
the general state of the market. This can be remedied, - 431 -
if course, as is done in Germany and the Nether-
ands, by allowing dealers to supplement supply 
>r demand at the very last moment or, as in 
lelgium, by subjecting any excess supply or excess 
lemand to an additional auction. 
lot only different trading procedures based on the 
luction principle but also dealing methods founded 
>n the market-maker principle or on both principles 
lay be used side by side on a single stock exchange, 
is the example of American stock exchanges demonstrates, 
:f there are neither market makers nor competition 
>etween buyers or sellers, then even on the floor of 
i stock exchange the determination of prices has to 
:all back on elementary negotiation, which often 
[leans the straightforward acceptance of an offer 
or bid. If a price agreed in this way is based on 
i collective price that has just been established or 
>n other kinds of prices of special quality, one may 
itill regard it as a qualified price. Other stock 
exchange prices, which are agreed without the help 
)f such guide posts, are in principle no better in 
juality than any non-exchange price. They are plain 
srices. In transactions in inactive securities it is 
often difficult to avoid using them. 432 
Annex 3 
THE COST OF IMMEDIACY, OR MARKET DEPTH 
AND MARKET NARROWNESS 
We have outlined the substance and the economic 
significance of the special transaction service 
"securing an instant bargain" in Part 1, on pages 
2 3 f. and 39 f. The effects of various types and 
degrees of segmentation on the cost of immediacy are 
central to many sections of this study, particularly 
in Part 3 (but see also pp. 58 - 62, 123, 257 - 262, 
272 - 274, 297 f., 301). The purpose of this annex 
is to clarify a few concepts and statements closely 
related to the cost of immediacy. 
This cost of securing an instant bargain will be 
incurred by anybody wishing to sell or buy securities 
immediately. Roughly speaking, it is the difference 
between the agreed price and the equilibrium price, 
a difference sufficient to immediately attract 
other dealers or investors on the other side. If an 
instant purchase is desired, the difference is 
positive, i. e. it increases the purchase price; if 
an instant sale is desired, it is negative, i. e. 
it reduces the selling price. In addition, the 
difference usually depends on the number of units 
to be bought or sold; the larger the desired trans-
action, the greater it is likely to be. 
These relations are reflected in Diagram 5 in the 
curved solid lines for q > 1 . The diagram is based 
on prices that a seller or buyer could obtain Diagram 5 : The cost of immediacy 
CO - 434-
Key to Diagram 5 : 
p price 
q quantity to be traded in round lots 
A market maker's offer 
N market maker's bid 
p opening price or equilibrium price in market maker's opinion  £ 
q smallest quantity that can be traded, e. g. one share 
a immediacy discount off equilibrium price if one round lot 
is sold by an investor 
b immediacy premium on equilibrium price if one round lot 
is bought by an investor 
c quantity discount off p on large instant sale by an investor 
£ 
d quantity premium on p on large instant purchase by an investor 
£ 
e small-quantity discount off p on instant sale by an investor 
E 
f small-quantity premium on p on instant purchase by an investor 
£ 
k costs of bargain per unit transacted 
Examples: When there is a sale of q = 10 the cost of immediacy 
will comprise the immediacy discount a and the 
quantity discount C^Q
 =
 w
x (for lack of space sub-
stantially larger bargains than q = 10 cannot be shown); 
where there is a purchase of q = 0.5 the cost of 
immediacy comprise the immediacy premium b and the 
small-quantity premium fo.5
 =
 Yz-
if he came to a market requesting to transact imme-
diately, that is to say we work from the prevailing 
bids and offers. It is possible that the broker of 
an investor who was in a hurry would have to feel his 
way towards these prices, e. g. by repeated calls. 
But on some markets the broker could simply ask a 
market maker, i. e. a dealer specializing in immediacy 
services, for these prices. The curves for bid and 
offer prices in Diagram 5 may therefore be understood 
as the prices which a market maker would quote for - 435 -
Since the cost of holding a plus position is not 
identical with the cost of holding a minus position 
and since the additional costs related to a 
prospective transaction are dependent on the market 
maker's position at the time, curves A and N will 
only exceptionally take the same shape. Apart from 
the factors mentioned - quantity to be traded, 
cost of processing a transaction, the market maker's 
cost of capital and his price expectations (see 
pp. 59 f.) - the following factors also have an 
influence on the cost of immediacy: 
the turnover characteristics and the extent to 
which the security to be traded is known on the 
market, which are closely related to the number 
of shareholders or bondholders; 
the competition the market maker is exposed to; 
the effect of the desired transaction on the 
risk of the market maker's portfolio; 
the market maker's ability to meet liabilities, 
particularly his net worth; and his 
ready sources of additional funds; 
regulatory measures and rules affecting 
market making; 
the probability that other traders may fail to 
perform their contracts. 
As explained on pages 5 8 - 60, the cost of immediacy 
must not be equated with the market maker's spread 
earnings. Whereas the cost of immediacy will usually - 436-
various quantities of a certain security to be 
bought or sold. Normally he would quote only 
the bid and offer price for a round lot (his 
"quote", "quotation", or "spread"). A market maker 
is a dealer who is ready at all times during 
business hours to either buy or sell, as requested, 
certain securities immediately for the account of 
his firm on the basis of the bid and offer he has 
quoted. 
Whereas for q > 1 quantity premiums or discounts 
will arise, for q < 1 there will be small-quantity 
premiums and discounts (e. g. odd-lot differentials 
charged on buy-on-offer or sell-on-bid orders). 
In order to explain how odd-lot differentials come 
about, two curves marked k have been drawn in 
Diagram 5. They represent the market maker's cost 
of bargain, e. g. the cost of processing and clearing 
a transaction prorated per unit transacted. The 
larger the transaction, the less significant such 
costs become. On the other hand, other costs become 
more and more significant with the increasing size 
of the transaction and compel the market maker to 
widen his spread. The latter costs are dependent on 
the size of the market maker's long or short positions 
in securities. The larger the desired transaction, 
the larger will such positions tend to become; for 
the larger the deal, the more time will the market 
maker usually need to liquidate his position. 
Such costs consist primarily of the market maker's 
normal cost of capital and of a forward-cover premium 
which he considers necessary in a particular situation 
to protect himself against a fall or rise in prices. - 437-
be positive, the corresponding spread earnings 
may well turn out to be negative (liquidation of 
position at a loss), particularly since the 
equilibrium price is never known with certainty. 
The question of the cost of immediacy is hardly 
raised in connexion with transactions of normal 
size. With smaller transactions, such costs 
usually are low and go often unnoticed; only in the 
case of large transactions does it become clear 
that substantial variations from the equilibrium 
price occur. Professionals therefore speak of 
market depth or marketability and mean by this that 
even fairly large quantities can be sold or bought 
immediately or at least quickly without substantial 
price concessions, in other words that only low 
cost of immediacy are incurred. Accordingly, market 
depth in a security is characterized by horizontal 
or gently declining N-curves and by, at the most, 
gently rising A-curves, whereas market narrowness is 
represented by a steeply falling N-curve and a 
steeply rising A-curve. Market depth or market 
narrowness thus may be expressed in concrete terms 
by low or high cost of immediacy, respectively, either 
measured in absolute terms in monetary units per 
price basis (e. g. in DM per share) as in Diagram 5 
or - similarly - as a spread, or as a percentage of 
the value of the transaction. 
After this exposition of fundamentals, we shall 
discuss briefly how investors, either alone or in 
competition with market makers, offer immediacy 
services. It is assumed that at the beginning of a 
stock exchange session there is a fairly large - 438-
number of limited orders in hand, as shown in 
Diagram 6. 
Orders represented by the broken lines can be executed 
at the opening price. The orders to buy with limits 
lower than the opening price and the sell orders 
with higher limits remain unexecuted. If there were 
no market makers, these orders would determine the 
prices at which an instant bargain could be done. 
On some exchanges this is obvious, for instance at 
Brussels where these orders are written up on a board 
for each security and are if necessary supplemented 
by new orders that have come in (see p. 123). 
Therefore, on markets on which there are central order 
books a market maker must compete with the supply 
from investors A. and the demand from investors N.  l I 
which reflect these orders (see Diagram 6), for 
instance by being prepared to quote in the way im-
plied by curves N and A . (For the sake of clarity 
c
 J m m
 J 
in Diagram 6, N and A are shown as curves, although 
strictly speaking they should be drawn like N. and A..) 
The same applies when there are no order books, 
provided the investors' representatives are allowed 
to deal with each other directly and may thus 
"circumvent" the market maker, or to be more accurate, 
may overbid or underoffer him. If, on the other 
hand, a stock exchange makes it mandatory to deal 
with a market maker, one can conceive of circumstances 
such as those represented by N and A . Competition 
between market makers tends to prevent unreasonable 
spreads. But competition will be even keener if 
every dealer is also allowed to establish and accept 
bids and offers which result from investors' orders. 
Finally, it may be noted that transactions may be - 439-
Diagram 6 
Investors and market makers offering 
immediacy services 
p opening price;  q volume of sales at the opening  E 
effected without incurring the cost of immediacy 
if parts of A. and N. are temporarily identical. 
With the help of Diagram 6 it can easily be explained 
why market makers tend to have low participation 
rates in very active securities, higher participation 
rates in fairly active securities, and why they 
participate very little in the turnover again of 
inactive securities. In the first instance they are 
squeezed out be the competition of investors, in - 440-
the third instance market-making positions are 
too risky; only in the second instance are they 
able to operate with good prospects of success, 
perhaps even covered by the orders on the book. 
Their knowledge of orders makes it easier for them 
to estimate their price risk. Therefore it would 
seem that competing market makers ought all 
to be able to consult the order book in the same 
way or else should not do so at all, for otherwise 
they will not be competing on an equal footing. - 441 -
Annex 4 
PROGRAMME OF THE STUDY 
When this study on "Secondary securities markets: 
advantages and disadvantages of an integrated market 
compared with a fragmented market" was commissioned 
the assignment was clarified as follows: 
1. The study must first describe and analyse the 
organization and functioning of securities 
markets in the nine Member States of the Community, 
in the United States and in Japan. The study 
shall establish whether an integrated secondary 
stock market exists in the country in question 
or whether the stock market in that country is 
fragmented, i. e. in addition to the official 
stock exchange or exchanges there is at least one 
other regulated or unregulated securities market, 
e. g. unofficial exchange trading ("geregelter 
Freiverkehr"), over-the-counter market, Ariel. 
In addition, the study must state what were the 
decisive reasons why the various markets came 
into being, what relations exist between these 
markets and what conclusions are to be drawn from 
the co-existence of such markets. 
2. Then the advantages and disadvantages of an 
integrated stock exchange system compared with 
a system of fragmented markets must be discussed 
on an empirical basis and beyond it on the basis 
of theoretical considerations. Moreover, the 
advantages and disadvantages to the investor - 442-
of a market system must be pointed out which 
records the transactions with the aid of 
electronic data processing methods, in contrast 
to a conventional market with traditional 
procedures. 
Finally, under the aspect of the further 
development of securities markets at the national 
and international level, the study must answer 
the question whether a similar form of organization 
is advisable for the markets of the individual 
Member States in the interest of the proper 
functioning of the Common Market and if so 
whether an integrated or a fragmented market 
provides the superior solution. - 443-
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